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BRYN MAWR COLLEGE MONOGRAPHS

Monograph Series, Vol. XVII

HUME'S PLACE IN ETHICS

BY

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Published by BRYN MAWR COLLEGE
Bryn Mawr, Pennsylvania

1915

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23/4/17

HUME'S PLACE IN ETHICS

A Dissertation

PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY OF BRYN MAWR COLLEGE IN PARTIAL
FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE
OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

BY

EDNA ASTON SHEARER


BRYN MAWR, PENNSYLVANIA
JANUARY, 1915

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The Lord Baltimore Press
BALTIMORE, MD., U. S. A.

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INTRODUCTION.

In attempts to treat of ethics historically, or to classify its various systems and schools of thought, advantage has frequently been taken of a convention by which the ethical writings of David Hume stand as the classical statement of English utilitarianism.¹ It is an arrangement which gratifies many of the demands of the systematizing spirit. It names one of the greatest of English philosophers as the leader of a school the adherents to which in English thought have been so numerous and of such great renown as fitly to claim the distinction of his name. It satisfies, moreover, the expectation that the various aspects of a man's thoughts shall be found to be in clear relation one to another. As a man of cool and calculating temperament, in his metaphysics a sceptic, Hume might be expected to feel himself akin in his ethics to those more practical moralists who interpret the moral life in the light of its achievements, who explain its judgments as calculations of sums of happiness, rather than to those who would stress its peculiar and not wholly explicable character, who hold that it

¹ "It would hardly be too much to claim that the *Inquiry concerning the Principles of Morals*, with all its defects and shortcomings, is the classic statement of English Utilitarianism." (Albee, *A History of English Utilitarianism*, p. 112.)

"Hume was the first to hold the Utilitarian doctrine in its unmistakable form, and at the same time to admit, and defend, the altruistic tendencies of human nature. . . . Hume was as sure as Gay had been that we must not explain the phenomena of our moral life by referring them, or any part of them, to a special faculty like the 'moral sense.'" (*Ibid.*, p. 111.)

"But all must admit that the essential doctrines of utilitarianism are stated by Hume with a clearness and consistency not to be found in any other writer of the century." (Leslie Stephen, *History of English Thought*, Vol. II, p. 86. See also pp. 91, 93. Second edition.)

"When Hume presented Utilitarianism as a mode of explaining current morality, it was seen or suspected to have a partially destructive tendency." (Sidgwick, *Methods of Ethics*, p. 86. Sixth edition.)

has to do with an original and irreducible element of human nature.

There have been many lines of demarcation in ethical thought, but the various slighter divergencies have not obscured a division, the general nature of which has been indicated above, into two opposing lines of thought. According to the one, we distinguish right from wrong by appeal to external achievement; according to the other, we pass moral judgments by the help of certain admonitions intuitively received. This is a well recognized distinction; it is clearly expressed, in terms that mark it as of general, not merely historical, significance, by Mr. Bertrand Russell:

"In judging of conduct we find at the outset two widely divergent methods, of which one is advocated by some moralists, the other by others, while both are practised by those who have no ethical theory. One of these methods, which is that advocated by utilitarians, judges the rightness of an act by relation to the goodness or badness of its consequences. The other method, advocated by intuitionists, judges by the approval or disapproval of the moral sense or conscience." (*Philosophical Essays*, p. 16.)

Intuitional ethics assumes a special faculty by which we recognize moral distinctions. Now this faculty may be conceived (1) as judging of separate acts or motives, or (2) as supplying us with certain rules of conduct, by which we are made aware of the rightness or wrongness of certain *classes* of acts or motives. The latter is the usual view of the intuitional school; it may be more closely characterized as rational intuitionalism; among the English moralists of the eighteenth century it is represented by Clarke, by Price and by Reid. The former view, which has been called perceptual intuitionalism, had its chief development in the eighteenth century, and was given its most significant expression in the works of Shaftesbury and Hutcheson; it was then known as the moral sense theory. The bond among all forms of intuitionalism is the assumption of a special moral faculty. As a faculty it cannot of course be derived from any other element of consciousness.

Disregarding, perhaps finally violating, the conventional classification, we shall attempt to place Hume in the history of ethics, to define his relations to rational intuitionism, to the moral sense theory, and to utilitarianism. Before considering how he stands as to the special points at issue between utilitarianism and the other two schools, we had better slowly approach what has come to be the particular matter in dispute by setting forth certain superficial indications of his relation to the moral sense school, indications which, though not conclusive, are yet not without significance. Hume himself was at pains to ally himself by assertion at least with the moral sense philosophers, Shaftesbury and Hutcheson. His own classification has, rightly enough, been considered somewhat questionable evidence, for an author's own view of the general nature of his theories is often determined by some cherished intention of secondary importance rather than by the real tendency of his whole line of thought. It is plain enough that Hume wished to take credit to himself for a concern for the moral motive—a concern which, in the controversy between the ethics of reason and the ethics of feeling, ranged him against the rationalists. Though we should, then, be quick to deny it any final significance, it is at least interesting at the start of an examination of the moral sense elements in Hume's ethics, to note that he thought of himself as a moral sense philosopher. In ¹ the *Treatise*, in a section under the heading *Moral distinctions deriv'd from a moral sense*, he gives the conclusion ² of an examination as to "whether it is by means of our ideas or impressions" we distinguish betwixt vice and virtue, and pronounce an action blameable or praiseworthy:

"Thus the course of the argument leads us to conclude, that since vice and virtue are not discoverable merely by reason, or the comparison of ideas, it must be by means of some impression or sentiment they occasion, that we are able to mark the difference betwixt them. Our decisions concerning moral rectitude

¹ *I. e.*, here 'impressions of reflection,' or, as we should say, feelings, sensations, or sentiments.

and depravity are evidently perceptions ;³ and as all perceptions are either impressions or ideas, the exclusion of the one is a convincing argument for the other. Morality, therefore, is more properly felt than judg'd of ; tho' this feeling or sentiment is commonly so soft and gentle, that we are apt to confound it with an idea, according to our common custom of taking all things for the same, which have any near resemblance to each other." (*Treatise*, III, i, 2.)⁴

Again :

" The same unquestionable argument may be deriv'd from the opinion of those, who maintain that morality is something real, essential, and founded on nature. The most probable hypothesis, which has been advanc'd to explain the distinction betwixt vice and virtue, and the origin of moral rights and obligations, is, that from a primary constitution of nature certain characters and passions, by the very view and contemplation, produce a pain, and others in like manner excite a pleasure." (*Treatise*, II, i, 7.) (The only reference to the origin of moral distinctions in Book II.)

And to quote a similar statement from the *Inquiry*:

" The final sentence, it is probable, which pronounces characters and actions amiable or odious, praise-worthy or blameable ; that which stamps on them the mark of honour or infamy, approbation or censure ; that which renders morality an active principle, and constitutes virtue our happiness, and vice our misery : it is probable, I say, that this final sentence depends on some internal sense or feeling, which nature has made universal in the whole species." (*Inquiry concerning the Principles of Morals*, I.)

which thus, it appears, would class himself as of the moral sense school. It is possible, as has been suggested, to account for this respect for Hutcheson and Shaftesbury as merely an indirect expression of distrust of the rationalists. His tone here is plainly not so much that of allegiance to the moral sense philosophers as of antagonism to Cudworth and Clarke. Their moral faculty, reason, a reason the sole function of which was

³ 'Perception' is Hume's most general term for 'content of consciousness,' corresponding to Locke's 'idea.'

⁴ The quotations from Hume are from the Selby-Bigge edition of the *Treatise* and the *Inquiries*.

to recognize relations, failed to provide a moral motive, and the matter of the moral motive gave Hume, with the other eighteenth century moralists, constant anxiety. By his expression of sympathy with the moral sense school he was able with the desired propriety to rebuke the rationalists for the offense of offering a moral faculty which could be shown to supply no moral motive, and thus imperilling moral practise. Now his critics have had further reason to feel that this relation to the moral sense philosophers was merely occasional and expedient, and merely superficial. As he expounds his system as he interprets the nature and the working of the moral sense, as he analyzes our various moral judgments, Hume is, it is usually held, essentially utilitarian; he shows that men reach conclusions on moral matters by way of "experience of actions to bring about results judged to be good," and give approval to whatever contributes to the "greatest happiness of the greatest number."

We have to discover, then, how significant is his account of the moral end. Does he, moreover, whether directly or by implication, substitute for the moral sense theory from which he starts, an account of the moral motive, or of the formation of moral judgments, dependent on a utilitarian theory of the end? Our task is to see whether, as he develops his ethical theory, it is in essential nature, not merely by the assumption of the label of a contemporary controversy, of the moral sense stamp; and if we find him not a utilitarian, to ascertain by what methods of interpretation he has been classed as a utilitarian.

Again we would pause before taking up the main issue. Before we consider directly his treatment of the moral sense, it may be well to note a certain train of thought explicable in an intuitionist, but not in accord with utilitarian conceptions. The utilitarian concerns himself with results; motives are to him indifferent except as pledges of future action, and the permanent self is obscured behind the sum of its actions. Now Hume prefaces his account of moral phenomena by emphatic

assertion of the final worth of motives, of the intrinsic moral worth of character. He says in Book III of the *Treatise*:

"All virtuous actions derive their merit only from virtuous motives, and are consider'd only as signs of these motives." (*Treatise*, III, ii, 1.)

Again in the same section:

"'Tis evident, that when we praise any actions, we regard only the motives that produced them, and consider the actions as signs or indications of certain principles in the mind and temper. The external performance has no merit. We must look within to find the moral quality. This we cannot do directly; and therefore fix our attention on actions, as on external signs. But these actions are still considered as signs; and the ultimate object of our praise and approbation is the motive, that produc'd them."

And in Part iii:

"If any action be either virtuous or vicious, 'tis only as a sign of some quality of character. It must depend upon durable principles of the mind, which extend over the whole conduct, and enter into the personal character. Actions themselves, not proceeding from any constant principle, have no influence on love or hatred, pride or humility; and consequently are never consider'd in morality." (*Treatise*, III, iii, 1.)

And yet again in the following paragraph:

"Actions are, indeed, better indications of a character than words, or even wishes and sentiments; but 'tis only so far as they are such indications, that they are attended with love or hatred, praise or blame."

We might here call attention to the fact that Hume's ethics is, on its face, an ethics of *virtue*; not of *duty*; his classification of his material is a classification of qualities of mind (those useful to others, to the agent himself, etc.).

Bentham's proper utilitarian refusal to see any moral significance in motives as such, is in striking contrast.

"In the foregoing chapter it has been shown at large, that goodness or badness cannot, with any propriety, be predicated of motives, etc." (*Principles of Morals and Legislation*, p. 131. See also p. 132.)

And this disregard of motives is an essential part of utilitarian doctrine. James Mill holds with Bentham that the motive of an act has nothing to do with its morality. "Mr. Bentham demonstrated," he says, "that the morality of an act does not depend upon the motive . . . that it is altogether dependent upon the intention."⁵ (*Fragment on Mackintosh*, p. 161.) This disregard of motive is due to the assumption that all men are in this respect fundamentally the same, that variations in behavior are due to variations in circumstances. Leslie Stephen thus analyzes the point of view:

"The Utilitarian 'man' therefore inclines to consider other people as merely parts of the necessary machinery. Their feelings are relevant only as influencing their outward conduct. If a man gives me a certain 'lot' of pain or pleasure, it does not matter what may be his motives. The 'motive' for all conduct corresponds in all cases to the pain or pleasure accruing to the agent. (*English Utilitarians*, Vol. I, pp. 310, 311.)

It is possible, doubtless, still to insist that virtuous character is a pledge of virtuous action, and that Hume ran certainly no practical risk of diminishing the total sum of happiness by attending to the value of character as such. Yet the stress on it as of final significance is not in the utilitarian manner. And, moreover, Hume goes so far as to assert that there is no diminution in the morality when a virtuous man is by ill fortune so situated that he is unable to contribute to the general happiness.

"Where a person is possessed of a character that in its natural tendency is beneficial to society, we esteem him virtuous, and are delighted with the view of his character, even though particular accidents prevent its operation, and incapacitate him from being serviceable to his friends and country." (*Treatise*, III, iii, 1.)

This might of course have been written by a utilitarian, but it is certainly not a characteristic utilitarian utterance.

⁵ 'Intention' means the foreseen consequences of the act.

CHAPTER I.

THE MORAL SENSE AND ITS PECULIAR STIMULI.

But general persuasions are not particular proofs. We shall have now to submit to examination Hume's account of the moral sense, to see whether he uses it merely as an introductory pledge of antagonism to the rationalists, and afterwards, as it has been thought, strips from it any special meaning by an explanation of its origin which resolves it into elements acceptable enough to the utilitarians.

The significant distinction between utilitarianism and the moral sense theory is best stated by Gay, in the dissertation prefixed to Law's translation of King's *Essay on the Origin of Evil*, first published in 1731. Utilitarianism, according to Gay, gives an *empiristic* account of the moral sense and of benevolence; it derives both the moral sense and benevolence from an original desire for one's own pleasure. The moral sense theory gives a *nativistic* account of benevolence and of the moral sense; it maintains that both benevolence and a moral sense are original elements of human nature.

What is Hume's attitude on these two points? What we are inclined to think is, that he agrees with the moral sense theorists on *both points*; that he regards both the moral sentiments (of approbation and disapprobation) and benevolence as original and unanalyzable elements of human nature, not to be derived from anything more primitive; and that he holds this equally in both of his principal ethical works. And we would explain that the confusion which has arisen in the minds of many readers comes from the fact that he has an unfortunately elaborate theory as to *the way in which these feelings are excited each time that they arise*; and that it has been only too easy incorrectly to mistake this for such a genetic account as is given by the utilitarians.

That in the *Inquiry* Hume insists upon an original benevolence is generally admitted. It has been denied¹—the force of the denial can better be considered later—that Hume gave any place to an original benevolence in the *Treatise*. Such denial is not, however, felt to be necessary to secure Hume an assured place among the utilitarians. Even those who accept and make much of an original benevolence in the *Inquiry* yet hold with some plausibility that Hume may be a utilitarian and yet admit an original altruism. Of the two differences between the moral sense theorists and the utilitarians the principal one was that in regard to the moral sense; eighteenth century utilitarianism did not admit an original altruism; but as a matter of fact many of the later utilitarians have given up this principle of the original selfishness of human nature. It is accordingly with the question of the moral sense that we shall begin. Does it possess throughout Hume's account an original character?

In his ethics as in his metaphysics, Hume expects us to have in mind his introductory psychology. It is from failure scrupulously to refer to this that much misapprehension has arisen. We must, then, ascertain where Hume places the moral sense in the general scheme of human endowments. As our intellectual life, so our emotional is explained by reference to the distinction between impressions and ideas. Impressions are “all our sensations, passions, and emotions as they make their first appearance in the soul.” Ideas are “the faint images of these in thinking and reasoning.” Impressions are divided into impressions of sensation and impressions of reflection, or, according to the terminology sometimes used when he is treating of the passions, ‘original’ and ‘secondary’ impressions. Now—

“Original impressions or impressions of sensation are such as without any antecedent perception arise in the soul, from the constitution of the body, from the animal spirits, or from the application of objects to the external organs. Secondary, or reflective impressions, are such as proceed from some of these

¹ See Albee, *A History of English Utilitarianism*, Chap. V, especially pp. 96, 102, 103, III.

original ones, either immediately or by the interposition of its idea. Of the first kind are all the impressions of the senses, and all bodily pains and pleasures: Of the second are the passions, and other emotions resembling them." (*Treatise*, II, i, 1.)

The passions, then, and the "other emotions resembling them" (distinguished from them by a greater calmness) are "impressions of reflection." Under the calm emotions, or sentiments, come the moral sentiments. The moral sentiments follow upon some preceding impression or idea of pleasure or pain. *All* the emotions, the 'violent' emotions called 'passions,' and the 'calm' emotions called 'sentiments,' are 'impressions of reflection,' *i. e.*, arise only after the presence of impressions of sensation—pleasure or pain—or their ideas. They do not "without any introduction make their appearance in the soul"; they are, as we have said, preceded by impressions which, according to Hume, depend upon natural and physical causes, the examination of which would lead him "far from his present subject, into the sciences of anatomy and natural philosophy."

The distinction between direct and indirect passions—the direct passions being such as desire, aversion, joy, hope; the indirect being pride, humility, love, and hate—has likewise to do with the matter of the preceding excitants. The indirect passions have as preceding condition a certain peculiar form of double association between groups of the stimulating impressions and ideas. The direct passions, like the sentiments (for us notably the moral sentiments), follow in more simple fashion on some preceding affection of pleasure and pain. The account in this, the second book of the *Treatise*, is directly concerned with the passions; for the most part, we are expected to take it for granted that the sentiments are aroused in the same way. Now what we have to note is that, despite the frequent clumsiness of the terminology, what Hume is telling us is merely that certain impressions and ideas of pleasure and pain appear in the mind as stimulants of the 'passions' and the

'sentiments.' The passions and the sentiments are not modifications of the pleasures and pains in question; their relation to the pleasures and pains is simply one of well established sequence.² Benevolence, for instance, is a perfectly simple original passion;³ nothing could be further than this from the empiristic theory of benevolence.

He takes pains to insist not only that the passions are thus perfectly simple impressions, but also that the nature of these responses which the mind makes to the exciting stimuli of pleasure and pain can be explained only by peculiarities in its constitution. The impressions of sensation, or their ideas, are the exciting stimuli of the impressions of reflection by virtue of "concurring with certain dormant principles of the human mind." (*Treatise*, II, iii, 9.) He makes a special point of this dependence of the whole mechanism for its proper working on the original composition of the mind, in his endeavor to establish love as a passion distinct from benevolence, hatred as a passion distinct from anger.⁴ To show his attitude here, it is necessary to quote him at length:

"The passions of love and hatred are always followed by, or rather conjoin'd with, benevolence and anger. . . . The conjunction of this desire and aversion with love and hatred, may be accounted for by two different hypotheses. The first is, that love and hatred have not only a *cause*, which excites them, viz. pleasure and pain; and an *object*, to which they are

² Hume admits certain exceptions. All the passions are not stimulated in the usual manner by a preceding impression or idea of pleasure or pain. But nothing which he anywhere says would lead us to expect a similar exception in the case of the moral sentiments.

"Besides good and evil, or in other words pain and pleasure, the direct passions frequently arise from a natural impulse or instinct, which is perfectly unaccountable. Of this kind is the desire of punishment to our enemies, and of happiness to our friends; hunger, lust, and a few other bodily appetites. These passions, properly speaking, produce good and evil, and proceed not from them, like the other affections." (*Treatise*, II, iii, 9.)

³ *Treatise*, II, ii, 6; II, iii, 3; II, iii, 9.

⁴ It should be observed that, whereas love and hatred are regarded by Hume as *indirect* passions, benevolence and anger are recognized as *direct* passions.

directed, viz. a person or thinking being; but likewise an *end*, which they endeavour to attain, viz. the happiness or misery of the person belov'd or hated; all which views, mixing together, make only one passion. According to this system, love is nothing but the desire of happiness to another person, and hatred that of misery. The desire and aversion constitute the very nature of love and hatred. They are not only inseparable but the same.

"But this is evidently contrary to experience. For tho' 'tis certain we never love any person without desiring his happiness, nor hate any without wishing his misery, yet these desires arise only upon the ideas of the happiness or misery of our friend or enemy being presented by the imagination, and are not absolutely essential to love and hatred. They are the most obvious and natural sentiments of these affections, but not the only ones. The passions may express themselves in a hundred ways, and may subsist a considerable time, without our reflecting on the happiness or misery of their objects; which clearly proves, that these desires are not the same with love and hatred, nor make any essential part of them.

"We may, therefore, infer, that benevolence and anger are passions different from love and hatred, *and only conjoin'd with them, by the original constitution of the mind.*" As nature has given to the body certain appetites and inclinations, which she increases, diminishes, or changes according to the situation of the fluids or solids; she has proceeded in the same manner with the mind. According as we are possess'd with love or hatred, the correspondent desire of the happiness or misery of the person, who is the object of these passions, arises in the mind, and varies with each variation of these opposite passions. This order of things, abstractedly consider'd, is not necessary. Love and hatred might have been unattended with any such desires, or their particular connexion might have been entirely revers'd. If nature had so pleas'd, love might have had the same effect as hatred, and hatred as love." (*Treatise*, II, ii, 6.)

And, at the beginning of Section 7: "The desire of the happiness or misery of others, according to the love or hatred we bear them" is "an arbitrary and original instinct implanted in our nature."

⁵ *I. e.*, theory.

⁶ The italics here are mine.

Again, in a definition of passion:

“What we commonly understand by *passion* is a violent and sensible emotion of the mind, when any good or evil is presented, or any object, which, by the original formation of our faculties, is fitted to excite an appetite.”⁷ (*Treatise*, II, iii, 8.)

As we have said, the moral sentiments, approval and disapproval, as sentiments, are placed psychologically on the same footing as the passions. They follow in like peculiar manner upon the exciting stimuli of certain impressions of sensation, *i. e.*, on pleasure and pain. That this response is due to the functioning of the moral sense, an original element of human nature, Hume shows directly in Book III of the *Treatise*, *Of Morals*, and in the *Inquiry concerning the Principles of Morals*. That the moral sense is here consistently what the name would indicate, an original element in human nature—not merely an unnecessary name for the feeling of pleasure and pain, nor a part of our nature that can be derived from desire for pleasure—it will not always be easy to show. Hume often so distributes his emphasis that at times the more carefully we scrutinize his words, the more perplexed we become as to just what it is he is committing himself to. What we have to bear in mind is that at the start he committed himself very definitely to certain psychological conceptions, and that what he says at any point has, whenever possible, to be read in the terms of these conceptions. It will be found that they are not so often violated by his various scattered statements as a first reading might lead one to think. Indeed, the more carefully one compares passage with passage, the more convinced will one be that the inconsistencies are but trifling.

To start with a definition in which there is some of the vagueness as to the special point which we have referred to above:

“The hypothesis which we embrace is plain. It maintains that morality is determined by sentiment. It defines virtue to be *whatever mental action or quality gives to a spectator the pleasing sentiment of approbation*; and vice the contrary.” (*Inquiry*, Appendix I.)

⁷ The italics here are mine.

This is far from saying that *whatever* gives one pleasure is that to which in recognition of the pleasure one gives moral approval, though on first reading this may seem to be just what is said. But shifting the emphasis from what can claim it only if helped out by the reader's preconceived notion that Hume is in this matter a hedonist, one sees that pleasure is here used as merely a description of the sentiment of approbation, as merely one of its marks or signs—a mark which it necessarily wears from the way in which this feeling is excited each time that it arises. In the phrase, "pleasing sentiment of approbation," "pleasing" is merely descriptive of such a sentiment. The process is just that which we have explained fully in the general working of the passions. On the presentation of certain impressions or ideas of pleasure and pain, the moral sense responds, and we feel the sentiments of approval and disapproval. Nothing could more plainly than this make of the moral sense a faculty. That the whole process is dependent on something peculiar and original in our nature is, by the use of the special term, the moral sense, made even more apparent than in the case of the other emotions.

Numberless passages can be cited indifferently from the *Treatise* or the *Inquiry* to prove that Hume holds to this point of view. In different passages the emphasis is of course on different aspects or different consequences of the original quality of the moral sentiments. In the first place he insists always on a special constitution of human nature as the only and the final explanation of the facts:

"The vice entirely escapes you, as long as you consider the object. You never can find it, till you turn your reflexion into your own breast, and find a sentiment of disapprobation, which arises in you, towards this action. Here is a matter of fact; but 'tis the object of feeling, not of reason. It lies in yourself, not in the object. So that when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the construction of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it." (*Treatise*, III, i, 1.)

And in the *Inquiry*:

“ But that *all* moral affection or dislike arises from this origin [education], will never surely be allowed by any judicious enquirer. Had nature made no such distinction, founded on the original constitution of the mind, the words, *honorable* and *shameful*, *lovely* and *odious*, *noble* and *despicable*, had never had place in any language.” (*Inquiry*, V, i.)

And again in the *Inquiry*, in a passage in which the moral sense is viewed as the source both of the distinction between virtue and vice, and of the preference for one over the other:

“ Now as virtue is an end, and is desirable on its own account . . . it is requisite that there should be some sentiment which it touches, some internal taste or feeling, or whatever you may please to call it, which distinguishes moral good and evil, and which embraces the one and rejects the other.” (*Inquiry*, Appendix I.)

But it is not only plain that Hume's characterization of the moral sense is always that it is an original part of our nature. It is also clear, from the manner of statement, that he has definitely in mind his introductory psychology and abides by its conditions, that he does not depart from the necessary consequences of the classification of moral approval and disapproval as sentiments, excited, in the way we have described, by preceding stimuli.

“ And as the good, resulting from their benign influence, is in itself complete and entire, it also excites the moral sentiment of approbation, without any reflection on farther consequences, and without any more enlarged views of the concurrence or imitation of the other members of society.” (*Inquiry*, Appendix III.)

And again, in a passage in which the exciting stimuli are sympathetic pleasures—the rôle in this process of sympathy will be considered later—the moral sentiments are plainly spoken of as a response, a special reaction.

“ Let these generous sentiments be supposed ever so weak; let them be insufficient to move even a hand or finger of our body, they must still direct the determinations of our mind, and

where everything else is equal, produce a cool preference of what is useful and serviceable to mankind, above what is pernicious and dangerous. A *moral distinction*, therefore, immediately arises; a general sentiment of blame and approbation." (*Inquiry*, IX, i.)

If the moral sense is a faculty, its findings should have a subjective and arbitrary character. Hume recognizes that they have these characteristics. And they have such infallibility, such protection from question, as is given to the mere data of sensation. The decisions of the moral sense are, as are those of the aesthetic sense, simply and entirely dependent on the presence of a spectator. Comparing the phenomena of the moral sense with those of the aesthetic, to which in many particulars they bear, Hume thinks, a close resemblance, Hume says:

"The beauty is not a quality of the circle. It lies not in any part of the line, whose parts are equally distant from a common centre. It is only the effect which that figure produces upon the mind, whose peculiar fabric of structure renders it susceptible of such sentiments. In vain would you look for it in the circle, or seek it, either by your senses or by mathematical reasoning, in all the properties of that figure. . . . Should you ask the description and position of its beauty, they would readily reply, that the beauty is not in any of the parts or members of a pillar, but results from the whole, when that complicated figure is presented to an intelligent mind, susceptible to those finer sensations. Till such a spectator appear, there is nothing but a figure of such particular dimensions and proportions: from his sentiments alone arise its elegance and beauty. . . . You must acknowledge that the moral turpitude results, in the same manner, from the contemplation of the whole, when presented to a being whose organs have such a particular structure and formation." (*Inquiry*, Appendix I.)

Again:

"Consequently, we may infer, that the crime of ingratitude is not any particular individual *fact*; but arises from a complication of circumstances, which, being presented to the spectator, excites the *sentiment* of blame, by the particular structure and fabric of his mind." (*Inquiry*, Appendix I.)

This subjectivity distinguishes the moral sense theorists from both the rationalists and the utilitarians of this period. The 'obligation' of the utilitarians had objective necessity; the precepts of the understanding of the rationalists had rational necessity. Subjectivity is an essential quality of any ethics of feeling, a quality to which, try as it may to escape, it will always find itself fast bound. We shall see later in what manner Hume endeavored to push past this restraint; but when he is not hampered by it, he sees, as a moral sense philosopher must, that the moral sentiments are necessarily subjective.

That we should under certain conditions feel certain moral sentiments of approval and disapproval cannot in any real sense be explained; it can only be attributed to an arbitrary act of the will of God.

"The standard of the one [reason], being founded on the nature of things, is eternal and inflexible, even by the will of the Supreme Being: the standard of the other, arising from the eternal frame and constitution of animals, is ultimately derived from that Supreme Will, which bestowed on each being its peculiar nature, and arranged the several classes and orders of existence." (*Inquiry*, Appendix I.)

It is because the moral sentiments are thus dependent on peculiarities of human nature, on a part of human nature the decisions of which we cannot check by comparison with those of any other part, that they have an arbitrary, what Hume calls an infallible, character.

"For it must be observ'd, that the opinions of men, in this case, carry with them a peculiar authority, and are, in a great measure, infallible. The distinction of moral good and evil is founded on the pleasure or pain, which results from the view of any sentiment, or character; and as that pleasure or pain cannot be unknown to the person who feels it, it follows, that there is just so much vice or virtue in any character, as every one places in it, and that 'tis impossible in this particular we can ever be mistaken." (*Treatise*, III, ii, 8.)

It would seem then apparent, that, in his psychological account of the moral sense, and in his characterization of its

nature;⁸ Hume consistently explains that the moral sentiments are due to an unanalyzable, irreducible part of human nature. Now the opinion usually held, that Hume in properly utilitarian fashion derives the moral sense from self-love, seems to be due to two somewhat different methods of interpretation. Either the critic hastily understands the passage he is considering as obviously utilitarian in its implications, without regard to Hume's psychology;⁹ or assuming that Hume holds that all desire is for pleasure, he will not permit him to say that anything but our own pleasure can ever account for our preferences.¹⁰ The latter misapprehension, since it is in part the source of the former, had better be dealt with first.

The charge of inconsistency, based on the assumption that Hume's psychology postulates that we never desire anything

⁸ As we have seen, he can *characterize* it only by noting some of the consequences of its nature. Just because the passions are original we can never "by a multitude of words, give a just definition of them."

"The passions of pride and humility being simple and uniform impressions, 'tis impossible we can ever, by a multitude of words, give a just definition of them, or indeed of any of the passions. The utmost we can pretend to is a description of them, by an enumeration of such circumstances as attend them." (*Treatise*, II, i, 2.)

We repeat that the fact that they are secondary impressions simply means that they follow on preceding impressions, or their ideas; it has not, in the utilitarian sense, any reference to their origin, but merely indicates the manner in which they occur.

⁹ Certainly the fashion that has prevailed of expounding Hume's ethics largely by triumphantly pointing out inconsistencies has given little encouragement to any search for consistency between his metaphysics or his psychology and his ethics.

¹⁰ In common with *all* the eighteenth century philosophers, Hume accepts from Locke a hedonistic theory of values. He can hardly be said to raise the question at all; when he approaches it he takes it for granted that the good and the pleasant are identical; such passages as "besides good and evil, or in other words pleasure and pain" frequently occur. But, as has been said, *all* the schools of the period—the intuitionists and the moral sense philosophers as well as the utilitarians—are hedonists in their theory of value, so that this in no sense marks a man as a utilitarian. What is distinctive of the utilitarians is the theory of psychological hedonism—that *all desire is for pleasure*, and all aversion for pain; or as some members of the school held, all desire is *originally* for pleasure. As far as psychological hedonism is concerned, we contend that Hume stands with the other anti-utilitarians.

but pleasant feeling—of course our own pleasant feeling—is found in Green:

“Hume’s Hedonism needs only to be clearly stated to be found ‘unsatisfactory.’ If it ever tends to find acceptance with serious people, it is through confusion with that hybrid, though beneficent, utilitarianism which finds the moral good in the ‘greatest happiness of the greatest number’ without reflecting that desire for such an object, not being for a feeling of pleasure to be experienced by the subject of the desire, is with Hume impossible.” (Introduction to Volume II of Green and Grose’s Edition of the *Treatise*, p. 70.)

In commenting on Green’s charge of inconsistency here, Knight shows that he is held by the same misconception, that he too takes it as obvious that for Hume the object of all desire is pleasure.

“His suggestion that we may make the desire for another’s good *our own* good, and so pursue it both from benevolence and self-interest, is not (as Mr. Green suggests) so much a mark of inconsistency, as it is the sign of the working of two opposite principles in his nature. He admits the existence of sympathetic emotion, which, being unselfish, carries us straight away from self to others; but, on the other hand, he maintains that the goal of all desire is pleasure. And if pleasure be the one motive of action, the difference between pleasure and morality is destroyed.” (William Knight, *Hume*, p. 198.)

Now far from saying that pleasure is the only object of desire, Hume gives an account of the object of desire very much like Butler’s. Like Butler he holds that almost all pleasure *presupposes* desire; this puts the question of interest and disinterestedness on a different footing. Hume’s full and clear account of the matter should have made impossible the crude conception that he must have held that we can desire only our own pleasure. His analysis is so free from any misleading implications that it will be well to quote it at length. It happens to be part of his discussion of benevolence.

“But farther, if we consider rightly of the matter, we shall find that the hypothesis which allows of a disinterested benevolence, distinct from self-love, has really more *simplicity* in it, and is more conformable to the analogy of nature than that

which pretends to resolve all friendship and humanity into this latter principle. There are bodily-wants or appetites acknowledged by every one, which necessarily precede all sensual enjoyment, and carry us directly to seek possession of the object. Thus, hunger and thirst have eating and drinking for their end; and from the gratification of these primary appetites arises a pleasure, which may become the object of another species of desire or inclination that is secondary and interested.¹¹ In the same manner there are mental passions by which we are impelled immediately to seek particular objects, such as fame or power, or vengeance without any regard to interest;¹¹ and when these objects are attained a pleasing enjoyment ensues, as the consequence of our indulged affections. Nature must, by the internal frame and constitution of the mind, give an original propensity to fame, ere we can reap any pleasure from that acquisition, or pursue it from motives of self-love, and desire of happiness. If I have no vanity, I take no delight in praise: if I be void of ambition, power gives me no enjoyment: if I be not angry, the punishment of an adversary is totally indifferent to me. In all these cases there is a passion which points immediately to the object, and constitutes it our good or happiness; as there are other secondary passions which afterwards arise and pursue it as a part of our happiness, when once it is constituted such by our original affections. Were there no appetite of any kind antecedent to self-love, that propensity could scarcely ever exert itself; because we should, in that case, have felt few and slender pains or pleasures, and have little misery or happiness to avoid or to pursue."¹² (*Inquiry, Appendix II.*)

It is thus plain that Hume goes even further than the conception that there are desires, and original desires, other than

¹¹ 'Interest' is used to mean desire for one's own pleasure; 'interested,' concerned with desire for one's own pleasure.

¹² In view of this passage, such a comment as that in a recent history of ethics seems incredible. In a passage which attributes to Hume psychological hedonism, Mr. R. A. P. Rogers, referring to Butler, offers the very same objections to psychological hedonism that Hume himself urges here.

"Hume generally assumes that pleasure and pain affecting the self, are practically the only motives of voluntary action (Psychological Hedonism). As Butler pointed out, this is not true. Appetites, passions and affections aim commonly at their appropriate objects, not at the pleasure of self-gratification. Hunger, for example, urges one to eat, etc." (*A Short History of Ethics*, p. 188.)

the desire for pleasure: if pleasure is ever to be pursued as an end, it can in general only be as it is preceded by a simpler, more direct desire. The gratification of the passions is pleasurable from the very nature of desire. In like manner we should be able to see that Hume can speak of the *pleasing* sentiments of approbation and yet not mean that to approve of anything, however pleasurable the approval, means merely to take pleasure in it. It is such expressions as the "pleasing sentiments of approbation," and his description of sensations and ideas of pleasure as the stimuli of the moral sense (when the reader ignores that this does not make them the end of moral action), that have led to the misinterpretation already referred to of separate passages.

When they read some of Hume's statements about the moral sense, many critics have readily drawn the inference that according to him virtue is the pursuit of the pleasures of the moral sense.¹³ It is such passages as the following that, by the careless and shifting use of words, lead straight enough to just such a misapprehension:

"The most probable hypothesis, which has been advanc'd to explain the distinction betwixt vice and virtue, and the origin of moral rights and obligations, is, that from a primary constitution of nature certain characters and passions, by the very view and contemplation, produce a pain, and others in like manner excite a pleasure."¹⁴ The uneasiness and satisfaction are

¹³ See especially pp. 31, 32 of Green's Introduction:

"Hume sees that the two sides of Locke's doctrine—one that thought originates nothing, but takes its objects as given in feeling, the other that the good which is the object of desire is pleasant feeling—are inseparable. Hence he decisively rejects every notion of rational or unselfish affections, which would imply that they are other than desires for pleasure; of virtue, that it antecedently determines, rather than is constituted by, the specific pleasure of moral sense; and of this pleasure itself, which would imply that anything but the view of tendencies to produce pleasure can excite it."

¹⁴ Hume here, as frequently elsewhere, means by "a pleasure" a *pleasant emotion*, and by "a pain," a *painful emotion*. Where he does not mean this the article *a* would be uncalled for; it would spoil the sense of the passage to substitute "pain" for "a pain," "pleasure" for "a pleasure." See also the passage, quoted on p. 27, in which pleasure is similarly treated as a class name. Pleasure, as a simple impression, is of course always identically the same.

not only inseparable from vice and virtue, but constitute their very nature and essence. To approve of a character is to feel an original delight upon its appearance. To disapprove of it is to be sensible of an uneasiness." (*Treatise*, II, i, 7.)

Now is it not apparent that even here the intention is to describe the process—"to approve of a character is to feel an original delight"—to give us its sign of identification, not to call the moral sentiments of approbation and disapprobation *the same thing as* feelings of pleasure and pain? That pleasure is a mark of the sentiment of approbation, that there was in Hume's mind no such confusion as there was in Shaftesbury's, by which a principal motive to virtue is desire for the pleasure which the view of it causes, and the pleasures of the exercise of the moral sense become the reason for exercising it, is plain enough. Some of his remarks do not have to be thus carefully analyzed to avoid this misinterpretation. They plainly ascribe to the pleasure the rôle of a mark, a reliable sign, always present because sympathetic pleasures are the stimuli of the moral sense.

"Here we cannot remain long in suspense, but must pronounce the impression arising from virtue, to be agreeable, and that proceeding from vice to be uneasy. . . . There is no spectacle so fair and beautiful as a noble and generous action. . . . No enjoyment equals the satisfaction we receive from the company of those we love and esteem. . . . To have the sense of virtue, is nothing but to *feel* a satisfaction of a particular kind from the contemplation of a character. The very *feeling* constitutes our praise or admiration. We go no farther; nor do we enquire into the cause of the satisfaction. *We do not infer a character to be virtuous, because it pleases: But in effect feel that it is virtuous.*¹⁵ The case is the same as in our judgments concerning all kinds of beauty, and tastes, and sensations. Our approbation is imply'd in the immediate pleasure¹⁶ they convey to us." (*Treatise*, III, i, 2.)

Aside from this matter that the pleasure of the exercise of the moral sense is not what leads us to encourage those actions

¹⁵ The italics here are mine.

¹⁶ Here again "the pleasure" means the pleasant emotion, or, as Hume says just above, "a satisfaction of a particular kind."

which give rise to the pleasant moral approval, Hume of course recognizes that in general one's own advantage is not the point in approval. "The good qualities of an enemy are hurtful, but may still command our esteem and respect." (*Treatise*, III, i, 2.) Very apparently our pleasure in it does not make the character virtuous; only a virtuous character can *de facto* give us *this* pleasure.

Finally, a further indication that the moral sense is of a special and inexplicable nature is his assertion that its pleasures are of a peculiar kind—of a peculiarity to be from the nature of the case noted, but not explained. The most complete statement of this is in Part i of Book III of the *Treatise*.

"Now it may . . . be objected to the present system, that if virtue and vice be determin'd by pleasure and pain, these qualities must, in every case, arise from the sensations; and consequently any object, whether animate or inanimate, rational or irrational, might become morally good or evil, provided it can excite a satisfaction or uneasiness. . . . First, 'tis evident, that under the term *pleasure*, we comprehend sensations, which are very different from each other, and which have only such a distant resemblance, as is requisite to make them be express'd by the same abstract term. A good composition of music and a bottle of good wine equally produce pleasure; and what is more, their goodness is determin'd merely by the pleasure. But shall we say upon that account, that the wine is harmonious, or the music of a good flavour? In like manner an inanimate object, and the character or sentiments of any person may, both of them, give satisfaction; but as the satisfaction is different, this keeps our sentiments concerning them from being confounded, and makes us ascribe virtue to the one, and not to the other. Nor is every sentiment of pleasure or pain, which arises from characters and actions, of that *peculiar* kind, which makes us praise or condemn." (Sec. 2.)

And in Part iii:

"Whenever we survey the actions and characters of men, without any particular interest in them, the pleasure, or pain, which arises from the survey (with some minute differences) is, in the main, of the same kind, tho' perhaps there be a great diversity in the causes, from which it is deriv'd. On the other hand, a convenient house, and a virtuous character, cause not

the same feeling of approbation; even tho' the source of our approbation be the same, and flow from sympathy and an idea of their utility. There is something very inexplicable in this variation of our feelings; but 'tis what we have experience of with regard to all our passions and sentiments." (Sec. 5.)

And there is a similar passage in a note to Part i of Section V of the *Inquiry*:

"We ought not to imagine, because an inanimate object may be useful as well as a man, that therefore it ought also, according to this system, to merit the appellation of *virtuous*. The sentiments, excited by utility, are, in the two cases, very different; and the one is mixed with affection, esteem, approbation, &c., and not the other. In like manner, an inanimate object may have good colour and proportions as well as a human figure. But can we ever be in love with the former? There are a numerous set of passions and sentiments, of which thinking rational beings are, by the original constitution of nature, the only proper objects: and though the very same qualities be transferred to an insensible, inanimate being, they will not excite the same sentiments. The beneficial qualities of herbs and minerals are, indeed, sometimes called their *virtues*; but this is an effect of the caprice of language, which ought not to be regarded in reasoning. For though there be a species of approbation attending even inanimate objects, when beneficial, yet this sentiment is so weak, and so different from that which is directed to beneficent magistrates or statesmen; that they ought not to be ranked under the same class or appellation.

"A very small variation of the object, even where the same qualities are preserved, will destroy a sentiment."

What we have tried to do so far is to show that the moral sentiments, which are for Hume "impressions of reflexion" or "secondary impressions," follow, like the direct passions, in perfectly simple fashion upon *some preceding affection of pleasure or pain*; to show, moreover, that this is not a method of deriving the moral sense from an original desire for one's own pleasure; and to account for the various misunderstandings by which it has been made to appear so.

CHAPTER II.

SYMPATHY¹ AND BENEVOLENCE.

We have now to submit to a similar examination Hume's account of *sympathy*. We recall that in his characterization of the difference between utilitarianism and the moral sense theory, Gay maintained that the distinction between them is twofold. Utilitarianism gives an *empiristic* account of benevolence as well as of the moral sense, derives it also from an original desire for one's own pleasure. The moral sense theory maintains that benevolence, like the moral sense, is an original element in human nature. What we have still to prove, then, is that Hume treats benevolence also as an original and unanalyzable element of human nature; because of the direction the controversy on this point has recently taken, we have especially

¹ The term 'sympathy' is used in the *Treatise*, with a fair degree of consistency, to refer to the *mechanism* by which we pass from the idea of some one else's emotion to a similar emotion. In such passages as the following, it clearly stands for the process by which the sentiments are communicated:

"This proceeds from the principle of sympathy or communication; and sympathy, as I have already observ'd, is nothing but the conversion of an idea into an impression by the force of imagination." (*Treatise*, II, iii, 6.)

"In sympathy there is an evident conversion of an idea into an impression. . . . Sympathy is exactly correspondent to the operations of our understanding. . . . Now nothing is more natural than for us to embrace the opinions of others in this particular; both from sympathy, which renders all their sentiments intimately present to us," etc. (*Treatise*, II, i, 11.)

"Some may, perhaps, find a contradiction betwixt this phaenomenon and that of sympathy, where the mind passes easily from the idea of ourselves to that of any other object related to us." (*Treatise*, II, ii, 2.)

Throughout the *Treatise*, whenever the word appears, whether in noun, in adjective, or in verb form, it will usually bear this interpretation. But in the *Inquiry* it is used in no special fashion; it stands as synonym for benevolence, fellow-feeling, humanity. The following passage is characteristic:

"The former sentiment, to wit, that of general benevolence, or humanity, or sympathy, we shall have occasion frequently to treat of in the course of this enquiry; and I assume it as real, from general experience, without any other proof." (*Inquiry*, Appendix II, note 1.)

to prove that he holds to this equally in both the *Treatise* and the *Inquiry*.

In the preceding chapter on the moral sense, we have already quoted a number of passages from Hume's critics which asserted that Hume's moral sense is of derived character, and which also implied or directly stated that Hume denies as well an original altruism. It may be well, however, to quote further comment concerned especially with the matter of benevolence. The passages we shall refer to will not only show the conclusion some of his critics have reached, but may also throw light on how they have come by this conclusion.

Wundt, who says nothing of any difference between the *Treatise* and the *Inquiry*, has this to say of Hume's sympathy:

"This feeling of sympathy,² however, by virtue of which we respond to actions that do not touch us directly at all, has, according to Hume, an egoistic origin. For we should not sympathise with virtue if we did not in imagination put ourselves in the place of³ those who receive benefit and advantage from the virtuous act. Hume's sympathy is thus very different from that emotion of benevolence and universal love for humanity on which Hutcheson had based his ethical theory. The latter is selfless, the former springs ultimately from self-love." (*Ethical Systems*, pp. 75, 76; third edition, Bd. I, 418. Wundt's references here are to the *Treatise*, III, i, iii; *Inquiry*, V, ii, and Appendix II.)

Wundt sees a complication in the special matter of *justice*; it is by reason of his treatment of justice that he places Hume

²Of course there is for Hume, as we shall see, no such thing as a feeling of sympathy; any feeling may be a sympathetic feeling, that is, sympathetically aroused.

³This is, on the contrary, the theory of Hume's great adversary, Adam Smith. Though it is often attributed to him, Hume never suggests that we take any such attitude, that we try thus to lay hold of the pleasure and pain of others. According to Hume, we stay in our own place, and not by a process of temporary transposition of personality by which we may pretend that it is our own pleasure and pain we are considering, but by the operation of a part of our nature, sympathy, come to feel the pains and pleasures of others.

⁴The quotations from Wundt are from Miss Washburn's translation of the second edition of the *Ethics*. The passages quoted stand unchanged in the third edition, to which also I have given the page references.

midway between the *feeling* ethics of Shaftesbury and the intellectual and utilitarian ethics of Locke. His remark that "while according to Hume all the rest of our moral judgments are based on sympathy, and hence, indirectly, on self-love, there is one moral attribute which is wholly altruistic from the beginning (justice)," might make us think that here at least Wundt sees in Hume's conception of morality an element not based on the feeling of self-love. But the element of reflection, which, according to Wundt, is what Hume adds to his ethics of feeling to account for justice, is itself based, Wundt thinks, on selfish feeling. Reflection assists us to see "that we get more by restraining our selfish impulses than by giving them loose rein. Hence the sense of justice is a corrective for our natural impulses, though like them it has its ultimate source in self-love." (*Ethical Systems*, p. 77; third edition, Bd. I, 419, 420. Wundt's references here are to the *Treatise*, III, ii; *Inquiry*, III.) Again, Wundt says:

"To get out of the difficulty [the improbability that so disinterested an emotion as justice sprang from the soil of man's selfish instincts] he supplements his emotional theory by introducing rational reflection, which proceeds from considerations essentially egoistic." (*Ethical Systems*, p. 79; third edition, Bd. I, 421).⁶

Watson reaches an egoistic interpretation of our concern for the community more simply, without feeling any need to note a departure here from the ethics of feeling.

"What is the source of moral approbation and disapprobation? Locke's view was, that action is morally good when it is done out of regard for law. But this seems to place morality in something entirely distinct from the desire for pleasure. Hume cannot allow this discrepancy between the assertion that pleasure is the motive of all actions, and the assertion that some actions are done not from pleasure but from respect for law, to pass unchallenged; and so he seeks to show that all actions

⁶ Note that in the *Inquiry*, the sympathetic emotions arise in such a direct and spontaneous fashion that to analyze the manner in which they arise is impossible; in the *Treatise*, reflection on one's own interest plays no part.

called virtuous are so called because of the pleasure which they give to one who contemplates their general tendency.

"To explain the feeling of moral approbation, the passion of sympathy is in some cases sufficient. On this principle Hume accounts for the manner in which we view benevolent actions. . . . Nothing more than sympathy is needed to explain those acts which directly excite in us a feeling of pleasure or pain. But what is to be said of those acts the immediate effect of which is to produce in us a feeling of pain, and which we yet morally approve? How, in other words, are we to account for moral judgments in regard to laws of justice? Justice is an 'artificial' virtue; *i. e.*, it gives rise to the pleasure of moral approbation, not directly, but indirectly. But Hume endeavours to show that the pleasure felt in just acts is developed out of the pleasure of direct sympathy with benevolent acts, and rests on the same fundamental desire for pleasure. . . . But why is an observance of the rules of justice called virtue, and their violation vice? Certainly not, as Locke thought, because they are imposed by an external authority upon the individual. The explanation must be sought in the desire for pleasure, which leads to the establishment of justice. Hume's explanation is that, so long as the community is small, men can see at a glance what is for their own interest, and hence self-interest is a sufficient motive. But as society expands, what is for one's interest is no longer self-evident, and some other principle has to come into play. That principle is sympathy; by which is to be understood the feeling of pleasure which arises in a man's mind when he contemplates an action done by another, the tendency of which is to bring pleasure to the community. The feeling of sympathy by which Hume explains the artificial virtue of justice is thus a special sort of pleasure differing from all other pleasures. . . . Granting that we have explained the origin of law and custom, and accounted for our moral approbation of acts in accordance with them without departing from the principle that all actions are done from the desire of pleasure," etc. (John Watson, *Hedonistic Theories*, pp. 124-127.)

This reduction of the whole account of sympathy to the pleasurableness of sympathetic feeling is typical of that casual interpretation of Hume by which, in like manner, the whole matter of the moral sense was reduced to the pleasure of exercising it.

Again, the explanation of the misinterpretation has to be that the critics have restated Hume in terms to which they attach meanings not his, meanings which are, moreover, at variance with his whole line of thought. When he tells us of the 'origin' of any passion—and his atomistic philosophy left him the somewhat dry task of a close record of 'relations' as his chief occupation—he intends to set down certain constantly observed temporal sequences; he is interpreted as asserting origin in the full sense of derivation, of the original elements to which the passion in question can be reduced.

In his effort after popularity, and in distrust, too, of the value of his previous speculations, Hume does not renew in the *Inquiry* the attempt of the *Treatise* to give a psychological explanation of the mechanism of sympathetic emotion.⁶ And it is because this explanation is present in the *Treatise* and lacking in the *Inquiry*, that in the criticism of Hume's treatment of sympathy there is a general tendency—as by Jodl and Pfleiderer and Professor Albee—to hold that he presents human nature as to a large extent unselfish in the *Inquiry*, but is committed to egoistic principles in the *Treatise*. Professor Albee is perplexed by a certain ambiguity—an "exasperating ambiguity"—but he seems finally to come to the conclusion that in the *Treatise* Hume must be interpreted as attempting "to reduce the altruistic tendencies of human nature to terms of something else." (Albee, *History of English Utilitarianism*, p. 111.) Mr. Selby-Bigge, in the introduction to his edition of the *Inquiries*, made with no such hesitation a similar distinction between the *Treatise* and the *Inquiry*.

"But the impression produced by the comparison of such passages as the above is very much strengthened when we consider the functions and position of *Sympathy* in the *Treatise* and

⁶ Hume still has in mind a 'mechanism,' though its nature he now considers inexplicable:

"And though all kinds of passion, even the most disagreeable, such as grief and anger, are observed, when excited by poetry, to convey a satisfaction, from a mechanism of nature, not easy to be explained." (*Inquiry*, vii.)

Enquiry respectively. It has been already noticed that in the *Dissertation on the Passions* sympathy was almost ignored, though it was perhaps the most important subject of Book II of the *Treatise*.

“Speaking broadly, we may say that in the *Treatise* nothing more is clear than that sympathy is used as a solvent to reduce complex feelings to simpler elements. In the *Enquiry*, sympathy is another name for social feeling, humanity, benevolence, natural philanthropy, rather than the name of the process by which the social feeling has been constructed out of non-social or individual feeling. (Sections 180, 182, 186, 199, 203, 210, 221-223.) Hume may have felt that the machinery assigned to sympathy in Book II of the *Treatise* did not work very well, and so have decided to get rid of it, but in so doing he may be said to have abandoned perhaps the most distinctive feature of his moral system as expounded in the *Treatise*, so that in the *Enquiry* there is little to distinguish his theory from the ordinary moral-sense theory, except perhaps a more destructive use of ‘utility.’ In the *Treatise*, his difference from the moral-sense school lay precisely in his attempt to resolve social feeling into a simple sensitivity to pleasure and pain, which has become complicated and transformed by sympathy. In reading Hutcheson we feel that he makes out a good case for his ‘benevolence’ against Hobbes and Mandeville and the more insidious selfishness of Shaftesbury, but that it would fall an easy prey to the ‘sympathy’ of Hume’s *Treatise*.” (Mr. Selby-Bigge’s edition of the *Inquiries*, p. xxvi.)

It is apparent that the real dispute has to do with the interpretation of the treatment of benevolence in the *Treatise*. I quoted Mr. Selby-Bigge at such length not only because the passage distinguishes between the *Treatise* and the *Inquiry*, but also because it is illustrative of the tendency to read and refashion Hume in the impressionistic manner, in accordance with the expectations of the critic, when he is peculiarly an author who can safely be paraphrased only with precise, with almost pedantic, reference to his text. On this matter of the rôle of benevolence in the *Treatise*, his text receives just such close scrutiny in the treatment of Professor McGilvary,¹ and I would

¹ The Philosophical Review, 1903, *Altruism in Hume’s Ethics*.

wish my account to be supplemented by reference to Professor McGilvary's clear and admirable discussion.

What has already been said as to the perfectly simple and original nature of the passions in Hume's psychological scheme should be recalled here. Benevolence, as a passion, is a secondary impression, an impression of reflection, and as such always follows on some preceding affection of pleasure or pain. It was maintained that this explanation was merely a record of temporal laws of occurrence, and in no way reduced this original passion—of inexplicable nature—to a modified form of its preceding stimuli. Hume ought, then, if consistent with his introductory psychology, to have nothing to say of the altruistic emotions and sentiments—of love, and of private and extensive benevolence—which could be interpreted as an assertion or an admission that they are compounded of, partake in any measure of, an equally original and simple passion, that of self-love. As has been said, it is usually conceded that an original benevolence is admitted⁸ in the *Inquiry*. Those passages in the *Treatise* that are generally considered attempts to reduce the apparently altruistic elements to self-love are what must now be examined.

In his discussion of *love*, Professor McGilvary gives a remarkably lucid account⁹ of how the preceding stimulation of this 'indirect passion' is brought about by the working of three principles: association of ideas, association of impressions by the resemblance of their affective tone, and parallel direction. Elaborate as this may seem, it is only the full statement of that "association of impressions and ideas" which arouses those special "impressions of reflection" which Hume calls indirect passions. Hume is telling us not of the *nature* of love, but of its 'origin,' which for Hume always means the necessary preceding impressions. And Professor McGilvary defines with admirable sharpness the point that, so far from introducing any element of self-love into love of another, it is the original quali-

⁸ It is of course considered an *admission*.

⁹ Philosophical Review, 1903, *Altruism in Hume's Treatise*, pp. 288-291.

ties of love, notably its direction toward *another person*, which make it possible for the principle of association to work. "One of these original qualities is the fact that love is 'always directed to some sensible being external to us'; that is, the original and invariable altruism of love is *presupposed* by Hume's associational explanation." This is far from an attempt to produce love out of self-love by help of the laws of association; these laws are here themselves dependent for their working on the original and peculiar qualities of love.

Now love is attended with, is arbitrarily "conjoined with," a certain appetite or desire, that of private benevolence, 'confined generosity,' 'limited generosity'—"a desire of the happiness of the person belov'd, and an aversion to his misery." Benevolence is regularly, for Hume, an active affection, as distinguished from love, a passive affection. His full discussion of the inexplicable nature of the union of love and private benevolence has already been considered.¹⁰ He can discover no mechanism, no laws of association, to explain our desire to acquire "goods and possessions . . . for ourselves and our nearest friends"—a desire which is "insatiable, perpetual, universal, and directly destructive of society." (*Treatise*, III, ii, 2.) He can only affirm that as a matter of fact "the passions of love and hatred are always follow'd by, or rather conjoin'd with, benevolence and anger." (*Treatise*, II, ii, 6.) Of this constant combination, he offers then no explanation. That we wish to forward the interests, to control the happiness, of those we love, we must accept as due to the original constitution of human nature.

Now sympathy plays somewhat the same rôle in regard to 'extensive benevolence' that love plays in regard to private benevolence, 'limited generosity.' The happiness and misery of the people we do not love affects us by virtue of 'sympathy.'

"There is no human, and indeed no sensible, creature, whose happiness or misery does not, in some measure, affect us, when

¹⁰ See pp. 16-17.

brought near to us, and represented in lively colours: But this proceeds merely from sympathy." (*Treatise*, III, ii, 1.)¹¹

By means of sympathy, we experience an active desire to contribute to the happiness and remove the pain of any creature subject to pleasure and pain. The connection between sympathetic pain or pleasure and the resulting 'extensive benevolence' is, like the connection between love and private benevolence, inexplicable. There can be discovered no explanation that would reduce either of them into anything else; they are of "the original frame of our mind." Though present only in a weak degree, extensive benevolence is not, according to Hume—as has been asserted—wholly absent in an uncultivated state; it is strengthened, not created, by "artifice and human conventions."

But to explain how the sympathetic emotion itself arises, he has in the *Treatise*, as has been said, an elaborate mechanism based on the principles of association. (The comment in the note to the title of Chapter III, in regard to Hume's use of the term 'sympathy,' should be recalled here; at times Hume uses

¹¹ See especially Professor McGilvary's discussion of the passage grossly misinterpreted by Mr. Selby-Bigge: "In general, it may be affirm'd, that there is no such passion in human minds, as the love of mankind, merely as such, independent of personal qualities, of services, or of relation to ourself." (*Treatise*, III, ii, 1.) Mr. Selby-Bigge points to this passage, which plainly refers to love, the accompaniment of private benevolence, as proof of Hume's tendency in the *Treatise* to deny the existence of what Hume would call extensive benevolence; Mr. Selby-Bigge says that such a passage "sternly limits" the "extent and influence" of benevolence; Hume here does not even raise the question of benevolence. Hume often has occasion to remark that our concern for those with whom we have no special connection is not so great as that for our relations and friends; but it is certainly strange to take a comparison of the strength of our concern for our intimates with the weakness of our interest in others, as an assertion that we have *no* kindly sentiments toward men in general. Hume is merely asserting that these are not naturally *strong* feelings. Note such passages as: "Now it appears, that in the original frame of our mind, our strongest attention is confin'd to ourselves: our next is extended to our relations and acquaintances; and 'tis only the *weakest* which reaches to strangers and indifferent persons. This *partiality*, then, and *unequal affection*," etc. (*Treatise*, III, ii, 2.) "We may conclude from it, that a regard to public interest, or a *strong* extensive benevolence, is not our first and original motive for the observation of the rules of justice," etc. (*Treatise*, III, ii, 2.) (The italics here are mine.)

the term in the ordinary sense of the passive sentiment of interest in the happiness and misery of others; but generally it is the name he gives to the mechanism by which we pass from the idea of some one else's emotion to a similar emotion.) This account of the operation of sympathy—the account in which Hume is supposed to extract sympathetic emotion from self-love—is, put briefly, as follows:¹² Impressions are distinguished from ideas only by their greater vividness, their greater 'liveliness.' No impression has such peculiar vividness as the impression of the self, which "is always intimately present with us," and of which we have so "lively a conception" that "'tis not possible to imagine, that anything can in this particular go beyond it." (*Treatise*, II, i, 11.) In intercourse with our fellows we become aware from their countenances that they are moved by certain passions, and so we receive *ideas* of their affections. Now we are so like other human beings that they can hardly experience any emotion with which we ourselves are not familiar. Thus the "inclinations and sentiments" which we observe in others are related to our own by resemblance, and may also be related by higher or lower degrees of contiguity. There is, then, so close a relation between our ideas of the passions of others and our always vivid conception of ourselves that the vividness of the latter tends to pass over to the former, and what was an *idea* of the "sentiments or passions" of another, taking on the liveliness, the vividness, always associated with ourselves, becomes an *impression*. What has happened because of the reference, the relation, to ourselves, has been merely a greater liveliness in our conception of other men's sentiments, not a momentary and artificially humane conceit that the other man's pains and pleasures are our own and as such must receive active attention. All that is transferred from the idea of the self is its vividness. What we are still, what we have never at any point in the process ceased to be concerned with, is the *other man's* condition. As we observe another man's happiness or misery, what happens

¹² I shall quote later the passages which I thus paraphrase.

to us, because we are men like him (the principle of resemblance), and may be related to him in many ways (the principle of contiguity or causality), is that we conceive his pleasure and pain with a greater liveliness, a greater vivacity; what we conceive is still *his* condition, not our own. As Professor McGilvary puts it, "sympathy does not make us feel for ourselves, but makes us ourselves feel for the same object the same passion which the other man feels." There is in this no trace of the unquestionably egoistic account of sympathy according to which we put ourselves unconsciously in the place of those with whom we sympathize—a theory properly to be attributed to Adam Smith,¹³ but not to Hume.

The further result of the action of sympathy, of the impression we through sympathy receive, is, naturally, an active desire to control the pains and pleasures of those with whom we sympathize, similar in nature, if not in strength, to our practical concern for "ourselves and our nearest friends,"—i. e., extensive benevolence.

That this interpretation does not depart from the intention of the original, will be clear on an examination of the following passages:¹⁴

"All the perceptions of the mind are of two kinds, viz. impressions and ideas, which differ from each other only in their different degrees of force and vivacity. Our ideas are copy'd from our impressions, and represent them in all their parts. When you wou'd any way vary the idea of a particular object, you can only encrease or diminish its force and vivacity. If you make any other change on it, it represents a different object or impression. The case is the same as in colours. A particular shade of any colour may acquire a new degree of liveliness or brightness without any other variation. But when you produce any other variation, 'tis no longer the same shade or colour.

¹³ *Essay on the Moral Sentiments*, Bk. I, Chap. I.

¹⁴ In the first passage quoted, Hume is explaining how liveliness is communicated from impressions to those special ideas that we call beliefs; but his account here implies a general theory of the transference of vividness. Though much in it on the special matter of belief, which cannot well be extricated, is not immediately relevant, I choose it for quotation because it is the best explanation of the manner in which vividness may pass from impressions to ideas.

So that, as belief does nothing but vary the manner, in which we conceive any object, it can only bestow on our ideas an additional force and vivacity. An opinion, therefore, or belief may be most accurately defin'd, A lively idea related to or associated with a present impression. . . . Having thus explain'd the nature of belief, and shewn that it consists in a lively idea related to a present impression; let us now proceed to examine from what principles it is deriv'd, and what bestows the vivacity on the idea.

“ I wou'd willingly establish it as a general maxim in the science of human nature, *that when any impression becomes present to us, it not only transports the mind to such ideas as are related to it, but likewise communicates to them a share of its force and vivacity.* All the operations of the mind depend in a great measure on its disposition, when it performs them; and according as the spirits are more or less elevated, and the attention more or less fix'd, the action will always have more or less vigour and vivacity. When therefore any object is presented, which elevates and enlivens the thought, every action, to which the mind applies itself, will be more strong and vivid, as long as that disposition continues. . . . Hence it happens, that when the mind is once inliven'd by a present impression, it proceeds to form a more lively idea of the related objects, by a natural transition of the disposition from the one to the other. The change of the objects is so easy, that the mind is scarce sensible of it, but applies itself to the conception of the related idea with all the force and vivacity it acquir'd from the present impression.

“ If, in considering the nature of relation, and that facility of transition, which is essential to it, we can satisfy ourselves concerning the reality of this phenomenon, 'tis well: But I must confess I place my chief confidence in experience to prove so material a principle. We may, therefore, observe, as the first experiment to our present purpose, that upon the appearance of the picture of an absent friend, our idea of him is evidently inliven'd by the *resemblance*, and that every passion, which that idea occasions, whether of joy or sorrow, acquires new force and vigour. In producing this effect there concur both a relation and a present impression. . . .

“ We may add force to these experiments by others of a different kind, in considering the effects of *contiguity*, as well as of *resemblance*. 'Tis certain, that distance diminishes the force of every idea, and that upon our approach to any object, tho' it does not discover itself to our senses; it operates upon

the mind with an influence that imitates an immediate impression. The thinking on any object readily transports the mind to what is contiguous; but 'tis only the actual presence of an object that transports it with a superior vivacity . . . [as in the one case] both the objects of the mind are ideas; notwithstanding there is an easy transition betwixt them; that transition alone is not able to give a superior vivacity to any of the ideas, for want of some immediate impression.

"No one can doubt but causation has the same influence as the other two relations of resemblance and contiguity. . . . A present impression, then, is absolutely requisite to this whole operation; and when after this I compare an impression with an idea, and find that their only difference consists in their different degrees of force and vivacity, I conclude upon the whole, that belief is a more vivid and intense conception of an idea, proceeding from its relation to a present impression." (*Treatise*, I, iii, 7, 8.)

Impressions may, then, convey to related ideas some of their own vividness. It should be insisted that there is no suggestion here that anything passes over other than the vividness; there is no interchange of content between impression and idea. It is on this ready transference of vividness from impression to idea that his account of the working of sympathy is based. As it stands in Book II of the *Treatise, Of the Passions*, it runs thus:

"No quality of human nature is more remarkable, both in itself and in its consequences, than that propensity we have to sympathize with others, and to receive by communication their inclinations and sentiments, however different from, or even contrary to our own. This is not only conspicuous in children, who implicitly embrace every opinion propos'd to them; but also in men of the greatest judgment and understanding, who find it very difficult to follow their own reason and inclination, in opposition to that of their friends and daily companions. . . . So remarkable a phaenomenon merits our attention, and must be trac'd up to its first principles.

"When any affection is infus'd by sympathy, it is at first known only by its effects, and by those external signs in the countenance and conversation, which convey an idea of it. This idea is presently converted into an impression, and acquires such a degree of force and vivacity, as to become the very passion itself, and produce an equal emotion, as any original

affection. However instantaneous this change of the idea into an impression may be, it proceeds from certain views and reflections, which will not escape the strict scrutiny of a philosopher, tho' they may the person himself, who makes them.

" 'Tis evident, that the idea, or rather impression of ourselves is always intimately present with us, and that our consciousness gives us so lively a conception of our own person, that 'tis not possible to imagine, that any thing can in this particular go beyond it. Whatever object, therefore, is related to ourselves must be conceived with a like vivacity of conception, according to the foregoing principles; and tho' this relation shou'd not be so strong as that of causation, it must still have a considerable influence. Resemblance and contiguity are relations not to be neglected; especially when by inference from cause and effect, and by the observation of external signs, we are inform'd of the real existence of the object, which is resembling or contiguous.

" Now 'tis obvious, that nature has preserv'd a great resemblance among all human creatures, and that we never remark any passion or principle in others, of which, in some degree or other, we may not find a parallel in ourselves. The case is the same with the fabric of the mind, as with that of the body. However the parts may differ in shape or size, their structure and composition are in general the same. There is a very remarkable resemblance, which preserves itself amidst all their variety; and this resemblance must very much contribute to make us enter into the sentiments of others, and embrace them with facility and pleasure. Accordingly we find, that where, beside the general resemblance of our natures, there is any peculiar similarity in our manners, or character, or country, or language, it facilitates the sympathy. The stronger the relation is betwixt ourselves and any object, the more easily does the imagination make the transition, and convey to the related idea the vivacity of conception, with which we always form the idea of our own person.

" Nor is resemblance the only relation, which has this effect, but receives new force from other relations, that may accompany it. The sentiments of others have little influence, when far remov'd from us, and require the relation of contiguity, to make them communicate themselves entirely. The relations of blood, being a species of causation, may sometimes contribute to the same effect; as also acquaintance, which operates in the same manner with education and custom; as we shall see more fully afterwards. All these relations, when united together,

convey the impression or consciousness of our own person to the idea of the sentiments or passions of others, and makes us conceive them in the strongest and most lively manner.

"It has been remark'd in the beginning of this treatise, that all ideas are borrow'd from impressions, and that these two kinds of perceptions differ only in the degrees of force and vivacity, with which they strike upon the soul. The component parts of ideas and impressions are precisely alike. The manner and order of their appearance may be the same. The different degrees of their force and vivacity are, therefore, the only particulars that distinguish them: And as this difference may be remov'd, in some measure, by a relation betwixt the impressions and ideas, 'tis no wonder an idea of a sentiment or passion, may by this means be so inliven'd as to become the very sentiment or passion. The lively idea of any object always approaches its impression. . . . Besides the relation of cause and effect, by which we are convinc'd of the reality of the passion, with which we sympathize; besides this, I say, we must be assisted by the relations of resemblance and contiguity, in order to feel the sympathy in its full perfection. And since these relations can entirely convert an idea into an impression, and convey the vivacity of the latter into the former, so perfectly as to lose nothing of it in the transition, we may easily conceive how the relation of cause and effect alone, may serve to strengthen and inliven an idea. In sympathy there is an evident conversion of an idea into an impression. This conversion arises from the relation of objects to ourself. Ourself is always intimately present to us. Let us compare all these circumstances, and we shall find, that sympathy is exactly correspondent to the operations of our understanding; and even contains something more surprising and extraordinary." (*Treatise*, II, i, 11.)

There could hardly be more insistence on the point that, as the only difference between impressions and corresponding ideas is that of the greater force and vivacity of the former, the only change that can take place by the operation of sympathy is in the force, the vividness, of what, at first an idea, becomes, when thus enlivened, an impression. The object is the same in the impression as it was in the idea; at no point do we imagine that we are the other man; nor have we in any way come to imagine that his situation is in some sense ours; we have come to feel somewhat as the other man feels about *his*

situation. The only change here accounted for, when our idea of another man's passion changes to an impression, to the very passion itself, is an increase in vividness; the impression of the self, aroused by virtue of the relations which Hume mentions, passes over to the idea some of its own vivacity; but it conveys, it can convey, nothing else. According to Hume's psychology, the principles of which he here plainly reaffirms, any further change in the idea in the course of its transformation into an impression would be inexplicable; this is the only change that can take place between an idea and a related impression.

In another account in Book II, which differs little from the preceding, Hume suggests that the theory here given should refute those philosophers who would derive compassion from our habitual realization that we are ourselves liable to the misfortunes of others:

" 'Twill be easy to explain the passion of *pity*, from the precedent reasoning concerning *sympathy*. We have a lively idea of everything related to us. All human creatures are related to us by resemblance. Their persons, therefore, their interests, their passions, their pains and pleasures must strike upon us in a lively manner, and produce an emotion similar to the original one; since a lively idea is easily converted into an impression. If this be true in general, it must be more so of affliction and sorrow. These have always a stronger and more lasting influence than any pleasure or enjoyment. . . . Unless it be asserted, that every distinct passion is communicated by a distinct original quality, and is not deriv'd from the general principle of sympathy above-explain'd, it must be allow'd, that all of them arise from that principle. To except any one in particular must appear highly unreasonable. As they are all first present in the mind of one person, and afterwards appear in the mind of another; and as the manner of their appearance, first as an idea, then as an impression, is in every case the same, the transition must arise from the same principle. I am at least sure, that this method of reasoning wou'd be consider'd as certain, either in natural philosophy or common life.'

" Add to this, that pity depends, in a great measure, on the contiguity, and even sight of the object; which is a proof, that 'tis deriv'd from the imagination. . . . Those philosophers, who derive this passion from I know not what subtle reflec-

tions on the instability of fortune, and our being liable to the same miseries we behold, will find this observation contrary to them among a great many others, which it were easy to produce." (*Treatise*, II, ii, 7.)

In his description of the same process in Book III, he reinforces his account of the rôle of sympathy in the sphere of morals by pointing out that in a similar fashion the same mechanism operates in the production of our "sense of beauty"; and here it is very plain that our natural and continued concern is for the *other man's* advantages and disadvantages—not that the possibility of egoistic considerations is directly raised, for Hume's explanation admits, as has been said, no such contingency. The passage on beauty runs as follows:

"Our sense of beauty depends very much on this principle; and where any object has a tendency to produce pleasure in its possessor, it is always regarded as beautiful; as every object, that has a tendency to produce pain, is disagreeable and deform'd. Thus the conveniency of a house, the fertility of a field, the strength of a horse, the capacity, security, and swift-sailing of a vessel, form the principal beauty of these several objects. Here the object, which is denominated beautiful, pleases only by its tendency to produce a certain effect. That effect is the pleasure or advantage of some other person. Now the pleasure of a stranger, for whom we have no friendship, pleases us only by sympathy. To this principle, therefore, is owing the beauty, which we find in everything that is useful. How considerable a part this is of beauty will easily appear upon reflexion. Wherever an object has a tendency to produce pleasure in the possessor, or in other words, is the proper *cause* of pleasure, it is sure to please the spectator, by a delicate sympathy with the possessor." (*Treatise*, III, iii, 1.)

This account of how, from mere observation of the pains and pleasures of others, we finally arrive through sympathy at benevolence, a desire to control these pains and pleasures—this account of the mechanism of 'sympathy' through which there arises the sentiment of benevolence—he drops, as has been said, in the *Inquiry*; he rejects all explanations that have been offered of how we come to feel for others, having in mind apparently particularly his own theory of the sympathetic

mechanism ; he would now have us draw our conclusions from apparent fact, or rather refrain altogether from speculation and accept the plain appearances of things. It is because he thus gives up his explanation of how we come by sympathetic emotions, and accordingly extensive benevolence, that he is thought to depart in the *Inquiry* from the egoistic principles of the *Treatise*, for it is, manifestly, his description of the workings of sympathy that is interpreted (incorrectly, as I have tried to show) as a derivation of benevolence from self-love. He now accepts benevolence without examining how the particular manifestations take place, and his tone is one of impatience with inquiries which, as they alter not the nature of the thing discussed, are more curious than significant. He is objecting directly to those who, for the sake of "that love of *simplicity* which has been the source of much false reasoning in philosophy," would consider our sentiments of generosity but modifications of the selfish passions—would, by "philosophical chymistry," "explain every affection to be self-love, twisted and moulded, by a particular turn of imagination, into a variety of appearances." (*Inquiry*, Appendix II.) And, moreover, the point he here makes justifies, too, his departure from his own non-egoistic attempt to look behind the bare facts of benevolence ; for he has come to consider any analysis of its manifestations probably futile and certainly unnecessary. Referring to the text here we find that at first he proposes an examination of the question as to the universal or partial selfishness of man :

" But though the question concerning the universal or partial selfishness of man be not so material as is usually imagined to morality and practice, it is certainly of consequence in the speculative science of human nature, and is a proper object of curiosity and enquiry. It may not, therefore, be unsuitable, in this place, to bestow a few reflections upon it." (*Inquiry*, Appendix II.)

But his inquiry soon falls away into mere impatience with what he dismisses as a "paradox," a manifest improbability. Continuing the preceding quotation :

" The most obvious objection to the selfish hypothesis is, that, as it is contrary to common feeling and our most unpreju-

diced notions, there is required the highest stretch of philosophy to establish so extraordinary a paradox. To the most careless observer there appear to be such dispositions as benevolence and generosity; such affections as love, friendship, compassion, gratitude. These sentiments have their causes, effects, objects, and operations, marked by common language and observation, and plainly distinguished from those of the selfish passions. And as this is the obvious appearance of things, it must be admitted, till some hypothesis be discovered, which by penetrating deeper into human nature, may prove the former affections to be nothing but modifications of the latter. All attempts of this kind have hitherto proved fruitless, and seem to have proceeded entirely from that love of *simplicity* which has been the source of much false reasoning in philosophy. I shall not here enter into any detail on the present subject. Many able philosophers have shown the insufficiency of these systems. And I shall take for granted what, I believe, the smallest reflection will make evident to every impartial enquirer." (*Inquiry*, Appendix II.)

His right in this matter to accept immediately what he finds, he insists on further in a note:

"Benevolence naturally divides into two kinds, the *general* and the *particular*. The first is, where we have no friendship or connexion or esteem for the person, but feel only a general sympathy with him or a compassion for his pains, and a congratulation with his pleasures. The other species of benevolence is founded on an opinion of virtue, on services done us, or on some particular connexions. Both these sentiments must be allowed real in human nature; but whether they will resolve into some nice considerations of self-love, is a question more curious than important. The former sentiment, to wit, that of general benevolence, or humanity, or sympathy, we shall have occasion frequently to treat of in the course of this enquiry; and I assume it as real, from general experience, without any other proof." (*Inquiry*, Appendix II, note 1.)¹⁵

He proceeds to give reasons for thinking that in this case the obvious explanation is the true one, and to express a strong

¹⁵ See also *Inquiry*, Section V, Part ii, note 1: "It is needless to push our researches so far as to ask, why we have humanity or a fellow-feeling with others. It is sufficient, that this is experienced to be a principle in human nature. We must stop somewhere in our examination of causes; and there are, in every science, some general principles, beyond which we cannot hope to find any principle more general. No man is absolutely indifferent to the happiness or misery of others," etc.

doubt whether future philosophers will fare any better in their attempts to reduce benevolence to passions apparently different than have those of the past.

“ But the nature of the subject furnishes the strongest presumption, that no better system will ever, for the future, be invented, in order to account for the origin of the benevolent from the selfish affections, and reduce all the various emotions of the mind to a perfect simplicity. The case is not the same in this species of philosophy as in physics. Many an hypothesis in nature, contrary to first appearances, has been found, on more accurate scrutiny, solid and satisfactory. Instances of this kind are so frequent that a judicious, as well as a witty philosopher, has ventured to affirm, if there be more than one way in which any phenomenon may be produced, that there is a general presumption for its arising from the causes which are the least obvious and familiar. But the presumption always lies on the other side, in all enquiries concerning the origin of our passions, and of the internal operations of the human mind. The simplest and most obvious cause which can there be assigned for any phenomenon, is probably the true one. When a philosopher, in the explication of his system, is obliged to have recourse to some very intricate and refined reflections, and to suppose them essential to the production of any passion or emotion, we have reason to be extremely on our guard against so fallacious an hypothesis. The affections are not susceptible of any impression from the refinements of reason or imagination; and it is always found that a vigorous exertion of the latter faculties, necessarily, from the narrow capacity of the human mind, destroys all activity in the former. Our predominant motive or intention is, indeed, frequently concealed from ourselves when it is mingled and confounded with other motives which the mind, from vanity or self-conceit, is desirous of supposing more prevalent: but there is no instance that a concealment of this nature has ever arisen from the abstruseness and intricacy of the motive. These and a thousand other instances are marks of general benevolence in human nature, where no *real* interest binds us to the object. And how an *imaginary* interest, known and avowed for such, can be the origin of any passion or emotion, seems difficult to explain. No satisfactory hypothesis of this kind has yet been discovered; nor is there the smallest probability that the future industry of men will ever be attended with more favourable success.” (*Inquiry*, Appendix II.)

CHAPTER III.

PRIVATE AND EXTENSIVE BENEVOLENCE.

It has been shown that while, in the *Treatise*, Hume tried to show just what is the psychological mechanism involved in 'sympathy,' in the *Inquiry* he does not renew this attempt. In both books, it is 'sympathy' that arouses the sympathetic emotions, which, in turn, lead to extensive benevolence. The original, underivable quality of extensive benevolence we are, in the *Inquiry*, asked to take for granted; in the *Treatise*, in the account of the process by which it is aroused, its original character is, we found, confirmed rather than destroyed. In Hume's description of the operations of 'sympathy,' and in the statements in the *Inquiry* in which he gives up the explanatory mechanism, there is naturally involved much of his direct treatment of the two varieties of benevolence. What has to be said about this point has, then, to a certain extent been necessarily anticipated.

Hume makes, as has been pointed out, a distinction between private and extensive benevolence,¹ the one a desire for the happiness of those we love, the other a desire for the happiness of those we do not love; the second being the benevolence which is dependent on the operations of 'sympathy.' But except in the discussion of the origin of justice, the distinction has little significance for the rôle benevolence is to play in morality. It is, however, important to note that it is because of failure to bear in mind this distinction—the reader must needs recall it for himself, for in general discussion Hume takes our awareness of it for granted—that Mr. Selby-Bigge can quote a passage which has to do with love, and thus indirectly with private benevolence, as proof of a tendency to

¹ *Treatise*, III, ii, 2; *Inquiry*, Appendix II, note.

deny an "original instinct of Benevolence" in contradiction to certain passages which seem to admit it. This passage, with Mr. Selby-Bigge's misinterpretation of it, has already been referred to, but it seems well again to bring it in here, since it offers the best chance to point out Hume's distinction—and the ease of neglecting it. The passage is this:

"In general, it may be affirm'd that there is no such passion in human minds, as the love of mankind, merely as such, independent of personal qualities, of services, or of relation to ourself. 'Tis true, there is no human, and indeed no sensible, creature, whose happiness or misery does not, in some measure, affect us, when brought near to us, and represented in lively colours: But this proceeds merely from sympathy, and is no proof of such an universal affection to mankind, since this concern extends itself beyond our own species." (*Treatise*, III, ii, 1.)

It is evident from the preceding discussion that all that Hume is denying here is that there are toward all mankind such sentiments as those of private benevolence, which follow only on love, a feeling we may have only for those with whom we have special relations; what there are instead, as he here indicates, are the sentiments of extensive benevolence, which come into being through sympathy.²

Benevolence Hume describes as a calm desire or passion:

"There are certain calm desires and tendencies, which, tho' they be real passions, produce little emotion in the mind, and are more known by their effects than by the immediate feeling or sensation. These desires are of two kinds; either certain instincts originally implanted in our natures, such as benevolence and resentment, the love of life, and kindness to children; or the general appetite to good, and aversion to evil, consider'd merely as such." (*Treatise*, II, iii, 3.)

² Note the extraordinary disregard of Hume's distinctions in a recent history of ethics:

"What is its motive [that of justice]? Not public interest, for this is 'a motive too remote and sublime to affect the generality of mankind'; and in general 'there are no such passions in human minds as the love of mankind, merely as such, independent of personal qualities, of services, or of relation to ourself,' for sympathy does not extend to every one." (R. A. P. Rogers, *A Short History of Ethics*, p. 183.)

Just because it is thus a passion, it must be an original endowment of our nature ; and there are many passages, several of which have already been quoted, which insist that it is present in human nature, and is ultimate, unresolvable. It may be well to add some of the more striking direct statements :

“ Compelled by these instances, we must renounce the theory, which accounts for every moral sentiment by the principle of self-love. We must adopt a more public affection, and allow, that the interests of society are not, even on their own account, entirely indifferent to us.” (*Inquiry*, V, ii.)

“ All mankind so far resemble the good principle, that, where interest or revenge or envy perverts not our disposition, we are always inclined, from our natural philanthropy, to give the preference to the happiness of society, and consequently to virtue above its opposite. Absolute, unprovoked, disinterested malice has never perhaps place in any human breast ; or if it had, must there pervert all the sentiments of morals, as well as the feelings of humanity.” (*Inquiry*, V, ii.)

“ These principles of humanity and sympathy enter so deeply into all our sentiments, and have so powerful an influence, as may enable them to excite the strongest censure and applause.” (*Inquiry*, V, ii.)

And in the conclusion of this section on why utility pleases :

“ Were it doubtful, whether there were any such principle in our nature as humanity or a concern for others, yet when we see, in numberless instances, that whatever has a tendency to promote the interests of society, is so highly approved of, we ought thence to learn the force of the benevolent principle ; since it is impossible for anything to please as means to an end, where the end is totally indifferent.”

And however weak he may at times consider particular instances of this sentiment in comparison with the desire for our own interest, he feels that he may yet conclude that—

“ So far from thinking, that men have no affection for anything beyond themselves, I am of opinion, that tho' it be rare to meet with one, who loves any single person better than himself ; yet 'tis as rare to meet with one, in whom all the kind affections, taken together, do not over-balance all the selfish.” (*Treatise*, III, ii, 2.)

It should be observed that beyond the general distinction between private and public benevolence, Hume recognizes a gradual scale in the degrees of benevolence; and the weakness of our kindly feelings toward those remote from us, in comparison with the strength of our sentiments toward those near and dear to us, he looks on as a fortunate arrangement to secure the limitation of interest necessary for definite, effective action.

“When the interests of one country interfere with those of another, we estimate the merits of a statesman by the good or ill, which results to his own country from his measures and councils, without regard to the prejudice which he brings on its enemies and rivals. His fellow-citizens are the objects, which lie nearest the eye, while we determine his character. And as nature has implanted in every one a superior affection to his own country, we never expect any regard to distant nations, where a competition arises. Not to mention, that, while every man consults the good of his own community, we are sensible, that the general interest of mankind is better promoted, than by any loose indeterminate views to the good of a species, whence no beneficial action could ever result, for want of a duly limited object, on which they could exert themselves.” (*Inquiry*, V, ii, note 4.)

Of the practical wisdom of this arrangement for variation in strength from private benevolence through the degrees of extensive benevolence, he repeats his approval:

“It is wisely ordained by nature, that private connexions should commonly prevail over universal views and considerations; otherwise our affections and actions would be dissipated and lost, for want of a proper limited object.” (*Inquiry*, V, ii, note 7.)

In the *Treatise* there is no approving comment, but merely mention of this as a state of affairs that we readily accept, commanding the man who is useful within his own sphere:

“When experience has once given us a competent knowledge of human affairs, and has taught us the proportion they bear to human passion, we perceive, that the generosity of men is very limited, and that it seldom extends beyond their friends and family, or, at most, beyond their native country. Being thus acquainted with the nature of man, we expect not any

impossibilities from him; but confine our view to that narrow circle, in which any person moves, in order to form a judgment of his moral character. When the natural tendency of his passions leads him to be serviceable and useful within his sphere, we approve of his character, and love his person, by a sympathy with the sentiments of those, who have a more particular connexion with him." (*Treatise*, III, iii, 3.)

We must not think that because benevolence is not a violent passion it is therefore less effective, has therefore less control over the will.

" 'Tis evident passions influence not the will in proportion to their violence, or the disorder they occasion in the temper; but on the contrary, that when a passion has once become a settled principle of action, and is the predominant inclination of the soul, it commonly produces no longer any sensible agitation. As repeated custom and its own force have made everything yield to it, it directs the actions and conduct without that opposition and emotion, which so naturally attend every momentary gust of passion." (*Treatise*, II, iii, 4.)

Hume, then, finds in human nature the passion of benevolence, varying in degree in accordance with the relation toward us of those for whom we feel it, and, though not a violent passion, not on that account of less influence over action.

CHAPTER IV.

THE RELATION OF BENEVOLENCE TO THE MORAL SENSE.

We have now to determine the relation of benevolence to the moral sense. Benevolence is, as we have seen, a direct passion, which arises, in the case of private benevolence, from the indirect passion of love, in the case of public benevolence, from sympathetic pain and pleasure. In each case it is concern for the pain and pleasure of others. Now the moral sentiments of approbation and disapprobation are, after the manner of direct passions, dependent on the sympathy which Hume has established. The pleasures and pains of others as we feel them through sympathy are those that stimulate the moral sense, and so give rise to the sentiments of approbation and disapprobation. It is important to note that Hume's theory here differs from the typical moral sense theory ; approbation and disapprobation are not *sensations* but *sentiments*, since previous pleasure and pain are necessary to stimulate them. But there remains the essential characteristic of the moral sense school, the provision of a peculiar faculty.

We give moral approval to benevolence, or the active desire for the good of others ; the benevolent tendencies approved of have, in general, been aroused by the action of sympathy ; the pleasure-pain that so arouses the moral sense that it responds in the moral sentiments is likewise aroused by sympathy—sympathy with the pleasures and pains of those toward whom are directed the benevolent tendencies approved of. Considering in how many connections this matter comes up, and the apparent lack of any intention to develop the point systematically, it is remarkable how unvaryingly the separate passages will bear this interpretation. In the more popular language of the *In-*

quiry, the relation between benevolence and the moral sense is expressed in very loose and general terms ; it is here put in the attractive form of a general identification between the moral sentiments and humanity, though here, too, the phrasing at times takes on such more precise form as “ the sentiments which *arise from humanity* can alone be the foundation of morals, or of any general system of blame or praise.” (*Inquiry*, IX, i.)¹

The more vague account of the relation is that in such passages as this :

“ But if, instead of this fancied monster [a person originally framed so as to have no manner of concern for his fellow creatures], we suppose a *man* to form a judgement or determination in the case [the choice between the prosperity and the ruin of nations], there is to him a plain foundation of preference, where everything else is equal; and however cool his choice may be, if his heart be selfish, or if the persons interested be remote from him ; there must still be a choice or distinction between what is useful, and what is pernicious. Now this distinction is the same, in all its parts, with the *moral distinction*, whose foundation has been so often, and so much in vain, enquired after. The same endowments of the mind, in every circumstance, are agreeable to the sentiment of morals and to that of humanity ; the same temper is susceptible of high degrees of the one sentiment and of the other ; and the same alteration in the objects, by their nearer approach or by connexions, enlivens the one and the other. By all the rules of philosophy, therefore, we must conclude, that these sentiments are originally [“ originally ” means “ in origin ”] the same ; since in each particular, even the most minute, they are governed by the same laws, and are moved by the same objects.” (*Inquiry*, VI, i.)

In Section V, where he also contends that the degree of a man’s humanity corresponds to the degree of his susceptibility to vice and virtue, he further makes the point that an inversion in our attitude toward mankind by which we came to wish to them ill rather than good must bring about a correspondent inversion in our sentiments of approbation and disapprobation.

¹ The italics here are mine.

" If any man from a cold insensibility, or narrow selfishness of temper, is unaffected with the images of human happiness or misery, he must be equally indifferent to the images of vice and virtue: As, on the other hand, it is always found, that a warm concern for the interests of our species is attended with a delicate feeling of all moral distinctions; a strong resentment of injury done to men; a lively approbation of their welfare. In this particular, though great superiority is observable of one man above another; yet none are so entirely indifferent to the interests of their fellow-creatures, as to perceive no distinctions of moral good and evil, in consequence of the different tendencies of actions and principles. . . . And if the principles of humanity are capable, in many instances, of influencing our actions, they must, at all times, have *some* authority over our sentiments, and give us a general approbation of what is useful to society, and blame for what is dangerous or pernicious. . . . A creature, absolutely malicious and spiteful, were there any such in nature, must be worse than indifferent to the images of vice and virtue. All his sentiments must be inverted, and directly opposite to those, which prevail in the human species. Whatever contributes to the good of mankind, as it crosses the constant bent of his wishes and desires, must produce uneasiness and disapprobation; and on the contrary, whatever is the source of disorder and misery in society, must, for the same reason, be regarded with pleasure and complacency." (*Inquiry*, V, ii.)

The passage in the *Inquiry* in which humanity is most plainly described as a passion, producing the sentiments of approbation and disapprobation, is the following:

" The notion of morals implies some sentiment common to all mankind, which recommends the same object to general approbation, and makes every man, or most men, agree in the same opinion or decision concerning it. It also implies some sentiment, so universal and comprehensive as to extend to all mankind, and render the actions and conduct, even of the persons the most remote, an object of applause or censure, according as they agree or disagree with that rule of right which is established. These two requisite circumstances belong alone to the sentiment of humanity here insisted on. The other passions produce, in every breast, many strong sentiments of desire and aversion, affection and hatred; but these neither are felt so much in common, nor are so comprehensive, as to be the founda-

tion of any general system and established theory of blame or approbation." (*Inquiry*, IX, i.)²

Indeed, none of these passages is inconsistent with—they simply take for granted—what has been given as the precise relation among benevolence, sympathy, and the moral sentiments. But in the *Treatise* any reference to benevolence and the moral sentiments is usually so worded as to keep to a relation between the pain-pleasure stimulus and the resultant sentiment, with an accuracy, an exactness, that should leave us in no doubt as to the author's intention. When, in Part iii of Book III of the *Treatise*, he heads the first section, *Of the origin of the natural virtues and vices*, he means to discover, as always when he sets out to investigate 'origins,' the immediately preceding phenomena, the stimuli on which that which he is examining follows.³ When he says, "To discover the true origin of morals, and of that love and hatred, which arises from mental qualities, we must take the matter pretty deeply, and compare some principles, which have been already examin'd and explain'd," he has started his search for the stimuli of these moral sentiments. And at once he looks to 'sympathy': "We may begin with considering a-new the nature and force of *sympathy*." When at the end of Section 2 of Part i, the section on *Moral distinctions deriv'd from a moral sense*, he said that we have now only to discover "why any action or sentiment upon the general view or survey, gives a certain satisfaction or uneasiness, in order to show the origin of its moral rectitude or depravity," he meant that what he had to describe was whatever

² See earlier in the same section:

"Let these generous sentiments be supposed ever so weak; let them be insufficient to move even a hand or finger of our body, they must still direct the determinations of our mind, and where everything else is equal, produce a cool preference of what is useful and serviceable to mankind, above what is pernicious and dangerous. A *moral distinction*, therefore, immediately arises; a general sentiment of blame and approbation."

³ In reading Hume we must take as much precaution against resolving the moral sentiments into the sympathetic emotions as against resolving them into self-love. The sympathetic emotions are preceding stimuli, not constituent elements.

contributes to the stimulus of the moral sense, that which is its origin in the sense of the preceding pleasure and pain necessary to the excitation of any passion from its very nature. When, then, in the section *Of the origin of the natural virtues and vices*, he examines the nature of sympathy, in a passage much of which I have already quoted when trying to show how an *idea* of another's pleasure is enlivened until it becomes an *impression*, his account of the relation between sympathy and morality goes thus :

“ Now the pleasure of a stranger, for whom we have no friendship, pleases us only by sympathy. To this principle, therefore, is owing the beauty, which we find in everything that is useful. . . . Wherever an object has a tendency to produce pleasure in the possessor, or, in other words, is the proper *cause* of pleasure, it is sure to please the spectator, by a delicate sympathy with the possessor. . . . The same principle produces, in many instances, our sentiments of morals, as well as those of beauty. No virtue is more esteem'd than justice, and no vice more detested than injustice; nor are there any qualities, which go farther to the fixing the character, either as aimable or odious. Now justice is a moral virtue, merely because it has that tendency to the good of mankind. . . . All these [allegiance, the laws of nations, of modesty, of good manners] are mere human contrivances for the interest of society. And since there is a very strong sentiment of morals, which in all nations, and all ages, has attended them, we must allow, that the reflecting on the tendency of characters and mental qualities, is sufficient to give us the sentiments of approbation and blame. Now as the means to an end can only be agreeable, where the end is agreeable; and as the good of society, where our own interest is not concern'd, or that of our friends, pleases only by sympathy: It follows, that sympathy is the source of the esteem, which we pay to all the artificial virtues. . . . That many of the natural virtues have this tendency to the good of society, no one can doubt of. . . . Now we have no such extensive concern for society but from sympathy; and consequently 'tis that principle, which takes us so far out of ourselves, as to give us the same pleasure and uneasiness in the characters of others, as if they had a tendency to our own advantage or loss. . . . After it [justice] is once establish'd by these conventions, it is *naturally* attended

with a strong sentiment of morals; which can proceed from nothing but our sympathy with the interests of society. We need no other explication of that esteem, which attends such of the natural virtues, as have a tendency to the public good." (*Treatise*, III, iii, 1.)

And a sentence very suggestive of the method by which sympathy acts:

"When any quality, or character, has a tendency to the good of mankind, we are pleas'd with it, and approve of it; because it presents the lively idea of pleasure; which idea affects us by sympathy." (*Treatise*, III, iii, 1.)

Again the point is especially made that it is only by sympathy that we can account for our approval of qualities which make for the good of strangers, since it is only by sympathy that we have an interest in the welfare of those whom we do not love:

"The person is a stranger: I am in no way interested in him, nor lie under any obligation to him: His happiness concerns not me, farther than the happiness of any human, and indeed of every sensible creature: That is, it affects me only by sympathy. From that principle, whenever I discover his happiness and good, whether in its causes or effects, I enter so deeply into it, that it gives me a sensible emotion. The appearance of qualities that have a *tendency* to promote it, have an agreeable effect upon my imagination, and command my love and esteem." (*Treatise*, III, iii, 1.)

And in the conclusion of Book III of the *Treatise*:

"If we compare all these circumstances, we shall not doubt, that sympathy is the chief source of moral distinctions; especially when we reflect, that no objection can be rais'd against this hypothesis in one case, which will not extend to all cases. Justice is certainly approv'd of for no other reason, than because it has a tendency to the public good: And the public good is indifferent to us, except so far as sympathy interests us in it. We may presume the like with regard to all the other virtues, which have a like tendency to the public good. They must derive all their merit from our sympathy with those, who reap any advantage from them: As the virtues, which have a tendency to the good of the person possess'd of them, derive their merit from our sympathy with him.

“ Most people will readily allow, that the useful qualities of the mind are virtuous, because of their utility. This way of thinking is so natural, and occurs on so many occasions, that few will make any scruple of admitting it. Now this being once admitted, the force of sympathy must necessarily be acknowledg'd. Virtue is consider'd as means to an end. Means to an end are only valued so far as the end is valued. But the happiness of strangers affects us by sympathy alone. To that principle, therefore, we are to ascribe the sentiment of approbation, which arises from the survey of all those virtues, that are useful to society, or to the person possess'd of them. These form the most considerable part of morality.” (*Treatise*, III, iii, 6.)

Plainly, then, it is sympathy, the process by which we share the pains and pleasures of others, that, in the pain-pleasure it creates, provides for the stimulus of the moral sense.

The moral sense is usually displayed by Hume as exercised in approving and disapproving of the qualities—or of the actions as indicating the qualities—of other men. When we pass judgment on a man's character, we naturally, especially because of the light in which we are considering him, turn our attention to his associates. Sympathy can always operate, and in turn cause the operation of the moral sense, because we have in mind the pains and pleasures of the agent and his associates. And that it is sympathy which is necessary to the stimulus of the moral sense seems to be one of the considerations that Hume thinks should make us realize that self-interest is not here influential. If we are to be affected by the moral sentiments, one of the conditions under which we must “ survey the actions and characters ” of men is suggested in the frequently recurring phrase, “ without any particular interest in them ”;⁴ obviously the operation of sympathy is so best arranged for. In his analysis of our approval of “ those, who are possessed of the advantages of fortune,” he makes, very mildly to be sure, and rather by persuasive suggestion than by close argument, the point that

⁴ “ 'Tis only when a character is considered in general, without reference to our particular interest, that it causes such a feeling or sentiment, as denominates it morally good or evil.” (*Treatise*, III, i, 2.)

though self-interest is here very plainly present, yet, since only sympathy can always explain our attitude, it had better be chosen as the determining factor. Here we are, of course, not dealing with *moral* approbation, but Hume is expounding the manner in which we may explain our esteem for the rich and powerful as of general significance for the rôle of sympathy.

" We have observ'd that our approbation of those, who are possess'd of the advantages of fortune, may be ascrib'd to three different causes. *First*, To that immediate pleasure, which a rich man gives us, by the view of the beautiful cloaths, equipage, gardens, or houses, which he possesses. *Secondly*, To the advantage, which we hope to reap from him by his generosity and liberality. *Thirdly*, To the pleasure and advantage, which he himself reaps from his possessions, and which produce an agreeable sympathy in us. Whether we ascribe our esteem of the rich and great to one or all of these causes, we may clearly see the traces of those principles, which give rise to the sense of vice and virtue. I believe most people, at first sight, will be inclin'd to ascribe our esteem of the rich to self-interest, and the prospect of advantage. But as 'tis certain, that our esteem or deference extends beyond any prospect of advantage to ourselves, 'tis evident, that that sentiment must proceed from a sympathy with those, who are dependent on the person we esteem and respect, and who have an immediate connexion with him. We consider him as a person capable of contributing to the happiness or enjoyment of his fellow-creatures, whose sentiments, with regard to him, we naturally embrace. And this consideration will serve to justify my hypothesis in preferring the *third* principle to the other two, and ascribing our esteem of the rich to a sympathy with the pleasure and advantage, which they themselves receive from their possessions. For as even the other two principles cannot operate to a due extent, or account for all the phaenomena, without having recourse to a sympathy of one kind or other; 'tis much more natural to chuse that sympathy, which is immediate and direct, than that which is remote and indirect. To which we may add, that where the riches and power are very great, and render the person considerable and important in the world, the esteem attending them, may, in part, be ascrib'd to another source, distinct from these three, *viz.* their interesting the mind by a prospect of the multitude, and importance of their conse-

quences: Tho' in order to account for the operation of this principle, we must also have recourse to *sympathy*." (*Treatise*, III, iii, 5.)

Hume's most direct statement that self-interest cannot give rise to moral approbation is in his discussion of the origin of justice. The original motive to the establishment of the rules of justice is self-interest together with confined generosity: but the moral approbation of just action and just character arises from sympathy with the wider interest, the public interest, which, once established, they seem to serve. "We come now to the *second* question we propos'd, *viz.* *Why we annex the idea of virtue to justice, and of vice to injustice.*" (The first question was: *Concerning the manner in which the rules of justice are establish'd by the artifice of men.*) As society becomes larger, it becomes less apparent to us that our own interests are best served by observance in general of the rules of justice, even if we suffer from them in particular instances. But so long as, in any sense, self-interest is the motive, our attitude toward them is not that of moral approval. We find, however, that "even when injustice is so distant from us, as no way to affect our interest, it still displeases us." And now it must do so—

"Because we consider it as prejudicial to human society, and pernicious to every one that approaches the person guilty of it. We partake of their uneasiness by *sympathy*; and as everything, which gives uneasiness in human actions, upon the general survey, is call'd Vice, and whatever produces satisfaction, in the same manner, is denominated Virtue; this is the reason why the sense of moral good and evil follows upon justice and injustice. And tho' this sense, in the present case, be deriv'd only from contemplating the actions of others, yet we fail not to extend it even to our own actions. The *general rule* reaches beyond those instances, from which it arose; while at the same time we naturally *sympathize* with others in the sentiments they entertain of us. *Thus self-interest is the original motive to the establishment of justice: but a sympathy with public interest is the source of the moral approbation, which attends that virtue.*" (*Treatise*, III, ii, 2.)

In spite, then, of his partly egoistic theory as to how the rules of justice come to be established in the first place, he still holds that the origin of our actual practice of the virtue, justice, is non-egoistic, that the moral approval of justice is dependent on sympathy.⁵

As has been indicated, our moral sense seems usually to be occupied in the praise and censure of others; there is but scanty consideration of our attitude toward our own actions. It is plain enough that, in judging of the virtues of others (*i. e.*, qualities useful or immediately agreeable to the possessor or his associates), the moral sense can be affected in the manner described by the operation of sympathy—our sympathy with the pains and pleasures that his virtues and vices will bring to the agent we are considering and his associates. Hume usually chooses to consider, as has been said, these moral judgments that we pass on others. A certain difficulty arises when we attempt to apply the explanation he offers to our attitude toward our own qualities and actions; there seems need for a special explanation of conscience. The usual account of the operation of sympathy would, of course, show how we come to approve of those qualities in ourselves that are useful or immediately agreeable to *others*. I can be affected sympathetically by the pain and pleasure of my associates—the pain and pleasure assured by my qualities to those who are connected with me. But obviously, if the moral sense is, as Hume holds, stimulated by sympathetic pain and pleasure, my moral sense cannot be stimulated by my own pain and pleasure—by the pain and pleasure that my own qualities, of the class of those “useful or immediately agreeable to the possessor,” will secure for me. To this Hume hardly gives any full consideration. But two ways out of the difficulty are sufficiently indicated to form a basis for an interpretation not inconsistent with his general account of the working of the moral sense.

⁵ See the full account of the establishment of the rules of justice in the *Treatise*, III, ii, 2.

The first explanation introduces the effect of general rules, or rather of experience and habit, on the imagination. Accustomed to approve of certain qualities in others useful or agreeable to the possessor, our imagination, running along the general rule, approves of the same qualities in ourselves. This explanation is offered in the passage already quoted on p. 65:

“ And tho’ this sense, in the present case, be deriv’d only from contemplating the actions of others, yet we fail not to extend it even to our own actions. The *general rule* reaches beyond those instances, from which it arose.” (*Treatise*, III, ii, 2.)

The second explanation is introduced in the clause which follows immediately on the passage just quoted: “ while at the same time we naturally *sympathise* with others in the sentiments they entertain of us.” Here again it is sympathy that directly operates. The following passage elaborates on this passing remark:

“ So close and intimate is the correspondence of human souls, that no sooner any person approaches me, than he diffuses on me all his opinions, and draws along my judgment in a greater or lesser degree. And tho’, on many occasions, my sympathy with him goes not so far as entirely to change my sentiments, and way of thinking; yet it seldom is so weak as not to disturb the easy course of my thought, and give an authority to that opinion, which is recommended to me by his assent and approbation. Nor is it any way material upon what subject he and I apply our thoughts. Whether we judge of an indifferent person, or of my own character, my sympathy gives equal force to his decision.” (*Treatise*, III, iii, 2).⁶

The sympathy that arouses our moral sense to approval or disapproval of our own actions thus appears as sympathy with the sentiments that others entertain of us. It would seem from this that the moral sentiments can be directly communicated, can spread, as it were, from one member of a community to others. We must remember that the moral sentiments are a species of emotion, which may well enough be transmitted by sympathy to those who witness the expression of them in others. A “ sympathy with the sentiments that others entertain of us,”

⁶ For a similar passage in regard to beauty, see *Treatise*, III, iii, 5.

which makes us to some extent "change our sentiments and ways of thinking," is phrasing which in modern forms of expression would be used to describe sympathetic *understanding*, acquiescence on some basis of reason; in Hume's language it is a precise account of one form of the process, with which Hume expects his readers to be now familiar, by which emotions are sympathetically communicated. There is, then, no need to suspect an egoistic element in my approval of those qualities in myself immediately agreeable or useful to me.

Very plain in its intention to rule out the self-interest which might be imagined present in our judgments on ourselves, because in the case of others we approve of the qualities agreeable or useful to the possessor, is the passage in which he says that qualities in ourselves in no way disagreeable to us we yet by sympathy disapprove of, if they be disagreeable to others; and that we even disapprove of qualities in ourselves of advantage to us, if they are displeasing to others; and there can be no thought that we here have in mind indirect gain, since we feel the same even when it can in no way serve our interest to be agreeable to those affected.

"One whose character is only dangerous and disagreeable to others, can never be satisfied with himself, as long as he is sensible of that disadvantage. . . . Our fancy easily changes its situation; and either surveying ourselves as we appear to others, or considering others as they feel themselves, we enter, by that means, into sentiments which no way belong to us, and in which nothing but sympathy is able to interest us. And this sympathy we sometimes carry so far, as even to be displeas'd with a quality commodious to us, merely because it displeases others, and makes us disagreeable in their eyes; tho' perhaps we never can have any interest in rendering ourselves agreeable to them." (*Treatise*, III, iii, 1.)

A further consideration which makes it clear that in moral judgments self-interest is never a determining factor, that it has no moral significance, is that, in the classification of those qualities which we approve of (qualities agreeable or useful to others, qualities agreeable or useful to the person who possesses them), the qualities agreeable or useful to the person who

possesses them have independent significance. Though we may share in the advantages that arise from qualities agreeable or useful to others, since we may be among those benefited, in the qualities agreeable or useful merely to the possessor we can have no share, except by sympathy. In a passage in the *Inquiry*, Hume points to this as an implication of his theory which should set at rest the question of self-interest.

"It seems, indeed, certain, that first appearances are here, as usual, extremely deceitful, and that it is more difficult, in a speculative way, to resolve into self-love the merit which we ascribe to the selfish virtues above mentioned [those that serve the person possessed of them], than that even of the social virtues, justice and beneficence. . . . As qualities, which tend only to the utility of their possessor, without any reference to us, or to the community, are yet esteemed and valued; by what theory or system can we account for this sentiment from self-love, or deduce it from that favourite origin?" (*Inquiry*, VI, i.)

Sympathy with the pleasure and pain of others is, then, always the stimulus of the moral sense. Further examination of the phenomena involved reveals that this in no sense explains the nature of the reaction. Hume makes many distinctions which emphasize the point that we are here considering a faculty, an original inexplicable element, and that the nature of the response is always finally determined by the nature of the moral sense, not by the stimulus. A virtuous character and a convenient house may give us the same sympathetic pleasure, but the one will arouse the moral sentiments and the other will not. And Hume here reminds us that when we are thus thrown back on something original and inexplicable in our nature, we are but encountering what we should expect in a passion, a sentiment.

"A convenient house, and a virtuous character, cause not the same feeling of approbation; even tho' the source of our approbation be the same, and flow from sympathy and an idea of their utility. There is something very inexplicable in this variation of our feelings; but 'tis what we have experience of with regard to all our passions and sentiments." (*Treatise*, III, iii, 5. See also *Treatise*, III, i, 2.)

CHAPTER V.

THE RELATION OF REASON TO THE MORAL SENSE.

We have now to discover the rôle that reason plays in Hume's ethical system. We shall find that he represents reason as performing two different functions in relation to morality. Hume's account of the first, the most frequently mentioned, is simple enough to interpret; it is the task of reason, in so far as it is a process of "comparison, and a discovery of those relations, either constant or inconstant, which two or more objects bear to each other,"¹ to instruct us fully in all the relevant facts and relations among the facts that are involved in any act, or quality of character. Hume's account of the further relation of reason to the moral sense is not so easy to reach conclusions about. It has to do with the process by which we pass from the immediate moral sentiments, which presumably vary in strength with the strength of our sympathy for the persons who profit or suffer from the acts or qualities under consideration, to the more or less steady objective judgments of virtue—to the conception of virtue of character as existing when we are not present to "sense" it, as unchanged when our sentiments, because of varying distance from the object, vary in intensity. We shall first consider reason as it functions to secure full knowledge, in each case, of the facts recognized as of moral significance.

I. When, on the view of any action, we experience a moral sentiment, this need not be an instantaneous response to what presents itself at the first glance. Hume makes constant mention of a process of comparison which precedes the exercise of the moral sense. Though the final sentence "which pro-

¹ *Treatise*, I, iii, 2.

nounces characters and actions amiable or odious depends on some internal sense or feeling, which nature has made universal in the whole species," yet "in order to pave the way for such a sentiment, and give a proper discernment of the object, it is often necessary, we find, that much reasoning should precede, that nice distinctions be made, just conclusions drawn, distant comparisons formed, complicated relations examined, and general facts fixed and ascertained." (*Inquiry*, I.)

As so frequently in this matter, he compares 'moral beauty' with natural; reason has a certain part to play in our decisions about either.

"Before we can pretend to form any decisions of this kind, everything must be known and ascertained on the side of the object or action. Nothing remains but to feel, on our part, some sentiment of blame or approbation; whence we pronounce the action criminal or virtuous. This doctrine will become still more evident, if we compare moral beauty with natural, to which in many particulars it bears so near a resemblance. It is on the proportion, relation, and position of parts, that all natural beauty depends; but it would be absurd thence to infer that the perception of beauty, like that of truth in geometrical problems, consists wholly in the perception of relations, and was performed entirely by the understanding or intellectual faculties. In all the sciences, our mind from the known relations investigates the unknown. But in all decisions of taste or external beauty, all the relations are beforehand obvious to the eye; and we thence proceed to feel a sentiment of complacency or disgust, according to the nature of the object, and disposition of our organs. Attend to Palladio and Perrault, while they explain all the parts and proportions of a pillar. But should you ask the description and position of its beauty, they would readily reply, that the beauty is not in any of the parts or members of a pillar, but results from the whole, when that complicated figure is presented to an intelligent mind, susceptible to those finer sensations. Till such a spectator appear, there is nothing but a figure of such particular dimensions and proportions: from his sentiments alone arise its elegance and beauty.

"Again; attend to Cicero, while he paints the crimes of a Verres or a Catiline. You must acknowledge that the moral

turpitude results, in the same manner, from the contemplation of the whole, when presented to a being whose organs have such a particular structure and formation." (*Inquiry*, Appendix I. See also *Inquiry*, I.)

It should be easy to see in such an account that in no way does the action of the reason alter for Hume the instinctive character of the moral sense; the contemplation of the whole after which the mind endeavors is a *process of preparation*, is, as we have found everything else to be, part of that train of circumstances on the completion of which the moral sense acts. Reason is necessary because it helps to bring about the proper preceding stimulus. It is to a record of such attending conditions that Hume has to confine himself. He has been faithful to his conviction at the start, that of the passions it is "impossible we can ever, by a multitude of words, give a just definition." (*Treatise*, II, i, 2.) "The utmost we can pretend to is a description of them by an enumeration of such circumstances as attend them." Reason is here one of these attendant circumstances—a preliminary circumstance. The reason, as here described, and the moral sense never really come into contact; there is no suggestion that the reason corrects by any considerations of its own the immediate decisions of the moral sense. Its operations remain always preparatory arrangements, have no part in the moral act as such. Reason is certainly not here represented as formulating general rules that may become moral principles. Every passage on this matter is concerned finally to represent the moral sense as acting immediately, and solely in accordance with its own nature. A further quotation from the *Inquiry* will show that the drift of the thought is always toward the final necessity of the subjective, the instinctive, immediate action of the moral sense in every particular case.

"In moral deliberations we must be acquainted beforehand with all the objects, and all their relations to each other; and from a comparison of the whole, fix our choice or approbation. . . . All the circumstances of the case are supposed to be laid before us, ere we can fix any sentence of blame or appro-

bation. If any material circumstance be yet unknown or doubtful, we must first employ our inquiry or intellectual faculties to assure us of it; and must suspend for a time all moral decision or sentiment. While we are ignorant whether a man were aggressor or not, how can we determine whether the person who killed him be criminal or innocent? But after every circumstance, every relation is known, the understanding has no further room to operate, nor any object on which it could employ itself. The approbation or blame, which then ensues, cannot be the work of the judgement, but of the heart. . . . In moral decisions, all the circumstances and relations must be previously known; and the mind, from the contemplation of the whole, feels some new impression of affection or disgust, esteem or contempt, approbation or blame. . . . Before we can pretend to form any decision of this kind, everything must be known and ascertained on the side of the object or action. Nothing remains but to feel, on our part, some sentiment of blame or approbation; whence we pronounce the action criminal or virtuous." (*Inquiry*, Appendix I.)

The understanding here merely observes the facts and the relations among the facts, in each particular case; and the relations mentioned are merely further facts—such as whether the person on whom judgment is to be passed was the aggressor or not. This is not an exercise of the reason which would lead to the formulation of any general moral principles. And the action of the moral sense it plainly affects only as it prepares an occasion for the preceding stimuli; it does not comment on it, nor correct it.

II. The further exercise of reason in its relation to the moral sense seems to be to assist the individual to take up the attitude which Hume calls that of the 'mere survey,' the attitude in which, in judging of actions and characters, we ignore all the many possible relations to ourselves. Hume wishes to supply less fluctuating conditions, conditions which shall be the same for each individual, under which sympathy—which acts immediately in each case—may act toward results in the form of moral opinions in which all men may agree. There might be fear that self-interest, and, of course not in the same sense, private benevolence, might influence our views of utility. If

the useful and the agreeable are the moral ends, might we not, naturally, approve most of those actions and qualities that are agreeable or useful to ourselves and our friends? Suspicion of self-interest as a source of approval ought to be allayed by the consideration that it is only sympathetic pleasure and pain that stimulates the moral sense. But still it might well seem that men's personal connections might sway them to various and conflicting sympathies with the useful results of the actions of others, that, indeed, they might well sympathize most with the pleasures of those whose pleasure would ultimately bring most advantage to themselves. From such conflicting sentiments how can there ever arise any generally accepted moral code? Hume's answer is that it is not under such conditions that the moral sense responds. More favorable conditions can be provided, and they are provided by what appears as a form of exercise of the reason; it is by its help that we take up the attitude of the 'mere survey,' the attitude necessary to just such sympathetic pleasures and pains as will stimulate the moral sense. Hume's "general review of the present hypothesis" as to the 'origin' of the natural virtues and vices is:

"Every quality of the mind is denominated virtuous, which gives pleasure by the mere survey; as every quality, which produces pain, is call'd vicious. This pleasure and this pain may arise from four different sources. For we reap a pleasure from the view of a character, which is naturally fitted to be useful to others, or to the person himself, or which is agreeable to others, or to the person himself. One may, perhaps, be surpriz'd, that amidst all these interests and pleasures, we shou'd forget our own, which touch us so nearly on every occasion. But we shall easily satisfy ourselves on this head, when we consider, that every particular person's pleasure and interest being different, 'tis impossible men cou'd ever agree in their sentiments and judgments, unless they chose some common point of view, from which they might survey their object, and which might cause it to appear the same to all of them. Now, in judging of characters, the only interest or pleasure, which appears the same to every spectator, is that of the person himself, whose character is examin'd; or that of persons who have a connexion with him. And tho' such interests and pleasures

touch us more faintly than our own, yet being more constant and universal, they counter-ballance the latter even in practice, and are alone admitted in speculation as the standard of virtue and morality. They alone produce that particular feeling or sentiment, on which moral distinctions depend." (*Treatise*, III, iii, 1.)

It should, then, be clear that since the moral sense is stimulated only by sympathy with the agent and his associates, one possible cause of variation in our moral opinions is not operative. I do not ascribe lofty virtue to a man who bestows benefits on me, while others on whom he afflicts injuries think him of low moral character; for such disagreement as to a man's virtue would arise only if self-love had any place among the stimuli of the moral sense; as we have seen, sympathetic pleasures and pains are its only stimuli.

But the difficulty from which we thus emerge reasserts itself as a direct consequence of what has been our means of escape. If sympathy is the source of the moral sentiments, will not our moral sentiments be stronger when our sympathy is more intense? And is there not reason to think that our sympathy will vary greatly in intensity? Will we not sympathize more with our friends than with our acquaintances, with those of whose happiness and misery we are spectators than with people of distant countries or of far past ages? Since a man's virtue is known to me only through my moral sentiments, sympathetically aroused, how can I ascribe equal virtue to a man with whose associates I am in close contact, and to a character in history; or how can any two men agree as to the character of a man whose beneficiaries one may know intimately, the other by report only; or how can I retain the same opinion of a certain man's virtue, when at times I encounter the recipients of his benefits, and at others only hear of his kindness? How, in short, can we pass from subjective moral sentiments, varying in strength, to an objective virtue? The difficulty here is analogous to that which perplexes Hume in his epistemological theory, when he wishes to pass from our varied and interrupted impressions of sensation to the idea of the continually existing,

identical object. It is the recurring problem of subjective idealism.

Hume's solution, so far as one can interpret with any certainty the few remarks that bear on the subject, remarks in which, moreover, the precise nature of the difficulty does not seem to be directly realized, is as follows: In the first place, as we have already seen, the sympathetic pleasures and pains do not have so uncertain an influence on the moral sense as we might hastily suppose, because obviously, in their action on the moral sense, they are not interfered with by any direct or indirect form of self-interest; and further, because the sympathy experienced when we are considering the same man is always, naturally, with the same group of persons—the agent and his associates. But it is just here that the fact presents itself that if this group is in close relation to myself in place and time, I feel a stronger sympathy with its pleasures and pains; the virtuous deeds of my servant arouse a livelier sympathy than those of Brutus, and yet I do not consider the former more virtuous than the latter. I have a much stronger sympathy with the beneficial consequences of the acts of a certain statesman than has a foreigner with whom I converse, because those to whom he brings prosperity are my own countrymen.² Yet the foreigner and I agree in our estimate of the statesman's virtue. Furthermore, the kindnesses or the injuries that would naturally flow from a man's virtue or vice may be prevented by circumstances, and yet, when there is thus no pleasure or pain of his creation with which I can sympathize, I still pronounce him virtuous or vicious, and of the same degree of virtue and vice as if his tendencies were fulfilled in action.

"Where a person is possess'd of a character, that in its natural tendency is beneficial to society, we esteem him virtuous, and are delighted with the view of his character, even tho' particular accidents prevent its operation, and incapacitate him from being serviceable to his friends and country." (*Treatise*, III, iii, 1.)

² *Treatise*, III, iii, 1; *Inquiry*, V, ii.

How, Hume asks, can such steadiness in the moral judgment arise from a sympathy that may either vary in degree, or even, as in the last instance, have apparently no chance at all actually to operate? Hume's answer is that it is by reflection that we correct the fluctuations in the strength of sympathy and in the consequent strength of the moral sentiments. Though we are naturally moved to a lively approval of those who confer benefits on those we know well, and to but weak approval of those who confer similar benefits on strangers, yet from reflection on past experience we can realize that were the situations reversed, the strength of our sentiments would be reversed. We therefore pronounce the benefactors in each case men of equal virtue, and may even have toward them sentiments more nearly equal than they would have been primarily. The relevant passages in the *Treatise* are the following:

"Our situation, with regard both to persons and things, is in continual fluctuation; and a man, that lies at a distance from us, may, in a little time, become a familiar acquaintance. Besides, every particular man has a peculiar position with regard to others; and 'tis impossible we cou'd ever converse together on any reasonable terms, were each of us to consider characters and persons, only as they appear from his peculiar point of view. In order, therefore, to prevent those continual *contradictions*, and arrive at a more *stable* judgment of things, we fix on some *steady* and *general* points of view; and always, in our thoughts, place ourselves in them, whatever may be our present situation. In like manner, external beauty is determin'd merely by pleasure; and 'tis evident, a beautiful countenance cannot give so much pleasure, when seen at the distance of twenty paces, as when it is brought nearer to us. We say not, however, that it appears to us less beautiful: Because we know what effect it will have in such a position, and by that reflexion we correct its momentary appearance." (*Treatise*, III, iii, 1.)

In the same section:

"Our servant, if diligent and faithful, may excite stronger sentiments of love and kindness than *Marcus Brutus*, as represented in history; but we say not, upon that account, that the former character is more laudable than the latter. We know,

that were we to approach equally near to that renown'd patriot, he wou'd command a much higher degree of affection and admiration. Such corrections are common with regard to all the senses; and indeed 'twere impossible we cou'd ever make use of language, or communicate our sentiments to one another, did we not correct the momentary appearances of things, and overlook our present situation. . . .

“ Being thus loosen'd from our first station, we cannot afterwards fix ourselves so commodiously by any means as by a sympathy with those, who have any commerce with the person we consider. This is far from being as lively as when our own interest is concern'd or that of our particular friends; nor has it such an influence on our love and hatred: But being equally conformable to our calm and general principles, 'tis said to have equal authority over our reason, and to command our judgment and opinion. We blame equally a bad action, which we read of in history, with one perform'd in our neighbourhood t'other day: The meaning of which is, that we know from reflexion, that the former action wou'd excite as strong sentiments of disapprobation as the latter, were it plac'd in the same position.”

Reflection, then, instructs us that certain agents or actions which arouse sentiments of varying strength when placed at different distances from us, would all, if brought equally near, arouse sentiments similar in strength, and our opinions are determined by the sentiments which reason in this sense assists us to a conception of.

Such comparison between the results of our present situation and those of which we have had experience in the past, such correction of present impressions by those of the past, is the function of reason in its relation to the external senses.

“ Such corrections are common with regard to all the senses; and indeed 'twere impossible we cou'd ever make use of language, or communicate our sentiments to one another, did we not correct the momentary appearances of things and overlook our present situation.” (*Treatise*, III, iii, 1.)

“ The judgement here corrects the inequalities of our internal emotions and perceptions; in like manner, as it preserves us from error, in the several variations of images, presented to our external senses. The same object, at a double distance, really throws on the eye a picture of but half the bulk; yet we imagine that it appears of the same size in both situations;

because we know that on our approach to it, its image would expand on the eye, and that the difference consists not in the object itself, but in our position with regard to it. And, indeed, without such a correction of appearances, both in internal and external sentiment, men could never think or talk steadily on any subject; while their fluctuating situations produce a continual variation on objects, and throw them into such different and contrary lights and positions." (*Inquiry*, V, ii.)

In like manner, it is by the help of reflection on our past experience, on what are the usual consequences of certain traits of character, that we are enabled to pass the same judgment on a character "tho' particular accidents prevent its operation, and incapacitate him from being serviceable to his friends and country," as on a character more fortunately placed for the practise of its virtues. Our experience has established for us certain general expectations, or general rules, which lead us to recognize certain effects (beneficial actions) as the result of certain causes (humane traits of character). The imagination readily passes, as always, from the cause to what has usually been associated with it as the effect, and there is thus brought before us what would be the beneficial consequences under more favorable circumstances, and we learn to pronounce judgment on characters according to their tendencies, rather than according to their actual achievements. Reflection assists us here to separate the character from the fortune. As we pronounce the virtue of men at varying distances from us to be the same, by reflecting that they would affect us similarly if all were at the same distance, so we pronounce characters differently assisted by fortune toward practical results, to be of the same virtue by reflecting that in similar situations their actions would be such as to affect us similarly.

The extent to which the uniformity we express in our opinions is paralleled by uniformity in our sentiments, Hume leaves, by somewhat non-committal statements, an open question. His language arouses the suspicion that, in so far as the sentiments do not conform, the moral opinions on which we agree are but a device for the sake of communication, that they

mean nothing more than that we have given a common name to various sentiments—sentiments which are related to their name as concrete objects are related for Hume to the general term, which for him has only a nominal significance. It is difficult to see how he can get to an objective virtue. And certainly Hume so expresses himself as to seem to claim nothing more than a general term, which stands for our various moral sentiments in so far as they have considerable similarity. We can but turn to the passages in which he describes the process that takes place when we pass judgment on men of noble character so situated that they can perform little.

“ Where any object, in all its parts, is fitted to attain any agreeable end, it naturally gives us pleasure, and is esteem’d beautiful, even tho’ some external circumstances be wanting to render it altogether effectual. ‘Tis sufficient if everything be compleat in the object itself. A house, that is contriv’d with great judgment for all the commodities of life, pleases us upon that account; tho’ perhaps we are sensible, that no-one will ever dwell in it. A fertile soil, and a happy climate, delight us with a reflexion on the happiness which they wou’d afford the inhabitants, tho’ at present the country be desert and uninhabited. A man, whose limbs and shape promise strength and activity, is esteem’d handsome, tho’ condemned to perpetual imprisonment. The imagination has a set of passions belonging to it, upon which our sentiments of beauty much depend. These passions are mov’d by degrees of liveliness and strength, which are inferior to *belief*, and independent of the real existence of their objects. Where a character is, in every respect, fitted to be beneficial to society, the imagination passes easily from the cause to the effect, without considering that there are still some circumstances wanting to render the cause a compleat one. *General rules* create a species of probability, which sometimes influences the judgment, and always the imagination.

“ ‘Tis true, when the cause is compleat, and a good disposition is attended with good fortune, which renders it really beneficial to society, it gives a stronger pleasure to the spectator, and is attended with a more lively sympathy. We are more affected by it; and yet we *do not say*³ that it is more virtuous, or that we esteem it more. We know, that an alteration of

³ The italics here are mine.

fortune may render the benevolent disposition entirely impotent; and therefore we separate, as much as possible, the fortune from the disposition. The case is the same, as when we correct the different sentiments of virtue, which proceed from its different distances from ourselves. The passions do not always follow our corrections; but these corrections serve sufficiently to regulate our abstract notions, and are alone regarded, when we pronounce in general concerning the degrees of vice and virtue." (*Treatise*, III, iii, 1. See also *Inquiry*, V, ii, notes 6 and 7.)

The endeavor is to realize, by reflection, what our sentiments would be under different circumstances, and, so far as possible, to modify the actual sentiments. When the actual sentiments fail to conform to the opinions reached by reflection, the uniform judgments in which we persist are but devices of language to bring about order and facilitate intercourse. Such, at least, is the impression which Hume's manner of statement, whenever this matter of the stubbornness of the sentiments comes up, cannot fail to leave with us; and, indeed, his general nominalism scarcely allows him any other position. The passage which bears most directly on this in the *Treatise* is the following:

"But these variations we regard not in our general decisions, but still *apply the terms*³ expressive of our liking or dislike, in the same manner, as if we remain'd in one point of view. Experience soon teaches us this method of correcting our sentiments, or at least, of correcting our *language*,⁴ where the sentiments are more stubborn and inalterable." (*Treatise*, III, iii, 1.)

And in the *Inquiry*:

"General *language*,⁴ therefore, being formed for general use, must be moulded on some more general views, and must *affix the epithets*⁴ of praise or blame, in conformity to sentiments, which arise from the general interests of the community." (*Inquiry*, V, ii.)

On the whole, we can conclude that the action of the reason does not produce in the usual sense a collection of general rules of objective validity, in accordance with which we pass judg-

⁴ The italics here are mine.

ments on particular actions and characters. It is true that our sentiments upon different occasions may be modified, to a certain extent, by reflection on past experience, and thus assisted to a certain degree of uniformity. But in so far as they fall short of perfect uniformity, any steadiness or agreement among men in their opinions about virtue is no more than an affair of words, of expressions that readily pass current because they stand for certain well established habits of feeling. These habits of feeling can no more prove the existence of an objective virtue, than certain recurring resemblances among our impressions of sensation can justify the fiction of the continual existence of objects.

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Published by BRYN MAWR COLLEGE
Bryn Mawr, Pennsylvania

1915



STUDIES IN ENNIUS

A Dissertation

PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY OF BRYN MAWR COLLEGE IN PARTIAL
FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE
OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

BY

ELEANOR SHIPLEY DUCKETT

BRYN MAWR, PENNSYLVANIA
JANUARY, 1915

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The Lord Baltimore Press
BALTIMORE, MD., U. S. A.

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CHAPTER I.

THE PLACE OF ENNIUS AMONG THE WRITERS OF HISTORY.

The early stages of the development of Roman historiography have been for the last fifty years the subject of intermittent discussion, and no small debatable land must be crossed before we can try to estimate the position due to Ennius among writers of history. The study of every historian, especially of the earlier historian, necessarily rests upon a knowledge of the conditions attending his work. For him experience has not determined the method which he shall follow in setting forth his tale, the manner of recounting fact or speech, the style appropriate to his own particular attempt. Every writer represents his own stage in the development of historiography; and no one of these writers can rightly be understood alone. If we would understand the *Annals* of Ennius, we must pref-ace our study of his contribution to Roman historiography with some definite theory as to the tradition which lay behind him.

We are confronted with a problem at the beginning of this tradition. Were the legends of Rome, as her earliest annalists related them, the genuine tradition of their native land? Or did the Roman annalists draw them from the *praetextae* of the early Roman dramatists, either as imported by these dramatists from Greek literature, or as invented by their own imagination? The answer to these questions involves the examination of the history of the early Roman legends told in the *praetextae*. It involves, moreover, a careful scrutiny of the circumstances amid which the earliest Roman annalists worked, the aims of their work, and the manner in which, so far as we can tell, they endeavoured to fulfil it. Only when we have thus arrived at some conclusion with regard to these earliest Roman

writers can we attempt to judge the merit, as writer of history, of the man who followed them. This man, Ennius, also wrote annals, but in poetry. The change of medium from prose to verse introduces a fresh problem: What conception of history had Ennius the poet? Here we must weigh evidence both internal, drawn from the Ennian *Annals*, and external, drawn from the *testimonia* of later men to Ennius as historian.

Furthermore, as epic poet Ennius certainly followed Homer, and much of his work recalls Homeric poetry at first sight. Did he, then, confine his imitation of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* to merely external colouring, introducing Homeric lines and phrases into a narrative historically true that he might vivify his description and render it more attractive? Or did he as poet feel himself free to embroider the annals of Rome with fictitious legend and incident, created by him after the fashion of Homeric tales, and still traceable in Homeric echoes in the Roman annals of the first century B. C.?

We reach the final stage when we attempt to review the influence exercised by Ennius over these later Roman annals, and to appreciate in some manner the extent and the limitations of that control.

It is to the study of these problems that the pages of this first chapter are given.

A. ROMAN LEGENDS AND PRAETEXTAE.

To Ranke first occurred a theory, based on dramatic elements in the narrative, that the details of the legend of Romulus and Remus spring from some play, possibly the *Alimonia Remi et Romuli* of Naelius; and Naelius in turn was said to have found his model in the *Tyro* of Sophocles. The suggestion was infectious, and quickly attacked other parts of this body of

folk-lore, till at the present time we are told that the influence of the Greek and Roman dramatic poets on the Roman annalists has created the main part of their legendary tales.¹

In approaching this problem we note two points. On the one hand, a line must be drawn between the work of the earliest Roman annalists and that of the Roman annalists who wrote in a later time, when records were being elaborated into the more detailed narratives of historians. On the other hand, the existence of only seven early *praetextae* is proved; others, very possibly, were written, but no certainty can be based upon uncertain and imaginary deductions. If, then, the influence of drama on the annals of Rome is to find proof, these seven *praetextae* must provide it. We shall therefore examine them and their subject-matter in the order of their appearance.

i. The Legend of Romulus and Remus. This was told in very similar manner by both Diocles of Peparethus and Fabius Pictor.² The kingship of Alba Longa fell to the brothers Numitor and Amulius, but was seized for sole possession by Amulius, who, in fear lest grandsons born to Numitor should at length dethrone him, forced Ilia, daughter of Numitor, to enter the virgin service of Vesta. When, shortly after, she was found with child, Amulius was minded to slay her, yet spared her life at his daughter's prayer. In close imprisonment she

¹ Ranke (*Monatsber. d. preuss. Akad.*, 1849, III, pp. 238 ff.) was followed by Ribbeck, with some caution, in *Röm. Tragödie*, 1875, p. 63, and in *Röm. Dichtung*, 1887, p. 21. In 1882 Bauer (*Sitzungsber. d. wiener Akad.* C, p. 539 ff.) suggested that Fabius, as a student of Greek, drew much of the story from the legend of Cyrus in Herodotus I, 107 ff. The theory that the *Tyro* of Sophocles supplied the details came from Trieber (*Die Romulussage, Rhein. Mus.* XLIII (1888), p. 569 ff.), though he held Diocles rather than Naevius as author of the *Romulus* play. Later writers of this school are Pais, *Storia di Roma* I, 1898, p. 24, and *Storia Critica di Roma* I, 1913, pp. 292 f.; De Sanctis, *Storia dei Romani* I, 1907, p. 215; Soltau, *Die Anfänge der röm. Geschichtsschreibung*, 1909, pp. 21 ff., and *Klio* X (1910), pp. 129 ff.; Costanzi, *Diocle di Pepareto, Studi Storici per l'antichità class.* III, 1910, p. 77; H. P. Wright, *The Recovery of a Lost Roman Tragedy (Accius, "Tullia"), A Study in Honour of Bernadotte Perrin*, 1910.

² I follow Schwartz (Pauly-Wissowa, s. v. *Diokles*, col. 797) in assuming that Plutarch (*Romulus* 3 ff.) used Diocles, while Dionysius (*Ant. Rom.* I, 79 ff.) followed Fabius.

bore two sons of wondrous stature and beauty, to the terror of Amulius, who ordered that they be straightway cast into the Tiber. But his servant feared to come too near the river, for it was time of flood, and the current ran swiftly. He therefore left the ark which held them on the bank; the waters as they rose lifted it, and bore it to other landing lower down. Here the babes were suckled by a wolf; hence Ilia was believed to say truly that she bare her sons to Mars, for the wolf was sacred to this god. They were then received by one named Faustulus, a herdsman of King Amulius, dwelling hard by, under whose care they grew to youth and lived freely in the woods; their high birth was unknown to all save Faustulus, but gave token in their noble form and character.

Strife arose between the neatherds of Amulius and Numitor; and Remus was taken captive in his brother's absence to answer before Amulius for the misdeeds of his band. Numitor, as the injured one, received him for punishment from the king, but, struck by his high bearing, asked him of his birth and heard the tale of his strange nurture. Faustulus, meantime, caught on his way to tell the truth to Numitor in fear for Remus, was carried before Amulius, and forced to declare that the sons of Ilia yet lived. Numitor and Remus came to the knowledge of their kinship; in union with Romulus and the citizens of Alba they won the city and slew the tyrant Amulius.

The similarity in the two versions (Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *Ant. Rom.* I, 79 ff.; Plutarch, *Romulus* 3 ff.) has suggested various theories. Many have inferred that Fabius drew upon Diocles for material, from the testimony of Plutarch, *Rom.* 3, *τοῦ δὲ πίστιν ἔχοντος λόγου μάλιστα καὶ πλείστους μάρτυρας τὰ μὲν κυριώτατα πρῶτος εἰς τοὺς Ἑλληνας ἐξέδωκε Διοκλῆς Πεπαρήθιος, ω̄ καὶ Φάβιος Πίκτωρ ἐν τοῖς πλείστοις ἐπηκολούθηκε. Τεγόνασι δὲ καὶ περὶ τούτων ἔτεραι διαφοραί· τύπῳ δὲ εἰπεῖν τοιοῦτος ἔστι, and 8, Ὦν τὰ πλεῖστα καὶ τοῦ Φαβίου λέγοντος καὶ τοῦ Πεπαρηθίου Διοκλέους, ὃς δοκεῖ πρῶτος ἐκδοῦναι Ῥώμης κτίσιν.³*

³ Of later writings on this side, see especially that by Karl v. Holzinger, *Diokles von Peparethos als Quelle des Fabius Pictor*, *Wiener Studien* XXXIV (1912), pp. 175 ff.

Against this belief, Hermann Peter pointed out in 1905 that the $\dot{\omega}$ of the passage in Plutarch's third chapter may refer to $\lambda\circ\gamma\circ\sigma$ instead of to $\Delta\iota\circ\kappa\lambda\bar{\eta}\circ\sigma$; this view is supported by the fact that $\tau\circ\iota\circ\bar{\nu}\circ\tau\circ\sigma$ in the next sentence certainly refers to $\lambda\circ\gamma\circ\sigma$, and that the intervention between $\lambda\circ\gamma\circ\sigma$ and $\tau\circ\iota\circ\bar{\nu}\circ\tau\circ\sigma$ of a relative referring to some other antecedent is distinctly awkward.⁴ But even before this time a number of scholars preferred to hold that Plutarch was here in error rather than that the national legend of Rome was composed by a Greek writer of whom hardly anything was known, and who was mentioned as an authority by no other annalist of the tradition. The dependence of Fabius upon Diocles in this matter, therefore, is improbable and is supported by no proof.

Others have accepted the opposite theory, that Diocles depended upon Fabius for his tale. Schwartz has traced the version given by Dionysius to Fabius as source, because of his clear description of two details of Roman law, the *noxae datio* of Remus to Numitor, and the *custodia libera* to be held by Amulius over his brother; the narrative of Plutarch, which does not describe these points, he assigns to Diocles.⁵

But his further conclusion that Diocles was therefore copying Fabius and omitted technical matter which, as a Greek, he did not understand, is by no means proved.⁶ Fabius was writing for Greek readers also; there was nothing in his account which any Greek in general, and Diocles in especial, as one acquainted with Roman life, could not easily understand. Had he been merely copying Fabius, he would naturally have reproduced his model without understanding that he was here

⁴ *Bursian's Jahresber. für Alt.* CXXVI (1905), p. 200; *Berl. phil. Woch.* XXVI (1906), col. 241. The support given by $\tau\circ\iota\circ\bar{\nu}\circ\tau\circ\sigma$ is due to Holzinger (*op. cit.*, pp. 180 f.), who does not accept it, but prefers rather to force the *kal* before $\Phi\acute{a}\beta\iota\circ\sigma$ in the same passage into a reference to Plutarch himself than to give it the simple meaning of "also" as referring to Fabius Pictor. See also Peter, *Hist. Rom. Reliquiae* I², 1914, pp. lxxxii f. This book unfortunately reached me too late for general use, but I have accepted its text of the fragments.

⁵ Pauly-Wissowa, 1903, *s. v. Diokles*, coll. 797 f.

⁶ Holzinger, pp. 176 f.

dealing with legal terms. The difference in the two versions is distinct.⁷ According to Dionysius, the captive Remus was first taken before Amulius, who of his free will delivered him to Numitor (*Ant. Rom.* I, 81) : *τῆς δὲ τιμωρίας τὸν Νεμέτορα ποιεῖ* (*sc.* Ἀμόλιος) *κύριον, εἰπὼν ὡς τῷ δράσαντι δεινὰ τὸ ἀντιπαθεῖν οὐ πρὸς ἄλλου τινὸς μᾶλλον ἢ τοῦ πεπονθότος ὁφείλεται.* Plutarch, on the other hand, related (*Rom.* 7) that Numitor first received Remus, but, because he feared his brother, dared not punish him by his own hand, but went to Amulius and prayed for reparation. Through this request and the sympathetic indignation of the citizens of Alba, Amulius was moved to hand over his prisoner to Numitor to use as he would.

The detail of the *custodia libera* is introduced in Dionysius' version thus (*Ant. Rom.* I, 83) : Amulius sent servants with Faustulus to capture the twins, and another servant to fetch Numitor, whom he intended to guard in this informal manner : *ταῦτα δὲ διαπραξάμενος αὐτίκα γνώμην ἐποιεῖτο καλέσας τὸν ἀδελφὸν ἐν φυλακῇ ἀδέσμῳ ἔχειν, ὡς ἀνὲν θῆται τὰ παρόντα· καὶ αὐτὸν ὡς ἐπ'* ἄλλο δῆ τι ἐκάλει. Plutarch does not mention it.

Finally, our very meagre knowledge of Diocles rather supports than refutes Plutarch in placing him earlier than Fabius. From the evidence given by Strabo and by Athenaeus it is possible to date the birth of Diocles as early as 280 b. c., and his work on Rome might, in this case, have been written at about 250 b. c.⁸ The latest date known of Fabius' life is 216 b. c.; but his *Annals* probably included the time succeeding the period of the Second Punic War.⁹

⁷ Details of variance were already marked by Trieber, pp. 578 ff.

⁸ Holzinger, p. 189, note 1; Strabo XIII, 27 : *καὶ τὸ Ιλιον, ὅ δὲ νῦν ἔστι, κωμόπολις τις ἡν, ὅτε πρῶτον Ῥωμαῖοι τῆς Ἀστλας ἐπέβησαν καὶ ἐξέβαλον Ἀντίοχον τὸν μέγαν ἐκ τῆς ἐντὸς τοῦ Ταύρου. Φησὶ γοῦν Δημήτριος ὁ Σκήψιος, μειράκιον ἐπιδημήσας εἰς τὴν πόλιν κατ' ἐκείνους τὸν καιρούς.* Demetrius, then, must have been born about 210 b. c.; from Athenaeus II, 44 e, *Διοκλῆ τε τὸν Πλεπαρήθιόν φησι Δημήτριος ὁ Σκήψιος μέχρι τέλους ψυχρὸς ὕδωρ πεπωκέναι,* we gather that he died after Diocles; and if the greatest possible difference in their ages is imagined, we reach 280 b. c. as the date of Diocles' birth.

⁹ Schanz, *Röm. Litteraturgeschichte* I³, 1907, p. 230.

We may reasonably conclude, therefore, that no proof has shown the dependence either of Fabius upon Diocles or of Diocles upon Fabius, and that these two annalists wrote independently of one another. The more important question remains: Did both, then, draw their versions separately from native tradition or from Naevius?

To this we may answer that the contents of Naevius' play cannot be said to provide for all the story given by Diocles and Fabius. Its name, the *Alimonia Remi et Romuli*, implies that it described their rescue and early fostering rather than the ἀνάγνωστος, the death of Amulius, and the conquest of Alba.¹⁰ If, again, the details of the legend had come from this drama, then the drama would have broken the rule of unity with regard to place and time in a very marked degree. As in the case of the legend of Camillus,¹¹ so in this, there is too much material for a single *praetexta*, and we have no record of any other on the subject.

Moreover, the versions of Diocles and Fabius differ from that of Naevius in important details.¹² In the prose narratives Ilia is the daughter of Numitor; in the story of Naevius she is the daughter of Aeneas.¹³ Here also, in one of the two fragments left, a King Viba of Veii is introduced,¹⁴ of whom neither Dionysius nor Plutarch makes mention.

¹⁰ Holzinger, p. 200.

¹¹ Münzer, Pauly-Wissowa, 1910, s. v. *Furius Camillus*, col. 327.

¹² Holzinger, p. 200.

¹³ Servius on *Aen.* I, 273: Naevius et Ennius Aeneae ex filia nepotem Romulum conditorem urbis tradunt.

¹⁴ Ribbeck, *Sc. Rom. Tr.*³, 1897, p. 322, Frag. I:

Réx Veiens regém salutat Vibe Albanum Amúlium

Cómiter seném sapientem. Cóntra redhostis?—Mín salus?

The only other fragment (Ribbeck, p. 322, Frag. II) which conveys any meaning cannot be fitted into the narrative of either Plutarch or Dionysius:

Cedo quí rem vestram pùblicam tantam ámisistis tám cito?—

Provéniebant orátores noveí, stulti adulescéntuli.

Ribbeck (*Röm. Trag.*, p. 66) shows that this cannot refer to the Alban State, for the rule of Amulius stands firm; and suggests that Viba, driven from the kingship of Veii, is hoping for aid from him.

In the next place, did Naevius, for his part, draw the material for his play which told of Romulus and Remus from a Greek play, the *Tyro* of Sophocles?

This theory rests on no sure foundation.¹⁵ The motive of the ἀναγνώρισις of grandson by grandfather does not occur in the story of Tyro, as it is given in Apollodorus I, 9, 8 and Diodorus IV, 68. We do not know how the recognition scene of the Greek play was introduced. There is no proof, moreover, that the story of the strange suckling was told by Sophocles. The cruel stepmother of Tyro, Sidero, has no place in the drama of Naevius; and the death of the tyrant Salmoneus, father of Tyro, differs from the death of the tyrant Amulius, uncle of Ilia, in that Salmoneus was slain by the lightning of Zeus for his impiety. Finally, if the *Tyro* were the source of the *praetexta* of Naevius, this *praetexta* would probably have been entitled *Ilia*, and Ilia would naturally have acted the principal part; yet Plutarch is not sure of the name Ilia, and Dionysius does not mention it. Her rôle in their narratives is entirely subordinate, and she takes no part in the different περιπέτειαι and ἀναγνώρισεις of the Roman play.

It seems, therefore, that Diocles and Fabius did not draw their versions from Naevius, and that Naevius did not borrow his plot from the *Tyro* of Sophocles. The alternative, then, follows: that all three drew independently upon a common source, the native tradition of Rome. The similarity in their narratives may reasonably be explained as due to the conservative character of the oral tradition of unsophisticated peoples. In the same manner the history of Iceland was handed down from 870 till 1120 A. D.; and a like care in reproduction is witnessed by the brothers Grimm with regard to German folk-tales.¹⁶

¹⁵ Holzinger (pp. 197 ff.) has adequately shown the dissimilarity between the *Romulus* and the *Tyro*.

¹⁶ In the preface to the second volume (published 1815) of their collection, they write these words of the peasant woman who supplied many of their tales (p. xxiv): "Wer an leichte Verfälschung der

Two points may here be noted. The dramatic character of this and other Roman legends provides no reason for their rejection as native folk-lore. The folk-stories of other peoples offer material equally fitted for representation in drama; they abound in lively dialogue, in songs, and in graphic descriptions such as might have been given by a spectator of the scene upon the stage. Supernatural occurrences are frequent; and here, too, beast or bird acts the part of man. Absence of myth, again, does not entail absence of legend; legends are usually found among primitive peoples even if they possess no myths. The Romans had none in these earliest days because they were still "on the threshold of religion";¹² they were still trusting to the uncertain system of magic. But myth can only grow when the animistic stage has passed, and gods are conceived in the likeness of men; when some idea is won of the relation of beings human and divine; in other words, when the religious stage is reached. Under the influence of this personal bond arise the stories which gather round the rulers of the world.

If we turn now from the negative to the positive side, we find support for the argument that tradition, and not an invention of Naevius, was the source of the legend of Romulus and Remus in the works of art which existed long before the time of his play, and which presuppose a general knowledge of the different elements of the tale.¹³ They are:

1. The coins issued between 338 B. C. and 269 B. C. at Rome and at her branch mint in Capua; these were Roman coins, whether struck in Rome or in Campania, and indicate the grow-

Ueberlieferung, Nachlässigkeit bei Aufbewahrung und daher an Unmöglichkeit langer Dauer als Regel glaubt, der müsste hören, wie genau sie immer bei derselben Erzählung bleibt und auf ihre Richtigkeit eifrig ist; niemals ändert sie bei einer Wiederholung etwas in der Sache ab und bessert ein Versehen sobald sie es bemerkt, mitten in der Rede gleich selber."

¹² Warde Fowler, *Religious Experience of the Roman People*, 1911, pp. 47 ff.

¹³ Holzinger, p. 189.

ing sway of Rome over Italy.¹⁹ They are classed in three series. The First Series (*circa* 338-314 or 312 B. C.) shows the ship's prow, referring to the naval victory at Antium in 338 B. C., and the wolf and twins, with the inscription ROMANO. The Second Series (*circa* 312-290 B. C.) shows the ship's prow, the head of Roma, and the wheel of six spokes, explained "as a symbol of the internal communication which was established between Rome and Capua by the completion of the Appian Way."²⁰ In the Third Series the silver coins of Capua are entirely Roman, and after 268 B. C. the coinage of silver was transferred in main part to the mint of Rome herself.²¹ These coins, then, are emblems of Rome; the ship's prow and the wheel refer, we may think, to her imperial power; the wolf with the twins, to her own history in legend.

2. The bronze group of the wolf and twins, set up, according to Livy X, 23, by the Oculinii in 296 B. C. This group presupposes a story which told of the strange birth of Romulus and Remus, the care given them by the god their father, their nurture by the wolf, the rescue by the sympathetic Roman, and the discovery of their high descent.²²

The legend was therefore recognized, long before the time of the earliest *praetexta*, as the explanation of Rome's origin, in symbols which set forth her civic and imperial power both within and without the city. But since a considerable interval must elapse between the rise of a legend and its representation in art, the story dates from a time long before the later years of the fourth century B. C.²³

¹⁹ This dual character of the earliest Roman coinage was first explained by Haeberlin (*Systematik des ältesten römischen Münzwesens*, 1905); he was followed by Hill (*Historical Roman Coins*, 1909, pp. 5 ff.), and by Head (*Historia Numorum*, 1911, pp. 32 ff.). Cf. Regling, Zum älteren römischen und italischen Münzwesen, *Klio* VI (1906), pp. 489 ff.

²⁰ Hill, p. 13, based on Haeberlin, *Systematik d. äl. röm. Münzwesens*.

²¹ Head, pp. 33 f.

²² Holzinger, p. 189; Pais (*Storia di Roma* I, p. 212, and *Storia Critica di Roma* I, p. 293) and De Sanctis (I, p. 213) suggest that the wolf and the woodpecker were totemistic creatures; but cf. Warde Fowler, *Religious Experience of the Roman People*, pp. 26 f.

²³ Holzinger, p. 189.

The representation on the Etruscan mirror of Bolsena, dated somewhat later than the Oculnian group,²⁴ shows that the tale was well known also in Etruria. Now we know that many Etruscan names are formed from Italic (Latin and Umbrian) praenomina with Etruscan suffixes.²⁵ It is probable, therefore, that the Etruscans were of mixed race, sprung from inter-marriage between Orientals who invaded and conquered Etruria, and the conquered Italic people. These Italic mothers, as was usual, gave native names to their children. Thus the names were handed down. Some of the great gods of the Etruscans, moreover, bear Italic names: *uni* (Juno); *menrva* (Minerva); *maris* (Mars); *usil* (Sol).²⁶ The Etruscans, therefore, took the worship of these deities from the Italic people. It is entirely possible, then, that the Etruscans received this story of native Italic growth from the people they conquered; if they adopted Italic religion, it is not surprising that they should adopt Italic legend. The picture of wolf and twins on the mirror of Bolsena, and of wolf and one child on the stele of Bologna,²⁷ may thus be traced as readily to an Italic as to a Greek source.

We may now summarize these points. Our argument maintains, with regard to the legend of Romulus and Remus, that Diocles and Fabius wrote their versions independently of one another. They did not, moreover, draw these versions from Naevius; for the contents of Naevius' play did not, and could not, provide enough material for all the story they told. Their story differs in important details from that of Naevius. Neither did Naevius draw his tale from the *Tyro* of Sophocles, because

²⁴ Petersen, *Klio* IX (1909), p. 34.

²⁵ Conway, Encl. Brit., *s. v. Etruria*, pp. 860 ff.; his argument is based on Schulze, *Zur Geschichte lateinischer Eigennamen*, *Abh. Götting. Ges. d. Wiss.* V, 5 (1904).

²⁶ G. Körte, *Pauly-Wissowa*, 1907, *s. v. Etrusker*, col. 766.

²⁷ Petersen (*Klio* IX (1909), pp. 35 f.) thinks that the position of the boy on this stele resembles that of the right-hand twin on the Campanian coins, and that the other twin may be supposed to be covered by the body of the foster-mother.

the imagined likeness between the Greek and the Latin play vanishes on examination of detail.²⁸ We may therefore conclude that Naevius, Diocles, and Fabius drew their tale from the common source of native tradition. This conclusion is supported in two ways. On the one hand, we find evidence of the representation of wolf and twins, recalling the chief details of the story in Rome and without Rome, and emblematic of her history as city and nascent empire. On the other hand, the presence of the same emblem in Etruria, when viewed in connection with Italic elements traceable in Etruscan language and religion, points to the existence of this old legend among the Italic folk-stories, whence it passed to the Etruscans.

2. **The Clastidium of Naevius.** The problem in this case is different; for this *praetexta* was founded on a fact of contemporary history. Is it probable that Fabius reproduced fictitious episodes from this drama in his *Annals*?

The play celebrated the slaying of Viridumarus, chief of the Gallic Gaesatae, in single combat at Clastidium in 222 n. c. by the consul Claudius Marcellus. We may note that the *Life* of Marcellus by Plutarch, which is drawn from annalistic sources, does not describe the battle at Clastidium in special detail. More space is devoted to the description of the siege of Syracuse and the wonderful contrivances of Archimedes. The military deeds of Marcellus at Canusium are also fully told.

If, moreover, Fabius had been persuaded by drama to give the story of this combat in special detail, we might expect Polybius, who knew the Fabian annals well, to notice it; but, though Polybius describes the movements at Clastidium (II, 34), he does not mention a fight between Marcellus and the Gallic chief.

Finally, historians who wrote after Fabius had probably no access to the *praetextae* of Naevius, and very few knew of their existence.

²⁸ Holzinger, p. 198: "Man rekonstruiert die Tyro des Sophokles nach dem Muster der Romulussage und freut sich dann über die Ähnlichkeit."

3. The Sabinae of Ennius. The question here is, whether this story was first invented by Ennius for his play from Greek elements, or whether our annalistic account came from early native tradition.

The evidence shows that the elements of the legend existed before the time of Fabius, for Plutarch refers to him for the date of the capture of the Sabine maids.²⁹ The theory that Ennius was the inventor of the legend is not in itself probable. It is scarcely natural that a client of the most powerful families of Rome should have sought their favour by representing, through a brilliant inspiration of his own and independent of all traditional tales, their race as sprung from a group of banditti, scorned by neighbouring folk, and driven to violence in quest of marriage.³⁰ Further, the various details of the narrative—the outlawed state of the Romans, the seizure of the women, the consequent warfare between Romulus and Tatius, the intervention of Hersilia and the Sabinae between the combatants, and the establishment of the Double Kingdom—form too heterogeneous a mass of extraordinary matter to be credited as the invention of Ennius, the student of the rationalistic teachings of Euhemerus and Epicharmus.³¹ Finally, it is hard to see how all these elements could be described in detail in one play, to say nothing of the serious break of unity

²⁹ *Romulus* 14: τετάρτῳ δὲ μηνὶ μετὰ τὴν κτίσιν, ὡς Φάβιος ιστορεῖ, τὸ περὶ τὴν ἀρπαγὴν ἐτολμῆθη τῶν γυναικῶν [Sabinarum] (Peter, *Historicorum Romanorum Reliquiae* I², Fabius Pictor 7). I have omitted here the story of Tarpeia, of which Fabius Pictor related the essential details (Peter, *Hist. Rom. Rell.*, Fab. Pict. 8), as possibly this was not an original part of the Sabine legend. Various theories have been suggested regarding Tarpeia. Pais thinks she was originally a beneficent deity (*Ancient Legends of Roman History*, trans. Cosenza, 1905, p. 105; *Storia Critica di Roma* I, p. 431). Salomon Reinach maintains that her story sprang from a rite, in which spoils captured from the enemy were solemnly declared *taboo* and piled in a consecrated spot, from which none might remove them; the heroine of the district, the *genius loci*, was buried under this pile in punishment for some crime, and thus became the centre of the tale (*Revue Archéologique* XI (1908), pp. 43 ff.). See also on this legend Henry A. Sanders, *The Myth about Tarpeia*, *University of Michigan Studies* I, 1904, pp. 32 ff.

³⁰ De Gubernatis, *Rivista di Filologia* XL (1912), pp. 453 f.

³¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 454 f.

in place and time; its action must have been concentrated on the battle.

The story of the rape and of the great battle may be satisfactorily accounted for by the old theory which described it as an aetiological tale, devised in order to explain the ceremonies in which the bride was lifted over the threshold and her hair was parted with the head of a lance; these marriage customs were very primitive, and indicate that the tale was of very early origin. The Roman legend that the Sabines had once captured Rome completed the story. The Latin language shows the influence of Oscan, *i. e.* of Sabine, elements, from an early date, in words like *bos*, *bufo*, *rufus*, *scrofa*, *popina*; and there is probably some truth in the legend that told of a Sabine settlement at Rome.

These arguments appear a sufficient basis for the belief that Ennius found his source in a native tale.

4. **The Ambracia of Ennius.** With regard to this *praetexta* we know that none of the four extant fragments finds clear parallel in historical accounts of the siege;²² and that the source used by Livy and, probably, by his predecessors, was Polybius, who certainly did not draw upon Ennius. The *Ambracia*, moreover, was not read when the later annalists were writing their detailed descriptions between 120 and 60 B. C.

5. **The Paulus of Pacuvius.** Livy (XLIV, 36-43) and Plutarch (*Aem. Paulus* 16-23) follow Polybius (XXIX, 16-18) in the narrative of the battle of Pydna which formed the chief subject of this play; neither shows any trace of the influence of a dramatic version.

With this work the discussion of the earlier period of Roman historiography comes to an end. There is no evidence that any of these five plays in any way influenced the historians of Rome.

There are only two chronicle plays, the *Brutus* and the *Decius* of Accius, which give evidence for the later time. Rhetoric was then influencing history, and it is possible that the

²² Ribbeck, *Röm. Trag.*, p. 211.

annalists of Accius' day drew upon drama for their material. Yet there is evidence to show that much of the story of these plays was known before they were produced.

6. **The Brutus of Accius.** The reason given for assuming that Livy's narrative of Brutus' deeds came from the *praetexta* of Accius rather than from tradition, is that the story is apparently full of Greek matter. According to Soltau,²² the tyrannical character given to Tarquin in Livy I, 49 was built up according to the model of Atreus. But Tarquin was known in Roman literature as a tyrant before Accius' day. Cassius Hemina writes (Servius on *Aen.* XII, 603; Peter, *Hist. Rom. Rell.*, Cass. Hem. 15): Tarquinium Superbum, cum cloacas populum facere coegisset, et ob hanc iniuriam multi se suspensio necarent, iussisse corpora eorum cruci affigi. Polybius, writing about 150 B. C., mentions (III, 22) an ancient treaty struck between Rome and Carthage: γίνονται τοιχαροῦν συνθῆκαι 'Ρωμαίοις καὶ Καρχηδονίοις πρῶται κατὰ Δεύκιον Ἰούνιον Βροῦτον καὶ Μάρκον Ὄράτιον, τοὺς πρώτους κατασταθέντας ὑπάτους μετὰ τὴν τῶν βασιλέων κατάλυσιν. The expulsion of the kings was therefore mentioned by Fabius, who also, as we may reasonably infer, told of tyrannical behaviour on the part of the king who was expelled.

Soltau believes, further, that the punishment of his sons by Brutus is modelled on the act of Creon in driving his nearest kinsfolk to death; that, as Eteocles banished Polynices, so Brutus banished Tarquinus Collatinus; as Eteocles and Polynices slew each other in the *Seven Against Thebes*, so did Brutus and Arruns Tarquinius deal to one another the mortal wound in single combat. But the punishment of the sons of Brutus and the banishment of Collatinus are represented by Livy as subsequent to the expulsion of the kings, and could not have been included in this play, which, if it preserved the unities, no doubt ended with the establishing of the Consulate and the flight of Tarquin.

²² *Röm. Geschichtsschreibung*, pp. 37 ff.

There is, again, indication that the story of Brutus was told by Fabius Pictor. Dionysius refers to Fabius in his account of the legend of Lucretia (*Ant. Rom.* IV, 64): Σέξτος ὁ πρεσβύτατος τῶν Ταρκυνίου παιδῶν ἀποσταλεῖς ὑπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς εἰς πόλιν, ἦ ἐκαλεῖτο Κολλάτεια . . . παρ' ἀνδρὶ κατήχθη συγγενεῖ Λευκίῳ Ταρκυνίῳ τῷ Κολλατίνῳ προσαγορευομένῳ. τοῦτον τὸν ἄνδρα Φάβιος μὲν οὐδὲν εἶναι φησιν Ἡγερίου.

Details of the legend, therefore, were probably not borrowed from Greek literature, and evidence points to the existence of the story before the time of Accius.

7. **The Decius of Accius.** With regard to this drama we only know that the battle of Sentinum and the *devotio* of Decius were recorded in the annals of a contemporary Greek, Duris of Samos.³⁴ Its basis in history is therefore proved. It is not likely that either the Roman *Annales Maximi* or Duris had any detailed account; but the character of Decius was so picturesque, the man himself (consul four times) and the battle of Sentinum were so important in the history of Rome, that the traditional story regarding both must already have been full and dramatic in the *Annals* of Fabius. Yet both the *Decius* and the *Brutus* of Accius, doubtless striking plays, were produced at a time when historical methods were at their worst;

³⁴ Münzer, Pauly-Wissowa, 1901, s. v. *Decius*, coll. 2283 f.: "Der Sieg über die Kelten machte auch in der griechischen Welt Aufsehen, so dass ihn Zeitgenossen der Erwähnung wert fanden, und einer von diesen, Duris von Samos, ist der älteste Zeuge für den Tod des Decius in der Schlacht. Leider ist sein Zeugnis nur in ganz entstellter Form erhalten bei Tzetzes zu Lykophr. 1378: γράφει δὲ Δοῦρις (F. H. G., II, 479, frg. 40). Διόδωρος (XXI, 6, 2) καὶ Δίων (frg. 32, 3), δτι Σαμνιτῶν, Τυρρηνῶν καὶ ἑτέρων ἔθνῶν πολεμούντων Ἀρμαίοις ὁ Δέκιος ὑπάτος Ἀρμαίων, συστράτηγος ὁν Τορκονάτουν. ἐπέδωκεν ἑαυτὸν εἰς σφαγὴν, καὶ ἀνηρέθησαν τῶν ἐναντίων ἑκατὸν χιλιάδες αὐθήμερον, wobei Tzetzes den D. mit seinem angeblich bei Veseris gefallenen Vater zusammenwirft, der College des T. Manlius Torquatus war. Doch verglichen mit Diod. XXI, 6, 1: ἐπὶ τοῦ πολέμου τῶν Τυρρηνῶν καὶ Γαλατῶν καὶ Σαμνιτῶν καὶ τῶν ἑτέρων συμμάχων ἀνηρέθησαν ὑπὸ Ἀρμαίων Φαβίου ὑπατεύοντος δέκα μυριάδες, ὡς φησι Δοῦρις, ergiebt jene Stelle, dass in dem gleichzeitigen Geschichtswerk des Duris bereits die übertriebensten Gerüchte über die Schlacht Aufnahme fanden, denen sogar Livius (X, 30, 5) den Glauben versagt; es ist daher sehr wahrscheinlich, dass er auch die Devotion des D. wirklich überliefert hat."

and historians may have allowed the drama in these cases to influence their records.

This ends the list of the *praetextae* proved by ancient witness. With regard to the possible existence of others, we may note that the legend of Coriolanus, in its oldest form, need only have told that an exile led his fellows in alliance with the Volscians against Rome, but retreated at his mother's prayer. Details may be referred to later additions made for the glory of the plebs and their political rights;²⁵ but no *praetexta* need have supplied them.

The ancient date of the story of Horatius is shown in:

1. The suggestion of Warde Fowler²⁶ that the passing of the guilty man under the yoke was a form of purification, resembling the creeping through a hollow tree of victims of *taboo* among other uncivilized peoples. If, then, Horatius was *taboo* and was purified from his blood guilt in this way, the story of his crime dates from the period when the Romans were still governed by magic.
2. The *patria potestas* claimed by the father of Horatius and his sister.²⁷
3. The connection with the right of *provocatio* exercised under the Kings.

The *Nonae Caprotinae*, which Soltau includes among his list of *praetextae*,²⁸ and of which Varro speaks (*De Ling. Lat.* VI, 19, G. S.: *Nonae Caprotinae, quod eo die in Latio Iunoni Caprotinae mulieres sacrificantur et sub caprifico faciunt; e caprifico adhibent virgam. cur hoc, togata praetexta data eis Apollinaribus ludis docuit populum*), may more naturally be thought to have represented the meaning of old custom to the people at the *Ludi Apollinares* than new fiction.

²⁵ Mommsen, *Die Erzählung von Cn. Marcius Coriolanus, Römische Forschungen* II, 1879, pp. 113 ff.; but cf. De Sanctis, *Storia dei Romani* II, 1907, p. 109.

²⁶ *Classical Review* XXVII (1913), p. 49.

²⁷ Dionysius of Hal., *Ant. Rom.* III, 22.

²⁸ *Röm. Geschichtschreibung*, pp. 43 f., 263, 264.

The legend of Camillus, in its detailed form, may reasonably be traced to post-Sullan writers.²⁹

There is, then, no evidence that the annalists of the earlier period of Roman historiography were influenced by any chronicle play of Naevius, Ennius, or Pacuvius; and all evidence points to the conclusion that both those annalists and these poets found their common source in native tradition existing long before their day. The *Brutus* and the *Decius* of Accius, on the other hand, very possibly influenced historical narrative, because they were composed at a time when Roman writers had little feeling for historical accuracy; yet we may reasonably believe that the story of Brutus was told, as the deed of Decius was done, before Accius recorded either tale. The existence of no other *praetexta* has been proved; none, therefore, can be considered as a witness on either side.

²⁹ Täubler, *Zur Entstehung der Camilluslegende*, *Klio* XII (1912), pp. 219 ff. See also Section C, note 14.

B. THE METHODS OF THE EARLY ROMAN ANNALISTS.

Our knowledge, then, of the early Roman legends and *praetextae* cannot show that dramatic matter influenced the earliest Roman annalists; and the next question arises: Does our knowledge of the work and of the life of the earliest Roman annalists support the belief that they could be influenced in their writings by rhetorical or by dramatic matter, whether borrowed by the Roman playwright from Greece or invented by his own device?

The theory that these annalists adopted the methods of the rhetorical historians of Greece has been widely accepted, and has lately been formulated by Hermann Peter.¹ He argues that

¹ *Wahrheit und Kunst-Geschichtsschreibung und Plagiat im klassischen Altertum*, 1911, pp. 274 ff.

Greek literature entered Rome in rhetorical form and that this form was followed by early Roman annalists; Dionysius of Halicarnassus, himself a student of rhetoric, did not criticize Fabius' style, and Plutarch (*Rom.* 8), after narrating the legend of Romulus and Remus, "of which Fabius tells τὰ πλεῖστα," described it as *δραματικὸν καὶ πλασματῶδες*.

We turn to the work of Fabius. It is divided by Dionysius into three parts:

1. The record of Fabius' own times.²
2. The record of the first two hundred years of the Republic.³
3. The record of the beginnings of Rome.⁴

We may examine the evidence for the first and second of these divisions. Of the first, Dionysius writes: *τούτων δὲ τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἐκάτερος (Κοῖντος τε Φάβιος καὶ Λεύκιος Κίγκιος), οἷς μὲν αὐτὸς ἔργοις παρεγένετο διὰ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν ἀκριβῶς ἀνέγραψε . . .*

In telling of contemporary events, then, the aim of Fabius was exactness; he was scrupulously careful to seek out facts, and whenever possible recorded his matter as proved by the witness of his own eyes. The testimony of Dionysius (*Ant. Rom.* VII, 71; Peter, *Hist. Rom. Rell.*, Fab. Pict. 16), *Κοῖντος Φαβίῳ βεβαιωτῇ χρώμενος καὶ οὐδεμαῖς ἔτι δεόμενος πίστεως ἐτέρας παλαιότατος γὰρ ἀνὴρ τῶν τὰ 'Ρωμαϊκὰ συνταξαμένων καὶ πίστιν οὐκ ἔξ ὧν ἥκουσε μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ ἔξ ὧν αὐτὸς ἔγνω παρεχόμενος*, very probably refers to repeated assurances, which Dionysius found in the Fabian *Annals*, of personal knowledge on their writer's part.

Polybius, the most sober of historians, uses Fabius here as one of his two principal sources;⁵ and in his work testifies emphatically to the respect which Fabius gained both from him and from other readers of history.⁶ The fact that Polybius criticized Fabius does not show that he did not follow

² *Ant. Rom.* I, 6; Peter, *Hist. Rom. Rell.*, p. lxxii.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.* I, 79 ff.; Peter, *Fab. Pict.* 5b.

⁵ For references in Polybius' *Histories* to Fabius, see I, 14, 15, 58; III, 8, 9.

⁶ *Histories* III, 9.

his work or think highly of it; for Polybius criticized all his sources without mercy.⁷

The evidence of Dionysius on the second part runs: *τὰ δὲ ἀρχαῖα τὰ μετὰ τὴν κτίσιν τῆς πόλεως γενόμενα κεφαλαιωδῶς ἐπέδραμεν.* In this part, then, Fabius' account was very brief. But the reason for this brevity is that he was avoiding the unauthenticated family legends and clinging closely to the official statements of the *Annales Maximi*, and in this we see the same love of accuracy which characterized his story of his own day. If he had been capable of embodying the plots of legendary and historical plays within his narrative, he would not have hesitated to draw upon hearsay and legend in this part in order to make his work more artistic and complete. Rhetoric and dramatic story were clearly no necessary element here.

We find, therefore, on definite evidence, that in two parts of his work Fabius was an exact and scrupulous writer, who considered truth rather than the public taste.

Nothing compels us to believe that he was less rigid in his standard for the opening part of his narrative. It was indeed full and dramatic, but this very character was due fundamentally to the same scrupulousness. No *Annales* provided materials for the history of the Regal period; hence Fabius gave legends to his readers as the earliest story of their land, and legends were all that he could give. Doubtless, as Livy did afterwards, he warned them in his preface that this narrative was based on hearsay and could not be proved. Yet this tradition he reproduced with all the faithfulness and literal precision within his power. He did not rationalize the story, as later annalists rationalized it, but repeated it word for word, as he knew it, even to the inconsistencies in statement. To this fact are due the criticisms of Dionysius, in which he blames Fabius time after time for giving stories which were not plausible. The version of the Tarpeian legend as given by Piso he preferred to that of Fabius, for it accorded better with

⁷ Von Scala, *Die Studien des Polybios*, 1890, Anlage II, *Zu den Quellen des Polybios*, pp. 259 f.

Roman custom.⁸ Fabius, further, according to Dionysius, made the altogether irrational statement that the boys who survived Tarquin were his sons, which chronology did not admit; and Piso took the liberty of describing them as grandsons.⁹ If Fabius, then, recorded tradition faithfully, he necessarily recorded incidents of a dramatic nature; for the dramatic colour was inherent in his material.

The evidence, moreover, of later Roman critics points in the same direction. Cicero declares (*De Orat.* II, 12, 51; Peter, *Hist. Rom. Rell.*, p. lxxviii): *Atqui, ne nostros contemnas, Graeci quoque ipsi sic initio scriptitarunt, ut noster Cato, ut Pictor, ut Piso; erat enim historia nihil aliud nisi annalium confessio hanc similitudinem [sc. annalium maximorum] scribendi multi seuti sunt, qui sine ulla ornamentis monumenta solum temporum, hominum, locorum gestarumque rerum reliquerunt.* Itaque qualis apud Graecos Pherecydes, Hellanicus, Acusilas fuit aliquie permulti, talis noster Cato et Pictor et Piso, *qui neque tenent quibus rebus ornetur oratio (modo enim huc ista sunt importata) et dum intellegatur quid dicant, unam dicendi laudem putant esse brevitatem.* Again, in the *De Legibus* (I, 2, 6) he writes: *Nam post annalis pontificum maximorum si aut ad Fabium aut ad eum, qui tibi semper in ore est, Catonem, aut ad Pisonem aut ad Fannium aut ad Vennonium venias, quamquam ex his alias alio plus habet virium, tamen quid tam exile quam isti omnes?*

Sempronius Asellio (Gellius V, 18; Peter, *Hist. Rom. Rell.*, Semp. Asell. 1) blames them for their bare enumeration of facts, unaccompanied by explanation of motive and plan: *Verum inter eos, inquit [sc. Sempronius Asellio], qui annales relinquere voluissent, et eos, qui res gestas a Romanis perscribere conati essent, omnium rerum hoc interfuit: annales libri tantum modo quod factum quoque anno gestum sit, ea demonstrabant, id est*

⁸ *Ant. Rom.* II, 40; Peter, *Hist. Rom. Rell.*, Piso 5.

⁹ *Ant. Rom.* IV, 6 and 7; Peter, *Hist. Rom. Rell.*, p. lxxxviii; Fab. Pict. 11^a; Piso 15; cf. *Ant. Rom.* IV, 30; Peter, Fab. Pict. 11^b.

quasi qui diarium scribunt, quam Graeci ἐφημερίδα vocant. nobis non modo satis esse video, quod factum esset, id pronuntiare, sed etiam, quo consilio quaque ratione gesta essent, demonstrare.

Later on, matters improved, to Cicero's mind; of Coelius Antipater he writes (*De Orat.* II, 12, 54; Peter, *Hist. Rom. Rell.*, p. ccxvi (*loquitur M. Antonius*)): *Paullum se erexit [sc. post Catonem, Pictorem, Pisonem] et addidit historiae maiorem sonum vocis vir optimus, Crassi familiaris, Antipater. ceteri non exornatores rerum sed tantum modo narratores fuerunt.* Est, inquit Catulus, ut dicis, sed iste ipse Coelius neque distinxit historiam varietate colorum neque verborum collocatione et tractu orationis leni et aequabili perpolivit illud opus; sed ut homo neque doctus neque maxime aptus ad dicendum, sicut potuit, dolavit; vicit tamen, ut dicis, superiores.

This evidence, then, of later times emphatically denies the adornment of rhetorical matter in the early Roman annals.

We shall now consider that school of Greek historiography which has been held to provide the model for beginners at Rome.¹⁰ After the time of Isocrates a marked reaction from the method of Thucydides took place among historians; and with his two followers, Ephorus and Theopompus, rhetoric began to dominate. Both were determined, above all, to win readers for their work, and hence to introduce all features which would tend to make it more attractive. To this epideictic aim was sacrificed the desire for truth. Elaborate speeches, rhetorical commonplaces, panegyrics, all helped to fill out the strict account; legendary matter was not only freely inserted, but even, in the case of the tale of Merope, invented for the occasion. This example was followed by the majority of later Greek historians; among them by Timaeus, by Hegesias, and by Duris of Samos. Timaeus, who lived until 256 B. C., studied rhetoric at Athens under a pupil of Isocrates, and his work

¹⁰ For the details of the following sections, see Bury, *The Ancient Greek Historians*, 1909, pp. 160 ff.

shows the influence of this school. Yet he did not conform to Attic standards, but, apparently, in common with Hegesias, adopted a new style of historiography. Of this Bury writes: "The literary parentage of this new style is to be sought in the prose of the elder sophists, like Gorgias and Alcidamas, but it outdid anything that Gorgias in his most frigid moments had been tempted to essay. It produces the impression of a bacchic revel of rhythms and verbal effects." For two hundred years Timaeus, together with his contemporary Duris, held the public mind. Duris emphasized, above all, the importance of dramatic effect in historiography; imaginary scenes of stirring pathos, anecdotes, spicy details, were introduced to keep his readers in thrall.¹¹

The work of historians, therefore, among the Greek writers of the third century B. C. corresponded to the work of novelists at the present time, and history did duty in providing light literature for the educated public. Its tendency would naturally lead it towards fiction in its own sphere.¹² If, then, Fabius and his followers were imitating Greek historiography, we should expect them to imitate these writers of their own century, Timaeus and Duris, whose works had travelled far and wide

¹¹ In its subject-matter, the work of Timaeus and Duris, in so far as it touched upon Rome, was only in the nature of an Appendix. Timaeus, after writing a history of Sicily and Italy, added a biography of Agathocles and an account of events as far as 264 B. C., among which he described the battles fought by Pyrrhus. Duris described the battle of Sentinum, but only in connection with his Life of Agathocles. It is not surprising, therefore, that Polybius should have felt it necessary to help his Greek readers by prefixing to his narrative of the Punic Wars some account of the earlier history of Rome (I, 3): ἐπει δ' οὔτε τοῦ Παραλών οὔτε τοῦ Καρχηδονίων πολιτεύματος πρόχειρός ἐστι τοῖς πολλοῖς τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἡ προγεγενημένη δύναμις οὐδὲ αἱ πράξεις αὐτῶν, ἀναγκαῖον ὑπελάθομεν εἶναι συντάξασθαι ταῦτην καὶ τὴν ἔξῆς βύθιον πρὸ τῆς Ιστορίας.

¹² Cf. Cicero to Luceius in *Fam.* V, 12, where Luceius is urged to write the narrative of Cicero's deeds in a manner which shall delight his readers' taste and appeal to their emotions. Of the earlier part of this letter Reitzenstein states (*Hellenistische Wundererzählungen*, 1906, p. 85): "Es ist die einzige erhaltene Theorie der hellenistischen Geschichtsschreibung."

and who were famous as historians.¹³ Yet, as we have seen, the evidence of later writers with regard to these earliest annalists points absolutely in the opposite direction.

On the other side, our knowledge of the life of Fabius indicates a training in which he must have acquired methods of strict accuracy in dealing with material. As senator, he was not only well acquainted with State history, but, what was more important, he had learnt from his official position to respect official matter; in dealing as statesman with laws and treaties he cultivated that feeling for precision which stamps his work. The *mos maiorum* held the senators of Rome under its influence long after the institutions of primitive times had passed out of date. The *patria potestas* still lived, though government by tribes had for centuries ceased to exist. International arbitration still followed the course laid down by the fetial laws of the stone age, and by the old system of *foedera*, devised originally for alliances between small neighbouring tribes, though Rome had risen to leading power, and the other Mediterranean peoples were striking treaties of manifold kind. The ancient forms were carefully guarded in unwritten tradition, transmitted by word of mouth from each generation of statesmen to their successors in official rank.

As priest, Fabius had gained a priest's respect for precise and accurate formulae, and for the priestly *Annales Maximi*, "quibus nihil potest esse ieiunius." The repetition of primitive formulae, as those of the Arval brothers, still practiced at a time when words or phrases were no longer intelligible, gives evidence of the conservative character of the priesthood of Rome.

¹³ The Greek historians of the deeds of Hannibal—Chaereas, Sosylus of Ilium, and Silenus of Calacte—belonged to this rhetorical school. Chaereas and Sosylus are vigorously condemned by Polybius as chatterers fit for barbers' shops; and the fragments yet extant of their work tell of an elaborate debate in the Roman Senate after the taking of Saguntum. Yet more ornate is the story of Hannibal's dream which Coelius Antipater found in Silenus (Peter, *Wahrheit und Kunst*, pp. 236 ff.).

For the man, therefore, trained as Fabius had been trained in the strict school of official statesmanship and of priestly office, for one who represented as statesman, priest, and aristocrat the gravest class of his grave Roman compatriots, rhetoric and drama, either based on stories imported from Greece or manufactured at Rome, were impossible in the discharge of his office as historian. He could not digress from actual records and authentic witness to waste time on rhetorical and entertaining details; he could not offer as official history a poet's fiction first put forth in the lifetime of himself and of his readers by the slave actors of the Roman theatre.¹⁴ Greek writings might easily find acceptance as models among playwrights at Rome, where the theatre was never viewed seriously as in Greece; for the Roman historian in this early stage of Roman civilization no writings were of account except those sanctioned by intimate connection with tradition, of greater account here than among any other people. Few laws had yet been registered; the necessity laid upon all was an unwritten one. In primitive times this, and not written matter, is of importance. In early Greece death was preferable to its neglect, and in Rome the *mos maiorum* ruled every department of civic and domestic life. Bound up with it was the story of the beginning of the nation, which, too, had been handed down as an heritage from father to son; and it never occurred to Fabius to touch rhetoric in its presentation, or any written work except the State records. Even if he could have broken through every tradition of his life in beginning such a practice, yet he would not have dared to come before Rome as her historian with a foreign tale; and foreign it must have been. There was no time for an invention of Naevius to grow into anything that would be accepted as history between the date of the *Romulus* and of the Fabian *Annals*.

At this point we may briefly sum up our argument. In consideration of the question whether Fabius and his immediate

¹⁴ De Gubernatis, *Rivista di Filologia* XL (1912), p. 447.

successors were influenced by rhetorical or dramatic matter in recording Roman annals, we note:

1. The exact manner in which Fabius told the history of his own times, and the precise manner in which he told only what official history he could find for the period 500-300 B. C., compel us to infer a like scrupulous account of the beginnings of Rome.

2. The judgment passed by later Romans, skilled in rhetoric, on their early annalists is in no way applicable to a rhetorical style such as that of those Greek historians whom Fabius and his contemporaries could have followed.

3. The training of these early Roman writers would naturally have enforced in them contempt for rhetoric and for drama as sources of material.

It appears reasonable, therefore, to conclude that the early Roman annalists did not follow the rhetorical method of Greece, and did not draw upon their own playwrights' adaptations from Greek drama, or original inventions¹⁵ in their work. It would rather seem that here we have yet another initial movement in the writing of history. One has been noted among the Israelites in the Jahwistic document which afterwards gave matter for the Hexateuch; it was the first attempt to form a connected written history from the records contained in their song and saga, and dates probably from the eighth or ninth century B. C.¹⁶ A second movement originated more than a century later, among the Greeks, in the genealogies of Hesiod, and was developed into the beginning of real history in the work of Hecataeus: "so in der Völkertafel des Jahwisten und den entsprechenden Abschnitten der Kataloge Hesiods . . . die

¹⁵ The evidence of the extant citations from *praetextae* shows no influence upon these men. Of the thirty-two fragments which remain only five are cited by writers other than grammarians; none is mentioned in any connection with historical matter. Cicero quotes once from Naevius (*Cato Mai.* 6, 20; Ribb., *Sc. Rom. Tr.*³, p. 322) with reference to youth and old age; and from the *Brutus* of Accius twice, once as an illustration of the interpretation of dreams (*De Div.* I, 22, 44; Ribb., p. 329), once in a reference to himself (*Pro Sestio* 58, 123; Ribb., p. 330).

¹⁶ Ed. Meyer, *Geschichte des Altertums* I², 1907, pp. 226 f.; Hastings, *Dictionary of the Bible* II, 1899, s. v. *Hexateuch*, p. 375.

dann bei fortschreitender Entwicklung zu selbständigen Werken über Geographie und Völkerkunde führen kann, die bereits echt historische Abschnitte enthalten, so bei Hekataeos."¹⁷ And now a third movement, equally original, though seldom recognized as such, started in the *Annales* of Fabius Pictor. Roman historiography, as shown in the earliest Roman annals, was born of the official and unrhetorical spirit of Rome, and arose in Rome independently of Greek models.¹⁸

A close parallel with this native departure at Rome, and with Fabius himself, is found in the first historical records of Iceland, and in their compiler, Are Frode.¹⁹ His work dates from the early part of the twelfth century, and in it he traced, as did Fabius, the history of his own land from the beginning down to his own day. He also was a priest, and had read the saints' tales introduced after the conversion of the island to Christianity; he was likewise a scholar, well versed in Latin literature, and had an intimate acquaintance with the cultured men of his age. But literature does not supply his material, and only once or twice in this work is mention made of a written source; the rest comes from oral tradition, which is repeatedly given as the authority. The names of those from whom Are heard his story are carefully cited, and witness is given to their special qualification. Here we find once more a native original attempt to record tradition, practically uninfluenced by the classical literature which might well be expected to serve as model.

Why, then, did Fabius write in Greek? The reason was simply that Greek "was the Esperanto of those parts of the

¹⁷ Meyer, p. 227.

¹⁸ The knowledge of Greek literature ascribed to the earliest Roman annalists appears exaggerated. They might indeed have read Timaeus and Duris, whose works were very popular; but there is no reason to suppose that at their yet immature stage of Greek culture they had studied the ὄποι Κυζικηνῶν of Neanthes, or "die horographischen Lokalchroniken der Griechen." (Norden, Die röm. Literatur, *Einleitung in die Altertumswissenschaft* I, 1910, p. 468.)

¹⁹ *Altnordische Saga-Bibliothek* I, Ares Isländerbuch, Einleitung (Wolfgang Golther), 1892.

universe that counted";²⁰ Fabius, like every Roman, was centred in his city, and wished to find for her history as large a circle of readers as possible, not merely in Rome, but in Magna Graecia, possibly in Greece itself. His immediate successors followed his example, until the anti-rhetorical, anti-Greek spirit was more consciously expressed in Cato's choice of the Latin tongue. For Cato's subject-matter, the Origins of Italy, the annalistic form was not suitable, and he discarded it. But all his work shows the same love of accuracy and precision, the same lack of rhetoric. The fragments of his speeches prove the crudity of his style; he included them, not to adorn his work, but to ensure their preservation.

For these writers history and poetry were no synonymous terms. But as time, and with it civilization, advanced at Rome, the prosaic and dry standard of the early annalists gradually disappeared. Ennius was far more interested in Greek culture than Fabius or Cincius; and his adaptations from Greek tragedy no doubt encouraged him, when acting as historian, to play more freely with his material than he otherwise would have done. Besides, he frankly assumed the rôle of epic poet. With his work, bearing the same title *Annales*, but written in verse, the distinction between history and poetry became less clear. It gave an initial impulse towards a more picturesque style of narrative in history, which developed more strongly and was carried into the sphere of prose in the days of the Gracchi, with the fashion of writing personal memoirs; these culminated in Sulla's tale of his *Life*, told in more than twenty books.²¹ During this age the old feeling for accuracy and scrupulous repetition was lost; the very fulness in which the narrative was given would widen the limits allowed to history. Shortly after, we find the inaccuracies of Claudio Quadrigerius and Valerius Antias, the fictitious speeches of Licinius Macer; literal tradi-

²⁰ Bury, *op. cit.*, p. 224.

²¹ Zarncke, *Der Einfluss der griechischen Literatur auf die Entwicklung der röm. Prosa, Commentationes Ribbeckianae*, 1888, pp. 310-316; Soltau, *Röm. Geschichtsschreibung*, ch. VII, *Die zeitgeschichtlichen Memoirenwerke der Gracchenzeit und ihr Einfluss auf die Rekonstruktion der Geschichte früherer Epochen*, pp. 153 ff.

tion was now subordinated to the endeavour to produce attractive and well-arranged periods. Borrowings were also made without hesitation from literature to enhance the interest of the account, imaginary descriptions of events at home and in the field were readily composed, and the history of primitive times was cast in the mould of the day.²² It was these men who followed the school instituted by Ephorus and Theopompus, and who may rightly be termed followers of Greek rhetoric. When they turned to tell of Roman legends, embellishments of tradition were naturally frequent, devised for the glory of individual patrons or drawn from the more or less fictitious stories that had accumulated around their clans. Finally, as we may believe, the later historians, to whom the historical plays of Naevius, Ennius, and Pacuvius were lost, were willing even to embody in their narratives details which they had learnt from Accius on the stage.

²² Soltau, *op. cit.*, pp. 160 f.; Cicero, *Brutus* XI, 42; XVI, 62.

C. THE ANNALES OF ENNIUS.

Our position, then, is this: The earliest Roman *praetextae*, including those of Ennius, did not influence the narrative of Roman history; the earliest Roman annalists could not draw upon these *praetextae* in their records. We are now to consider the place of the *Annales* in the historical literature of the Republic. This problem requires the investigation of two points: The first is that of Ennius' method as an historian; the second, that of the influence of his *Annals* upon later historians of the Republican time.

That the poet intended his *Annals* to serve, at least in certain parts, as authentic history, we may assume at once from his

care in retaining many prosaic details of the *Annales Maximi* and other priestly records. Like the *Annales Maximi*, the *Annals* of Ennius marked time by the record of consulships, and examples of such record are seen in lines: 295 (214 b. c.; cf. Livy XXIV, 9); 303 f. (204 b. c.; cf. Livy XXIX, 13); 329 (200 b. c.; cf. Livy XXXI, 5, 6); 331 (198 b. c.; cf. Livy XXXII, 7). A similar care appears in the lines which preface the narrative of the Macedonian War in Book X:¹

Insece Musa manu Romanorum induperator
Quod quisque in bello gessit cum rege Philippo.

Lines, further, occur which might spring directly from the early official records of Rome. Such are those which tell of: the religious institutions of Numa (ll. 120 f., Vah.):

Mensas constituit idemque ancilia
Libaque fictores Argeos et tutulatos;

and especially the dull record of names, which Vahlen, correctly, it would seem, placed directly after (ll. 122 ff.):

Volturnalem Palatualem Furinalem
Floralemque Falacrem et Pomonalem fecit
Hic idem;

the founding of Ostia (ll. 144 f.):

Ostia munita est; idem loca navibus pulchris
Munda facit: nautisque mari quaesentibus vitam;

the conquest of Anxur (406 b. c., l. 162):

Vulsculus perdidit Anxur;

the eclipse of 404 b. c. (l. 163):

. nonis Iunis soli luna obstitit et nox

(eclipses were regularly recorded in the *Annales Maximi* (Gellius II, 28; Peter, *Hist. Rom. Rell.*, Cato, Frag. 77), and Cicero related expressly that this one was mentioned both there

¹ For these details see Skutsch, Pauly-Wissowa, 1905, *s. v. Ennius*, coll. 2603 f.; and Vahlen's edition. For explanation of fragments of the *Annales* see the preface to this edition.

and in Ennius (*De Rep.* I, 16, 25; Vah. ed. p. 29)) ; the enfranchisement of Campanians (l. 169) :

Cives Romani tunc facti sunt Campani ;
the declaration of the First Punic War (l. 223) :
Appius indixit Karthaginiensibus bellum.

Suitable matter for the most unimaginative prose historians is continually found in the fragments. Any of these writers might have produced in substance the following descriptions of : the attack of the Gauls upon Rome (ll. 164 f.) :

Qua Galli furtim noctu summa arcis adorti
Moenia concubia vigilesque repente cruentant ;

the preparations for war with Pyrrhus (ll. 183 ff.) :

Proletarius publicitus scutisque feroque
Ornatur ferro, muros urbemque forumque
Excubiis curant ;

the events of the First Punic War (ll. 224 ff.) :

(224) Explorant Numidae totum : quatit ungula terram
(225) Mulserat huc navem compulsam fluctibus pontus
(232 f.) Denique vi magna quadrupes eques atque elephanti
Proiciunt sese

(265) Poeni stipendia pendunt ;

the allies convoked by the Romans before the battle of Cannae (l. 276) :

Marsa manus, Peligna cohors, *Vestina* virum vis ;
a night march (of Hannibal?) towards Rome (l. 297) :

Ob Romam noctu legiones ducere coepit ;

the victorious return of Livius Nero in 207 b. c. (l. 301) :

Livius inde redit magno mactatus triumpho ;

the levy of Flamininus for the war against Philip (ll. 332 f.) :

Insignita fere tum milia militum octo
Duxit delectos bellum tolerare potentes.

Such passages obviously prove that the poet regarded himself as a recorder of reliable history.

Even in the choice of material there is evidence that Ennius followed the method by which Fabius Pictor divided his space among the three periods of his history. He certainly told the story of Romulus and of the six succeeding kings of Rome with considerable fulness; three books, one sixth of his whole work, were devoted to their reigns. Later on, when he gave the narrative of modern days, the wars with Pyrrhus occupied a whole book; the First Punic War, although already discussed by Naevius, took another; the Second Punic War occupied two; and so on. His history must therefore have contained abundant detail. Yet only two books were assigned to the history of the two hundred years following the expulsion of Tarquin; and the natural conclusion is that Ennius, also, treated this period in summary fashion because, like Fabius, he was unwilling to rely on unauthenticated family tales. Our examination, then, at this point seems to indicate that Ennius sympathized with the careful methods of Roman annalists of the earliest time.

We reach similar results if we compare the testimony of other men to Ennius as an historian. Both Cicero (*De Inv.* I, 19, 27) and the *auctor ad Herennium* (I, 8, 12 f.) divided literary *negotiorum expositio* into three classes: *fabula*, *historia*, *argumentum*.² The *auctor ad Herennium* gave no examples of the several divisions; Cicero gave one for each. *Fabula* was illustrated by a line from tragedy, *argumentum* by a quotation from Terence, *historia* by a line from the *Annals* of Ennius: *Historia est gesta res, ab aetatis nostrae memoria remota; quod genus:*

Appius induxit Karthaginiensibus bellum [l. 223].

² The passages are collected in *Hellenistische Wundererzählungen*, Reitzenstein, 1906, p. 92.

Cicero could have drawn like examples from many prose historians, had he so wished.³

Further, Cicero confidently attributed words from the *Annales* to historical characters:⁴ To Pyrrhus (*De Off.* I, 12, 38; Vah. ed. p. 35): Pyrrhi quidem de captivis reddendis illa praeclara: [Ennius, *Annales*, Book VI, Frag. 12, follows here: *Nec dis* (ll. 194 ff., quoted below, p. 47)]. Regalis sane et digna Aeacidarum genere sententia; to Appius Claudius (*Cato Mai.* 6, 16; Vah. ed. p. 36): Tamen is, cum sententia senatus inclinaret ad pacem cum Pyrrho foedusque faciendum, non dubitavit dicere illa, quae versibus persecutus est Ennius [ll. 202 f.] ceteraque gravissime; notum enim vobis carmen est; et tamen ipsius Appi extat oratio. Cicero would hardly have quoted Ennius in this way, while the actual words of Appius were still to be read, if he had not looked upon the version in the *Annals* as true to history.

Cicero was willing, again, to accept the statements which Ennius made with regard to certain men: Cornelius Cethegus (*Brutus* 15, 57; Vah. ed. p. 53): M. Cornelius Cethegus, cuius eloquentiae est auctor, et idoneus quidem mea sententia, Q. Ennius, praesertim cum et ipse eum audiverit; Aelius Sextus

³ The word *historia* has been understood here as "historical romance"; but Cicero's respect for it as meaning sober history is seen in the following passages:

De Legibus I, 1, 5:

Quintus. Intellego te, frater, alias in *historia* leges observandas putare, alias in poëmate.

Marcus. Quippe, quom in illa omnia ad veritatem, Quinte, referantur; in hoc ad delectationem pleraque.

De Finibus V, 22, 64: Talibus exemplis non fictae solum fabulae, verum etiam *historiae* refertae sunt, et quidem maxime nostrae.

Brutus 16, 62: Quamquam his laudationibus *historia* rerum nostrarum est facta mendorior. Multa enim scripta sunt in eis quae facta non sunt.

Cicero made a deliberate exception, however, for the narrative of his own deeds! *Fam.* V, 12, 3 (to Luceius): Itaque te plane etiam atque etiam rogo, ut et ornies ea vehementius etiam quam fortasse sentis, et in eo leges *historiae* neglegas.

⁴ Cf. Vahlen, *praef.* ed., pp. xlvi f.

(*De Rep.* I, 18, 30): Here Cicero quotes from the *Annales*, line 331 (Vah. ed. p. 59):

Egregie cordatus homo catus Aelius Sextus,

and then remarks: qui egregie cordatus et catus fuit et ab Ennio dictus est; Fabius Maximus (*De Off.* I, 24, 84; Vah. ed. p. 66): Idem gloriae iacturam ne minimam quidem facere vellent, ne re publica quidem postulante. . . . Quanto Q. Maximus melius! de quo Ennius [ll. 370 f.]:

Unus homo nobis cunctando restituit rem.

Non enim rumores ponebat ante salutem;

M'. Curius (*De Rep.* III, 3, 6; Vah. ed. p. 66): Haec civilis [sc. vita] laudabilius est certe et inlustrior, ex qua vita sic summi viri ornantur, ut vel M'. Curius:

Quem nemo ferro potuit superare nec auro [l. 373].

He believed, also, that remembrance of Cethagus, and possibly of many others, was due to Ennius (*Brutus* 15, 60; Vah. ed. p. 54): At hic Cethagus consul cum P. Tuditano fuit bello Punico secundo quaestorque his consulibus M. Cato modo plane annis CXL ante me consulem: et id ipsum nisi unius esset Enni testimonio cognitum, hunc vetustas, ut alios fortasse multos, oblivione obruisset; and he recorded without question (*De Prov. Cons.* 9, 20; Vah. ed. p. 81), as a matter of history and of the *Annales* of Ennius, the reconciliation of Lepidus and Fulvius on their entrance to the censorship in 179 B. C.

From this evidence, therefore, both internal and external, we may conclude that Ennius, although a poet, yet possessed the early Roman feeling for accuracy in recording historical detail.

Yet the free use which Ennius made of Homeric poetry has led recent critics to suspect that he created Homeric incidents and inserted them in his *Annals* of Rome. These writers, encouraged by Zarncke and Soltau, are inclined to believe that the stories of Coriolanus and Camillus, and many other legends of the Early Republic, are largely fabrications of Ennius,

drawn by the poet on Homeric lines.⁵ If this is true, the position of the *Annals* as history is obviously lower than Cicero's estimate would imply.

There is of course no doubt that Ennius drew widely upon Homeric words and phrases;⁶ from the many examples noted from the *Annales* we may cite:

1. 415, Vah.: *Concidit, et sonitum simul insuper arma dederunt* (cf. Δ 504: *δούπησεν δὲ πεσών, ἀράβησε δὲ τεύχε' ἐπ' αὐτῶι*);
 1. 393: *Horrescit telis exercitus asper utrimque* (cf. N 339: *ἔφριξεν δὲ μάχη φθισίμβροτος ἐγχείησι*);
 1. 531: *Clamor ad caelum volvendus per aethera vagit* (cf. P 424 f.: *σιδήρειος δ' ὄρυμαγδὸς χάλκεον οὐρανὸν ἵκε δι' αἰθέρος ἀτρυγέτοιο*);
 1. 584: *animus cum pectore latrat* (cf. v 13: *κραδίη δέ οἱ ἔνδον ὑλάκτει*);
 11. 561 f.: *Non si, lingua loqui saperet quibus, ora decem sint, Innumerum, ferro cor sit pectusque revinctum* (cf. B 489 f.: *οὐδέ τι μοι δέκα μὲν γλῶσσαι, δέκα δὲ στόματ' εἶεν, φωνὴ δ' ἄρρηκτος, χάλκεον δέ μοι ἡτορ ἐνείη*).

Homer gave the initial inspiration, and explained Pythagorean tenets in a prelude; throughout the whole, language and style are modelled after the Homeric manner. Detailed descriptions of battles may be compared with corresponding passages in the *Iliad*; the tribune's hard struggle against the Istrians told in the *Annales* XV, Vah., recalls that of Ajax in ΙΙ 102 ff.; the sally of the two Istrians described in the *Annales* XV, Vah., is similar to that of the two Lapithae told in M 131 ff. Preparations for the burial of those slain at Heraclea

⁵ Zarncke, *Der Einfluss der griech. Litteratur auf die Entwicklung der röm. Prosa, Commentationes Ribbeckiana*, 1888, pp. 274 ff.; O. Hirschfeld, *Zur Camillus-Legende, Festschrift fur Ludwig Friedländer*, 1895 (= *Kleine Schriften*, 1913, p. 286; cf. Pais, *Storia di Roma*, 1, 2, p. 42); Soltau, *Röm. Geschichtschreibung*, 1909, ch. III, *Ennius' Annales*; Täubler, *Zur Entstehung der Camilluslegende, Klio* XII (1912), p. 220.

⁶ For the following, and further, details see Skutsch, *Pauly-Wissowa*, s. v. *Ennius*, especially coll. 2610 ff.; and Vahlen's edition *passim*.

are made as preparations were made for the burial of Patroclus ; compare *Annales* VI, ll. 187 ff., with Ψ 114 ff.

The speeches of Homer's poetry, again, were imitated by Ennius ; that of Appius Claudius before the Senate against Pyrrhus in the *Annales* VI begins (ll. 202 f.) :

Quo vobis mentes, rectae quae stare solebant
Antehac, dementes sese flexere viai?

and is imitated from the address of Hecuba in Ω 201 f. :

ὡς μοι, πῇ δὴ τοι φρένες οἴχονθ', γῆς τὸ πάρος περ
ἔκλευ ἐπ' ἀνθρώπους ξείνους ἡδ' οἰστιν ἀνάσσεις;

The Homeric similes are also represented by parallels in the Roman poems ; the contest of the winds in the *Annales*, ll. 443 ff. :

Concurrunt veluti venti cum spiritus austri
Imbricitor aquiloque suo cum flamine contra
Indu mari magno fluctus extollere certant,

recalls I 44 ff. :

ώς δ' ἄνεμοι δύο πόντον ὄρίνετον ἵχθυόεντα,
Βορρῆς καὶ Ζέφυρος, τώτε Θρήκηθεν ἄητον,
ἔλθοντ' ἔξαπίνης· ἄμυδις δέ τε κῦμα κελαινὸν
κορθύεται, πολλὸν δὲ παρέξ ἄλα φῦκος ἔχεναν.

Another example was noted by Macrobius, the illustration drawn from the horse in the *Annales*, ll. 514 ff. :

Et tum sicut equus qui de praesepibus fartus
Vincla suis magnis animis abrupit et inde
Fert sese campi per caerula laetaque prata,
Celso pectore saepe iubam quassat simul altam,
Spiritus ex anima calida spumas agit albas;

and in Z 506 ff. :

ώς δ' ὅτε τις στατὸς ἵππος, ἀκοστήσας ἐπὶ φάτνῃ,
δεσμὸν ἀπορρήξας θείη πεδίοιο κροαίνων,
εἰωθὼς λούεσθαι ἐύρρειος ποταμοῖο,
κυδιών· ἵψοῦ δὲ κάρη ἔχει, ἀμφὶ δὲ χαῖται
ῶμοις ἀλσσονται· ὁ δ' ἀγλαΐηφι πεποιθώσ,
ρίμφα ἐ γοῦνα φέρει μετά τ' ἥθεα καὶ νομὸν ἵππων.

Further details may be traced in the long list given by Skutsch, which yields conclusive proof that Ennius, before writing this work, had entirely saturated his mind with the Homeric manner and Homeric words.⁷

But these borrowings from Homer, although numerous, do not extend beyond form; they consist of beginnings and endings of lines, phrases, whole lines, adapted by Ennius as suitable for the expression of his record. The question yet remains whether he allowed himself free invention of whole episodes on Homeric models, and thereby created new legends which later annalists adopted as actual history. Zarncke and his followers have drawn special attention to the Homeric colouring in Livy's narrative of the battle of Lake Regillus, and of the bold attack whereby Marcus Valerius, brother of

⁷ A second influence which, no doubt, impressed itself strongly upon the Ennian *Annales* was that of Callimachus; it may be seen especially in the dream which prefaces the story, and we may compare the dream of Callimachus:

εὗτε μιν ἐκ Διβύης ἀναερπας εἰς Ἑλικῶνα
ἥγαγες ἐν μέσσαις Πιερίδεσσι φέρων·
αλ δέ οἱ εἰρομένῳ ἀμφ' ὥγνυλων ἡρώων
Αἴτια καὶ μακάρων εἴπον ἀμειβόμεναι.

Skutsch, *s. v. Ennius*, p. 2613; *Aus Vergils Frühzeit*, 1901, pp. 34 f. The philosophy imparted by Homer, and the personal address of Ennius to his readers, may be due to the same source. (See Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, *Sappho und Simonides*, 1913, p. 291.) Hellenistic precedent for the writing of historical epic certainly existed in the epics of Rhianos of Crete, dating from the second half of the third century, B. C. Of the four which he composed, *Θεσσαλικά*, *Αχαικά*, *Ηλιακά*, and *Μεσσηνιακά*, the last, which told the events of the Second Messenian War, was best known, and followed Homer both in diction and in the depicting of individual scenes. Pausanias used it as a source for the history of Messenia, in which he stated (IV, 6, 1), *τούτον τῶν Μεσσηνῶν τὸν πόλεμον Ριανός τε ἐν τοῖς ἔπεσιν ἐποίησεν ὁ Βηγναῖος*, and (IV, 6, 3), *Ριανῷ δὲ ἐν τοῖς ἔπεσιν οὐδὲν Ἀριστομένης ἐστὶν ἀφανέστερος η̄ Ἀχιλλεὺς ἐν Ἰλιάδι Ομήρῳ*.

Of interest also in this connection are the Jewish epics written in Greek by Philo the elder, who in his *περὶ τὰ Ἱεροσόλυμα* probably told the history of Jerusalem and of the Jewish kings; and by Theodotus, to whom is ascribed a *περὶ Ἰουδαίων*. Both are in hexameter verse and may be dated *circa* 200 B. C.; the work of Philo shows the artificial and complex diction of the Alexandrians, while Theodotus gave his tale with epic fulness, but in simple Homeric style. (See Norden, *Einleitung in die Altertumswissenschaft* I, 1910, p. 460; Christ, *Griech. Litteraturgeschichte* II, 1, 1911, pp. 109 f., 460 ff.; Pais, *Storia Critica di Roma* I, 1913, p. 77.) Ennius may possibly have seen some of this work.

Publicola, terrified Tarquin during the fight described in Livy II, 20, with which Zarncke compared Γ 15 ff.; of the challenge of the Gaul, and the answer and splendid victory of Titus Manlius, related in Livy VII, 9 f., with which he compared H 73 ff., 92 ff.; and of the life of Camillus. These narratives he traced back to Ennius.⁸

Yet in no case are these hypotheses founded upon direct proof that the *Annales* of Ennius even contained such episodes, which are only assumed for his account on the appearance of certain narratives in the Homeric poems. On the other hand, the later rhetorical annalists of Rome were generally well versed in Homer, and followed the Greek rhetorical historians who cultivated the epic style.⁹ Coelius Antipater, in his history of the Second Punic War, drew upon a writer of the Greek rhetorical school, Silenus, and did not scruple to introduce fictitious matter, such as dreams or councils of the gods, from his account.¹⁰ Many of the epic passages may come from a similar Greek source.

Critics assume Homeric colouring, moreover, in several passages, as in Livy II, 20; VII, 9 ff.; and the account of the battle of Zama (XXX, 32 ff.), because the stories describe challenges and single combats.¹¹ But these challenges and duels are not necessarily Homeric; single combats, with the consequent glory of the victor and downfall of the boastful enemy, form a natural part of any country's tradition. The methods of warfare characteristic of the Homeric age were in vogue in early Rome to a comparatively late time, as is shown by the instances of the *spolia opima*, and the duel between the Latin champion and Titus Manlius in 340 B. C.¹²

⁸ *Commentationes Ribbeckianae*, pp. 275 ff.

⁹ Cf. Zarncke, p. 276, note 1.

¹⁰ Peter, *Hist. Rom. Rell.* I², 1914, Coel. Antipater, p. ccxxi; *ibid.*, Coel. Antipater, Frag. 11; cf. Frag. 34; *Wahrheit und Kunst*, pp. 295 f.

¹¹ Zarncke, *Commentationes Ribbeckianae*, pp. 276 ff.

¹² Livy VIII, 7. W. Helbig (Sur les attributs des Saliens, *Mémoires de l'Institut national de France* XXXVII, 1906, pp. 205 ff.) thinks that the battles of early Rome were more Homeric in character than the annalists have shown; on pages 275 f. he writes: "Nous avons vu

We have already noted that the account given by Ennius of the period in question, the two centuries following 509 b. c., was brief and lacking in detail; his two books cover the field of Livy, Books II-XI. It was exactly in this period that the later annalists were richest in legends. The stories given by Livy include those of Horatius Cocles, Cloelia, Scaevola, Coriolanus, Appius Claudius the decemvir, Cincinnatus, Servilius Ahala, Cornelius Cossus, Camillus, Torquatus, Valerius Corvus, Decius Mus, Publilius Philo, Papirius Cursor, and so on. It appears, then, that most of this material found its way into the work of the annalists after Ennius' day.

Cicero, again, mentions none of these heroes of the fifth and the fourth century in connection with Ennius.¹³ He quotes the poet in connection with the great men of historical times: Pyrrhus (*De Div.* II, 56, 116; *De Off.* I, 12, 38; *Cat. Mai.* 6, 16); Cornelius Cethegus (*Brutus* 15, 57 f.; *Cat. Mai.* 14, 50); Cato (*Pro Archia* 9, 22); Scipio Africanus (*Pro Archia* 9, 22; *De Fin.* II, 32, 106); Aelius Sextus (*De Rep.* I, 18, 30; *De Orat.* I, 45, 198 (cf. *Tusc. Disp.* I, 9, 18)); Fabius Maximus (*De Off.* I, 24, 84; *Pro Archia* 9, 22; *Cat. Mai.* 4, 10); M'. Curius (*De Rep.* III, 3, 6); Marcellus (*Pro Archia* 9, 22); Fulvius Nobilior (*Pro Archia* 9, 22); Aemilius Lepidus (*De Prov. Cons.* 9, 20). He quotes Ennian material for the Regal period twelve times. But for the narrative of this semi-

qu'avant leurs relations avec les Hellènes les habitants de l'Italie subirent l'influence de la civilisation mycénienne . . . Nous devons faire abstraction des descriptions fantaisistes que les annalistes ont données des batailles livrées au début de l'histoire romaine, descriptions d'après lesquelles des soldats de cavalerie auraient ouvert le combat, et les *milites* auraient été armés de la même façon que les fantassins helléniques. Les batailles auxquelles participèrent les milices du Septimontium et de la commune établie sur le Quirinal ressemblaient plutôt à celles que décrit l'épopée homérique. Les chefs entraient en campagne, montés sur des chars. Tous les autres guerriers faisaient les marches et combattaient à pied. Leur équipement ainsi que celui des chefs, dans le type des coiffures, des boucliers, des ceintures, des épées et probablement aussi des chaussures, révélait l'influence de la civilisation mycénienne; il offrait beaucoup de points de contact avec l'armement attribué aux guerriers dans les plus anciens chants de l'*Iliade*."

¹³ See Vahlen's edition *passim*.

legendary period he only mentions Ennius once, and that for the date of an eclipse (*De Rep.* I, 16, 25). With the exception of this instance, all the fragments from Books IV and V are quoted by commentators or grammarians alone, which points to a brief and uninteresting treatment of matter in this part.

It is probable, therefore, that the full legends of the Early Republic, though partly formed by the time of Ennius, were not to any considerable extent accepted or elaborated by him. The legend of Camillus is an example of the manner in which detail after detail was added, in annals of the period between Fabius and Plutarch, to the originally brief records, under the influence of family legends, of similarity in religious elements, of late Greek historical methods, of attempts at rationalizing, and of aetiological explanations of older tales. A series of studies on this legend has pointed out many additions of this kind.¹⁴ Polybius knew no rescue of Rome by Camillus, and the story could have developed under the influence of Sulla's work as dictator at Rome. Camillus, as dictator, annulled the agreement that Rome should be freed by gold from Gallic arms; "ferroque non auro recuperare patriam iubet" are the words of Livy (V, 49, 3). The fact that Ennius told a similar detail of Pyrrhus (l. 196, Vah.),

Ferro, non auro, vitam cernamus utrius,

points to its introduction into the story of Camillus after the date of the Ennian poem; for Ennius would hardly have preferred his enemy to a Roman in telling this detail. The election of Camillus to the dictatorship by the people, and the change in this office during his tenure from that of an extraordinary to an ordinary post, recall the dictatorship of Sulla, marked by similar traits; Valerius Antias very possibly was agent here, as in much pertaining to this legend. With the accusation of

¹⁴ See O. Hirschfeld, *Zur Camillus-Legende*, 1895 (= *Kleine Schriften*, 1913, pp. 273 ff.); Pais, *Storia di Roma* I, 1899, p. 42; Münzer, Pauly-Wissowa, 1910, s. v. *Furius Camillus*, coll. 324 ff.; Täubler, *Klio* XII (1912), *Zur Entstehung der Camilluslegende*, pp. 219 ff.

unfair division of booty taken at Veii we may compare the charge brought against M. Livius Salinator in 219 B. C.; and the report that friends of Camillus wished to redeem the fine levied against him may well be borrowed from the analogous case of Scipio (Livy XXXVIII, 60). The details of his triumph at Veii seem to be inventions of the time of Caesar; the ensuing jealousy of the gods may be a warning devised against the excessive luxury of Caesar's day. None of these and other details can be referred to Ennius or even to Fabius Pictor. Most of them show the influence of late practices, which elaborated the story to a degree which has earned for it Mommsen's description as "die verlogenste aller römischen Legenden."¹⁵

We may conclude, therefore, with regard to Ennius' methods as annalist, that he told the legends of the Regal period in full detail as legends merely; that for the semi-historical period of the Early Republic he followed the *Annales Maximi* closely, and rejected mere hearsay and family legends; that in his books on the historical period his account was full and accurate. The form of his narrative, however, he modelled upon that of Homer; from this source he reproduced colour and phrases, and occasionally shaped incidents in imitation of Homeric episodes, if this imitation did not lead him too far astray from facts. The detail of the tribune's struggle, described in Book XV, Vah., was drawn, according to Macrobius, from II 102 ff., but Ennius heard of the events of the campaign day by day outside Ambracia, and witnessed many himself; he merely told them in Homeric fashion, did not invent them. We may compare the passage in Macrobius (VI, 2, 32) which relates that Vergil drew his description of Pandarus and Bitias from Ennius' account of the sally of two Istrians from a besieged town (most probably Ambracia).¹⁶ Macrobius did not mention here the Homeric parallel of the two Lapithae, M 131 ff. Moreover, though the fragment of the speech of Appius Claudius

¹⁵ Quoted by Münzer, Pauly-Wissowa, *s. v. Furius Camillus*, col. 348.

¹⁶ Vahlen, *praef. ed.*, p. cxcix.

was compared by Skutsch with the words of Hecuba in Ω 201 f., it has been shown to rest on an historical basis.¹⁷

Finally, as a creative poet with a gift for character-drawing and the graphic narrative of active life in peace and war, Ennius probably stamped his own interpretation permanently upon many personalities and events, more especially in recording the history of his own day.

The influence of the *Annales* on later historians, which we now go on to consider, can only, for the most part, be estimated in an indirect manner. With regard to the Regal period, we have already seen that the Ennian account was full; Coelius Antipater, on the other hand, and his successors, were not interested in its legends. The line of annalists from Coelius to Sulla wrote the narrative of their own times, and did not touch that of the early days. The first date we can establish in the work of Claudius Quadrigarius in 390 b. c.; Sisenna had already reached the Marsic War of 90 b. c. in his first book; Licinius Macer, the campaigns of Pyrrhus in his second; Aelius Tubero, the time of Servius Tullius, sixth king, in his first. Valerius Antias remains, and he treated the earliest period in detail; but his stories of Acca Larentia, of Numa, and of Servius are so fantastic and unlike early tradition that he need not be considered here. The influence of Ennius, therefore, in this section, as in that which told the story of the Early Republic, was probably slight.

The third period, however, that of historical times, both Ennius and the annalists who followed him described in full detail; and the conjecture that his work helped in no small measure to shape their narrative in this part is *à priori* very probable. Satisfactory traces of this influence of Ennius, it is true, are hard to find, but one or two may be noted.

¹⁷ On page 37: Tamen is [sc. *Appius Claudius*] . . . non dubitavit dicere illa, quae versibus persecutus est Ennius: [a fragment of the speech of Appius (= ll. 202 f., Vah.) follows here], ceteraque gravissime; notum enim nobis carmen est; et tamen ipsius Appi extat oratio. Vahlen, pp. ed. clxxviii and 36.

A whole book (VI, Vah.) was devoted to the short period of the war with Pyrrhus, and the picture of the king is clearly drawn. He is the bold and straightforward enemy, who stands in strong contrast to the perfidious Carthaginian in Book VIII, Frag. 4 (from a description of Hannibal) :

at non sic dubius fuit hostis
Aeacida Burrus.

He glories in the victory of Heraclea; yet justly owns defeat, as his inscription tells in Book VI, Frag. 11 :

Qui antehac invicti fuere viri, pater optime Olympi,
Hos ego in pugna vici, victusque sum ab isdem.

His generosity is splendidly shown in the lines (Book VI, Frag. 12) from a vividly dramatic speech which voices his refusal to accept ransom for the captives he freely liberates :

Nec mi aurum posco nec mi pretium dederitis :
Non cauponantes bellum sed belligerantes,
Ferro, non auro, vitam cernamus utrius.
Vosne velit an me regnare era quidve ferat Fors
Virtute experiamur. et hoc simul accipe dictum :
Quorum virtuti belli fortuna pepercit,
Eorundem libertati me parcere certum est.
Dono, ducite, doque volentibus cum magnis dis.

Now Ennius himself had come from the Messapian territory in which Tarentum lay; and his tribe, the Messapii, had helped Pyrrhus in his expedition.¹⁸ Hence sprang the kindly appreciation and graphic description of his merits, which coloured in general the view of later days, and emphasized the difference of character in the two great enemies of Rome. As is well known, the Roman annalists seldom wasted space to record

¹⁸ Plutarch, Pyrrhus 13 (in the message from the Tarentines to Pyrrhus) : δυνάμεις δὲ αὐτόθεν ὑπάρχοντι [i. e., to aid Pyrrhus] μεγάλαι παρά τε Λευκανῶν καὶ Μεσσαπίων καὶ Σαμνιτῶν καὶ Ταραντίνων εἰς δισμυρίονς ἵππεῖς. Cf. 15 (in the account of the storm during which Pyrrhus was cast upon the shore of Italy) : ἄμα δὲ οἵ τε Μεσσάπιοι, καθ' οὓς ἐξεβράσθη, συνέθεον βοηθοῦντες ἐκ τῶν παρόντων προθύμως.

the good deeds of Rome's enemies. When, therefore, we find that Claudius Quadrigarius told the story of Pyrrhus' release of the prisoners, we may assume that he or his source had drawn upon Ennius here. The statement occurs in Gellius III, 8; Peter, *Hist. Rom. Rell.*, Cl. Quad. 40: *Quadrigarius autem in libro tertio . . . Pyrrum populo Romano laudes atque gratias scripsisse captivosque omnes, quos tum habuit, vesti- visse et reddidisse.* Cicero certainly received his favourable impression of Pyrrhus from Ennius, for he quoted the *Annales* in his passage on Pyrrhus in the *De Officiis* (I, 12, 38): *Poeni foedi fragi, crudelis Hannibal, reliqui iustiores.* Pyrrhi quidem de captivis reddendis illa praeclarus: [Ennius, *Annales*, Book VI, Frag. 12, quoted above on p. 47, follows here]. *Regalis sane et digna Aeacidarum genere sententia.* Another passage in the *De Amicitia* (8, 28) expresses similar feeling. Justinus, also, in his epitome of Pompeius Trogus, related (XVIII, 1): *Ex ea praeda Pyrrus ex captivos milites gratis Romam remisit, ut cognita virtute eius Romani cognoscerent etiam liberalitatem;* and Livy probably had the story, since Florus (I, 13) and Eutropius (II, 12) show knowledge of it.¹⁹

If we pass from Ennius' account of his enemy to his account of men of Rome, and of those in especial on whom, as his benefactors, we might expect him to dwell, we find little trace of his influence on these prose annals. Ihne and Lehmann, supported by Vahlen,²⁰ traced to Ennius the story of the meeting of Hannibal and Scipio before the battle of Zama; but Polybius told the same incident, and it is hardly probable that Polybius used Ennius. Zielinski and Zarncke saw Homeric colour in the Livian description of the battle;²¹ no doubt truly, for Roman battles would not actually be fought in Homeric manner

¹⁹ Vahlen, *praef.* ed., p. clxxvii ff. The Greeks, Dionysius and Plutarch, probably drew their material from the *Commentaries* of Pyrrhus himself, which each mentioned in his narrative. Cicero mentioned *Libri Pyrrhi* once (*ad Fam.* IX, 25, 1); but they mattered little to him in comparison with the *Annales* of Ennius.

²⁰ Der letzte Feldzug des hannibalischen Krieges, Fleckeisen, *Jahrbücher* Supplementband XXI (1894), pp. 569 f.; Vahlen, *praef.* ed., p. cxii, note.

²¹ Zarncke, *op. cit.*, pp. 280 f.

at this later date. Very possibly the poetic description which Ennius gave of the crossing of Scipio to Africa influenced the annalists and Livy; ²² the language of Coelius has a poetic tinge: *Quantum militum in Africam [sc. a P. Scipione] transportatum sit, non parvo numero inter auctores discrepat. . . . Coelius ut abstinet numero, ita ad immensum multitudinis speciem auget: volucres ad terram delapsas clamore militum ait, tantamque multitudinem concendisse naves, ut nemo mortalium aut in Italia aut in Sicilia relinquiri videretur.* Yet even here, Coelius, the zealous student of Ennius, differed essentially, as Livy remarked, from many “Greek and Latin authorities.”

At times it is possible to prove that the later histories were not in debt to Ennius. Among notable men at Rome, Publius Cornelius Scipio Nasica and Marcus Fulvius Nobilior were both his friends; ²³ but no definite mark of his influence can be pointed out in Livy’s narrative of Nasica’s conquest of the Boii, in the dispute as to his triumph and in its final celebration (XXXVI, 38 f.). To the deeds of Fulvius in Aetolia Ennius devoted a whole book (XV, Vah.); but there is nothing specially poetical in Livy’s story of the conquest of Ambracia (XXXVIII, 4 ff.), which Polybius had also described with similar detail. Another dispute and dull list of spoil follows (Livy XXXIX, 4 f.). ²⁴ Neither is there any trace of Ennian material in later accounts of the two brothers in honour of whom Ennius wrote Book XVI, Vah.; and we have the word of Cicero (*Brutus* 15, 58, 60; Vah. ed. p. 54) that none of the historians recorded the oratorical skill of Cornelius Cethegus, which Ennius saved from oblivion by his praise.

²² Livy XXIX, 25 ff.; Peter, *Hist. Rom. Rell.*, Coel. Antipater, Fragg. 39 f.; Soltau, *Röm. Geschichtschreibung*, p. 67 f.; Stacey, *Archiv f. lat. Lex.* X, 22 f.

²³ Skutsch, Pauly-Wissowa, *s. v. Ennius*, coll. 2590 f.

²⁴ Cicero told (*De Prov. Cons.* 9, 20) that Lepidus “annalium litteris et summi poëtae voce laudatus est” because of his reconciliation with his colleague Fulvius Nobilior on their entrance to the censorship in 179 B. C. Vahlen (ed. p. 81) compares with this passage Livy XL, 45 f., where Q. Caecilius Metellus is represented as persuading reconciliation in a speech.

There is little direct evidence, then, for the influence of Ennius on later annals; yet in calculating it we may recall two facts. On the one hand, we know, from the work itself, in how lively and picturesque a style Ennius recorded events; fragments from speeches, dialogues, vivid descriptions of battles, minute portrayal of character, gathered from personal experience and the testimony of friends, appeared here for the first time in the course of Latin historiography. On the other hand, there is definite proof, in a long line of *testimonia*, that writers from 150 to 60 B. C. were reading Ennius with care.²⁵ Octavius Lampadio studied the work (Gell. XVIII, 5, 11; Fronto *ad M. Caesarem* I, 7, p. 20, Nab.); Quintus Vargunteius recited it on fixed days to large gatherings (Suet., *De Gramm.* 2); Coelius Antipater diligently strove to imitate it (Fronto *ad M. Caesarem* IV, 3, p. 62, Nab.); and Lucius Aelius Stilo, the grammarian, believed the character described in lines 234-251, Vah., to be that of the author himself. Lucilius compared the work with that of Homer (reading of Marx, ll. 343 ff.):

Illa poesis opus totum (tota[que] Ilias una
Est, una ut θέοις annales Enni) atque *opus* unum.

He imitated it, moreover, in details; as did Accius and Hostius, who also borrowed the title *Annales* for their poetry. Porcius Licinius, as Varro told, wrote of Ennius (*De Ling. Lat.* V, 163, G. S.); Antonius Gniphō, according to Buecheler (*Rhein. Mus.* XXXVI (1881), p. 334), wrote a commentary on the *Annales*; Pompilius Andronicus was only induced by dire poverty to sell his epitome of the work. Cicero (*De Orat.* I, 34, 154) represented the orator Crassus as studying the lines of Ennius in the training of his rhetorical art. Lucretius paid it splendid tribute in his first book (ll. 112 ff.);²⁶ Catullus, though of a newer school which despised archaic poems, yet

²⁵ For the following, and further, details see Vahlen, *praef.* ed., pp. xxv-lvi; and Skutsch, Pauly-Wissowa, *s. v. Ennius*, coll. 2613 ff.

²⁶ Cf. also Pullig, *Ennio quid debuerit Lucretius I*, 1888, mentioned by Skutsch (p. 2615).

drew upon this source.²⁷ The testimony of Cornelius Nepos is emphatic (*Vita Catonis* 1, 4) : ex qua [sc. *Sardinia*] quaestor superiore tempore ex Africa decedens [sc. *Cato*] Q. Ennium poetam deduxerat; quod non minoris existimamus quam quemlibet amplissimum Sardiniensem triumphum. Varro twice linked the work of Homer and of Ennius (*Sat. Menipp.* 398, Buech.; *Rerum Rust. Libri* I, 1), and quoted the poetry of Ennius not only in many parts of the *De Lingua Latina*, but also in his *Satires*. Finally, the works of Cicero himself abound in reminiscences of Ennius' writings, both with and without their author's name, and sometimes given in a way which shows that Cicero and his Rome knew their poet well. Thus, he suggests in the *Lucullus* (27, 88; Vah. ed. p. 3) : Nisi vero Ennium non putamus ita totum illud audivisse :

O pietas animi

si modo id somniavit, ut si vigilans audiret; in the *Orator* (51, 171; Vah. ed. p. 39), after quoting line 214 as from Ennius, he adds: Mihi de antiquis eodem modo non licebit [sc. *vetera contemnere*], praesertim cum dicturus non sim: "ante hunc" ut ille, nec quae sequuntur: "nos ausi reserare" In his correspondence, he writes to Varro (*ad Fam.* IX, 7, 2; Vah. ed. p. 55): Quid faciam? tempori serviendum est. Sed ridicula missa, praesertim quum sit nihil quod rideamus:

Africa terribili tremit horrida terra tumultu;

itaque nullum est ἀποπροηγμένον, quod non verear; to Atticus (VI, 2, 8; Vah. ed. p. 107): Ain tandem, Attice, laudator integritatis et elegantiae nostrae?

ausus es hoc ex ore tuo

inquit Ennius, ut equites Scaptio ad pecuniam cogendam darem, me rogare?²⁸

Our study, then, of the influence of Ennius on later Roman annals has shown that he gave the story of the Kings in full;

²⁷ Cf. Fröbel, *Ennio quid debuerit Catullus*, 1910.

²⁸ See also details in the article of Skutsch, p. 2614; and R. Wreschniok, *De Cicerone Lucretioque Ennii Imitatoribus*, 1907.

that the annalists either neglected or curtailed the narrative of this part. For the period of the Early Republic, on the other hand, the Ennian account was summary; that of the annalists, as is shown by the numerous legends told by Livy, abounded in picturesque detail. In these two sections, therefore, the influence of Ennius was of little account. The influence, on the other hand, of his lively description of historical times might well be expected to appear in the writings of men who desired to add colour to their work; direct evidence of this influence is shown in the favourable estimate, current at a later time among Roman circles, of Pyrrhus, the enemy of Rome; and, we may think, in the details of the elder Scipio's campaigns. This evidence fails, however, for other parts, as the fifteenth and the sixteenth book, of the poet's work, from which no influence on later annalists can be traced. Much of the proof, therefore, of this influence rests upon the indirect evidence given by the attractive character of the poem, shown by the fragments yet extant, and by those readers and writers from Coelius to Cicero who constantly studied its record. The story of the *Annales* remained living in Rome long after the dry statements of Fabius and Cincius were forgotten. It was the *Annales* of Ennius, and not prose annals, that Roman historians of the first century B. C. had studied as boys at school, and were reading as men; and this great national possession, doubtless at first distrusted because of its poetic form, was regarded in their time as the authentic record of Rome's former days. The graphic phrasing in which scenes of war and peace were cast, the vigorous march of the action, the lines which characterized the great men of Rome's history, had slowly steeped the minds of Quadrigarius, Sisenna, and the companions of their group till it was impossible for them to write without betraying in some measure the Ennian and Homeric style. It is this unobtrusive but pervading influence over the writers of the first century, not the creation of new substance, which gives to Ennius his significant place among writers of the history of Rome.

CHAPTER II.

THE INFLUENCE OF ENNIUS ON THE CHORUS OF ROMAN TRAGEDY.

Certain of the more definite characteristics of early Roman tragedy have been clearly traced by examination of the tragic fragments, made from time to time since the middle of the last century. The work of Grysar, Jahn, and Ribbeck¹ has proved that the first writers of tragedy in Rome transferred the Chorus, with other parts of the drama, from their Greek models, and that the activity of the Roman Chorus was not confined to the singing of Choral lyrics between the acts. But the part which the Roman Chorus played in speech or song within the action of the drama has not yet been satisfactorily explained.

On this subject two distinct theories have been maintained within more recent years. Capps² considers that the history of the Chorus proceeded on very similar lines during the periods of the classical Greek, of the Hellenistic, and of the Roman, drama, and that, so far as we can see, it enjoyed an unbroken prerogative of song and action within the progress of the plot: "I cannot but think that the Roman chorus, which seems hitherto to have been overlooked in interpreting the Greek, furnishes strong grounds for believing that the external characteristics of the Greek tragic chorus, and, to a certain extent, its inner relations to the drama, remained unimpaired from the fifth century down to the first."

On the other hand, Leo sees a decline in the song of the Chorus, beginning in the later plays of Euripides, continued by the school of Agathon and by the Hellenistic writers of

¹ Grysar, *Ueber das Canticum und den Chor in der röm. Tragödie*, *Sitzungsber. der wien. Akad.* XV (1855), pp. 365 ff.; Jahn, *Hermes* II (1867), pp. 225 ff.; Ribbeck, *Römische Tragödie*, 1875.

² The Chorus in the Later Greek Drama, *American Journal of Archaeology* X (1895), pp. 287 ff.

tragedy, and represented for Roman drama in the fragments which we may assign to the Chorus of Ennius. In his view, none of these fragments which truthfully represent the Chorus of their Greek originals is in lyric metre; and he therefore infers that the Chorus in Ennius' tragedies did not sing as a whole, but was represented by the recitative of individual leaders. This diminution of the Choral rôle in song, moreover, is regarded by Leo as a special characteristic of Ennius among Roman playwrights.³

In consideration of these conflicting views, and of the fact that our knowledge of Greek drama has been materially increased of late, it seems worth while to re-examine the evidence given by the fragments, lyric and non-lyric, which may reasonably be attributed to the Chorus on the Roman stage.

No trustworthy evidence can be gained from these fragments before the time of Naevius.⁴ In his tragedy, the *Lycurgus*,⁵

³ *De Tragoedia Romana*, 1910. On page 20 he writes (I have added the emphasis): "Testimonia igitur ne de Accio quidem multa sunt, sed satis ut intellegamus choro eum cantica dedisse, non satis ut illum quoque cantica chori in recitationem vertisse constet. quod Pacuvium fecisse vidimus, qui tamen cantentes choros induxit. *solius igitur Enni tragoediarium reliquiae nullum fere vestigium praebeant canticorum chori*, sed multa fragmenta sermonum ex canticorum locis tralatorum. ergo *hac quoque in re suum ac proprium locum Ennius tenere videtur, ut secundum artem ab Euripide conformatam et post Euripidem continuatam atque exauctam chori partes diminuerit*, monodiarum amplificarit, atque *ad histrionum quidem cantionem quod attinet, Pacuvius et Accius ab Enni ratione quae etiam Livi Andronicci fuit non deflexisse videntur, in choricis transferendis artius rursus ad exemplaria attica sese applicuisse.*" These remarks do not apply to the action of the Roman Chorus within the plot, which Leo naturally recognizes. Cf. *Plautinische Forschungen*, 1912, p. 96; *Die griechische und lateinische Literatur und Sprache*, 1912, p. 416; *Geschichte der römischen Literatur* I, 1913, pp. 193 f.

⁴ The disputed question as to the work of Livius Andronicus rests on the following evidence:

i. Terentianus Maurus 1931 (*G. L. K.* VI, p. 383):

Livius ille vetus Graio cognomine sua
inserit Inoni versus, puto, tale docimen:
praemisso heroo subiungit namque miuron,
hymnum quando chorus festo canit ore Triviae,
"et iam purpureo suras include cothurno,
balteus et revocet volucres in pectore sinus,
pressaque iam gravida crepitent tibi terga pharetra:
derige odorisequos ad certa cubilia canes."

news is brought to the Edonian king that a company of Bacchic Maenads have invaded his territory (Fragg. I; II; III R.), and he sends his men forthwith to pursue and capture the intruders (Fragg. V; VII R.).

The Chorus of Bacchants enters the stage; its leader invites them to the dance:

pergite,
Thýrsigerae Bacchae, modo,
Bacchico cum schemate.

This, in Bacchiac metre, is the reading of Leo (*De Trag. Rom.*, p. 13), and follows the MS. Other authorities scan differently. Lindsay (ed. Nonius, 1903, p. 333) gives:

pérgite,
Thýrsigeraé Bacchaé modo, Bácchicó cum schémate,

2. Marius Victorinus (*G. L. K.* VI, p. 68) : at cum Livius Andronicus praemisso hexametro huius modi subnectat versus per ordinem iambo terminatos, novam potius hanc speciem quam miuron existimant versum et teliambon appellant. Nam in hymno Diana apud eundem ita inveniuntur in fabula Inone (*e. q. s.*). On this we note (see authorities mentioned below) :

a. This metre and this style are unsuited to the immature stage of Latin literature to which Livius belonged.

b. Laevius wrote an *Ino*, from which Priscian quoted two choliambic lines (*VI, G. L. K.* II, p. 281, where see note; cf. Festus, ed. Lind., p. 334).

c. It is therefore possible that the lines quoted by Terentianus Maurus came from a polymetrical poem of Laevius, that the names were changed by the mistake of some copyist, and that *Andronicus* was added later as a gloss. The interchange of *Livius* and *Laevius* in MS. is known. Cf. *G. L. K.* II, p. 281, where some MSS. give *Livius*.

d. In any case, the lines come from a "hymn to Diana," and tell nothing of any participation in the plot on the part of the Chorus. The hymn might well have been sung between the acts.

The consensus of opinion is against the authorship of Livius. See Klussmann, *Livii Andronici Dramatum Reliquiae*, 1849, pp. 19 ff., and cf. Ribbeck, *Röm. Trag.*, p. 34; L. Havet, *Laeviana*, *Revue de Philologie* XV (1891), pp. 10 f.; H. de la Ville de Mirmont, *Études sur l'ancienne poésie latine*, 1903, pp. 175 f.; 273 ff.

e. The anapaestic lyric *ex incertis fabulis Livii*, Frag. III Ribb., may well belong to a *canticum* sung by some actor, not by the Chorus. It shows nothing for the part played by the Chorus in the action.

f. Ribbeck reasonably suggests that the lyric fragment of the *Equos Troianus* (*Rom. Sc. Tr.*³, p. 3; *Röm. Trag.*, p. 27) belongs to a *canticum* in which Cassandra appeals to Apollo to rescue her fatherland.

³ Ribbeck, *Röm. Trag.*, pp. 55 ff.

which also follows the MS., and belongs to a passage in trochaic septenarii. Ribbeck (*Sc. Rom. Tr.*, p. 12, Frag. IX) scans as iambic trimeter, but changes the reading:

pérgite,
Tyrsígerae Bacchae, Bácchico cum scémate.⁶

The next line in question occurs in three places, but the reading is doubtful. The different versions are:

1. Nonius: ed. Lind., p. 778:

Ignótei íteri' súmu'; túte scís? [Bacchiacs];

ed. Mü. VIII, p. 107:

Ignotis iterís sumu'; tute scís?
[Codd. ignoti.]

2. Priscian VI, *G. L. K.* II, p. 229:

Ignoti iteris sumus, tute scis.
[Codd. ignoti.]

3. Nonius: ed. Lind., p. 180:

Ignótae íteri' súmu'; túte scís. [Bacchiacs];

ed. Mü. II, p. 178:

Ignoreis iterís sumu'; tute scís?⁷
[Codd. ignotae.]

On the strength of this reading *ignotae*, the fragment has been generally ascribed to the Chorus, whose leader is represented as innocently inquiring the way from one of the royal police. Lindsay in the *Classical Review* (XVI (1902), p. 48),

⁶ L. Müller (*Cn. Naevi Fab. Reliquiae*, 1885, p. 10) writes, also in iambic trimeter:

pérgite,
Thyrsigerae Bacchae cómmodo cum schémate.

Klussmann (ed. Naevius, 1843, pp. 122 f.) reads anapaestic measure here in following Bergk's conjecture (*Rhein. Mus.* III (1835), p. 75) *Bacchiaco* for the MS. *Bacchico*; but the adjective *bacchiacus* is only used by grammarians in describing *Bacchiac* metre. See *Thesaurus s. v.*

⁷ This reading is found also in Müller's edition of Naevius, 1885, p. 10. In all cases, therefore, he scans as part of a trochaic line. Klussmann (p. 123) writes as iambic trimeter:

. . . ignóti iteris sumus, tute scis.

held *ignotei* to be the correct reading of Nonius. The reading *ignoti* may reasonably be considered the correct one, and the words may well belong to a *canticum* sung by an actor, possibly by one of the king's police during the search for the Bacchants. Ribbeck (*Sc. Rom. Tr.*⁸, p. 12, Frag. X) scans iambic trimeter with change of reading:

Ignótae <hic> iteris súmus: <si> tute scís?

At length all are captured, and dread the wrath of Lycurgus:

Ut ín venatu vítulantis éx suis
Locís nos mittant poénis decoratás feris.

Lindsay (ed. Nonius, p. 21) and Ribbeck (*Sc. Rom. Tr.*⁸, p. 12, Frag. VIII) both record this reading in iambic trimeter.⁹

The guards bring the Bacchants before the king, and one of these men reports upon the dress and surroundings of their captives at the time of discovery (Fragg. XVII; XVIII R.):

Frag. XVII: Námque ludere út laetantis ínter sese vídimus
Própter amnem, aquám creterrís súmere ex
fonte.

Frag. XVIII: Pállis patagiis crocotis málacis mortuálibus.

Lycurgus brutally orders that they be deprived of their tongues, and cast, bound hand and foot, into prison. They are led away (Frag. VI R.):

dúcite
Eó cum argutis línguis mutas quádrupedis.

With this ends the evidence from fragments with regard to the Chorus in the drama of Naevius.⁹ We may summarize it thus:

1. One, Frag. VIII R., is definitely written in iambic trimeter.
2. The other two, Fragg. IX; X R., are probably to be read in lyric metre; yet Ribbeck reads both in iambic trimeter.

⁸ L. Müller (ed. Naevius, p. 10) gives a slightly different reading, but also in iambic trimeter.

⁹ Other fragments in lyric metre from Naevius' work—*Danae* IV; VI; *Inc. Nom.* I; X—cannot be assigned to a Chorus.

3. One of these fragments, Frag. X R., may reasonably be referred to a *canticum*, and not to Choral lyric.

The only sure fact, therefore, which we can ascertain is that Naevius gave iambic trimeter to his Chorus.

We may turn now to Ennius himself. In his *Iphigenia* the warriors of the Chorus express their discontent in trochaic septenarii, according to all readings (Frag. XI Vah. (III R.)):

ótio qui nescit uti

Plús negoti habet quam cum est negotium in negotio.

Nám cui quod agat institutumst non ullo negotio

Id agit, id studet, ibi mentem atque animum delectat suum.

Ótioso in ótio animus nescit quid velit.

Hoc idem est: em neque domi nunc nos nec militiae sumus:

Imus huc, hinc illuc, cum illuc ventum est, ire illuc lubet.

Incerte errat animus, praeter propter vitam vivitur.¹⁰

In the *Medea Exul* the women of Medea declare in the same metre their horror at the impending murder of the children at their mother's hand (Frag. XVI Vah. (XIV R.)):

Iuppiter tuque adeo, summe Sol, qui res omnis spicis,

Quique tuo cum lumine mare terram caelum continet,

Inspice hoc facinus, prius quam fiat, prohibe scelus.¹¹

The original of this is the Choral song in lyric metre of Euripides, *Medea*, 1251 ff.

These two fragments are the only certain ones extant which show non-lyric metre given by Ennius to a Chorus in his plays. A fragment (*Inc. Inc. Fab.*, Frag. LXXI R.)—a trochaic septenarius:

Erebo <pro>creata fuscis crinibus Nox, te invoco

¹⁰ So Vahlen's reading. Those of Ribbeck and of L. Müller (*Q. Enni Carminum Reliquiae*, 1884, p. 95) differ, but give the same metre.

¹¹ Vahlen, Ribbeck, and L. Müller (ed. Enn., p. 118) all give trochaic septenarius.

though quoted without name of author or play, was compared by Ribbeck with the lyric song of the Chorus in Aeschylus, *Eumenides* 321 ff.:¹²

μᾶτερ, ἀ μ' ἔτικτες, ὡ μᾶτερ
Νύξ, ἀλαοῖσι καὶ δεδορκόσιν
ποινάν, κλῦθι

and 884 f.:

θυμὸν ἄε, μᾶτερ
Νύξ.

Ennius is the only Roman poet to whom we can assign a play of this name; but neither Vahlen nor Ribbeck ventures to include the line among his works.¹³

On the other hand, the fragments give evidence that the Chorus sang. The line (*Medea Exul*, Frag. XII Vah. (XVI R.)),

Útinam ne umquam Méde Colchis cúpido corde pédem
extulisses [v. l. extetulisses],

is in lyric metre, whether trochaic or anapaestic. Vahlen and Ribbeck write a trochaic octonarius; Buecheler, followed by L. Müller (*Q. Enni Car. Reliquiae*, 1885, *Medea Exul*, Frag. VIII) reads *extetulisses*; both scan the line as anapaestic.¹⁴ It is compared by Ribbeck¹⁵ with Euripides, *Medea* 431 f.:

σὺ δ' ἐκ μὲν οἴκων πατρίων ἔπλευσας
μαινομένᾳ κραδίᾳ.

¹² *Röm. Tragödie*, pp. 146 f.

¹³ Ribbeck, in *Sc. Rom. Tr.*³, p. 52, *Medea Exul*, Frag. XIV Vah. (IV R.), quoted by Nonius, reads *fluctus* <*Junius in mg*>, and compares Eur., *Medea* 131 ff. (lyric metre of Chorus). If this comparison might stand, the Chorus in Ennius would seem to be represented by iambic trimeter, as contrasted with lyric in the Greek; but the reading is doubtful. Both Vahlen and Lindsay (ed. Nonius, p. 748) retain the MS. *fructus*, and Vahlen (ed. p. 170) compares the words of Medea in Euripides' play, 772 f. (iambic trimeter).

¹⁴ So Müller (Nonius, p. 469) and Lindsay (Nonius, p. 461), both reading *extetulisses*.

Utinám ne umquam, Médé, cordis †
Cupidó corde pedem extétulisses!

Müller recognizes the possibility of reading a trochaic octonarius.

¹⁵ *Sc. Rom. Tr.*³, p. 56.

In both cases the Chorus is mourning the fact that Medea ever left her home.¹⁶

In the *Thyestes* there is little doubt that the friends of the unfortunate son formed the Chorus,¹⁷ and joined in a song in Bacchiac metre. Fragment VIII Vah. (VIII R.) runs:

Thyestes

Nolite, hospites, ad me adire, ilico istic,
Ne contagio mea bonis umbrave obsit.

Tanta vis sceleris in corpore haeret.

[Chorus]

Quidnam est obsecro quod te adiri abnutas?

The Bacchiac metre is given by Vahlen, Ribbeck and L. Müller (*Enni Car. Rell., Thyestes*, Frag. X).¹⁸

There are, then, two cases of lyric metre to be assigned to the Chorus, for one of which we find corresponding lyric in the Greek, while for the other no parallel case can be adduced. On the other hand, there are two certain cases, and one uncertain case, in which Ennius may be held to have substituted for the song of the Chorus in Greek tragedy a recitative of its leader in his Latin adaptation.¹⁹

¹⁶ Leo (*De Trag. Rom.*, p. 15) remarks that this may be sung by the leader of the Chorus, but does not correspond to the Choral song in Euripides. Yet there is no reason why it should not be assigned to the united song of a Roman Chorus.

¹⁷ Ribbeck, *Röm. Trag.*, p. 202.

¹⁸ Here again it does not seem necessary to think with Leo that the Bacchiac metre of the last line may be explained by the preceding Bacchiacs. If it does not come from a pure Choral song (*De Rom. Trag.*, p. 16), it comes from a song in which both Chorus and actor took part. Vahlen gives the last line to "unus hospitum," Ribbeck to "alius," Müller to "alia persona," but the singular number is used in the Choruses of Euripides.

¹⁹ The *Sabinae* of Ennius formed the Chorus of his *praetexta*; and the one fragment extant is certainly to be assigned to them, or to Hersilia, speaking for them as their leader. The reading is not certain. Vahlen suggested a trochiac octonarius in *Rhein. Mus.* XVI (1861), p. 580; for conjectures forming iambic trimeter see Ribbeck, *Sc. Rom. Tr.*, p. 324; Vahlen, ed. (1903) p. 190, note.

The next question is that of the degree in which Ennius allowed the members of his Chorus to interest themselves in the progress of the action.²⁰

1. In the *Achilles* the Chorus must have been composed of Greek soldiers, the λέως, who would be closely in touch with the action. What body of folk, if not the Chorus, could have been ordered by the *praeco* to keep silence in Fragment I Vah.?²¹ This fragment does not belong, apparently, to the prologue, as in the *Poenulus* of Plautus, where it is quoted (Vah. ed. p. 118).

2. By substituting in the *Iphigenia* a band of warriors for the young girls of the original, Ennius brought his Chorus into far greater harmony with the plot.²² These soldiers emphasize that strife of parties which is going on in the Greek camp; their introduction strengthens the effect produced by the threats of Calchas and Odysseus, and forms a powerful factor in the overwhelming force which crushed the feeble resistance of Agamemnon, the appeals of Clytemnestra, and the protesting innocence of Iphigenia.²³

3. In the *Medea*, the unhappy woman herself addresses the women of the Chorus (Frag. IV Vah. (V R.)), who in their turn address her in Fragment XII Vah. (XVI R.), and the Choral fragment XVI Vah. (XIV R.) is intimately connected with the action.

4. In the *Eumenides*, editors believe that Ennius was following Aeschylus; and therefore we may hold that the goddesses formed the Chorus, and were directed to bless Athens in the fragment (VII Vah.) spoken by Minerva.²⁴ There is an indi-

²⁰ See on this activity of the Chorus within the plot for Ennius, as well as for Pacuvius and Accius, the literature cited in note 1.

²¹ Ribbeck, *Achilles Aristarchi*, Frag. I.

²² As has been pointed out again and again, Ennius may possibly have borrowed this motive from Sophocles; the *contaminatio* in that case would be his own idea.

²³ Capps, *Amer. Journ. Arch.* X (1895), p. 298; Ribbeck, *Röm. Trag.*, p. 96; Michaut, *Le Génie latin*, 1900, p. 183.

²⁴ Ribbeck (*Sc. Rom. Tr.*, p. 294) includes this among the fragments *ex inc. inc. fabulis*, but remarks "Manifesto ad Enni Eumenides pertinent translata ex Aesch. 903 ff."

cation, also (Frag. V Vah. (IV R.)), of a second Chorus of Areopagites who formed the jury at the trial, and are here addressed by Minerva (cf. *Eumenides*, Frag. VI Vah. (*Inc. Enni*, Frag. XVIII R.)).²⁵

5. In the *Hectoris Lytra*, Priam appeals to the Myrmidons who no doubt formed the Chorus (Frag. XVII Vah. (XIV R.)). Possibly also in this play a secondary Chorus of Nereids is active in bringing the armour from Thetis to her son, if Ennius made here a *contaminatio* of the trilogy of Aeschylus.²⁶

6. In the *Hecuba*, the old queen addresses the Chorus (Frag. IV Vah. (V R.)). Vahlen compares a passage from her lament to the Trojan women in Euripides' play, after the sacrifice of Polyxena (165 ff.).

7. In the play bearing his name, Phoenix discusses his father's suspicion and angry accusation of him with his friends, who formed the Chorus. So Fragment VIII Vah. leads us to infer²⁷ (cf. Ribbeck, *Sc. Rom. Tr.*³, *Inc. Inc. Fab.*, Frag. CXVII). The blinding of his son by Amyntor was part of the story in Apollodorus III, 13, 8. Phoenix is expecting from his friends the same courage that he himself shows in his trouble, and does not yield to the sympathy which they show (as in Frag. V Vah. R.). Likewise in the *Telamo*, Teucer may be addressing a Chorus of his friends in Fragments VII; VIII Vah. (VI; VII R.). Thyestes, also, in his play, is in evident sympathy with his companions.

We find, therefore, in the fragments of seven plays, indication of relationship between Chorus and action: in two, *Medea*

²⁵ Capps states (p. 298) that the *Alexander* of Ennius had a second Chorus of shepherds. The extant fragments do not appear to show this, though it is probable, if Ennius followed his original closely.

²⁶ Vahlen, ed. p. ccvi. Ribbeck, *Röm. Trag.*, p. 356 (of the *Epinausimache* of Accius): "Den Chor der Nereustöchter, welche die Waffen des Hephaestos bringen, eine echt Aeschyleische, vermutlich bereits von Ennius in *Hectoris Lutra* verwertete Erfindung, scheint unser Dichter aufgegeben und den vollen Ton auf die Kriegsthaten des Helden gelegt zu haben."

²⁷ Ribbeck returns on account of the dactyl in *futtile amici* to *animi* in *Sc. Rom. Tr.*³, Phoenix, Frag. VII, though he read *amici* in *Röm. Trag.*, p. 195. Lindsay (Nonius, p. 827) reads *amici* in a trochaic octonarius; Vahlen reads *futtile amici*, and defends the dactyl (ed. p. 176).

Exul and *Phoenix*, there are traces of intimate relationship between the Chorus and the principal actor ; in two, *Eumenides* and *Hectoris Lytra*, the goddesses, jurymen, or Myrmidonian warriors are all brought into close connection with the plot ; while in the *Iphigenia* Ennius actually changed the personnel of the Chorus in his original in a way which furthered this aim.

It will be of interest now to consider how the immediate successors of Ennius treated the Chorus.

Pacuvius. In the *Antiopa*, the *astici* of Thebes formed the chief Chorus, as they did in Euripides.²³ Amphio proposes a riddle to them, and is answered probably by their leader ; the metre is the iambic trimeter of dialogue (Frag. IV R.) :

Amphio

Quadrupés tardigrada agréstis humilis áspera,
Brevi cápite, cervice ánguina, aspectú truci,
Evíscerata inánima cum animalí sono.

Astici

Ita saéptuosa díctione abs té datur
Quod cóniectura sápiens aegre cóntuit :
Non íntellegimus, nísi si aperte díxeris.

Amphio

Testúdo.

Ribbeck suggests that Amphio may have given these old men an exhibition of his skill on the lyre.²⁴ Fragment IV R. from the *Incerta* of Pacuvius may be attributed to the Maenads who formed the secondary Chorus of this play ; they sing their hate in anapaestic lyric as Dirce leads them to the capture of Antiopa :

Agite íte, evolvite rápite, coma
Tractáte per aspera sáxa et humum,
Scindíte vestem ocíus !

²³ Schol. Euripides, *Hipp.* 58 : ἐν τῇ Ἀντιόπῃ δύο χοροὺς εἰσάγει, τόν τε τῶν Θηβαίων γερόντων (quoted in *Röm. Trag.*, p. 285).

²⁴ *Röm. Trag.*, p. 292.

In the *Dulorestes* (Frag. XXVIII R.), Electra expresses her gratitude to her friends; no doubt these were young girls forming the Chorus of the play, as in the *Choephoroi* of Aeschylus and the *Electra* of Sophocles. But no fragment can be assigned to them.

The Chorus of the *Niptra* is formed of the servants of Ulysses, who sing with him in anapaestic metre as they enter, bearing the wounded man forth from the struggle with Telegonus (Frag. IX R.):

Ulixes

Pedetémptim ac sedató nisu,
Ne súccussu arripiát maior
Dolor

• • • • • • •

Chorus

Tu quóque Ulixes, quamquám graviter
Cernímus ictum, nimis paéne animo es
Mollí, qui consuetús in armis
Aevom ágere

• • • • • • •

Ulixes

Retinéte, tenete! opprímit ulcus :
Nudáte! heu mé miserum, éxcrucior!
Operíte: abscedite iám iam.
Mittíte: nam attrectatu ét quassu
saevum ámplificatis dolórem.

In the *Periboea*, a Chorus of Bacchants celebrates the festival of their god in anapaestic lyric (Fragg. XXVII; XXVIII R.):

Frag. XXVII: . . . scruepa saxéa Bacchi
Templá prope adgreditur.

Frag. XXVIII: . . . tiasantém fremitu
Concítē melum!

Their part is entirely in harmony with the whole, because Diomedes plans to take advantage of this time of holiday to carry out his attack upon the usurper Agrius.

In the *Teucer*, the friends of the hero Teucer, probably the Chorus, seek to conciliate the angry Telamo, and tell their story in iambic octonarii (Frag. VIII R.):

Nos illum interea próliciendo própitiaturós facul
Remúr.

Accius. The Chorus of the *Antigona* was formed, apparently, of watchmen. Two fragments from a song are extant (Fragg. III; IV R.):

Frag. III: Attát, nisi me fallít in obitu
Sonitús

Frag. IV: Heús, vigiles, properáte, expergite
Péctora tarda sopóre, exsurgite!

Accius, then, either substituted these watchmen for the Theban elders of Sophocles as Capps states,²⁰ or they formed a second Chorus.

In the *Armorum Judicium*, Fragment IV R. appears to come from the song of the Chorus. In the *Ajax* of Sophocles (609 ff.), the Chorus mourns in lyric the fate of its hero:²¹

καὶ μοι δυσθεράπευτος Αἴας
ξύνεστιν ἔφεδρος, ὥμοι μοι,
θείᾳ μανίᾳ ξύναυλος·
δὸν ἔξεπέμψω πρὶν δή ποτε Θουρίῳ
κρατοῦντ' ἐν Ἀρει.

So in the song from the Latin version, of which only one line remains, an iambic octonarius:

In quo salutis spés supremas síbi habet summa exérciti.

²⁰ *Amer. Journ. Arch.* X (1895), p. 298. *Antiope* is a misprint for *Antigona*.

²¹ *Röm. Trag.*, p. 373.

In the *Atreus*, the Chorus expresses on the stage its apprehension in a song, while the gruesome feast is progressing within. The rolling of thunder tells the horror of the deed (Frag. XIII R.):³²

Sed quid tonitru turbida torvo
Concussa repente aequóra caeli
Sensimus sonere?

The *Bacchae* gives sure evidence of Choral lyric in anapaestic and cretic metre (Fragg. III-VI R.):

Frag. III: (a reference to the song of the Bacchants),
. aéricrepatantés melos

Frag. IV: Agite modicó gradu! iácite thyrsós levís!

Frag. V: O Díonyse, óptime
Patér, vitisator, Sémela genitus, eúhie!

Frag. VI: . . . Ubi sanctús Cithaeron
Frondét viridantibus fétis.

The Bacchants of the Chorus sing in the play of Euripides (152 ff.; 862 ff.; 977 ff.).³³

The Chorus in the *Medea* is formed of herdsmen dwelling in a little island near the mouth of the Ister. They are terrified by the arrival of Jason and Medea with their company, who land here, seeking refuge from Apsyrtus and the Colchians (Fragg. I-III R., in iambic senarii). One of these shepherds declares in a trochaic septenarius his intention of climbing a tree to gain a safer view of the approaching strangers (Frag. IV R.).³⁴ At the end of the play, the old Aeetes mourns over the body of his son, and the Chorus in anapaestic measure seeks to comfort him (Frag. XVII R.):³⁵

Fors dóminatur neque víta ulli
Propria ín vita est.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 454. It is also possible, as Ribbeck suggests, that in Frag. XVIII R. Atreus, enraged at the curse uttered by Thyestes against himself and his race, commands the Chorus to seize his brother (p. 455).

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 570.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 532.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 534 f.

In the *Philocteta*, Accius had the choice of three models, one by each of the great Greek tragic poets. Ribbeck considers that he probably used them all, but chose to follow Euripides most closely. Natives of Lemnos formed the Choruses of Aeschylus and Euripides; but, since the Chorus in the Latin displays so much knowledge of Ulysses, no doubt Accius followed Sophocles in this detail, though with distinct changes.³⁶ For in the Greek play the sailors of the Chorus belong to the ship of Neoptolemus;³⁷ here they sing a lyric in anapaests in honour of their master Ulysses, and he answers in the same metre (Fragg. I; II R.):

Frag. I: Inclúte, parva prodíte patria,
Nomíne celebri claróque potens
Pectóre, Achivis classíbus ductor,
Gravis Dárdaniis gentíbus ultior,
Laértiade!

Frag. II: . . . Lemnía praesto
Litóra rara, et celsá Cabirum
Delúbra tenes, mystéria quae
Pristína castis concépta sacris

Volcánia <iam> templá sub ipsis
Collíbus, in quos delátus locos
Dicítur alto ab limíne caeli

Nemus épirante vapóre vides,
Unde ignis cluet mortálibus clam
Divísus: eum dictús Prometheus
Clepsísse dolo poenásque Iovi
Fato éxpendisse suprémo.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 378 ff.

³⁷ Soph., *Philoctetes* 1072:

Xo. ὅδ' ἐστὶν ἡμῶν ναυκράτωρ ὁ παῖς.

Cf. Jebb, ed. *Philoctetes*, p. 31, note.

The Argonauts seem to form the Chorus of the *Phinidae*, and to sing a lyric after they land upon the coast of Salmydessus in Thrace (Frag. I; II R.):

Frag. I: Hac ubi curvo litore latratu
Unda sub undis labunda sonit

Frag. II: Simul et circum magná sonantibus
Excita saxis suavísona echo
Crepitú clangente cachinnat.

Jason gives them directions (Frag. III R.); they are to move quietly, as he fears the presence of unfriendly folk (cf. Frag. IV R.).³⁸

The *Phoenissae* shows by its title that the Chorus was composed of Phoenician girls as in Euripides. Ribbeck points out that their presence in the Greek drama is purely accidental, and that they have no connection with the myth. They tarry on their way from Tyre to Delphi, in the city of Thebes, connected by kinship with their race; and the siege unexpectedly delays them there. No doubt they sang in lyric melody during the play of Accius; and the fact that he took over this Chorus is significant for the history of Roman tragedy at this time.³⁹

In the *Telephus*, the Myrmidons of Achilles apparently played as Chorus; they express their weariness at the long waiting in Argos by a Choral song (Frag. II R.):⁴⁰

Iam iam stupido Thessala somno
Pectora languentque senentque.

Fragment IX R. from the *Tereus*, an iambic octonarius, may express the determination of the leader of the Chorus to rescue, if possible, the little Itys from his mother's hideous purpose of revenge.⁴¹

³⁸ *Röm. Trag.*, p. 541.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 478: "Aus der Aufnahme gerade dieses Chors, der weder mit der Sage zusammenhängt noch in die Handlung eingreift, lässt sich erkennen, dass dieses lyrische Element auch der römischen Tragödie unentbehrlich war."

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 346.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 582.

The evidence, therefore, shows for Pacuvius and Accius a connection between Chorus and plot in twelve plays. In six of these, the *Niptra* and *Teucer* of Pacuvius, the *Antigona*, *Armorum Judicium*, *Atreus*, and *Medea* of Accius, this connection is intimate; and the desire to bring the Chorus into union with the action, if the view of Capps is correct, even caused the change from Theban elders to watchmen for the Chorus of the *Antigona* of Accius.

A summary of the metrical evidence shows the following:

	<i>Lyric Metre</i>	<i>Trochaic Septenarii</i> (i. e., recitative)	<i>Iambic Tri- meter</i> (i. e., dialogue as in Greek plays)
LIVIUS			
ANDRONICUS:		No trustworthy evidence.	
NAEVIUS:	Lycurgus?	Lycurgus?	Lycurgus
ENNIUS:	{ Medea* ⁴² Thyestes	Certain : { Iphigenia Medea* Uncertain : Eumen- ides* (only one line)	Greek corres- pond- ing verse is lyrical.
PACUVIUS:	{ Antiopa, Cho- rus 2 (<i>Thi- asos</i>) Niptra Periboea Teucer		Antiopa, Cho- rus 1 (<i>Astici</i>)
Accius:	{ Antigona Armorum Judicium* Atreus Bacchae* Medea Philoteta* Phinidae Telephus	Medea (only one line)	Medea

It seems, then, that there is not sufficient evidence for accepting the theory of Leo that Ennius was substituting the recita-

⁴² In cases marked * a correspondence may be traced with the Greek.

tive of the leader of the Chorus for the lyric song of the whole band. The leader of the Chorus speaks in iambic trimeter in Naevius. It would rather appear that in the tragedies of Ennius a reaction from Hellenistic tradition, which may already have been present to some extent in those of Naevius, was developed upon the Roman stage; and that he is to be regarded, not as the heir of the tendency to suppress the Chorus, but rather as the most important and influential agent in a movement towards its restoration to the rôle in song and action which it played in the drama of the fifth century. In Ennius, who presents among the extant fragments two (certain) cases of representation of Chorus by lyric and non-lyric metre respectively, we see evidence of the reaction. In Pacuvius and in Accius this development seems to have progressed until the Roman Chorus, in its song (even though this did not literally reproduce the complicated strophic responsion of the Greek original) and in its participation in the life of the plot, fulfilled to all intents and purposes the same function as its forerunner in the classic drama of Greece.

This position of Ennius among Roman playwrights, and the contribution made by him to Roman drama, will be more readily appreciated if we review the evidence for the Chorus in tragedy from the time of Euripides onwards. The passage dealing with this in the *Poetics* of Aristotle (18, 1456^a, 25) is usually understood as referring to a diminution of its rôle: *καὶ τὸν χορὸν δὲ ἔνα δεῖ ὑπολαβεῖν τῶν ὑποκριτῶν, καὶ μόριον εἶναι τοῦ ὄλου καὶ συναγωνίζεσθαι μὴ ὥσπερ Εὐριπίδη ἀλλ’ ὥσπερ Σοφοκλεῖ. τοῖς δὲ λοιποῖς τὰ ἀδόμενα <οὐδὲν> μᾶλλον τοῦ μύθου ἢ ἄλλης τραγῳδίας ἔστιν· διὸ ἐμβόλιμα ἀδουσιν πρώτου ἀρξαντος Ἀγάθωνος τοῦ τοιούτουν. καίτοι τί διαφέρει ἢ ἐμβόλιμα ἀδειν ἢ εἰ ρῆσιν ἐξ ἄλλου εἰς ἄλλο ἀρμόττοι ἢ ἐπεισόδιον ὄλον;* Capps, dissenting from Leo and other authorities, thinks that Aristotle here states the manner in which Sophocles and Euripides connected their Choruses with the plot, not that Euripides neglected this union: "The choruses of Sophocles, as a rule, have a deeper sympathy with the actors, a more intimate connection with the plot, than those

of Euripides, although those of the latter move about more freely and come into closer personal contact with the actors than those of the former. This is a distinction that has been generally overlooked by interpreters of Aristotle.⁴³ But Aristotle goes on to blame the successors of Euripides and Sophocles, beginning with Agathon, for making their melic verses mere ἐμβόλιμα; and here again Capps thinks that he was criticizing the method of connecting the Chorus with the play, that even though they sang ἐμβόλιμα between the acts, there is no evidence to prove that they took no part in the action. On the other hand, there is little evidence to prove that they did take part in the action in the post-Euripidean plays. The *Rhesus* is mentioned as showing that the tragic drama of the fourth century possessed a Chorus in sympathy with the actors;⁴⁴ but the date of the play is not certain.⁴⁵ In comedy the fragments of the *Mέση* and of the *Nέα*, composed in the fourth and the early part of the third century, show only a slight connection between Chorus and plot at this time. The Chorus in these plays seems regularly to consist of a *κῶμος* of drunken youths, whose office it is to give a performance between the acts. For Middle Comedy, Leo pointed out a case in the *Kovpis* of Alexis (Frag. 107 K. (III, 428 Mein.)).⁴⁶ The Chorus is here announced by one of the actors. In the fragments from the New Comedy, the mark *Xopoū* occurs six times, three of which may be considered as of importance for our problem:⁴⁷

⁴³ *Amer. Journ. Arch.* X (1895), p. 291.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 295 f.

⁴⁵ W. H. Porter (The Euripidean *Rhesus* in the Light of Recent Criticism, *Hermathena* XXXIX (1913), pp. 348 ff.), after a study of the arguments of Wilamowitz, Hagenbach, and Rolfe in favour of assigning the play to the fourth century, defends the "orthodox position that the *Rhesus* was composed by Euripides in the dawn of his genius"; cf. Gilbert Murray, introduction to *The Rhesus of Euripides*, 1913.

⁴⁶ XOPOT, *Hermes* XLIII (1908), pp. 308 ff.

⁴⁷ See Körte, XOPOT, *Hermes* XLIII (1908), pp. 299 ff., and Menandrea, 1910; Capps, *Four Plays of Menander*, 1910; Flickinger, *Classical Philology* VII (1912), pp. 24 ff.; Skutsch, *Hermes* XLVII (1912), pp. 141 ff.

1. In the *Epitrepontes* of Menander, the young man Charisius is spending his time in dissipation, that he may forget his grief at the discovery that his wife, Pamphila, was seduced by some unknown man before her marriage. One of the actors, Onesimus, slave of Charisius, announces the arrival of a band of youths, who come on his master's invitation to feast and revel at a banquet. Here occurs the mark *Xοροῦ*, at the end of the second act (l. 201 K.). This *κῶμος* gives a performance, and then retires into the house of Chaerestratus, in which Charisius is now living. At the beginning of the next act the girl, Habrotonon, comes out of the house, and is molested at the door by some young men, no doubt the same Chorus (ll. 213-214 K.).

2. The second case occurs in the Petersburg (Jernstedt) fragment, which is also assigned by Capps to the *Epitrepontes*.⁴⁸ The Chorus, in his view, is composed of the same guests of Charisius, who come out from the banquet in a state of drunkenness, and give another performance after Act III. Flickinger,⁴⁹ with greater probability, imagines these youths to be a chance band who come down the street with boisterous revelry at this convenient stage of the play. Their arrival is announced as in other cases (text of Körte, p. 211; cf. Capps, p. 98 f.):

T. (Onesimus (C.).)

τὴν σ]ήν γ'. ἵωμεν δεῦρο πρὸς Χαρίσιον.

B. (Chaerestratus (C.).)

*ἴωμ]εν, ὡς καὶ μειρακυλλίων ὄχλος
εἰς τ]ὸν τόπον τις ἔρχεθ' ὑποβεβρεγμένων,
οἵσ]μὴν νοχλεῖν εὐκαίρον εἶναι μοι δοκεῖ.*

Χοροῦ.

3. In the *Perikeiromene* of Menander, the young lover Polemon, after shearing the hair of Glycera in a fit of jealous passion, retreats to the country and tries to forget his grief in revel. A band of his companions who form a Chorus similar to that of the *Epitrepontes* take breakfast with him there, and come to his house in town for dinner in the evening. Their arrival is announced here by the *ostiarius*, according to Körte

⁴⁸ Körte (*Menandrea*, p. xvi; 207 ff.) does not assign this fragment to the *Epitrepontes*, but gives it as belonging to a "fabula incerta."

⁴⁹ Flickinger, *Cl. Phil.* VII (1912), p. 30.

(p. 103), by the slave Davus, according to Capps (p. 160), and shortly after appears the mark *Xopοv̄*.⁵⁰

The notice also appears once in the *Samia* (where Körte sees a similar Chorus of wedding-guests), and twice in the *Ghorān* fragments. But these instances cannot be said to throw any light on the use of the term. We may conclude that for comedy the evidence of fragments points to the probability that the Chorus still existed indeed, but was connected in a very superficial manner with the progress of the plot; its primary function was to amuse the audience in the intervals between the acts. The same influence which caused the diminution of Chorus in comedy was effective also in tragedy. Practice for Choral rôle exacted much time on the part of amateurs, and the hiring of a number of professionals involved cost, to say nothing of the necessity of appropriate costumes; while managers were glad to dispense with the necessity of conveying a skilled Chorus from place to place in provincial tours. The Greeks, also, outside Athens were not specially interested in either tragic or comic Chorus, and the religious associations of the tragic Chorus were gradually lost. The impoverished state in which Athens found herself after the great wars no longer admitted of the burden of costly Choral equipment; shortly before 300 b. c. the State took over the duties of *choregus* from the tribes and citizens of Athens, and appointed an *agonothetes* to superintend the lyrical contests of the different choirs.⁵¹ In the lack of satisfactory evidence to the contrary, it seems justifiable to follow the more natural interpretation of Aristotle's passage, and to infer that in both tragedy and comedy of the fourth century and the succeeding period of Hellenistic Drama little training and outlay were bestowed

⁵⁰ Körte believes that the "army" with which Polemon and Sosias are to besiege the house of Myrrhina in the attempt to capture Glycera is identical with the same Chorus of Polemon's friends. Robert (*Hermes* XLIV (1909), pp. 267, 278) and Capps (ed. Menander, *Four Plays*, pp. 137, 175) take a different view.

⁵¹ Bethe, *Prolegomina zur Geschichte des Theaters im Alterthum*, 1896, p. 255; Christ-Schmid, *Griechische Litteraturgeschichte* I⁶, 1912, p. 392 f.; II, I⁵, 1911, p. 130; Leo, *Gesch. d. Rom. Lit.* I, p. 71.

upon the Chorus, that it played a very minor part in the action, and confined its song to lyrical odes given in the intervals of the play.⁵² The increasing tendency to multiply lyrical metres in Choral lyric during the last years of the fifth and the early years of the fourth century, points to this same use of the Chorus in song rather than in action.⁵³

No more evidence can be adduced until we reach the tragedy of Seneca.⁵⁴ His work is modelled on Sophocles, Euripides, and post-Euripidean poets, but has no connection with the old Roman tragedy. This is indeed to be expected, for we know that the early dramatists of the Republic were no longer held in honour among the poets of the Empire. The Chorus regularly appears in the plays of Seneca, but it is only slightly related to the plot,⁵⁵ and its chief purpose is evidently to sing between the acts. In the greater number of cases it disappears after the last interval. We may suppose, then, that Seneca is disregarding the tradition of the Roman drama which preceded his work, and is reverting to Alexandrian methods.

We may note here that Seneca spent some time in Egypt, and no doubt interested himself in its literary works.⁵⁶ More-

⁵² Cf. with the article of Capps that by Körte, *Das Fortleben des Chors im griech. Drama*, *Neue Jahrbücher f. d. kl. Alt.* V (1900), pp. 81 ff., and that in Pauly-Wissowa, 1899, s. v. *Chor* by Reisch, pp. 2401 ff. They give evidence for the existence of Chorus in comedy and tragedy in post-classical times, but do not show its intimate connection with the plot.

⁵³ Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, *Hermes* XVIII (1883), pp. 248 f.

⁵⁴ See Leo, *Die Composition der Chorlieder Senecas*, *Rhein. Mus.* LII (1807), pp. 509 ff.

⁵⁵ For signs of this superficial connection see Lindskog, *Studien zum antiken Drama*, 1897, II, pp. 33 ff.

⁵⁶ In the *Ad Helviam Matrem de Consolatione* (19, 4) Seneca writes of his mother's sister: *Carissimum virum amiserat, avunculum nostrum, cui virgo nupserat, in ipsa quidem navigatione: tulit tamen eodem tempore et luctum et metum evictisque tempestatibus corpus eius naufragia eveyxit.* The journey was taken from Egypt, where she had been living (6: *per sedecim annos, quibus Aegyptum maritus eius obtinuit*); and as Seneca witnessed this example of fortitude (4: *sed si prudenter perfectissimae feminae novi, non patietur te nihil profuturo moerore consumi et exemplum tibi suum, cuius ego etiam spectator fui, narrabit*), he must have been returning from Egypt with her. Cf. also the reference to Seneca's lost work on Egypt in *Servius on Verg. Aen.* VI, 154: *Seneca scripsit de situ et sacris Aegyptiorum.*

over, the Choral lyrics of Seneca show a close connection with Hellenistic literature. For their metrical composition is not based on the old strophic and anti-strophic method, but is that of the monodies of Euripides, of the *Maiden's Lament*, and of the *cantica* of Plautus; the metres are those of Horace, but the lines are divided into periods corresponding to their contents.

From the evidence, therefore, for the tragic Chorus, we may trace a gradual diminution of its importance in action and in song within the limits of the play. This diminution began with Euripides and was continued during the fourth century and during Hellenistic times, was seen in the work of Livius and Naevius,⁵⁷ the first writers of Roman tragedy, and, once more, in the tragedies of Seneca. The rôle proper of the Chorus in this line of tradition was to sing between the acts. There was one reaction in the series, and this was developed by Ennius; his example in this respect was followed by Pacuvius, and ended in Accius with the culmination and the end of the real tragic art of Rome.

There is nothing contradictory to this theory in our knowledge of the formation of the stage in Greek and Roman times. Authorities at this day generally agree with Dörpfeld that actors and Chorus played on the same level, with free opportunity for communication one with another, in the classic theatre of Greece; they agree, moreover, that the same conditions obtained in the Roman theatre. Vitruvius tells us that plays at Rome were acted upon a low stage raised not more than five feet from the ground in order that the foremost ranks of the audience (the Senators, who occupied the orchestra from 194 B. C.) might gain a clear view of the action, and that it was sufficiently wide to allow all concerned to play their parts thereon.⁵⁸ The question which has not yet been settled is that of the formation of the stage in the later Greek

⁵⁷ It is not unlikely that the Chorus of Maenads in the *Lycurgus* was introduced in order to sing lyric verse in the intervals of the play.

⁵⁸ Vitruvius V, 6: et eius pulpiti altitudo sit ne plus pedum quinque.

theatre. The theory of Dörpfeld,⁵⁹ which places actors and Chorus on the same level, that of the orchestra, from the fifth century continuously until the period of the Roman theatre, is supported by the evidence to be gleaned from the fragments of Menander and from the plays of Seneca based on Hellenistic tradition.⁶⁰ For in these, actors and Chorus certainly enter into communication, even if very slight; and communication between actors, who are on the top of the *Proskenion*, and *Choreutae*, who are on the ground level of the orchestra, although possible for an uncritical audience, would scarcely tend to enhance artistic realism in the setting.⁶¹ On the other hand, Christ, E. Gardner, and Bethe⁶² follow the evidence of Vitruvius in believing that the roof of the *Proskenion* formed a stage of some twelve feet high for the actors in the later Greek period, and that the orchestra was reserved for other performers (*reliqui artifices*).⁶³ This theory, if proved correct, would inevitably entail the diminution of the Choral rôle

⁵⁹ *Das griechische Theater*, Dörpfeld-Reisch, 1896. Cf. Dörpfeld, *Bulletin de Correspondance hellénique* XX (1896), pp. 563 ff. (in answer to Chamond, *Bull. de Corr. hell.* XX (1896), pp. 291 ff.); *Mittheilungen d. K. d. Arch. Inst. Athenische Abt.* XXIV (1899), pp. 310 ff. (in answer to A. Müller in *Philologus*; see note 62); XXVIII (1903), pp. 383 ff. (in answer to Puchstein, *Die griech. Bühne*); Capps, *A. J. A.* X (1895), p. 288; Körte, *Neue Jahrbücher* V (1900), p. 89.

⁶⁰ See, for Menander, Körte, *Hermes* XLIII (1908), p. 301; and for Seneca, Leo, *Rhein. Mus.* LII (1897), p. 518.

⁶¹ See especially Menander, *Epitrepones*, ll. 213-214 K.; and the Jernstedt fragment (*Epitr.*, Act III, l. 32 C.), in which, according to Capps, Onesimus and Chaeresthratus retire to the house of Charisius in order to avoid meeting the *κώμος* of young men.

⁶² Christ, *Das Theater des Polyklet in Epidaurus*, *Sitzungsber. d. Akad. der Wiss. zu München* (1894), p. 1 ff.; Christ-Schmid, *Griechische Litteraturgeschichte* I⁶, 1912, p. 441; II, I⁶, 1911, pp. 130 f.; Gardner and Loring, *Excavations at Megalopolis*, *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, Supplement I (1892), ch. IV, esp. p. 88, and Appendix; Gardner in *Companion to Greek Studies*, 1905, pp. 337 f.; Bethe, *Prolegomena zur Gesch. d. Theaters im Alt.*, 1896, ch. XII; *Göttingische gelehrte Anzeigen* CLIX (1897), pp. 706 ff.; *Hermes* XXXIII (1898), p. 313; *Jahrbuch des K. d. Arch. Instituts* XV (1900), p. 69. Cf. A. Müller, *Philologus*, Supplementband VII (1899), pp. 108 ff.; and, for criticism of both Dörpfeld and Bethe, Robert, *Gött. gel. Anz.* CLIX (1897), pp. 39 f.; *Hermes* XXXII (1897), pp. 448 f.

⁶³ Vitruvius V, 7: *eius logei altitudo non minus debet esse pedum decem, non plus duodecim.*

in Hellenistic times ; and the return to the broader stage of the Roman theatre would at least invite greater participation in the plot on the part of the Chorus. The motive of this return may be seen in renewed study of classic Greek drama.

Finally, the view that Ennius developed the restoration of the earlier, in place of the later, Greek tradition, agrees with our knowledge of the early history of Roman literature. The first models on which this literature was framed came to Rome from South Italy and Sicily through the agency of the Tarentine, and of the First Punic War ; and, as was natural, the Romans learnt Greek drama of the Hellenistic type prevalent in Magna Graecia. Livius Andronicus was himself a Greek of Tarentum, and Naevius fought against the Carthaginians in Sicily ; it was enough for these pioneers to transfer to Rome the representations which they found nearest to their hand.⁶⁴ The same tendency to follow Hellenistic tradition is seen in the history of Roman comedy as represented by Naevius and Plautus. In the time of Ennius a Roman tragic drama was not an entire novelty, and he was able to seek improvement upon the work of his predecessors. We know from his other work how deeply versed he was in the writings of ancient Greece ; in epic, Homer had attracted him, in philosophy, Epicharmus. The literary circle, also, in which he lived at Rome, and especially his patron Scipio Africanus, were pushing their studies with energy among Greek writers of classic days. It is not surprising, then, that his original mind should have turned away from the familiar Alexandrian school to follow more closely the old tragic poets in his plays. This reversion with regard to Chorus superseded the tendency of former writers to cling to more obvious models, and was more fully developed by the followers of Ennius in the school of dramatic art.

⁶⁴ Schanz, *Röm. Litteraturgeschichte* I, 1³, 1907, pp. 54 ff. Atilius, author of the tragedy *Electra*, was probably a contemporary of Ennius ; but we can learn nothing of his treatment of the Chorus. See Ribbeck, *Röm. Trag.*, pp. 608 ff.; Schanz, p. 218.

The evidence, therefore, of the extant fragments of early Roman tragedy, of our knowledge of the Chorus from the time of Euripides until the time of Seneca, of the stage in both the Greek and the Roman theatre, and of literary movements during the earlier years of Rome, leads to the conclusion that the tragic Chorus in and after the time of Ennius was no longer denied vigorous action and lyric song within the limits of the play, as in the later Greek theatre, and was given a far greater share than in the earliest Roman theatre; it served in both respects the same purpose as the Chorus of the tragedy in the fifth century of Greece. But it is probable that the Romans, who lacked generally the keen feeling of the Greeks for artistic skill, never attempted to transfer to their own language the intricate metrical compositions which formed the Greek Choral lyric, but contented themselves with assigning to the Chorus of their plays the non-strophic measures of Hellenistic poetry illustrated for us in the *cantica* of Plautus and the artificial revival of tragedy in imperial Rome.

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A POETESS OF THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY

BY

ADAH BLANCHE ROE

Published by BRYN MAWR COLLEGE

Bryn Mawr, Pennsylvania

1915





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ANNA OWENA HOYERS
A POETESS OF THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY

A Dissertation

PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY OF BRYN MAWR COLLEGE IN PARTIAL
FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE
OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

BY

ADAH BLANCHE ROE

BRYN MAWR, PENNSYLVANIA
MARCH, 1915

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The Lord Baltimore Press
BALTIMORE, MD., U. S. A.

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I. MANUSCRIPTS AND EDITIONS.

The most comprehensive manuscript collection of Anna Owena Hoyers' poems is in the Royal Library in Stockholm.¹ It is bound in parchment and consists of 221 leaves, thirteen of which are left blank. The inside of the front cover is adorned with three small prints. The one in the center is a picture of Anna Owens herself,² with the inscription, "Obiit, Ao: 1655. Den 27: 9:b: Altt, 71, Jahr. A: O: H:" To the left is a representation of St. Michael's fight with the dragon, to the right the Hoyer family coat of arms.³ The latter bears the date 1643 and the words, "Caspar Hoijer Honos virtutis praemium."

The first Part of this manuscript, comprising 164 leaves written continuously (except Folio 134) on both sides, was inscribed by Anna Owens' sons, Caspar and Friedrich Hermann Hoyer. For the second Part the manuscript must be reversed. In 1658 Christian Straus obtained possession of it, and, beginning at the back, proceeded to copy into it the hymns of Herr Krustern, written in prison in Moscow and dated 1657. The index records seventeen hymns, but there are only six there, "Buszgebett desz Königs Manass" and Psalms 13, 1, 70, 25, 79. According to an inscription on the third page, the manuscript went back into the Hoyer family in 1660. The inscription reads, "Christian Straus, Dem das Buch Gehörigh, Anno Christy 1658," and on the margin is written, "Non est verum, Caspar Hoyer 1660," so that Straus's work was probably curtailed. With Folio 17 of Part II begin again the poems of Anna Owens copied by her son Friedrich Hermann Hoyer.

¹ Riks-Biblioteket, Stockholm, Handskrifter, Vitterhet, Tysk, No. 1854 (quoted as St. MS).

² Another picture of her as a young patrician lady appears in Heimreich's Supplementa, in Westphalen Monumenta Inedita, IV, Tab. 28. (See frontispiece.)

³ The coat of arms shows the head, shoulders and forelegs of a unicorn. It occurs also in Andreas Angelus' Holsteinische Chronica, I, 60.

The first page of Part I contains the title, "Lieder verfasset oder gesammelt von Anna Ovena Hoijer 1624-1655," and two Latin epigrams; the second page, a short poem in German and a Latin letter-cross. Then follows an inaccurate index of the first lines of the songs. About fifty of these Anna Owens had herself composed, usually signing them with her initials A. O. H. or, as was so often done at the time, spelling out her own name in the initial letters of the stanzas. For three of the songs (nos. 4, 6, 69) she wrote her own music. For the others she often chose some well-known melody. Twelve of them appear also in the only edition of her poems now in existence, published in Amsterdam in the year 1650.

Seven are hymns:

Steht Auff von Allen Sunden, St. MS no. 1; Poem. p. 302.

O, du geliebte Christenheit, St. MS no. 10; Poem. p. 228.

O, Gott mein Herr wie wunderbahr, St. MS no. 14; Poem. p. 299.

Christe Gotts einiger Sohn du bist, St. MS Fol. 45; Poem. p. 282, with music.

Unter den Dornen Rosen stehn, St. MS no. 25; Poem. p. 219.

Auff, auff es ist nun Zeitt, St. MS no. 36; Poem. p. 223.

Komb Davids Sohn sturtz Babylon, St. MS no. 38; Poem. p. 177.

One poem can be classed as a hymn only in the sense that it is a song expressing religious feeling, for it is quite personal in tone:

Auff, Auff Zion und schmucke dich schon, St. MS no. 35; Poem. p. 216, with the refrain, "Hans Owens Tochter Anna."

Two poems are in praise of her royal Swedish patronesses: Grosmechtigste Königin, Frewlein Hochgeboren, St. MS no. 28; Poem. p. 276.

Frewet euch mit mir ihr frommen, St. MS no. 37; Poem. p. 279.

Two are didactic:

Geldt- und Welt-freunde vortrauen, St. MS no. 17;

Poem. p. 294.

Weh ju pastoren, St. MS no. 67; Poem. p. 259.

The other poems of the Stockholm manuscript may have appeared separately in pamphlet form, as did "Ein Schreiben über Meer gesandt," "Süssbitre Freude," etc., but I have not been able to find any trace of such publications. So far as I have been able to discover, they exist only in manuscript. They are as follows:

Twenty hymns:

Dasz 2 Liedt. Adde, Adde du blinde Welt.

Dasz 3 Liedt. Adde ihr Menschen Kinder.

Dasz 4 Liedt. Auff, Auff lobt Gott mit singen (with music).

Dasz 6 Liedt. Alles wasz sich bewegt (with music).

Dasz 7 Liedt. Zu wem soll ich nun fliehen hin.

Dasz 9 Liedt. O Jhesu Christ mach mich bereit.

Dasz 11 Liedt. Auff, Auff Jungen und Alten.

Dasz 15 Liedt. Allmechtiger Gott und Herr der Herrschen.

Dasz 16 Liedt. Allein zu Gott hab ich gericht, mein zuversicht.

Dasz 18 Liedt. Ach, Ach ihr Menschen, last euch sagen.

Dasz 19 Liedt. Bekehret euch uon Eur bosheit.

Dasz 22 Liedt. O Gott mein Herr dein Ehr, und Lob vermehr.

Dasz 23 Liedt. O Jesu König, Gott und Herr.

Dasz 24 Liedt. Ach Herr bewahr mein Kinderlein.

Dasz 31 Liedt. Ach Gott wie gehts her im Land.

Dasz 39 Liedt. Auff Zion, Auff, bereit dich.

Dasz 40 Liedt. Alle Völcker der Erden Nah' und weit.

Dasz 49 Liedt. Auff mein Hertz zu erheben.

Dasz 57 Liedt. O Herr bekehr, Regir und Lehr.

Fol. 158. Jesu Christ, der du bist mensch gebohren (with music).

Five didactic poems:

Dasz 32 Liedt. O, Ihr Kinder ist es recht.
 Dasz 41 Liedt. Kumpt her zu schauwen.
 Dasz 42 Liedt. Ach ihr Weltmenschen last euch sagen.
 Dasz 43 Liedt. Liedlein von den Undanckbaren gesten.
 Fol. 140. O Du Epicurj Knecht, wie erbarmlich wird dirs
 gehen.

Eight occasional poems:

Dasz 12 Liedt. Alles das, den odem hatt empfangen.
 (Eiderstedt flood.)
 Dasz 13 Liedt. Auff, auff zu sehn und hören. (Eider-
 stedt flood.)
 Dasz 21 Liedt. Allmechtiger Herr Zebaoth. (Pest in
 Hamburg.)
 Dasz 44 Liedt. Gluck Schweden, löblichs Königreich
 (in honor of Hedwig Eleonora).
 Dasz 46 Liedt. Barmhertzig ist mein Jesus Christ (in
 honor of Benjamin Magnus Croneburg).
 Dasz 47 Liedt. Erbarme dich doch O Herr Jesu (in
 honor of Elisabeth Krusbiörn).
 Dasz 48 Liedt. Gott der alles Sunderlich, regieret in der
 Welt (thanks for the gift of Sittwick).
 Fol. 148. Seyt frölich ihr frome Hertzen (in honor of
 Carl Gustavus).

A short poem extolling the beneficence of the Lord:

Fol. 94. Gebet Iesu Die Ehr' Die Ihm Gebühret.

Besides these poems, which can definitely be ascribed to Anna Owens, there are seven songs of unknown authorship:

Dasz 5 Liedt. Heut früh ehe noch der Tag Anbracht.
 Dasz 8 Liedt. Ich musz Tragen die thorheit meiner
 Jugent.
 Dasz 30 Liedt. Mein Gott und Herr bekehr, Die Men-
 schen Kindt.
 Dasz 33 Liedt. Ach ich musz klagen, Ja schir verzagen.
 Dasz 34 Liedt. Ausz gutem grunde sage ich.
 Dasz 45 Liedt. Mein Hertz ist sehr betrübet (a lament
 for Maria Gubert's departed husband).

Fol. 106. Ich bin von euch geschieden (Jakob Makeleir's consolation sent from the heavenly world to his wife). Nineteen hymns belong to other poets:

Fol. 40. O, Gott mein Herr, Dein Ehr, erretten thu.— Margarita Hoyer.⁴

Dasz 20 Liedt. Christliches Herz nimb woll in acht.— Caspar Hoyer.⁵

Dasz 29 Liedt. Ach wasz ist doch dasz ich befind.— Daniel Sudermann.⁶

Dasz 50 Liedt. Mein Gott und Herr, Ich suche dich.— Ottmar Ellyger.⁷

Dasz 51 Liedt. Das Walt Gott Vater, und Gott Sohn.— Hinderich Otterson.⁸

Dasz 52 Liedt. Es ist Hochzeit, der thorheit ist genug.
Ausz dem Buchlein genandt Panacea, des Herren
Jacobi Guarini, genandt Dickhautt.⁹

⁴ Probably Anna Owens' sister-in-law. She married Vincent Möller, mayor of Hamburg. (See Carlander's *Stammbuch*.)

⁵ Either Anna Owens' father-in-law or her son. If the latter, then her grandson must have worked with her two sons, Caspar and Friedrich Hermann, in writing the manuscript, since the poem bears the inscription "Pater meus Fecit." (See Schütze⁽¹⁾, p. 250.) The initial letters of the stanzas spell out the name "Caspar Hoyer, Hermans Sohn," which could refer to either one.

⁶ The same hymn appears again in Folio 145. Daniel Sudermann (1550-1631) was a devoted student and follower of Caspar Schwenckfeld. In 1584 he published a new edition of Caspar Schwenckfeld's writings, and throughout his life defended and explained his teacher's theories. His numerous hymns (2500 in all) are often only didactic, and always without regard for the niceties of form; but because of his position as Domherr in Strassburg (in Elsass), he was able to do much for the Schwenckfeld sect and was highly honored by his contemporaries. (Koch II, 422-428.)

⁷ I have not been able further to identify the author.

⁸ According to Koch II, 232 and Wack. V, 309, Martin Behm (1557-1622) is author of this hymn. Anna Owens has omitted the eighth stanza.

⁹ See Jöcher II, 1240: "Guarinus (Jacob), mit dem Zunahme Dickhaut, ein Theologus, lebte um 1607, und schrieb ideam universae theologiae diaeteticae, adhibitis tabulis synopticis; Grundheil aller krancken, betrübten, angefochtenen und sterbenden Menschen; 9 Tauf Predigten." Guarinus' book "Panacea" I have not been able to discover.

Dasz 53 Liedt. Lobet Gott unsern Herrn.—Martin Luther.

Dasz 54 Liedt. Merck auff du frommer Jungling zart.—B. Ringwald.

Dasz 55 Liedt. Der grimmig Tod mit seinem Pfeil.—Balthasar Bidembach¹⁰ or Petrus Franciscus.¹¹

Dasz 56 Liedt. Ach Gott wie manches Hertzeleit.—M. Möller.¹²

Dasz 58 Liedt. Frisch Auff mein Seell in Noth.—Josua Stegmann.

Dasz 59 Liedt. Werde Munter mein gemüte.—Johann Rist.

Dasz 60 Liedt. Wo soll ich fliehen hin.—Joh. Herrmann.
Fol. 141. Wach auff mein Seel wasz schleffestu.—P. Nagel.¹³

Fol. 146. Waltz Gott mein Werck ich lasse.—Michael Ziegenspeck.¹⁴

¹⁰ Balthasar Bidembach (1533-1578) was bishop in Stuttgart. His "Schwanengesang" is a collection of sermons concerning the Epistle of Paul to the Romans (Koch II, 291). In Wetzel's Historische Beschreibung der berühmtesten Lieder-Dichter, Herrnstadt, 1719, I, 111, this hymn is also ascribed to Bidembach.

¹¹ Petrus Franciscus is probably the author of the first five stanzas in Wack. V, 1557, beginning "O Sonnen schön, edler Planet." The last stanza in Wack. is not the same as here.

¹² The hymn is more often ascribed to Cunrad Hoier. It appeared first in Martin Möller's "Meditationes" (1587), but among those songs which he himself designated as being written by others (A. D. B., 1880, XII, 709).

¹³ See Jöcher III, 805: "Nagel (Paul), ein Mathematicus, am Anfange des 17 Seculi, war Rector auf der Schule zu Torgau, schrieb Novam philosophiam & astronomiam; prodromum astronomiae apocalypitiae; de IV mundi temporibus; letztes Freuden-Geschrey contra Phil. Arnoldum; prognosticon astrologicum, und starb 1621. Weil es verboten war, ihn auf den Gottesacker zu begraben, und ihn daher niemand in die Erde bringen wollte, haben ihn endlich die Weiber verscharret. Er ist aber wieder ausgegraben, und die Weiber mit 4 Wochen Gefängnis bestraft worden."

The A. D. B., 1886, XXIII, 215, gives 1624 as the date of "Philosophia Nova," and this hymn is dated 1631, so that Jöcher must be mistaken in the date of Nagel's death.

¹⁴ See Koch II, 270: "Ziegenspeck, Michael, Pfarrer und Senior zu Burg-Rhanis im sogenannten Osterlande, einem Städtchen bei Saalfeld. Hier gab er im Druck heraus: 'Christlich Tag- und Uhrwerk. Leip-

Fol. 150. Wer in guter Hoffnung will.—Petrus Herbert.¹⁵

Fol. 154. Så som de wysa män (with music).—Friedrich Hermann Hoyer.¹⁶

Fol. 159. Ach was soll ich anfangen.—Anna Rathgen.

Fol. 162. Wan wird doch mein Jesus komēn.—Thomas Kühnemann Uhrmacher.¹⁷

Folios 157 and 158 record the number of those drowned in Eiderstedt during the great storm of 1634 and the amount of property destroyed.¹⁸ With Folio 133 two leaves were turned over instead of one, and this space is filled out with two short German verses and three Latin quotations. Other Latin epigrams appear in Folios 21, 24, 26, 39, 45, 68, 127, and 130. Folio 39 contains also a brief poetic comment upon Isaiah LXIII, 4: "Gott hat einen Tag der Rach, Ihm furgenommen." Letter-crosses appear in great numbers, wherever a strophe does not quite fill out the page, or as adornment for the margin.

In Part II, Folios 1 to 3 contain Latin and German maxims. Folios 4 and 5 recount the twelve signs of the zodiac and the combinations which are most propitious for taking medicine, sending messengers, cutting the hair, putting on new clothes, etc. Folios 6 to 16 contain the hymns of Herr Krustern.

zig 1617' aus welchem sich bis heute noch in thuringischen G. G. erhalten hat—'Walt's Gott, mein Werk ich lasse'—ein Abendlied für Handwerksleute. Später erschienen dann auch von ihm: 'Freud- und Gebet-Psalmen am Jubilaeo der Augsburgischen Confession. Leipzig 1630' mit dem Lied:

'Fangt all mit mir zu jauchzen an.'"

¹⁵ One of the three editors of the hymn-book of the Moravian Brothers. He was also one of those sent to Emperor Maximilian II, in 1566, with the hymn-book and the second plea for protection, as a result of which the Brothers received the promise that they should not be persecuted on account of their faith (Koch II, 414).

¹⁶ Anna Owens' youngest son. The hymn is in Swedish and was written on his 54th birthday, in 1675.

¹⁷ "Wann wird doch mein Jesus kommen" appears in Fischer IV, 552, among the hymns of the North-German poets, "Lieder von unbekannten Verfassern."

¹⁸ Heimreich II, 142, records 2107 men, 6100 head of cattle, 6738 sheep and swine, 664 houses as destroyed by the storm in Eiderstedt. Anna Owens gives 2110 men in Eiderstedt, 6133 men and 1333 houses in Nordstrand.

Then there are several of Anna Owens' poems, etc.: a series of short prayers; a morning blessing in prose; a memorial (Fol. 20. "O Menschenkindt du Wasseblasz"); part of the prologue of "Süssbittre Freude" (Fol. 23); two "orationes," one of which (Fol. 27. "O Wesen dasz all' ding bewegt") occurs also in the edition of 1650 (p. 167); "Regulae Vitae"; and four other poems:

Fol. 32. Ein getrewer freundt ders hertzlich meint.

Fol. 35. Gott lasz Nimmer von mir scheiden.

Fols. 36 and 37. Two poems directed against the aristocracy of wealth.

There are other prayers and poems in Part II without any signature or with an insufficient one. I have not been able to discover their author.

Thirteen prayers in verse.

Two prayers in prose.

One prayer signed Joach. M. (Fol. 25. "Gebett um Wahre gelassenheit").

Four other poems:

Fol. 20. O Mensch lerne die Welt verachten.

Fol. 26. In drey dingen ich mich ergetz.

Fol. 27. Das sterbstundlein und lest gericht.

Fol. 31. Ein warhafftige Gesicht.

Folios 27 and 29 contain quotations from St. Augustine; Folios 24, 25, and 27, other Latin quotations and mottoes.

According to a note on the first page of Part I, the collection was bought in 1854 by B. A. Rappe of Kalmar and presented by him to the Royal Library in Stockholm.¹⁹

There is also another manuscript, discovered by Helene Höhnk (Archivar in Heide, Schleswig-Holstein) in the library of Breitenburg Castle near Itzehoe, which I was able to use through the courtesy of Hans Caspar Graf zu Rantzau. This contains the thirty-six-line fragment of "Süssbittre

¹⁹ "Har tillhört familjen Hoijer, som i sednare hälften af 1600 talet var bosatt i Kalmar län. Köpet af B. A. Rappe i Kalmar 1854 och af honom gifven till Kongl. Biblioteket i Maj samma år."

Freude," the last eighteen verses of which occur also in St. MS II, Fol. 23, and nine other poems, all of which appear in the Stockholm manuscript:

Absag der Welt und Ihrer Eitelheit, St. MS 2.

Heut früh ehe noch der Tag Anbracht, St. MS 5.

Adde ihr Menschen Kinder, Adde Du blinde Welt, St. MS 3.

Zu wem soll ich nun fliehen hin, St. MS 7.

Auff, Auff lobt Gott mit singen, St. MS 4.

New Jars liedlein, St. MS 1.

Gebeth einer Getrewen Mutter für Ihre Kinder, St. MS 24.

O Jesu Christ mach mich bereit, St. MS 9.

Alles was sich beweget, und auff der Erden reget, St. MS 6.

The title page reads, "Lieder von Anna Hoyers eines Stallers Wittwe," and then (in a different script) "ein Manuscript welches bei ihre gedruckte Bücher eingebunden war worin sie sich diesen Namen gegeben Anero Hireijo." The handwriting is the same as that of the first part of the Stockholm manuscript.

The only attempt at a publication of a large number of her compositions is the beautiful little Elzevier²⁰ edition (quoted as Poem.), of which I have discovered five copies: one in the Royal Library in Berlin, one in the City Library in Hamburg, one in the University Library in Kiel, one in the University

²⁰ See F. A. Ebert, *Allgemeines Bibliographisches Lexikon*, Leipzig, 1821, Appendix II, pp. 1111-1115. Ludwig Elzevier Junior established his publishing-house in Amsterdam in 1640, and until 1655 conducted it alone. From that time on, until his death in 1662, he worked in partnership with his cousin Daniel. He was the last of the distinguished Elzevier family, and with him ended the glory of their publications. The first book in this edition was *Eutropius*, printed by Ludwig Elzevier Senior in 1592; and the collection, not yet complete, contains chiefly the Greek and Latin Classics and the Church Fathers. There are, however, several interesting German publications among the number aside from the poems of Anna Owens: *Liebesbeschreibung Lysanders und Kalisten nach dem Französischen*, Philip von Zesen, Amst., 1644; *Die adriatische Rosemund*, Philip von Zesen, Amst., 1645; *Ibrahim*, Philip von Zesen, Amst., 1645; *Argenis aus dem Lateinischen* von Johann Barclay, Martin Opitz, Amst., 1644; *Gedichte*, Martin Opitz, Amst., 1646; *Gedichte*, Weckerlin, Amst., 1648; *Wunderliche und wahrhaftige Gesichte*, Philander von Sittewalt, Leyden, 1646; *Apophthegmata*, Der Deutsche Scharfsinnige kluge Sprüch, Zincgref, Leyden, 1644; and others.

Library in Göttingen, and one in the Ducal Library in Wolfenbüttel. The title page contains the inscription :

A N N Æ O V E N Æ
Hoyers
Geistliche und Weltliche
P O E M A T A
Amsteldam,
Bey Ludwig Elzevieren. A°. 1650.

and an engraving, which pictures the situation of the first poem, "Geistlich Gespräch zwischen Mutter und Kindt." The mother sits beside a table upon which are two large books, and before her stands the boy whom she is teaching. Upon the wall hangs a guitar and a large picture representing the conflict of the soul with the world, the flesh and the devil. Cherubs hover about the head of the victorious hero. Upon the floor in the foreground is an open book and a wand surmounted by a dove and wound about with serpents.

The copies which I saw in Berlin and Hamburg are bound in white calfskin and have two silver clasps. The book consists of 310 pages in duodecimo form and contains :

The didactic poems :

- p. 3. Geistlich Gespräch zwischen Mutter und Kindt vom wahren Christenthumb.
- p. 41. Einfältige Warheit.
- p. 67. Schreiben an die Herrn Titultrager von Hohen Schulen.
- p. 131. Christi Gülden Cron.
- p. 145. A. O. H. Guter Rath an alle Alte Wittwen.
- p. 153. Kurtz bedencken von der Alten Weiber Heyrath.
- p. 169. Deutsche Warheit.
- p. 181. Posaunenschall.
- p. 231. Schreiben an die Gemein im Land Holstein.

p. 246. De Denische Dôrp-Pape.

p. 263. Schreiben an die Gemein in Engellandt.

The Book of Ruth (p. 77) and Schwenckfeld's "Buch vom Wort Gottes" (p. 157) done into verse.

An occasional poem:

p. 74. Schrieben an Peer / Niels Sôhn tho Westerwyck.
The twelve poems and the "oratio" already mentioned as occurring also in the Stockholm manuscript.

A hymn (with music) signed F. A. K.:²²

p. 286. Kommt her mit fleisz betrachtet.

Moller says that the Swedish ambassador, Le Blond (a Schwenckfelder), attended to the publication of the poems, and that the author of the introductory verses signed J. A. W. (p. 2) was the imperial ambassador to the Hanse cities, Johannes Angelus Werdenhagius. He also mentions an edition dated 1661, and Adelung speaks of one dated 1663, but repeated inquiries failed to discover them.

Anna Owens' work seems to have been published at first, however, in pamphlet form, and some of these editions of single poems are still in existence. Moller and Adelung mention "Süssbitre Freude 1617"; "Gespräch eines Kindes mit seiner Mutter 1628, 1634" (the edition of 1628 is in the City Library in Brunswick, bound with "Heraclite ov de la Vanité et misere de la vie humaine 1613"); "Zwey geistliche Lieder, Amsteldam, 1644." They also cite, "Frauenpflicht, zu lernen Gott und ihren Männern zu gehorsamen, geschrieben durch eine tugendhafte Frau und Liebhaberinn Christi. Amsteldam 1636" as one of Anna Owens' works. This last statement, however, I have found to be incorrect. In the introduction to the book, which I obtained through the courtesy of the Ducal Library in Wolfenbüttel, is stated expressly that the authoress is unknown and wishes to remain so, and that the work is

²² F. A. K.—Fecit Andreas Kesler (?), General Superintendent in Coburg, or Fecit Andreas Kritzemann (?), Cantor in Altenburg. I have not been able to find the hymn in any of the large hymn-books. The author need not necessarily have been in Eiderstedt at the time of the flood, but was nevertheless deeply impressed by the catastrophe, as the hymn clearly shows. The song is dated 1635.

published under the name of Anna Owena Hoyers as a protection against possible critical attacks and because under her name the book would command more recognition than under that of an unknown aspirant to literary fame.” If Anna Owens did write the “Frauenpflicht” herself, it is the only prose work we have from her pen; and its confused and tautological style is in great contrast to her usual clear, direct, vigorous manner.

Paul Schütze mentions the separate publication of “Ein Schreiben über Meer gesandt.” It is in the University Library in Kiel in a small volume containing also “Frohlocken des Helicons und der Musen über den Geburtstag Sophie Dorotheen 1707: Zufällige Gedanken über das am 1st Nov. 1755 die Stadt Lisabon betroffene Schicksal; Cantate bey der öffentlichen Feyer der Vermählung Ludewig Herzogs zu Meklenburg und Charlotta Sophia Herzoginn zu Sachsen am 15. May 1755. Joachim v. Bülow; Wittenberg im Feuer, den 13. October 1760 von dem Herrn Hofrath Triller.” I give these names and dates as interesting evidence that during a century at least Anna Owens’ poems retained their interest and attracted attention.

A complete edition of her works will follow as complement and illustration of this thesis, for which the edition of 1650 will serve as a basis so far as it goes, since it gives the impression of being a very careful and scholarly work, while the manuscripts, although copied with filial piety, contain many orthographical and other errors, due either to ignorance or to carelessness.

²² Introduction, p. 2: “Ehrliebende Frawen / mir ist zu Handen kommen disz klein Büchlein von einer Frawen gemachet / doch nicht wissent wer sie sey / oder wo sie wonhaftig ist / vnd hat jhren Nahmen nicht offenbaren wollen / vmb deszwegen keinen Ruhm zu haben / was GOTT durch jhr gethan hat” . . . ; p. 3: “Disz Büchlein hab ich im Namen Anna Oeveam Höyers auszgeben vnnd jhr zugeeignet zu einer Beschirmung dieses Werckes / ob es vielleicht möchte angefochten werden / als Petri Schifflein. Vnd weil die, die das Büchlein gemacht hat / Christi Weinberg sucht fort zu pflanzen / gleich Anna Höyers jhre Schwester / wol genennet mag werden / vnd auch / vmb dasz durch jhren Nahmen von Anna Höyers disz Büchlein besser bekand möchte seyn.”



IN THE STOCKHOLM MANUSCRIPT.

II. BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH.

In the seventeenth century, after an almost complete silence¹ of five hundred years since the time of the pious Ava, women began again to play an important part in the creation of German literature. Naturally enough the new actors were received with applause as a pleasant diversion. The public had become weary, in the masculine century just passed, of having its attention constantly called to feminine faults. It welcomed the refining influence of woman.

The satirists, especially Lauremberg and Rachel, made merry of course at the expense of the poetizing ladies. They insisted that a woman's place was in the kitchen and beside the cradle, and that the pen and beard belonged to the man alone. But they were in the minority. At almost all the courts in Germany were found noble ladies² who indulged in literary work of some sort, and under their protection other women found it possible to assert themselves. They were soon invited to membership in some of the literary societies³ which were prominent at the time. To the surprise of a few people, women were found worthy even of the imperial laurel wreath.⁴ Anna Maria von Schürmann⁵ aroused astonished admiration as one of the wonders of the world on account of her learning and her

¹ In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries there were, to be sure, some mystical writers who were women: Mechtild von Magdeburg, Adelheid Langmann, Christina Ebnerin, and others.

² Anna Maria, Duchess of Saxony; Anna Sophie, Countess of Hessen-Darmstadt; Louise Henriette, Electoral princess of Brandenburg; etc.

³ The Pegnitz society in Nuremberg, and the Deutschgesinnte in Hamburg.

⁴ Sibylla Schwarz, Katharine Regina von Greiffenberg, Gertrud Moller.

⁵ Anna Maria von Schürmann (1607-1678) spoke and wrote seven languages, including Hebrew, and was a fine musician as well. She was a disciple of Labadie and followed him to Altona, where he established a sectarian community.

poetry. In fact the general opinion was that the literary women were to be accepted and flattered.

Among her celebrated sisters, however, Anna Owena Hoyers⁶ stood singularly alone. She did not understand the fine art (then so fashionable) of using beautiful and high-sounding phrases to say nothing. The careful metrical rules, which Opitz and others had laid down, were apparently unknown to her. When she wrote, it was always with a definite purpose in view. The substance was the important thing, not the form. She was always blunt, often very sarcastic in her violent outbursts of wrath against the evils of her day. The clergy received the lion's share of her bitter criticisms, and were the more deeply insulted by the fact that she herself was entirely unmoved either by censure or by ridicule.

The chroniclers of the period have very little to say in praise of her. The greater number of them were clergymen, and could hardly be expected to feel anything but disapproval for this straightforward, energetic woman who attacked the vices of their class so mercilessly. That she was not so fanatical as they would have us believe, is, however, quite evident to all who have read her writings with an open mind.

Anna Owens was born in 1584 in Coldenbüttel, a small town in Eiderstedt, in the duchy of Schleswig. Her family was a distinguished and wealthy one, with generations of culture behind it.⁷

The family was in all probability North Frisian. One must distinguish here between the West Frisians, who dwelt in the country north of the mouth of the Rhine (now the Netherlands), the East Frisians, in the Netherland district of Groningen and as far north as the Weser, and the North Frisians, in Schleswig and the adjoining islands, although as seafaring people they were closely associated with each other in commerce and politics. The North Frisians retained their own

⁶ In the genitive case, as the wife of Hoyer.

⁷ She was apparently not related to the painter Georg van Owens (1620-1695); see Z. f. Schleswig-Holst. 38, 416.

government longer than the others, and their own language as well, in spite of Danish and Low-German influences. Indeed, Frisian is still spoken upon the islands of Sylt, Föhr, Amrum and Helgoland, and along the west coast of Schleswig, although the dialect upon the mainland is quite different from that upon the islands. Eiderstedt was colonized very early by the Frisians, and Frisian was spoken there until about the middle of the seventeenth century.

Bold sea robbery had not been unknown among this people. Always at war with the elements, and especially with the sea, which repeatedly overwhelmed their low and flat country, they had developed a defiant courage and endurance, a proud self-respect and hatred of all tyrannical arbitrariness, which made them dangerous enemies. "Deus Mare, Friso litora fecit" (God created the sea, but the Frieslander its boundaries) is one of their oldest mottoes. There were no nobles, no feudal lords among them, for none of them could consent to be a vassal.

In matters of religion they had been as independent as in matters of government. No other nation had cherished its ancient rites and ceremonies with as much loyalty as the Frisians. They had, in common with all the North Germans, little sympathy with the poetic mysticism of the Catholic Church. The priests had no authority over them. On the contrary, the priests were themselves dependent upon the favor of an assembly of citizens. The Reformation found therefore very little opposition in this land where Catholicism was so weak. The Frisians are still an intellectual, reasonable, practical people because of the stern necessities of their existence, although not without an understanding of the imaginative and philosophical side of life. The various sects flourished among them; and Menno, the leader of the Mennonites, was a Frisian.

Unfortunately, repeated floods, followed by famine and pestilence, almost exhausted this sturdy people. When finally, in 1634, the tremendous Nordstrand flood came, Duke Frederick III was obliged to enter into a compact with the wealthy Netherlanders, according to which they should have possession of all

the land which they were able to rescue and protect with dikes. Some of the old inhabitants worked as servants for the intruders, some went to Holland to serve as sailors, some settled on the island Föhr.⁸

At the time when we first hear of the Owens family, however, these disasters had not yet occurred, and they found in Eiderstedt opportunity for following their professions and for amassing wealth. Tete Owens (Anna Owens' grandfather) was barrister in Witzworth. Her father, Hans Owens, was a well-known astronomer, but he died in the year in which Anna was born. Her mother was Wennecke Hunnens, daughter of Jacob Hunnens, alderman and councilor in Oldensworth. She died, too, only a few years after her husband,⁹ and left the three-year-old baby to be cared for and educated by relatives.

Of Anna Owens' childhood we know nothing definite, but the probability is that she grew up in Witzworth, where two of her uncles acted as her guardians.¹⁰ She was full of vitality and of the joy of living, and not entirely unconscious of her beauty and her intellectual accomplishments:¹¹

Wann ich all sein Wolthat betracht,
Das Er Zum menschen mich gemacht,
Durch fromme Eltern mir das leben
Und wolgestalten Leib hat geben,

⁸ See G. Weigelt, *Die nordfriesischen Inseln vormals und jetzt*, Hamburg, 1873; and M. Anton Heimreich, *Nordfresische Chronik*, Tondern, 1819. The Frisians living between the Weser and the Jade maintained their independence until they were conquered in 1234 by the Archbishop of Bremen and the Count of Oldenburg and their land was united with Oldenburg.

⁹ See Carlander's *Stammbuch*.

¹⁰ Staatsarchiv Schleswig, Acta A, XX, Nr. 3305: "An Mewes und Jon Owens zu Witzworth von Herzog Johann Adolf, dasz ihr Mündlein Anna Owens, weill dieselbe sich mit benanntem Staller [Hermann Hoyer] für diesen eingelassen, sich bis zu Austrag solcher Sachen des Freyens enthalten soll." (By courtesy of Helene Höhnk.)

¹¹ See Helene Höhnk, *Niedersachsen*, 9. Jahrgang, Nr. 8, p. 128: "In den Schreiben, welche der Herzog an sie richten liess, wird sie stets die 'Hochgelehrte und Wohlweise' angeredet." The many Latin words and phrases in her poems show that this was not merely a form of address.

Stete fürsorg für mich gehabt,
 Mit Witz und Verstandt mich begabt,
 Von der kindheit und Jugend auff,
 Auch mitten im Sundlichen lauff,
 Mich gnädiglich gesehen an,
 Ich ihn nich genug rühmen kan.

—Poem. p. 15.

She probably had more than one suitor for her hand, for the joys and sorrows of love are the theme of her first long poem:

Wie wunderbar die liebe Sey
 Ist klar hirinn zufinden,
 Was freüd und Süszigkeit dabey,
 Thut disz büchlein verkünden,
 Imglichen auch die bitterkeit
 Viel trauren, Sorg und schmertzen
 So wohnet bey zu iederzeit
 Allen verliebten Hertzen.

—Breitenburg MS p. 2.

From her father she inherited apparently a great interest in astronomy¹² and mathematics,¹³ although she may simply have absorbed her knowledge from the people round about her. The Frieslander lived in close dependence on the stars, partly as necessary guides upon his long voyages, partly as sympathetic companions for his deep philosophical inquiries;¹⁴ and astronomy and mathematics were the most important subjects required of those desiring to be confirmed.¹⁵ Gustav Frenssen

¹² Thu deinen fleisz
 Zu seinem preisz,
 Lunam zu überwinden.
 —Poem. p. 200.
 Lasz deinen sinn
 Nicht, wie vorhinn,
 Vom *Scorpion* regieren.
 —Poem. p. 203.

Solarisch arth,
 Ist etwas hart,
 Jächzörnig und hochmütig.
 —Poem. p. 204.
 Werff *Martis* stern
 Auch von dir fern.
 —Poem. p. 205.

¹³ St. MS Fol. 154.

¹⁴ Gustav Frenssen, Jörn Uhl, Berlin, 1912, p. 176: "Der Menschenschlag des Landes ist vorwiegend für Philosophie und Mathematik beanlagt," etc.

¹⁵ G. Weigelt, Die nordfriesischen Inseln, p. 233.

has not forgotten this inborn instinct in his people, and to his hero Jörn Uhl he gives at first but two treasures to comfort him in his bitter loneliness: an old book (Littrow, *Wunder des Himmels*) and a crooked telescope. Amid such surroundings even the children study the heavens.

Anna Owens had also a fair knowledge of Latin, to judge from the many Latin quotations and the frequent use of Latin words and phrases in her works.¹⁶ The only attempt at writing Latin verses is, however, scarcely worthy of admiration:

Littera gesta docet,
quid Credas Allegoria,
Moralis quid agas,
quo tendas Anagogia,
S. A. O. H. Schripcit.

—St. MS p. 6.

Her school days were destined to be brief. Scarcely fifteen years old, the rich and beautiful girl was sought in marriage by the distinguished Staller,¹⁷ Hermann Hoyer, and became

¹⁶ Es geht nicht mehr
So scharff daher,
Denn *Pax* ist nun geboren;
Die *Charitas*
Vertreibt den hasz,
Der Kriegs-mann hat ver-
loren.

See also St. MS Fols. 21, 24, 26, 39, 45, 68, 127, 130, 133, etc.

¹⁷ Grimm, Deutsches Wörterbuch: "Nach Adelung gab es in der landschaft Eiderstädt einen Oberstaller (Amtmann zu Husum) als oberste aufsichtsbehörde in kirchlichen, politischen und ökonomischen sachen und einen unterstaller oder staller schlechthin als richter für das erste verfahren in privatsachen; daneben bei den Friesen staller gleichbedeutend mit statthalter" (governor, lieutenant).

Christian I, 45: "Zu den Hofbedienten gehören die Hirdsmen, Gestir, Kuskaler, denen der Staller oder Marschall vorstand, der aber auch öfters vom Hofe entfernt und eine Provinz zu regieren bekam; daher man noch jetzt in der Provinz Eiderstedt einen königlichen Staller findet." According to Christian, then, the Staller was originally a Stallmeister.

Heimreich, p. 19, derives "Staller" from "installando," because he was installed.

In earlier times the Staller led the people in war as well, but is here only the highest judicial and executive authority in his district.

Im Regiment
Gehts *Excellent*,
Concordia floriret;
Justitia
Ist wieder da,
Pietas Gubernieret.

—Poem. p. 192.

mistress of the manor in Hoyersworth,¹⁸ the 15th of April, 1599. It has been said that her married life was not happy,¹⁹ and indeed the reasons adduced for its not being so seem somewhat plausible. The Hoyer family was related to the royal household in Denmark,²⁰ had been employed in important diplomatic missions, and was enjoying many of the privileges of the nobility. Hermann Hoyer himself had been educated almost entirely with princes and, as Staller of Eiderstedt, Everschop and Utholm,²¹ was a personage of great importance. His wedding day was celebrated in Latin poems composed in honor of "nobilissimi viri Casparis Hoyeri, Consiliarii Principum Holsatiae primarii, filii provinciae Eiderostadiensis Praefekti dignissimi,"²² and the privileges²³ granted to the father were cordially extended to the son. No greater contrast could be imagined than that existing between this experienced courtier and his naïve young bride. That they were both self-willed and independent personalities²⁴ would make the adjustment even more difficult.

¹⁸ Hoyersworth is the only estate in Eiderstedt with noble privileges, and lies half a mile north of Tönning. It is at present in the possession of the Hamkens family, and looks almost like a castle, with its double moat and extensive grounds. It was used by the Danish king Frederick IV as his headquarters during the siege of Tönning, in 1713. The old house has its family ghost as well as its underground dungeon. The iron ring, sign of the Staller's office, still hangs on the high tower.

¹⁹ See Moller I, 264: "Post mariti (quocum, heterodoxiae suae, a parentibus forsan in filiam derivatae, indignante, haud admodum concorditer eam vixisse, Sperlingius perhibet), d. 13 Sept. A. 1622. defuncti, excessum, in praedio illius commorata Hoyerswortano, librorum lectione assidua, & carminum vernaculorum scriptio, cui jam ante assvererat, thori vidui fefellit taedia." Compare also Adelung and Erich Schmidt's essay in A. D. B.

²⁰ Harmen Hoyer married Catharine, the illegitimate daughter of Frederick I.

²¹ Since 1456 the three districts had had one Staller.

²² Krafft, p. 171.

²³ They were excused from paying the usual taxes, had the privilege of hunting and fishing at all seasons of the year, and could not be called to account by the provincial court.

²⁴ Manuscript aus Eiderstedt geliehen (without signature or number, by courtesy of Helene Höhnk), Nachricht von den Stallern in Eiderstedt, Everschop und Utholm, mit einigen Fragmenten aus der Geschichte der drei Landen, p. 32: "Hermann Hoyer war ein grosser

From an old document²⁵ we learn, too, that Hermann Hoyer had been engaged to Margareta Schultze, before he offered his hand to Anna Owens. In fact Margareta's mother complained to Duke Johann Adolf about the fickleness of the Staller, and the result was a ducal command that Anna Owens should refuse any further attentions from Hermann Hoyer until the difficulty might be arranged.²⁶ Perhaps the devout Margareta had not charm enough to hold him, or the wealthy Anna, with her enormous dowry of 100,000 Lübeck marks (about \$30,000),²⁷ presented greater attractions. At all events, there seems to have been very little deep affection connected with the marriage of the duke's representative and the rich orphan girl.

There is, however, no trace of dissatisfaction with her lot in any of her poems. She bore her husband seven children²⁸ and watched over them with loving motherly care.²⁹ She

starker schwarzbrauner Mann, breit von Schultern, Stirn und Brust, hatte ziemlich grosse Augen, abgekürztes Haar, grossen und breiten Bart, ein ziemlich breites Kinn, ein ernsthaftes Angesicht, war jedoch gemeinsam und fast geschwäztig, auch sehr lustig und kurtzweilig und war froh, wenn er einfältige Leute aus einer geschwinden Rede überhanden konte. Er war gastfrey und bewirthete oft die Landleute. Er hatte kein Laster, als dasz er was eigensinnig war."

²⁵ Staatsarchiv Schleswig (document not numbered, by courtesy of Helene Höhnk): "Conradt Wulff Hoyer war mit einer Schultze verheiratet. Mit einer Schwester derselben war Hermann Hoyer verlobt. Die Mutter dieser Schultzen hies Catherina geb. Blankenfeldt."

²⁶ Compare note 10.

²⁷ 100,000 Lübeck marks were of much greater value at that time than the same sum would be to-day. Anna Owens brought her husband a fortune, and he himself was not poor. See Andreas Angelus, Holsteinische Chronica, 1597, I, 60: "Disz Geschlecht hat in Eyderstedt drey Vorwerck vnd Häuser."

²⁸ Johann died apparently as a small baby. Anna married Peter Siemens, did not go with the others to Sweden, and on that account is not mentioned in the poem "Christi Gülden Cron," Poem. p. 132. Maria married the musketeer Friedrich Nassach. Christina married a Swedish sculptor. Caspar was innkeeper in Sittwick. Christian was foreman in the iron-works about four miles from Stockholm. Friedrich Hermann, born 1621, was pilot in the Swedish fleet, teacher at a naval academy, and later copper-plate engraver in Stockholm.

Erich Schmidt, whose two essays furnish the most modern source of information for Anna Owens, mentions but five children, quoting probably Poem. p. 132. (See Carlander's Stammbuch.)

²⁹ St. MS 24, "Ach Herr bewahr mein Kinderlein"; Poem. p. 133, "Christi Gülden Cron"; "Posaunenschall," especially pp. 199-208; p. 3, "Gespräch zwischen Mutter und Kindt."

proved herself a true and obedient wife, subservient to her husband in all things:

Ihr Frawen ewer Männer Ehret,
 Mindert ihr Leidt, ihr freüde Mehret,
 Ihnen zu dienen seyt geflissen,
 Männer sind Herren, das solt ihr wissen.

—St. MS Fol. 99.

She encouraged young girls to marry and to help their husbands in founding pious homes.³⁰ In her version of the Book of Ruth she describes the loyal wife as the paragon of all virtues,³¹ showing that she herself is by no means the emancipated woman who would disregard all home ties.

She seems, moreover, to have enjoyed the complete confidence of her husband. He made her sole guardian of his children and executrix of his large estates. Whether it was due to her tact or to his diplomacy, there was at least no open break between them.

The only thing which perhaps might be interpreted as a sign of unhappiness on her part is her first literary effort (already mentioned above), written five years before her husband's death. It is a version of Aeneas Sylvius'³² famous love story of Euryalus and Lucretia,³³ in which Lucretia, the wife of a

³⁰ Poem. p. 150.

³¹ Poem. p. 87.

³² Pope Pius II.

³³ "Süszbittere Freude; oder eine wahrhaftige Historie von zwey liehabenden Personen, unter verdeckten Nahmen Euryali und Lucretiae, durch Aeneam Sylvium Lateinisch beschrieben, durch Nicolaum von Weil, Stadtschreiber, verdeutscht, jetzt aber in deutsche Reimen gestellt durch Anero Hireijo zu Horstrowey in Testredey (Anagramm für Ovena Hoyeri zu Hoyersworth in Eyderstedt). Schleswig 1617. 40."

Niclas von Wyle, important chiefly as translator, was born in Bremgarten, in Switzerland. In 1445 he was city secretary in Nuremberg; in 1449 he filled the same office in Eszlingen. In 1470 he was chancellor to Count Ulrich von Würtemberg. He dedicated some of his translations to Duchess Mathilde of Austria, the most important of which are: "Euriolus und Lucretia"—Aeneas Sylvius; "Über den Nutzen der klassischen Studien"—Aeneas Sylvius; "Bericht über Procesz und Tod des Hieronymus von Prag"—Poggio; "Von dem Adel"—Hammerlin;

wealthy citizen in Sienna, dies of love for the chancellor of the emperor Sigismund. Only a short fragment remains extant, but what we have is a warning against the dangers and sorrows which Venus sends upon her worshipers.

Her life as seen from a superficial point of view was crowned with all the blessings which make for happiness. Her social position as wife of the influential Staller was an enviable one. Her beautiful home in Hoyersworth, and later in Tönning, was often thronged with guests who vied with each other in showering compliments upon her and in showing her every mark of respect.²⁴ Music and the laughter of children were not wanting. Wealth was also there in abundance. What more could the heart of woman desire?

There was one thing, however, which disturbed the harmony apparently existing between the husband and wife. They were not in sympathy with each other in regard to the endless litigation carried on between the Lutheran pastors in Eiderstedt and the various Anabaptist sects (some of whom called themselves Mennonites, some David Jorites). Since the terrible events in Münster in 1535,²⁵ the Anabaptists had been espe-

"Guiscarde und Sigismunde"—Boccaccio (from the Latin translation of Aretino).

See Goedeke I, 361, and the dissertation of Bruno Strauss, "Der Übersetzer Nicolaus von Wyle," Berlin, 1911.

²⁴ Mit Reverenz fein zierlich
Setzt man uns oben an,
Praesentirt uns manirlich,
Viel dienst und Freundschaft an.

—Poem, p. 294.

²⁵ The trouble began in 1534 with Bernhard Rotmann, who, at the head of 900 armed citizens, demanded unconditional religious freedom from the Catholic bishop. Then came Jan Mathys and Jan Bockelson from the Netherlands, and drew a multitude of fanatics to Münster through the fiery eloquence of their preaching. On the 27th of February, 1534, Mathys announced it as God's will that all unbelievers should be driven out of the city. All images, church organs and books were destroyed. Twelve of the oldest men, as inspired prophets, were set at the head of the city government. A community life was introduced, which included even a community of wives. Hessen, Trèves, Cleves, Mainz and Cologne helped in laying siege to the city, which finally had to yield on account of famine. After a hard struggle the Anabaptists were conquered and Catholicism was reestablished. (Joh. Heinr. Kurtz, *Lehrbuch der Kirchengeschichte*.)

cially feared and persecuted. In Schleswig they had found a peaceful refuge for thirty years or more, partly because of the more tranquil nature of the people, partly because of the less zealous dogmatism of the clergy, who were for the most part disciples of the peace-loving Melanchthon. But they increased so rapidly, and came to form such a large part of the community, that they could be tolerated no longer. In 1588 Caspar Hoyer banished six and called many others to account. His son, Hermann, attacked the heretics even more energetically. On the 29th of March, 1602, he brought many to trial at Tönning. In 1607 he cross-examined and rebuked a number of Mennonites and David Jorites in Cotzenbüll and Tönning. In 1608 he held another cross-examination and threatened all who did not recant before June, 1609, with banishment and the confiscation of half their property. In 1614 he was obliged to interfere again, for the Anabaptists had summoned clergymen of their own from Holland and were making converts. He put several in prison, but they were soon released by a ducal command³⁶ and had to defend themselves before the chancellor and the duke's council in Gottorp. Permission was finally granted them to remain in the country on condition that they conducted themselves with propriety and made no attempt to disseminate their teachings.

The Anabaptists themselves gave four reasons why they were so hated and persecuted: they had not the Lutheran but the symbolic point of view; they could not believe that young children were afflicted with original sin which could be exorcised only by the rite of baptism; they expected forgiveness of sin from God alone and not from the priest; they could not put the Confession of Augsburg and Luther's Shorter Catechism on an equal footing with the Bible. They were accused, furthermore, of having a community of wives, and of trying to destroy the whole idea of a state government since they refused to serve even in a just war or to take the oath of allegiance.³⁷

³⁶ Most of the Anabaptists were rather wealthy, and the duke's heaviest tax-payers.

³⁷ Hansen⁽¹⁾, p. 175.

These difficulties with the sectaries were not really adjusted until after the death of Duke Johann Adolf (March 31, 1616). His son Frederick III, a mild and broad-minded prince, followed him as Duke of Schleswig-Holstein; and he, although himself an orthodox Lutheran, granted the sects a village on the Eider called Sebul. This they enlarged and built up into a city which they named Friedrichstadt. Special privileges were bestowed upon them by the duke on the 13th of February, 1623. For the first time the sectaries were entirely free from religious persecution.³⁸

The series of lawsuits and banishments in Eiderstedt must have seemed very unjust to the Staller's wife, for she was a great admirer of David Joris, "De trūw Gottes Knecht,"³⁹ and had read his writings with almost as much attention as those of Schwenckfeld. One could hardly expect her to recognize that the Schleswig authorities were, in comparison with those in other parts of Germany, remarkably moderate and tolerant in their action. However, she seems to have concealed her interest in the heresies until after her husband's death. At least she made no public attempt to defend them.

In 1603 the Staller's residence was changed from Hoyersworth to Tönning, where the Hoyer family lived for nineteen years. Then, on the 13th of September, 1622, Hermann Hoyer died, and his wife began almost immediately to give expression to her natural antipathy for the orthodox clergy. There was needed only a special case in which she was personally interested to stir her wrath to a white heat, and that came very soon.

Moller tells us that after her husband's death she returned to Hoyersworth, where she passed her time in "librorum lectione assidua, et carminum vernacularum scriptione." Jöcher and Paullinus give the same account of these years following her bereavement. Judging from her poems and various quotations in the Stockholm manuscript, she had a superficial knowl-

³⁸ Christian III, 137.

³⁹ Poem. p. 259.

edge at least of St. Augustine⁴⁰ and Propertius.⁴¹ She had also read the eager controversialists of the Reformation—Luther, Flacius, Calvin, and Melanchthon; the heterodox mystics—Schwenckfeld, Joris and Weigel; the modern poets—Opitz, Rist, Sudermann, Nagel and Ziegenspeck; and knew most intimately of all, Luther's translation of the Bible.⁴² Indeed, the Bible was her household book, which she read and re-read and knew almost by heart. It furnished her with material for her poems⁴³ and had a very strong influence upon her language and style.⁴⁴

But her life was also an active one, made such in part by acquaintance with Dr. Nicolaus Teting (Knutzen). One of her children was ill and she needed his medical aid; but aside from that, she had heard of his unjust banishment from Flensburg and was curious to meet him. Born about 1590 at Husum, he had studied medicine and chemistry (which at that time meant alchemy) in Leyden and later settled in Flensburg, where he won many friends. In 1622 he and his friend, Hartwig Lohmann, the town clerk, came into conflict with the clergy, perhaps unnecessarily. Habacuc Meyer, pastor of St. Mary's, had publicly attacked Weigel's theory of the Incarnation. Teting and Lohmann, supposing that the sermon was directed against them, wrote out a confession of what they really believed, in order to defend themselves against any false accusation. Their minister conferred with Friedrich Johannes, his colleague, and with Friedrich Dame, Propst⁴⁵ and pastor of St. John's. The controversy was carried on partly in writing, partly by cross-examination, and the two friends finally left Flensburg of their

⁴⁰ St. MS II, Fols. 3, 26.

⁴¹ St. MS Fol. 24.

⁴² This translation contains the Apocryphal books. (See Poem. p. 117; St. MS 6—9; St. MS II, Fol. 31.)

⁴³ "Das Buch Ruth"—Poem. p. 77; "An die Gemein in Engelland"—Poem. p. 268.

⁴⁴ See Chap. IX.

⁴⁵ Propst—head pastor of a district, almost always pastor of the largest church.

own accord. Teting went to Hattstedt and from there to Windert, whence he was called to Hoyersworth.

Here he won the sympathy and confidence of the Staller's widow, and she invited him and his family to take up their abode in the gate-keeper's house on her estate. Adelung writes scornfully of the influence which the "Erzschwärmer und Goldmacher" had over her. It was not difficult for him, says Adelung, to turn her head completely, and to involve her in the wildest fanaticism. She kept Teting, whom she considered a divine prophet, with her, to the disgust of the whole neighborhood, and made Hoyersworth a gathering-place for all the Anabaptists and fanatics, announcing herself as their leader and giving Teting the power to baptize and teach whom he would. Krafft tells, too, how she and her children and her entire household were ensnared by Teting; and Holberg remarks that, because she was very eager to learn of new religious theories, it was easy for Teting to imbue her, "als ein schwaches Weib," with many strange and foolish notions.⁴⁶

This zeal on Teting's part only transferred the Flensburg disputes to Hoyersworth. Resentment was at once aroused by the fact that Teting held private church services in his patroness' home and proceeded to extend his influence to the people in the vicinity. On the 24th of May, 1623, the duke ordered an investigation, which Nicolaus Wedovius of Witzwort was to conduct. According to the account which his adversaries give of the trial, Teting expressed some very unorthodox views: that in 1625 the kingdoms of this world would come to an end and the millennium would then begin; that Christ received the human part of his person (as well as the spiritual) from the Holy Spirit, and that the conception took place through faith; that Christ dwells bodily in the hearts of his children; that the reading of the Bible and the hearing of the word is of no value without the inner enlightenment of the

⁴⁶ Krafft, p. 173: "Sie ist herzlich zu bedauern, dass sie bei ihren Gaben so tief verfallen ist durch den Umgang mit Nicolaus Knutzen (Teting)."

Spirit.⁴⁷ The discussion became somewhat heated on both sides, and Teting found it advisable to return to his native city Husum. Anna Owens and her family soon followed him; and they began again their community life, this time, too, in a house belonging to her. As might have been expected, they were at once attacked by the resident clergy of Husum, with Petrus Dankwerth at their head; and September 27, 1624, Teting was commanded to recant or leave the country within fourteen days. He chose the latter alternative and departed for Hamburg, where he lived for some time as a practising physician.

Lohmann settled in Odense, on the island of Fünnen, eventually repented of all his heretical beliefs, and was received back into the church as a penitent sinner (1635).

Anna Owens was naturally very angry over the banishment of her friend, and in 1625 wrote a biting satire against the "Herrn Titultrager von Hohen Schulen," directing her invective against the clergy of Flensburg—Meyer, Johannes and Dame—and repudiating Dame's "Abgetrungene Relation des Colloquii mit denen von Flensburg entwichenen Enthusiasten":

O Ihr verkehrte Pfaffenknecht,
Fritz Hannsen und Fritz Dame.
O Schlangen art, Ottern geschlecht
Ja Satans eigner same.

—Poem. p. 67.

She also continued to hold private church services in her own house and to receive hospitably the sectaries who had been driven out of other provinces.⁴⁸ She depended for protection upon the favor which her family had long enjoyed at the hands of the royal house of Gottorp. Nor was she mistaken. The clergy began their attack by a "kindly reminder." She retorted with characteristic independence that she had never received any consolation or help from the church and that the

⁴⁷ M. Fridericus Dame, *Abgetrungene Relation des Colloquii mit denen von Flensburg entwichenen Enthusiasten*, Rostock, 1625.

⁴⁸ Poem. p. 242.

ministry had no authority over her. A typical story is told of one of the rare occasions when she attended the church service in Husum. The minister noticed his distinguished visitor at once and began a polemic against Teting's special teacher (Weigel) and other fanatics. This the impetuous lady could not endure. She arose with much noise and rushed out of the church with the words, "De Düwel schall in de Husumer Kark kamen."⁴⁹ The clergy then appealed to the Duchess Augusta, Johann Adolf's widow,⁵⁰ but she would take no steps against one whose family had performed such good services for the Crown. The ministers had to content themselves with public admonitions and rebukes.

As the natural result of all this bickering, Anna Owens became bitter and defiant toward the whole world. In 1625 she even refused to pay a special tax levied upon one of her houses in Husum, but had to yield to a ducal command. She became involved in endless lawsuits over debts which her husband had left unsettled. She went to law with the mayor of Husum on account of a quarrel over a house there, and lost her case.

She suffered from financial embarrassment as well, some say because of extravagant beneficence to her sectarian friends.⁵¹

⁴⁹ M. Voss, p. 104.

⁵⁰ Kraftt, p. 498, Beilage 41: "Sie euszert sich mit ihren Kindern und mehrtenheils Hausgesinde desz üblichen Gottesdienstes liederlicher und verächtlicher Weise; Ja auch frembde Seelen, die ohne Zweiffel eben dieses gebäcks seyn, in ihre Beheuszung auffnehmen, vnd mit denselben eine eigene Enthusiastische Winckel-Kirche haben sollen, mit welchen allen dem Fürstlichen ernsten Mandat nicht allein trotziglich zuwidern gelebet, sondern auch eine grosse Ergernisz in vnser Gemeine angerichtet wird."

⁵¹ Moller: "Has ob causas cum patriae clero esset exosa, opesque ingentes liberalitate prodiga dilapidasset, praedio Hoyerswortano Augusta, Johannis Adolphi, Ducis Holsatici, viduae, vendito, in Sveciam A. 1632 exulatum abiit."

Adelung says she lived in such an extravagant fashion that she went through her own and her husband's money in less than ten years, of which the Anabaptists and other "schwärmerische Schmarotzer" may have enjoyed the greater part.

Christian IV, chap. 12: "Ihre Freygebigkeit brachte sie um ihr Vermögen. Ihr Vater und Schwiegersonn suchten gerichtliche Hülfe dagegen aber vergebens."

But her large inheritance was already heavily encumbered with debt at her husband's death.⁵²

About this time she seems to have found the executorship of her estate very burdensome and to have divided the property among her children. On the 17th of March, 1625, she requested the appointment of trustees for them.⁵³

In 1628, relieved to some extent of her business difficulties, she went to Hamburg, perhaps to obtain comfort and help from her friend Teting,⁵⁴ or to visit her sister-in-law Margareta Moller, who had married the mayor of Hamburg.⁵⁵ At any rate she stayed some weeks there, just at the time of the great plague:

Auch da grosz sterben umb mich war,
erhilstestu mein Leben,
Und rettest mich aus der gefahr,
damit ich war umbgeben.
Zu mir und meinen Kindern Müst,
die pestelentz nicht kommen.
Hast väterlich zur selben frist,
dich vnser angenomen.

—St. MS 21—4.

From Hamburg she went to Denmark, whether to Copenhagen we do not know, and suffered shipwreck just off Helsingör.⁵⁶ Why did she make this long, dangerous and expensive journey, rendered even more exhausting by the care of several of her children whom she took with her, at a time when she could hardly well afford it? She was undoubtedly wearied to death by

⁵² Helene Höhnk, Niedersachsen, p. 129: "In einem Aktenstück 1626 heißt es direkt, dass Harmen Hoyers Erbschaft mit ansehnlichen Schulden belastet gewesen war."

⁵³ Schleswig Staatsarchiv, Acta A, XX, Nr. 3304.

⁵⁴ None, even of her most bitter enemies, has made any compromising remark concerning this friendship, except the clergy in Husum in the written complaint which they sent to Duchess Augusta (Krafft, p. 498).

⁵⁵ Carlander's Stammbuch.

⁵⁶ On the Danish island of Seeland, not far from Copenhagen. (See St. MS 21—6.)

the incessant and paltry hostilities which she had to endure in Husum. Her old acquaintances, who had cultivated her so sedulously as long as she had money and position, had also left her⁵⁷ and she found herself bitterly alone. It is probable that she had already begun to consider the necessity of leaving her native land forever, and sought in Hamburg and Copenhagen friends who might be helpful to her.

But her absence from Husum was not prolonged. The years 1629 and 1630 she spent again at home, and with unconquerable courage published two of the most stinging satires which we have from her pen. If she had written nothing else but "Einfältige Warheit" and "De Dörp-Pape," she might have considered herself sufficiently revenged for all the injuries inflicted upon her by her old enemies, the theologians. "De Dörp-Pape" was especially sharp and cutting, the climax of all her writings, and aroused a storm of abuse against her.⁵⁸ The clouds in her sky began to darken ominously.

In December of the year 1630, she was obliged to sell a house in Husum, "because she and her heirs were hard pressed by their creditors and were involved in not a little expense."⁵⁹

In 1634 she incurred heavy loss in the famous Nordstrand flood. Her son Friedrich Hermann tells how his mother, his sister Maria and his brother Caspar had to sit three days in the upper rooms of their house and wait for the waters to recede, "da die fische durch fenster und thür in der stuben spatzierten vnd die Schiffe auf der gassen gingen, über acker und wiesen."⁶⁰ The island of Nordstrand was almost entirely swallowed up by the sea, and the whole coast suffered greatly from the inundation. The event made a deep impression upon Anna Owens. In the twelfth and thirteenth songs of the Stockholm manuscript she expresses a wondering awe toward the Almighty God who could so swiftly and unexpectedly

⁵⁷ Poem, p. 294; St. MS 43.

⁵⁸ See Krafft, p. 173.

⁵⁹ Schleswig Staatsarchiv, Acta A, XX, Nr. 3305.

⁶⁰ St. MS Fol. 158.

punish. Her almost childlike confidence in His mercy and goodness is, however, not disturbed :

O Gott wie wunderbarlich, errettestu vom thott,
 Der rechter Helffer warlich, bistu in aller Noth.
 Wen wir in Angst und schrecken, bitten im
 glauben dich,
 so lestu unsz Nicht stecken, das hab erfahren ich.

—St. MS 13—11.

It is remarkable that we find no ballad or popular song commemorating this terrible misfortune. The only really thrilling description of the disaster is that in Heimreich's "Nordfresische Chronik."⁶¹ Otherwise the clergy have used it simply as an illustration of divine chastisement. Our author also adopted the didactic tone, but with some impressive accents :

Nemht sein werck, zu hertzen o ihr Sünder,
 Erkent sein grosse sterck.
 Etzlich thausent seindt umbekommen,
 durch die flut hinweg genommen,
 In der Nacht, plötzlich zu Nicht gemacht,
 auch frawen die ihr Kinder,
 Nur halb ansz licht gebracht.

—St. MS 12—3.

About this time Anna Owens decided to leave the unfriendly city of Husum,⁶² never to return. Almost impoverished, she

⁶¹ Heimreich II, chap. 13, pp. 134-152.

⁶² The date of her departure is variously given. Most of the chroniclers hold to 1632, because of the poem "Peer / Nielsz sin Söhn tho Westerwyck" (Poem. p. 74), dated 1633, which gives the impression of having been written in that city. 1632 is, however, certainly too early. In 1634 she was still in Eiderstedt, at the time of the flood; and, aside from this indisputable fact, she would hardly have gone to Sweden just after the death of Gustavus Adolphus, when a young queen still in her minority was but nominally on the throne. (Gustavus Adolphus died in 1632, and Christina was not invested with full regal authority until 1644.) The date of "Peer / Nielsz sin Söhn tho Westerwyck" may be a misprint. Gottfried Arnold says she did not leave Schleswig-Holstein until 1644, but that is just as certainly too late. In 1642 was the great Tönning lawsuit against the Anabaptists, and she was then already in Sweden. Erich Schmidt also says that she went in 1632 (A. D. B.).

sold the estate Hoyersworth to Duchess Augusta and with a heavy heart turned her back upon a land which had been very dear to her. It is not easy for the Frieslander to leave his native soil; he goes only when compelled by stern necessity, and she had all the Frisian loyalty and national pride. Armed with a letter of recommendation from Augusta to Maria Eleonora, the widow of Gustavus Adolphus,⁶³ she departed for Sweden, leaving behind the eldest daughter Anna, who was already married. There she lived for some time in Vestervik, a seaport town in Götaland, in Kalmar län:

Arm und elend, als vergessen,
Hab gewohnt bald hie bald dort,
In der Stadt und auff dem Lande
Im betrübten Witwen Stande,
Hie an diesem frembden Ort.

—Poem. p. 280.

If one may assume that the poem “Peer / Nielsz sin Söhn tho Westerwyck” is the result of a personal experience, as almost all of her poems are, she led a poverty-stricken existence there upon a small farm called Blickhem, on which she had cows and chickens. Her freedom and independence were protected by a document signed by her landlord and the mayor of Vestervik (Peer Nielson himself), but her rights were not always respected. Her produce was often bought without being paid for, and the rents were exorbitant.⁶⁴ The years must have been unspeakably hard for the proud, aristocratic, once wealthy woman.

Yet her own trials did not make her indifferent to those of old friends whom she had left at home. The poem “Ein Schreiben an die Gemein im Land Holstein,” written in 1642,

⁶³ Ja, Gott sey dafür gepreiset,
Er hat mir viel Gnad beweiset,
Mich als bey der Hand gefürt
Ausz Holstein hierher ohn schaden:
Ich bin von Ihr Fürstlich Gnaden
An Ihr Maystät commendirt.

—Poem. p. 280.

⁶⁴ Poem. p. 74.

shows what an active interest she took in all that happened there. There had been another protracted lawsuit against the David Jorites in Eiderstedt, and Anna Owens had followed the proceedings with close attention. This time the leader of the orthodox party was Moldenit, Propst in Tönning. Severe and ruthless in his zeal for the Lutheran dogmas, he sought out heresy even where it really did not exist, and aroused interest in David Joris and his writings among people who would otherwise never have thought of reading them. He brought about the imprisonment of several of his parishioners during March and April of the year 1642, and refused to admit several others to the Confession on the ground of their being suspicious characters. In May the duke commanded the confiscation of all the David Jorite books which upon search could be discovered. The accused tried to defend themselves, presented a written confession of faith, and complained of the unjust way in which they had been treated by Moldenit. In October, however, they were obliged to sign a "formulam Confessionis," which the "General Superintendent" ⁶⁵ Fabricius had drawn up, and in the same month the confiscated books were burned in the market square in Tönning. With this the proceedings against the sectaries were, for the time being, brought to a close, although Moldenit still found occasional cases of heresy.⁶⁶

Anna Owens was of course incensed by the whole dispute, and took up arms with great energy in defense of her sectarian friends against the "Praelaten":

Der Teuffel aller boszheit voll,
Ist in den Pfaffen rasend toll,
Und macht sie tobend wie die Heiden,
Dass sie Fried-liebend Leut nicht leiden.

—Poem. p. 234.

⁶⁵ His duties corresponded to those of a bishop. The office was introduced during the reign of Christian III, 1541, in Schleswig-Holstein and Denmark.

⁶⁶ Hansen⁽²⁾, p. 31.

She appealed to the duke not to drive away "Jesu Christi Brüder," but admitted that it was a terrible thing for a ruler to incur the anger of the priests and to be obliged to endure the ban of the church.

In 1643 she was still in Vestervik, but brighter days were soon to come. In the poem "Lob-Liedlein zu Ehren der Schwedischen Cronen," written in honor of Christina's coronation and dated Stockholm, September 7, 1644, she already rejoices in the protection of the Swedish queen:

O Ruhm-würdigs-Schweden-Reich,
 Frew dich deiner Cronen ;
 Kein Königreich ist dir gleich
 In dir ist gut wohnen ;
 Bey dir suchen schirm und schutz
 Wider ihrer Feinde trutz
 Frembde, Wittwen, Waisen,
 Hoch bistu zu preisen.

—Poem. p. 277.

She had found a rich patroness, too, in Maria Eleonora of Brandenburg, the widowed queen-mother, to whom she had already dedicated "Das Buch Ruth" ⁶⁷ in 1632, and from her bounty she received a small country-seat in Laagard, northeast of Stockholm, called Sittwick. In the poem "Gott, der alles Sunderlich regieret in der Welt," she expresses hearty thanks for this generous gift:

Er hat unsz alsz bey der hant, recht väterlich geführt,
 Seine gnad hab ich erkant, und seine lieb gespührt.
 Im Elenden Wittwen stand, hat er mich woll ernehrt,
 Bey Stockholm auff Ladgarts landt, mir auch ein Haus
 beschert.

—St. MS 48—2.

Queen Hedwig Eleonora of Holstein-Gottorp and Karl Gustavus were also very gracious to her.⁶⁸ Indeed, she did not lack

⁶⁷ Poem. p. 77.

⁶⁸ St. MS 44: "Auff die Frölige Ankunfft Der Durchläuchtigen, Hochgeborenen Fürstinnen und Frewlein F. Hedwich Eleonora."

wealthy and influential friends outside of the royal family. Benjamin Magnus Croneburg⁶⁹ and his noble wife, Elizabeth Krusbiörn,⁷⁰ showered benefits upon her, so that she began to live more happily here, although in exile, than she had lived at home. Her songs in praise of Sweden are eulogies written with genuine gratitude for the favors which she had received.

In 1649 she took as active an interest in English affairs⁷¹ as she had taken in 1642 in the Eiderstedt lawsuits, and poured out her wrath upon the rebels.⁷² She accused them unceremoniously of high treason in their execution of Charles I, and enlarged upon the respect and esteem due to all those in authority:

Wisst ihr nicht dass ihr schuldig seyd,
Zu gehorchen der Obrigkeit,
Welche die Schrifft nennt Götter?

—Poem. p. 269.

The poem was so personal in its invective that it called down an official reprimand upon the head of its author.⁷³ As might have been expected, she answered the rebuke with another poem⁷⁴ in which she reiterated her former statements as undeniably true, showing a fearless obstinacy against which state and church alike were powerless.

But her work did not last much longer. In 1655 the pen suddenly became too heavy for her feeble hand, and in the midst of a polemic against the aristocracy of wealth, she found it impossible to write further. Her son Friedrich Hermann was obliged to finish the poem for her. On the margin of Folio

⁶⁹ St. MS 46: "Erl gesessen auff Walstad und Haselaäs, etz. K: M: in Schweden woluerordneter Commendant auff Lageholm in Halland" (a province in the southern part of Sweden).

⁷⁰ St. MS 47.

⁷¹ It is interesting to note Moller I, 263, in this connection: "In Aktis Erud. Germanicis Lipsiensibus, Parte XXXV, p. 896, perperam appellatur die bekannte Engelländische Qvackerinn, cum Angliam nec patriam habuerit, nec unquam adierit."

⁷² Poem. p. 263: "Schreiben an die Gemein in Engelland."

⁷³ Poem. p. 272.

⁷⁴ Poem. p. 272, "Wer gern mit Alten Frawen streitt."

36, Part II, of the Stockholm manuscript, opposite the seventh verse, stands, "So weit hats meine Mutter Seelige," and at the foot of the page, "dieser rest F. H. Hoyer." An old engraving in the same manuscript bears the inscription, "Anna Ovena Hoiuers Obiit Ao: 1655. Den 27:9:b: Alt, 71, Jahr."

The chroniclers of the time have all manner of curious tales to tell about the last years of her life. They say she became infatuated with Pythagorean "vagaries"⁷⁵ and would allow no living creature to be killed, not even for food; that she ate only decaying fish; and kept dogs for the special benefit of fleas and lice, that they too might have an assured habitation.⁷⁶ Why her sympathies did not extend to the dogs is not explained. She is said to have had a foreboding of the hour of her death, and to have sought out a lonely spot where she might die without a witness of her final weakness.⁷⁷

These tales contain in all probability a minimum of truth. Anna Owens devoted herself evidently to her family and her literary work, without disturbing herself about the opinions of her neighbors. Her independent attitude, her frank and obstinate maintenance of her own opinion, estranged people from her. In the poem, "Wer gern mit alten Frauen streit," we can see that she was not particularly beloved:

Bitt last es euch gefallen doch
 Und tadelt nicht ihr schreiben,
 Sie bleibt bey warheit, liebt das Recht,
 Lest sich daran genügen,
 Hat ihren eignen Kopff (ist schlecht)
 Wie die Gånsz im Land Rügen,
 Achtet nicht mehr Welt-schand noch ehr.

—Poem. p. 273.

Under such circumstances, stories, fanciful and grotesque to almost any degree, might easily be devised about her character and manner of living.

⁷⁵ Especially touching the transmigration of the soul.

⁷⁶ Adelung says that this form of charity is also practised in India.

⁷⁷ Joh. Henr. Feustking, *Gynaecium Haeretico Fanaticum*, p. 358.

This much, however, we may infer from her writings and from the various accounts concerning her: She was a strong, earnest, deeply religious personality whom the struggle of life did not soften or make more compliant. She found worldly pleasures transitory and deceptive, and disavowed all interest in wealth or position or power. This hard, austere woman has written no love lyrics of any kind; but it is highly improbable that such an impetuous and passionate nature was entirely uninfluenced by the effect of love. The only place where she touches on the subject is in the fragment of "Süssbitte Freude" where she warns against its sorrows:

Die sich begeb'n in liebes bandt
 Macht Venus All zu Gecken,
 Verendert ihr gemüth und Sinn,
 Macht hin und wieder wandern,
 Nimpt Mannheit, sterck und klugheit hinn,
 gibt kindische Gedanken,
 Kindische Wort, Sinn, Muth und sterck,
 Anschleg, thun und furnehmen.

—Breitenburg MS Fol. 1.

In her friendships, too, she seems to have had unfortunate experience. The poem "Gegen die Geldt- und Welt-freunde" ⁷⁸ gives a very vivid characterization of the fair-weather friend who fills one's ears with protestations of willingness to serve as long as the purse is full and the table well set, but who fails to recognize one on the street after misfortune has come:

Disz ich vor wenig Jahren,
 Sehr wol empfunden hab,
 Darumb lasz ich sie fahren
 Scheid von der Freundschafft ab.

—Poem. p. 297.

In the forty-third song of the Stockholm manuscript she laments over an ungrateful guest whom she had hospitably enter-

⁷⁸ Poem. p. 294.

tained, and in Part II, Folio 31, she speaks of the rarity of true friendship.

Her children were also a source of grave anxiety to her. Tenderly as she loved them, it was natural for an imperious person like herself to try to domineer over them even after they were full-grown; and she resented bitterly their objection to her attempt at maintaining an absolute control. In 1643 and 1645 she even tried to choose her sons' wives for them,⁷⁹ and as late as 1650 she threatened them with eternal punishment if they refused to obey her.⁸⁰

The stern and serious household had, however, one lighter, more human aspect. The whole family was extremely fond of music. Anna Owens herself composed the music for several of her hymns.⁸¹ The eldest son, Caspar, played the violin;⁸² Friedrich Hermann, the trombone;⁸³ and Maria, the spinnet.⁸⁴ One can picture many a family concert. Nor did the music consist entirely of hymns. Secular songs were cultivated, the very newest as well as the older ones: "Warum sollt ich nicht fröhlich sein,"⁸⁵ "Wol dem, der weit von hohen Dingen,"⁸⁶

⁷⁹ Poem. p. 153, "Kurtz Bedencken von der Alten Weiber Heyrath"; p. 145, "Annae Ovenae Hoiijers Rath an alle Alte Witwen."

⁸⁰ St. MS 32, "O, Ihr Kinder ist es recht, Euer Mutter zu betrüben."

⁸¹ St. MS 4, 6, 69; Poem. p. 282.

⁸² Poem. p. 198.

⁸³ Poem. p. 200.

⁸⁴ Poem. p. 203.

⁸⁵ Warum sollt ich nicht fröhlich sein und haben guten Mut?

Das Alles wollst du bleiben lan, was dir mit wohl ansteht.

Brauch deine Sinn zu der Vernunft, dein Gmüth zu dem Verstand und thu auch keinem Andern nicht, was du nicht haben willst.

Text im Ambraser Liederbuch 1582. Nr. 251.

Melodie bei Werlin Hdschr. um 1640, p. 2513.

See Erk und Böhme, Deutscher Liederhort, Leipzig, 1894, III, 574. (Compare St. MS 10 and 19, "Auff die Melodey, Worumb sollt ich Nicht fröhlich sein.")

⁸⁶ Wol dem, der weit von hohen Dingen
Den Fusz stellt auf der Einfalt Bahn;
Wer seinen Muth zu hoch wil schwingen,
Der stöszt gar leichtlich oben an.
Ein jeder lobe seinen Sinn,
Ich liebe meine Schäferin.

—Martin Opitz.

Goedeke u. Tittmann, Leipzig, 1869, I, 27. (Compare St. MS 18.)

"Einsmahls da ich lust bekam, anzusprechen eine Dam,"⁸⁷
 "Amor hat mich zum süßen Possen,"⁸⁸ "Daphnis gieng vor
 wenig Tagen,"⁸⁹ "Mitt viel schmertzen muss ich dich vor-
 lassen," "Daphnis om en Sommer Natt," "Falscher Schaffer
 ist es recht,"⁹⁰ etc. These songs, her deep affection for her
 children, and her keen sense of humor, so often shown in the
 apt use of proverbial expressions, prevent us from considering
 her either an unbalanced religious visionary or an unsexed in-
 tellectual reformer.⁹¹

From iconographical materials we can likewise divine some-
 thing of her character. The youthful portrait in Heimreich's

⁸⁷ Einsmahls da ich lust bekam,
 anzusprechen eine Dam
 vnd sie freundlich fragte
 ob ich jhr auch wol gefiel,
 warlich nicht besonders viel,
 sie gar spöttlich sagte.
 —1647. Author unknown.

Venus Gärtlein 1656, herausgegeben von Waldberg.

Halle, 1890, p. 109. (Compare St. MS 25.)

⁸⁸ Armor hat mich zum süßen Possen,
 Mein Hertz in jhr Castel verschlossen,
 befehlt mir solches zu manteniren,
 sol ich darüber mein Leben quitiren.

—Author probably G. Finkelthaus.

Venus Gärtlein, Halle, 1890, p. 209. (Compare St. MS 42.)

⁸⁹ Daphnis gieng vor wenig Tagen
 Ueber die gegründte Heid;
 Heimlich fieng er an zu klagen
 Bei sich selbst sein schweres Leid.
 Sang aus hochbetrübtem Herzen
 Von den bittern Liebesschmerzen :
 "Ach! dasz ich dich nicht mehr seh';
 Allerschönste Galathe!"

—Joh. Rist.

(Aus "Des Daphnis aus Cimbrien Galathe," 1644. Nr. 1.)

Franz Magnus Böhme, Volksthümliche Lieder der Deutschen, Leipzig,
 1895, 359. (Compare St. MS 43.)

⁹⁰ The three last songs I have not been able to find. Compare St. MS
 12, 28, 32.

⁹¹ For this account of her life I have drawn very largely upon her
 poems, and felt justified in doing so, because her work is not that of a
 fertile imagination. She could not assume at will any rôle she chose,
 and wrote therefore simply out of her own experience. Her verses
 contain on that account much valuable biographical material.

Supplementa, in "Westphalen Monumenta Inedita"⁹² represents her as a young patrician lady with clear, finely chiseled, resolute features, revealing intellectual power as well as energy of character. In startling contrast to this image of confident youthful strength is the engraving in the Stockholm manuscript (made in her seventy-first year). Placing these pictures side by side, one can see how harshly life had treated her, for the older face is full of bitterness and severity. It is, however, impossible to mistake the high forehead, aristocratic nose and vigorous chin. From one portrait the other is easily recognizable. There is one other picture said to be a portrait of her, an oil painting which hangs in the little church in Oldensworth, of which I was able to obtain a photograph, thanks to the courtesy of Pastor Wulf. But the features do not in the least resemble those of our author,⁹³ nor is the coat of arms the same as that of the Hoyersworth family. The picture is interesting only as showing that she is still remembered by the people of the neighborhood, who know that the stately manor-house of Hoyersworth once belonged to her. The shy, sensitive face which looks down upon us from the wall of the Oldensworth church has nothing at all of the almost masculine strength displayed in the portraits of Anna Owens.

⁹² Heimreich IV, Tab. 28.

⁹³ It has probably been ascribed to her because of her husband's prominent position and the active part which he took in church matters, as well as because he and his family had a pew in the Oldensworth church. It is not known whether he left any legacy to the church or not.



IN THE CHURCH IN OLDENSWORTH.

III. RELIGIOUS POINT OF VIEW.

More important than the account of Anna Owens' external career is the consideration of her inner life, its problems and development. She has been most often described and classified as a sectary and a mystic. In a ducal mandate, dated March 18, 1651, her poems were denounced as heretical and disgraceful and their confiscation was enjoined.¹ Adelung compared her with Antoinette Bourignon,² Madame Guyon³ and Johanna Eleonora Petersen.⁴ Lemcke said her mysticism went to the extent of being preposterous. Feustking maintained that she surpassed Teting in her zealous propagation of Weigelian doctrines, and that the sources of her heterodoxy were the writings of Schwenckfeld, Paracelsus, the Rosicrucians, Weigel and David Joris, which she had studied under Teting's guidance.⁵

No criticism, however, could be more untrue or more superficial. She was, in fact, supremely practical in her religious ideas and wasted no time in theoretical and philosophical speculations. Her writings show no morbid disregard of the duties of this work-a-day world, no attempted flight into worlds

¹ M. D. Voss, p. 11.

² Netherland Mystic (1616-1680).

³ French Mystic (1648-1717).

⁴ Wife of Joh. Wilhelm Petersen, bishop of Lüneburg. In 1692 he and his wife were obliged to flee to Magdeburg because of the Chiliastic opinions which they entertained.

⁵ Colberg, p. 245: "Sie ist recht vom Schwenckfeldischen, Rosencreutzerischen (die in ihren altfränkischen Versen trefflich herausgestrichen werden) und Weigelianischen Geist besessen gewesen."

Arnold says: "Sie heisst eine schwärmerin weil sie die Rosencreutzer, den David Georg, Schwenckfelden, die Chiliasten und Weigelianer gelobt."

In Koch's "Geschichte des Kirchenlieds" she is discussed in the chapter devoted to "Sektirer und Schwärmgeister. Anhänger Schwenckfeldts und Weigels."

Erich Schmidt, Charakteristiken I, p. 88: "Sie begründete ein förmliches wiedertäuferisches 'Gemeinschäfte'."

beyond. Nor did she concern herself with the fine distinctions of dogma which claimed so much of the attention of the sectaries at that time. She did not try to explain the Incarnation, or the meaning of the Lord's Supper, or the significance of baptism.

Her independent attitude⁶ is evident when we compare her with the various men whose style and thought influenced her. In the Stockholm manuscript she has usually noted the names of those who served her as models, and many are as loyal in their Lutheranism as one could desire: Christoph Knoll, deacon in Sprottau;⁷ Sebaldus Heyden, rector of the School of St. Sebald in Nuremberg;⁸ Martin Luther himself, whose "Wer Gott nicht mit uns dise zeyt" served as model for the fourteenth hymn; Nicolas Herman, the pious precentor of Joachimsthal;⁹ and Lobwasser, whose psalms enjoyed at first such popularity in the Lutheran Church, although they were later discredited as containing Calvinistic heresies.¹⁰ The hymns of some of the most zealous Lutherans made such an impression upon her that she copied them in their entirety into

⁶ She classed Lutherans, Calvinists and Catholics all together in her disapproval of sectarianism. (St. MS Fol. 31; Poem. p. 30.)

⁷ Christoph Knoll was deacon in Sprottau from 1563 to 1621. He was also very much interested in astrological investigations. During the time of the pest he composed his famous hymn "Herzlich thut mich verlangen nach einem selgen End." (See St. MS 3.) It acquired a widespread popularity almost immediately.

⁸ Sebaldus Heyden (1498-1561) was a distinguished pedagogue, church reformer and composer. His hymn "O Mensch bewein dein Sünde gross" (see St. MS 7) was written in 1525 and describes the sufferings of Christ. In spite of its great length, it was soon adopted by all the churches and was sung even among the Catholics.

⁹ Nic. H. Herman (died, 1561). His poems reveal a simple and fervent piety and an ingenuousness equal to that of Hans Sachs. He says himself they were written only for children and for the family circle. The best-known are "Lobt Gott, ihr Christen, alle gleich" and "Wenn mein Stündlein vorhanden ist." (See St. MS 14.)

¹⁰ Lobwasser (1515-1585) was for seventeen years professor of law in Königsberg. His Psalter appeared in 1573, as an antidote for Paul Melissus' Psalmody (of the Reformed Church), and is simply a translation of the French Psalter of Marot and Beza, with the same stanza forms and melodies. Lobwasser himself was and remained a staunch Lutheran, but his psalms were sung especially in the Reformed Church.

her manuscript: Bartholmeus Ringwald's "Merck auff du frommer Jüngling zart" (St. MS 54); Josua Stegmann's "Frisch auff mein Seell in Noth" (St. MS 58); Johann Rist's "Werde Munter mein gemüte" (St. MS 59); Johann Heermann's "Wo soll ich fliehen hin, weil ich beschweret bin" (St. MS 60).

What brought her into opposition with the Lutheran ministry was not a great conflict of soul over questions of creed to which she could not give assent. She never found it necessary to present a confession of faith, as Schwenckfeld, Joris and Teting had done. With her the motive power was simply an unfeigned piety of heart and a genuine sincerity and truthfulness of character which could tolerate no hypocrisy. She was rationalistic in the sense that her moral ideals were the controlling influence in her religion. The whole attitude and manner of living of many of the clergy of her land were utterly distasteful to her. Some of them filled their days with feasting, reveling and debauchery, and were much more zealous in stirring up dissension than in inspiring the members of their parish to purity of thought and Christian activity. Their sermons were too often either uninteresting rehearsals of historical parts of the Bible or invectives against the "heretics" who had become tired of the dead doctrinal religion to be found in the church and were seeking some faith with more life and vigor in it. The conditions were not very different from those in England in 1739, when, under John Wesley's leadership, the Methodist Church came into being.¹¹

That Anna Owens had had some personal experience with these "Christian" clergy is very apparent in her bitterest satire, "De Denische Dörp-Pape." It gives a very clear picture of a time when pastors and peasants danced and caroused together,

¹¹ The brothers John and Charles Wesley had established a society in Oxford as early as 1729. Their object was prayer, study of the Bible, preaching the gospel to the ignorant, and visiting the sick and prisoners. The members of the society were contemptuously called Methodists, because they were supposed to perform their acts of piety according to rule.

and when the clergy thought only of filling their purses at the expense of their parishioners, and at heart despised the simple and superstitious people whom they could so easily terrify and control. It explains perhaps better than any other of her writings her anti-orthodox attitude. The worldly, unjust, licentious conduct of men who were supposed to care for the welfare of the souls of their fellow-men could only arouse her wrath and opposition. Not for philosophical, but for practical reasons, she took the side of the "Schwarmer"—who at least strove to lead a clean and decent life—against the established church.

Our author avows openly that she is not attacking the church as an institution (she had really far too much respect for authority to think of doing such a thing), but only the evils existing therein. She does not include the really devout ministers in her severe criticisms :

Die frommen sind hir nicht gemeynt,
Ich halt sie all' fur liebe freund,
Die sich im guten üben.

—Poem. p. 47.

Why, then, is she always classed among the fantastic spirits of her age? The question is not difficult to answer. In her quest after godliness she came upon the writings of Caspar Schwenckfeld, David Joris, and Valentin Weigel, all notorious for their heterodoxy. There she found, among many extreme and curious theories, much that was alive with a real devotional spirit. Her poems are permeated with the phraseology of these men; and since her teachers were outlawed by the church, she could hardly expect a better fate herself.

Schwenckfeld presented in his teachings four points at variance with the tenets of the Lutheran Church: (1) Justification was to him not merely a gift of divine grace passively received, but denoted an inner transformation and purification of the soul. This was a theory diametrically opposed to Luther's, who preached zealously the imputed righteousness of Christ through faith, without the necessity of good works or the coöperation

of the individual will. (2) The Sacrament of the Lord's Supper should be celebrated daily between the soul and its Maker; for the outward breaking of the bread and drinking of the wine are simply a reminder of the coming of the Lord, while the inner and vital meaning of the Sacrament is the feeding of the hungry soul with spiritual manna, and this is not dependent upon any outer sign. Luther, on the other hand, clung to the word of Holy Writ, "This *is* my body," and insisted upon the actual presence of Christ in the elements of which he partook. Schwenckfeld interpreted the words to mean, "My body is bread (the bread of life)." (3) The human part of Christ's body was received from the Holy Spirit as well as the spiritual part. He was not a creature as we are creatures, but was the Son of the Most High, and His body could not die. He rules in Heaven as a perfect man, with body and soul, flesh and blood. The orthodox church answered with the texts, "And the Word was made flesh and dwelt among us"¹² and "For verily he took not on him the nature of angels, but he took on him the seed of Abraham. Wherefore in all things it behooved him to be made like unto his bretheren."¹³ (4) The inner word of God is much more important than the outer, and can be heard and understood quite independently of any outer medium. This was the most heretical doctrine of all, for it endangered one of the central pillars of the evangelical faith, the indispensability and importance of the Scriptures. In 1553 Flacius¹⁴ attacked Schwenckfeld on this score in his pamphlet, "Von der heiligen Schrift und ihrer Wirkung," and

¹² Joh. 1, 14.

¹³ Heb. 2, 16, 17.

¹⁴ Matthias Flacius Illyricus (1520-1575) was, after Luther's death, the active representative of the stricter church party. He opposed Melanchthon's teaching, that good works are necessary to salvation and that the free will has its part in the conversion of the individual, with the doctrine that mankind is fundamentally and naturally evil and can only oppose all acts of divine grace. He has been called the father of Protestant church history because of his "Magdeburger Centurien," as well as of all modern Biblical exegesis because of his "Clavis scripturae."

later in other argumentative writings, showing that the Holy Spirit had exalted the human word to be the instrument of its divine activity. Schwenckfeld wrote, in reply, "Das Buch vom Wort Gottes" (about 1555), in which he explained at great length that the outward word could effect only the physical ear, and went no further unless the Spirit of the Lord spoke directly to the soul.

He was much persecuted by the orthodox clergy. In 1529 he was obliged to leave his Silesian home.¹⁵ In 1540 his teachings were officially condemned in the convocation of Schmalkald and his books were confiscated. Luther wrote contemptuously of him as Stenckfeld. From 1540 on, he found only temporary resting-places in Ulm, Tübingen, Augsburg, etc., and after twenty-one years of wandering he died in Ulm (1561).¹⁶

After his death his friends formed themselves into a sect, living chiefly in Silesia and enduring imprisonment and cruel treatment. Finally, in 1726, Count von Zinzendorf gave them a place of refuge, and in 1734 forty families departed for America. There is still a large colony of these sectaries in Pennsylvania, and they are at present engaged in the laudable work of publishing a complete edition of Schwenckfeld's writings.¹⁷

His teaching of the inner voice inspired Anna Owens to write the poem "Judicium über des in Gott seiligen Herrn

¹⁵ He was born in 1490, in Ossing, not far from Lübben, in the principality of Liegnitz.

¹⁶ Arnold, Part II, chap. XX; Hagenbach's Kirchengeschichte III, 632; A. Köpke, Historische Nachricht von dem vor 200 Jahren berühmten und verrufenen Schlesischen Edelmann, Herr Caspar Schwenckfeld von Ossing, 1744; Caspar Schwenckfeld, Verantwortung vnnd Defension für Casparn Schwenckfeld, 1542; Caspar Schwenckfeld, Bericht von Caspar Schwenckfelds leere, 1547; Karl Adolf Menzel, Neuere Geschichte der Deutschen seit der Reformation, Breslau, 1854, I, 233.

¹⁷ Corpus Schwenckfeldianorum, published under the auspices of the Schwenckfelder Church, Pa., and the Hartford Theological Seminary, Conn. Vol. I, A Study of the Earliest Letters of Caspar Schwenckfeld von Ossing, Leipzig, 1907; Vol. II, Letters and Treatises, June 11, 1524, to 1527, Leipzig, 1911; Vol. III, Letters and Treatises, 1528 to December, 1530, Leipzig, 1913, not yet complete.

Caspari Schwenckfeld's Buch vom Wort Gottes," which is quoted at length in Köpke's "Historische Nachricht von Caspar Schwenckfeld von Ossing, 1774":²⁸

Caspar Schwenckfeld von Ossing ist
Der Warheit zeug, ein Frommer Christ;
Hat Gottes Wort bey seiner zeit
Durch red und schreiben auszgebrett.

—Poem. p. 163.

This poem is particularly characteristic of her religious point of view, especially when one considers what she avoided in discussing Schwenckfeld's book. His censure of Flacius Illyricus, quotations from the Church Fathers, exegesis of various Bible verses, and his long discourse concerning justification she omitted entirely. Through her interest in mystical writings generally, her attention had been called to the inner voice, the inner light; but the theological, controversial aspect of the matter did not appeal to her.

The vital point in Schwenckfeld's doctrine, however, the necessity of good works as the result and outward sign of the "inward and spiritual grace," she adopted with enthusiasm. In his "Ermahnung des Miszbrauchs etzlicher furnembsten Artikell des Evangelii"²⁹ he had shown how Luther's doctrine of justification by faith could be misused, how by denying free will it could lull the soul into dangerous passivity and security, how by emphasizing the worthlessness and inadequacy of human achievements it could lead to a neglect of all active virtues. With this teaching Anna Owens could agree most heartily. Indeed, she went further than Schwenckfeld in her negation of justification by faith, even satirizing it in "Einfältige Warheit":

Dadurch ist, was Adam verrichtt,
Nun gantz vergeben und geschlichtt,

²⁸ p. 172.
²⁹ Breslau, 1524.

Unser sünd sind vergraben
 In seinem grab. Nun werden wir
 (Sprechen sie) Ewig fried hinfür
 Darumb mit Gott auch haben.

—Poem. p. 56.

Schwenckfeld insisted upon faith *and* works. Anna Owens laid the emphasis upon the works. To her the important thing was purity and consistency of life, not belief in this or that theological doctrine. Herein she is essentially Schwenckfeldian, although she never declared herself a follower of his. To be sure, in some of her hymns occur passages which, on the contrary, sound very Lutheran;²⁰ but in her other writings she has emphasized again and again this central teaching of Schwenckfeld's doctrine, that the outward conduct of the Christian is a very important measure of his inward piety and that good works are the necessary expression of a truly devout heart:

Herr Gott lehre mich deinen Weg,
 Und leite mich in deiner Warheit steg,
 Das ich nach deinem Willen
 Dein gebott mög erfüllen.
 (Die Pfaffen sagen Es ist unmüchlich.)

—St. MS 2—10.

She also knew and loved Daniel Sudermann, the most important of the Schwenckfeld hymn-writers; and his hymn "Ach was ist doch dasz ich befind" appears twice in the Stockholm manuscript (nos. 29 and 63).

Although one cannot say that she belonged to the sect of the Schwenckfelders, for she concerned herself not at all with what their leader taught on the Sacrament and only superficially with what he taught on the Incarnation,²¹ nevertheless his influence is the most important one in her life, and is the more noticeable because she had not the immediate or personal con-

²⁰ St. MS 3—11, 49—9, 30—11.

²¹ Poem. pp. 13, 59.

nection with the Schwenckfelders that she had with the Jorites and Valentin Weigel. The "Judicium" was written in 1642, long after Anna Owens had gone to Sweden and in the same year in which the Anabaptist lawsuit, which was also of great interest to her, was being carried on in Tönning.²² It is very significant that she turns at this point from all the troubles of her sectarian friends to Schwenckfeld and his "Buch vom Wort Gottes."²³

Her interest in the Anabaptists and David Joris²⁴ was aroused during the time of the Eiderstedt lawsuits in which her husband was involved. David Joris had joined the Anabaptist sect, but he had also developed an independent system of his own. It is reported of him that he claimed to be nothing less than the second Messiah, that he excused his disciples from all obedience to law and that he did not set a very high value upon the holy state of matrimony. He really did teach an unusual conception of the Trinity, as representing three stages in the revelation of God to the world, these stages being expressed in Moses, Christ, and "Christ David," who was yet to come.

He was born in Delft, in 1501, and became a skilful glass-painter in Antwerp and in his native town. In 1533 he joined the Anabaptists, although disapproving highly of their extravagant violence. He wandered from city to city, fleeing from his persecutors and doing his best to persuade his co-sectaries to greater moderation and harmony among themselves. In 1544 he settled in Basel under the name of Johann von Brügge, joined the Reformed Church, and won the respect and affection of his neighbors. His writings were anonymously printed in Holland, so that he remained undiscovered. He died on the 26th of August, in 1556, and was buried as a highly respected citizen; but almost immediately one of his servants betrayed

²² Compare "Schreiben an die Gemein im Land Holstein," Poem. p. 231.

²³ Erich Schmidt (*Charakteristiken*, p. 87) has called her "Die Schwenckfeldianerin," but she never broke off her connection with the Lutheran Church or openly joined the Schwenckfelders.

²⁴ Poem. p. 259.

him, and his family was obliged to endure endless cross-examinations as well as imprisonment. In 1559 his body was disinterred, and with his portrait and all his heretical papers was burned under the gallows.²⁵

The most important teaching of the Anabaptists—as the name implies—concerned baptism. They did not acknowledge the baptism of young children as practised by the church, and rebaptized all those who wished to join their society, basing their action upon Christ's command to his disciples—first to teach and then to baptize.²⁶ The Anabaptists did not attend the public church service, because, they said, God is everywhere and can be worshipped in the forest and on the mountains as well as in the chapel or cathedral. All political authority seemed to them a heathen institution, and consequently they refused to take any oath of allegiance. One of their favorite theories was the community of all property, and they cherished the hope of seeing the kingdom of Christ established upon earth.²⁷

From them and David Joris, Anna Owens adopted the doctrine of the freedom which God's children enjoy,²⁸ and the hope of a Golden Age soon to appear. This latter teaching made such a strong impression upon her that she wrote seven hymns celebrating the second advent of Christ and the establishment of His kingdom upon the earth.²⁹ Nicolaus Teting had already prophesied, in 1624, that the millennium would begin in the next year; and it was said of David Joris that he himself, as the second Messiah, expected to usher in the new epoch. The Chiliasts, too, believed that the Golden Age would soon appear, and specified the length of its duration as a thousand years. Anna Owens says nothing of the thousand years, but the hope

²⁵ Hansen^(1, 2); Hagenbach's Kirchengeschichte IV, 470; Ubbo Emmen, Ein grundtlick Bericht Van der Lehre vnd dem Geist des Ertzkettters David Joris, 1597; Adelung III, 336; Arnold, Part II, chap. XXI; David Joris, Wonderboeck; David Joris, Tractaten.

²⁶ Matt. XXVIII, 19.

²⁷ Hagenbach's Kirchengeschichte III, 350; Arnold, Part II, chap. XXI; Hansen⁽¹⁾, p. 175.

²⁸ St. MS 7—4, 14—9.

²⁹ St. MS 10, 15, 25, 36, 38, 39, 40.

that Christ would soon come to punish his enemies and comfort his loyal followers was very dear to her heart:

O Du geliebte Christenheit
Auszerwehlt von dem Herren,
Gesessen bistu lange zeit
In schimpff, spott und unehren,
Steh' auff, drew dich und tritt herfür,
Dein König kömpt und will bey dir
Mit seiner hülff einkehren.

—St. MS 10—1.

Valentin Weigel had also a certain amount of influence upon her. She became acquainted with him through her friend Teting, whose first difference of opinion with the clergy was concerning Weigel's teachings. The orthodox church saw in Weigel not only the leader of a great spiritual revolution, but the head of a political party as well. He appeared as a second Münzer³⁹ when he spoke of the rights and duties of Christian magistrates. During his life he was not suspected of having any dangerous ideas. From 1567 until his death in 1588 he was pastor in Zschopau, honored and beloved because of his brilliant oratory and his gentle seriousness. But in 1616 his books were burned in the University of Altdorf, and many students who confessed that they were followers of his were imprisoned.

His exaltation of the believing soul above all laws and forms brought him to the conclusion that even the ceremonies of the Catholic Church had nothing absolutely objectionable in them. The only criterion by which a Christian could be recognized was the purity of his life. He spoke much, too, of a quiet

³⁹ Thomas Münzer (1499-1525) was an evangelical minister in Zwickau in 1520; and although he was soon dismissed on account of his Anabaptist beliefs, he received another appointment, in 1523, to the church in Allstedt. Here he commanded a radical reform, not only in the church but in political affairs as well, and was again deprived of his office. In 1524 he went to Mühlhausen, where he instigated a great revolt among the peasants. Philipp von Hessen silenced the uproar with speed and severity. Münzer beat a hasty retreat toward Frankenhausen, but was captured and with twenty-five others was beheaded in Mühlhausen.

passive waiting upon God, of a complete effacement of self, and of the teaching of the Holy Spirit.³¹

His influence upon Anna Owens is most apparent in the emphasis which she lays upon the necessity of an absolute renunciation of self-will, if the soul is to enter into communion with God and be taught by Him:

Ich geb mich gantz in deinen Zwang,
Und will dein seyn mein lebenlang.

—St. MS 23—I.

Fast ewer Seel gedultig in der still,
Denn disz allein ist sein befehl und will.

—St. MS 40—II.

It has been said that the Rosicrucians left their mark upon her writings too,³² but how or when she became interested in them is not known. The name Rosenkreuzer was first used by Valentin Andreä (1586-1654) in his satires against the lifeless dogmatism of the church, as well as against the secretiveness of the alchemists.³³ The clergy, however, mistook his purpose entirely and declaimed against the society of the Rosicrucians as if it really existed.³⁴ Andreä recommended a general revolution in all classes of society, and lamented espe-

³¹ Julius Otto Opel, Valentin Weigel, Leipzig, 1864; Arnold, Part II, chap. XVII; Hagenbach's Kirchengeschichte IV, 365; Weigel, Der Guldene Griff, Das ist, Alle Ding Ohne Irrthum zu erkennen, Newenstatt, 1617; Weigel, Dialogus de Christianismo, Newenstatt, 1618; Weigel, Von der Gelassenheit, Newenstatt, 1617; Weigel, Gnothi Seauton, Newenstatt, 1618.

³² Compare Colberg, Feustking and Arnold.

³³ Confession der Societät der Rosenkreutzer, 1613; Fama Fraternitas, 1614; Chymische Hochzeit Christian Rosenkreutz, 1616.

³⁴ Jensen, Schleswig-Holsteinische Kirchengeschichte II, chap. II: "Die Rosenkreuzer fürchtete man wie ein Gespenst. Man konnte sie nirgends fassen. Zuerst 1611 erschien über diesen Bund eine Druckschrift, die von einem deutschen Mönche, Christian Rosenkreuz erzählte, der schon im vierzehnten Jahrhundert gelebt hätte. Er war im Morgenland gewesen, lernte dort die Magie, die Kunst verstand Gold zu machen und das menschliche Leben zu verlängern, wäre in die Geheimnisse der Cabbala eingedrungen und hätte diese in die gestiftete Bruderschaft niedergelegt. Der fromme Johann Arndt blieb von dem Verdachte nicht frei, dass er nicht dazu gehöre."

cially the scandalous life of the clergy. He complained, too, of their erudition, and taught that all wisdom must be obtained through prayer alone.

Anna Owens' relation to the Rosicrucians may be traced in two references to them:

Kompt einer her und sagt vom Geist,
Der wird sehr übel abgeweist,
Und alsz ein Ketzer hart verklaget,
Incarcerirt oder verjaget,
Genant Schwenckfelder und Phantast,
Rosencreutzer, Enthusiast,
Chiliast, Weigelianist,
Davidianer, Neutralist.

—Poem. p. 165.

Unter den Dornen *Rosen* stehn,
Also auch unterm *Creutz* hergehn,
Die Christen, Christi Brüder.

—Poem. p. 219.

Our author appears to have been influenced by others who were decried as "enthusiasts." Paul Nagel's hymn "Wach auff mein Seel wasz schleffestu" appears in the Stockholm manuscript (no. 62); and of him it is related that he was a Chiliast and an astrologer, and that his corpse was refused a resting-place in the churchyard.³⁵ Petrus Herbert, one of the leaders of the Moravian Brothers,³⁶ is also represented with

³⁵ Compare p. 10, note 13.

³⁶ The society of the Moravian Brothers arose about 1453, and was especially well-known at first in Prague. Their principal doctrines were: The law of God is the supreme law of all, above that of church and state; a Christian may not take part in any war or shed blood even in self-defense, but must love his enemies under all conditions; the efficacy of the sacraments depends to some extent at least upon the moral character of the priest administering them; marriage is only a concession to the weakness of the flesh, and should be avoided when possible; every believer can fill the office of a priest, and needs no theological training, which, after all, only tends towards a misuse of the Scriptures; in the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper the body of Christ is present in the sense that, as the Christian partakes of the visible elements, he also partakes of the real body of the Lord through faith. (Cf. Albert Hauck, *Realencyklopädie für protestantische Theologie und Kirche*.)

his hymn "Wer in guter Hoffnung will von hinten abscheiden" (no. 66). And of Nicolaus Teting's influence we have already given an account.

Anna Owens showed, however, a most characteristic selective ability in her use of her various teachers. She ignored all theological arguments and disputes, and employed only those doctrines which she could understand and which she considered essential.

For information concerning what she herself believed, I have made use of her hymns, as being more intimate and subjective in style than the satires or the didactic writings. She emphasizes especially the possibility of satisfying the divine law in this life—an entirely anti-Lutheran idea:

Herr Gott lehre mich deinen Weg,
Und leite mich in deiner Warheit steg,
Das ich nach deinem Willen,
Dein gebott mög erföllen.

(Die Pfaffen sagen Es ist unmüchlich.)

—St. MS 2—10.

Christian activity is so important that the greatest blessing is promised as a reward for it:

Der den Armen guts beweist,
Wirt werden belohnet,
Die Barmhertzigkeit gepreist,
Und mit straff verschonet.

—St. MS 31—6.

The Christian is no longer a sinner,³⁷ for his *will* is to do good and Christ has expiated his trespasses upon the cross. The justice of God is therefore his consolation:

Gerechtigkeit ist nun mein schutz,
und mir nutz wieder Satans-trutz.

—St. MS 30—11.

³⁷ Compare Schwenckfeld, Aufflösung einer Christlichen notwendigen frag, ob ein Christ auch ein Sünder sey, 1560.

The impossibility of performing good works without the aid of the Holy Spirit is also dwelt upon, and the prayers for help and succor are frequent and insistent:

Kan aber in den Dingen
nichts, weder grosz noch klein,
es mangelt am Vollbringen,
Dein gnad thut es allein.

—St. MS 3—11.

Mankind is after all entirely dependent upon God for all good and perfect gifts, whether material or spiritual;³⁸ and a deep sense of gratitude to the wise and gracious Heavenly Father who so tenderly cares for His children, even when He leads them into danger and distress,³⁹ is everywhere expressed. The fourth hymn especially is a paean of praise for the mercy and goodness of God, in that He has created the soul in His own image, given it a fine body, and devout parents, has rescued it from the power of Satan and endowed it with receptivity and understanding for the true wisdom. Thankfulness can be shown not by sacrifice, but by humility of heart and a willingness to serve.

All human wisdom and learning are of no avail without the heavenly instruction, which the Lord is ever ready to impart by means of His Spirit:

Verstandt zu seinen Ehren,
Vermehrt er Täglich mir,
Sein Weisheit mich zu lehren,
Ich augenscheinlich spühr,
Sein Wort macht er mir kundt.

—St. MS 4—6.

He has also given us Holy Writ for our instruction and admonition, but it must be accepted by a pure and sincere mind, unin-

³⁸ St. MS 2—9, 4—12, 11—7, 22—4.

³⁹ St. MS 14.

fluenced by the sacerdotal arrogance of those teachers who only lead their followers astray:

Thut selbst die schrifft erwegen,
Die Weisheit ist umb sonst zu Kauff,
bittet nur Gott umb segen.

—St. MS 19—6.

Worldly pleasures, which are after all transitory and deceptive, are to be given up;⁴⁰ and the soul must be freed even from itself, that it may live unto God:

Von mir selbst wer ich gern erlöst,
Der eigen Will thutt mir das böst
· · · · ·

Könt ich von mir selbst nur auszgehn.

—St. MS 23—2.

This renunciation of all worldly ambition and the complete effacement of self are the most pronouncedly pietistic tendencies in Anna Owens' writings, but the intensely practical way in which she understands and utilizes them is very typical of her. They do not signify to her an excuse for neglecting the duties which naturally devolve upon her, nor a justification of indecision and weakness. Her self-effacement never means a lack of vigorous and well-developed individuality, although it involves putting aside everything which could hinder an intimate relationship between herself and God.

She prays that He may reveal Himself directly to her, and take up His abode within her, that she may be one with Him:

Wollst dich mir offenbaren,
Eröffne meinesz Herzensthür,
Dasz ich dein gegenwart in Mir,
mög in der that erfahren.

—St. MS 7—1.

She waits for the early advent of the Almighty and for His judgment upon those who have despised the pure in heart,⁴¹

⁴⁰ St. MS 2—1, 6—6.

⁴¹ St. MS 6—8, 10—4.

as well as for the speedy establishment of the kingdom of God and of His Christ upon earth:

Alszdann wird die lieb auszgebreitt,
Die Warheit herfür blitzen:
Frombhertzig' und friedfertig' Leut,
Werden das Land besitzen.

—St. MS 10—5.

The eighteenth hymn gives warning of the near approach of the Last Judgment, and admonishes all to turn away from their sins and to seek mercy while it is yet to be obtained. All war shall cease, for the spilling of human blood is horrible to God, and the peace-makers shall inherit the earth. The whole world shall prepare itself for the coming of the Lord of Lords:

Folget rath, gehorchet mir,
Bessert ewer leben,
Dasz Gericht ist fur der thür,
Rechnung Müst ihr geben.

—St. MS 31—8.

These are the principal elements in the poetic expression of Anna Owens' religious thought, and all of them may be paralleled in Joris or Weigel, Schwenckfeld or Teting. As we have seen, Schwenckfeld laid especial stress upon the necessity and importance of a holy life; and in David Joris' "Wonderboek" we often find the same idea. Christ has died that we should live alone in Him in unity and peace. The evil must die in us if He is to give us His Spirit and life. The darkness must depart before the light can shine.⁴² Man is created for the express purpose of becoming a complete and perfect being.⁴³ Ubbo Emmen reports as one of the teachings of the arch-heretic David Joris, that man can attain perfection even in this life

⁴² Wonderboek, chap. 78; Poem. p. 49.

⁴³ Wonderboek, chap. 123.

and fulfil the whole will of God here upon earth.⁴⁴ Weigel, too, judges of a man's Christianity by his life.⁴⁵ Every believer has by his confession of faith put on Jesus Christ and thereby promised to lay aside worldly desires, the lust of the eyes and the pride of life. He who cannot put these aside has not real faith. True Christians are to be recognized by their complete surrender to God and by their love of mankind.⁴⁶ All things are easy and possible for the believer. Indeed, it would be impossible for a Christian not to keep the commands of Christ, for love is the fulfilment of the law.⁴⁷

The entire and direct dependence of the soul upon its Maker is also a favorite theme with Joris,⁴⁸ Schwenckfeld⁴⁹ and Weigel.⁵⁰ Flesh and blood can accomplish nothing. The letter of the law is useless. All wisdom and all knowledge of God lie hidden in Jesus Christ, in Whom is all depth and height, all the riches of understanding. These He bestows upon the weak and simple, upon the poor in spirit. Human wisdom and learning are of no avail, for here we have a higher science, a truer wisdom, a holier, better language. All erudition outside of God is great ignorance, but if the soul is anointed of the Holy Spirit, it is wiser than its earthly teachers.

The renouncing of self is particularly emphasized. Weigel has written a long tract on this very subject.⁵¹ One must disclaim all one's own thoughts, desires and works, all inclination

⁴⁴ Ubbo Emmen, *Ein grundtlick Bericht Van der Lehre vnd dem Geist des Ertzketters Dauid Joris*, 1597, p. 115.

⁴⁵ J. O. Opel, *Valentin Weigel*, p. 49. Compare also Caspar Schwenckfeld, *Underweisung vnnd verstand des eusserlichen vnd innerlichen worts Gottes*, p. 9: "Nu wer khan daran zweiflen / gottes werck seind gütte werck / vnd gütte werck seind gottes werck / vnd darumb wer glaubt in Christum / der thüt gottes werck / das ist der thüt gütte werck / Vnd also kan der rechte glaube vñ gütte werck nit von einander gescheiden werden."

⁴⁶ Weigel, *Dialogus de Christianismo*, 1618, pp. 48, 49.

⁴⁷ *Dialogus de Christianismo*, p. 76.

⁴⁸ *Wonderboek*, chap. 4; *Tractaten I, 22; XIII, 1.*

⁴⁹ *Underweisung vnnd verstand des eusserlichen vnd innerlichen worts Gottes*, p. 2; *Von der hailigen Schrifft*, Fol. VIII.

⁵⁰ Arnold, Part II, chap. XVII.

⁵¹ *Von der Gelassenheit*.

to that which is evil, culpable and shameful.⁵² Even worldly prudence must be neglected, and the Christian must become a fool before the world that he may be wise before God; must be formless, naked, empty, that he may be filled with the Infinite.⁵³ A soul which will really surrender itself to God, and soar above itself into the boundless will of the Almighty, must give up its own individuality, must lose itself in His will.⁵⁴ The soul should fear itself more than the Devil, for it is its own worst enemy.⁵⁵ In Nicolaus Teting's sermon "Vom Reiche Gottes," we read, too, that we must put away all temporal and transitory things, separate ourselves from all that is earthly, that we may enter into the Holy of Holies. There we must stand in deep and boundless space, in silence and oblivion of self, that the glory of the Lord may appear unto us, full of mercy and truth.⁵⁶

The indwelling of Christ in the soul is the natural result of this self-effacement. The love of Christ, the Spirit and wisdom of God, shall be in us and we in Him.⁵⁷ This Spirit cannot be seen, but its voice is understood by the soul and it is under no authority but its own.⁵⁸ It is in mankind as the image of divine beauty, a living, eternal breath of the power and wisdom of the Almighty God.⁵⁹ Thus the Infinite God takes up His abode in the finite individual,⁶⁰ but only after all striving has ceased. Where man comes to an end of his powers, there God begins.⁶¹

The hope of the millennium is also cherished by Weigel, the Rosicrucians, David Joris and Nicolaus Teting. The time is coming when the blind shall see. Right and justice shall be recognized.⁶² The Lord shall judge the nations and rule over

⁵² Von der Gelassenheit, p. 4.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

⁵⁵ J. O. Opel, Valentin Weigel, p. 156.

⁵⁶ Nicolaus Teting, Vom Reiche Gottes, p. 3.

⁵⁷ Joris, Wonderboek I, chap. 133.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, II, chap. 7.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, II, chap. 8.

⁶⁰ J. O. Opel, Valentin Weigel, p. 51.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. 145.

⁶² Wonderboek I, chap. 6.

all people.⁶³ The day is near at hand when holy peace and the joy of the Spirit shall reign on earth.⁶⁴ All sectarianism and priestcraft will vanish away. The universal catholic church alone will remain. Christ Himself will rule over the earth, and the Father will reveal Himself in His entirety. Love will be the governing power in this epoch of the Holy Spirit.⁶⁵

Anna Owens undoubtedly absorbed many thoughts from her "heretical" teachers, but the use she makes of them acquits her of sectarianism and leaves her guilty only of a certain mystical tendency, well mixed with common sense. Her attitude in religious matters was determined by the practical needs of her own life. All about her she observed lewdness, debauchery, drunkenness and injustice towards the weak (the clergy being often worse than their parishioners), and she could not accept such a form of Christianity. Her religion must be as direct and sincere and practical as possible. She had nothing of that rapturous extravagance of feeling which made the Pietists tremble in reverential wonder before the Almighty and shed tears of awesome joy as they thought to approach Him in prayer; nothing of the sighs and sobs, the nervous abnormality and hysteria of the older mystic nuns (Hildegard von Bingen, Mechtilde von Magdeburg⁶⁶ and others); nothing of the amorous disposition of Heinrich Suso;⁶⁷ nothing of the voluptuous sensuousness of Zinzendorf;⁶⁸ no ecstasy nor excessive feeling of any kind.

Neither had she grasped even remotely the significance of the union of the Infinite with the finite, of the indwelling of God

⁶³ *Ibid.*, I, chap. 13.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, I, chap. 130.

⁶⁵ J. O. Opel, p. 191.

⁶⁶ Compare her book, "Das fliessende Licht der Gottheit."

⁶⁷ E. Lehmann, *Mystik im Heidentum und Christentum*, Leipzig, 1908, p. 111: "Denn Liebesschmerz und Schmerzenslust, davon hat er gesagt und gesungen wie seitdem keine andere Zunge auf deutsch, bis Werther erschien und Heine seine Lieder dichtete."

⁶⁸ Compare Koch V, 343, "Ich habe nur Eine Passion, und die ist Er, nur Er," and the hymn "O süsse Seelenweide in Jesu Passion!"

in mortal man. The lofty, mysterious, solemn grandeur of this mystical teaching passed her by. If one defines mysticism as that form of religion which distinguishes only quantitatively, not qualitatively, between God and man, then Anna Owens is not a mystic. Only vaguely does she even approach such an idea:

Dann darumb ist er Mensch gebohrn,
 Und hat ein Menschen Kindt seyn wollen,
 Auff das wir durch ihn werden sollen
 Kinder Gottes, from, rein und pur,
 Theilhaftig Göttlicher *Natur*.

—Poem. p. 14.

To her the Almighty is the Protector and Avenger, the Teacher, the Giver of all good things, but a being quite apart from the creatures that He has made—another trace of her rationalism. She is and remains a pronounced Deist. We hear nothing of the return of the soul to its source as the waters seek the sea—a figure which occurs again and again in the writings of the mystics. God created the soul in His own image, to be sure, but there is no emphasis laid upon the lordliness and intrinsic majesty of the individual. It would not have been possible for her to say, with Meister Eckhart,⁶⁹ “Wie sîn wir süne gotes? Daz ist, daz wir *ein* wesen hân mit ime.”⁷⁰ Such flights are beyond her. In fact, one never receives the impression that she

⁶⁹ Meister Eckhart (1260-1327) was born in Hochheim, not far from Gotha. He became a Dominican monk in Erfurt, and was soon made provincial (general superintendent of his order) there. From 1300 to 1303 he studied in Paris, and finally came to Strassburg, where his heretical beliefs were gradually discovered. The pope sent a bull against him, and it is said that he recanted all his teachings before his death.

⁷⁰ Meister Eckhart, herausgegeben von Franz Pfeiffer, Leipz., 1857, II, 39. Compare G. Landauer, Meister Eckharts mystische schriften, in unsre sprache übertragen, Berlin, 1903-1904; H. Büttner, Meister Eckharts schriften und predigten aus dem mhd. übersetzt, Leipzig, 1903-1904.

is making an attempt to utter the unutterable, or to penetrate into the mysteries of the Creator and His work.

She does not reject all outward expression of her religion either, as did Meister Eckhart¹¹ and Saint Teresa.¹² On the contrary, in the verses "Rath an alle Alte Witwen" (Poem. p. 152), she advises regular church attendance, Bible study, the singing of hymns, and prayer. Works of charity are, indeed, of paramount importance with her.

The feeling for nature, too, which plays such an important rôle in the metaphorical language of other fantastic spirits, is with her almost entirely unexpressed. The only time when she mentions the world about her at all is when she calls upon the heavens, the air, the sea, the mountains, the forests and everything that lives and breathes to praise and glorify the Lord:

Alles wasz sich beweget, und auff der Erden reget,
Das komm itzundt herfür, und sey frölich mit mir,
Ihr Berg und thal, psallirt mith schall.

—St. MS 6—1.

Personification is entirely lacking:

Die hohen Berg und tieffen Thal,
Die Bäum und Kräuter allzumal,
Alsz wenn sie stimmen hetten,
Sollen frölich antworten all.

—Poem. p. 221—II.

¹¹ Meister Eckhart, 1857, II, 27: "Sô der mensche also stât in eine lütern nihte, ist denne nicht bezzer, er tuo etwas, daz ime daz dunsternüsse unt das ellende vertriebe, also daz der mensche bete oder lese oder predie hoere oder ander werc tuo, daz doch tugende sint, daz man sich dâ mite behelfe? Nein, daz wizzest in der wärheit: aller stille stân und aller lêrest ist da din allerbestez."

¹² Teresa (1515-1582) was at first a Carmelite nun in Avila. Then she established, in 1562, a new rule for nuns of that order. In 1567 she traveled through almost all the provinces of Spain, establishing new cloisters and visiting old ones. Later, she was mercilessly persecuted by the older unreformed Carmelites.

Compare this poverty of feeling for nature with Spee's⁷³ intimate affection for all the phenomena about him, or with the pantheism of Jakob Böhme.⁷⁴

Anna Owens has, however, taken on much of the phraseology of her teachers in her attempt to find some real life outside the cold, insipid, systematized religion of her day. One finds the words: auserwählt, erkoren, neugeboren, Offenbarung, Erleuchtung, das Innere Wort, Gegenwart Gottes, Stille, Ruhe, Gemüts-augen, Herzensthür, Seelengrund, das neue Licht, Salbung des Geistes, etc.; but she uses them rather in imitation of Schwenckfeld, Weigel, Joris and Teting, than because she herself had any personal experience, or feeling for the sublimity of the ideas involved.

She is a strong, sincere, religious nature with high ethical ideals, but quite without the power to conceive or express a great thought. Her Christianity is eminently practical, but does not rise far beyond the moral precepts which she found in the Bible. It consists, she says,⁷⁵ in forbearance, peace, love, unity, tenderness, patience, friendship without envy, and in the crucifixion of the flesh. Further than this she does not go.

⁷³ Friedrich Spee, *Trutz-Nachtigal*, 1879, pp. 1, 16.

⁷⁴ Jakob Böhme, *Aurora*, herausgegeben von K. W. Schiebler, Leipz., 1832, p. 2: "Gott der Schöpfer herrschet in Allem, gleichwie der Saft in dem ganzen Baume"; Böhme, *Die drei Prinzipien göttlichen Wesens*, p. 9: "Da nun Gott diese Welt samt Allem hat erschaffen, hat er keine andere Materie gehabt, daraus er's machte, als sein eigen Wesen aus sich selbst."

⁷⁵ Poem. p. 30.

IV. HYMNS.

In the discussion of Anna Owens' religious point of view, the most important source of information was her hymns. She has written comparatively few of them—only twenty-six¹—in comparison with Daniel Sudermann's twenty-five hundred.

Wackernagel begins his history of the German religious song with Ottfried von Weissenburg. He does not omit "Christus und die Samariterin," "Ezzo," Spervogel's verses, the songs in honor of the Virgin Mary, the poems of the Minnesingers, the tender, fervent hymns of the mystics² or the penitential songs of the flagellants.³ But as an intrinsic part of the church service to be sung by the congregation, the religious hymn is the peculiar product of the Reformation. This Reformation period and the century following it present three distinctly recognizable stages in the development of the church hymn. The first is distinguished by pure religious enthusiasm and immutable faith, by a simple and naïve yet vigorous style of expression. The religious poetry of this period presents its truths, not in a didactic or reflective tone, but in the form of a confession or a testimonial. Not the subjective feeling of the individual but the joyous confidence of the whole company of believers is the characteristic mark of these hymns.⁴

¹ St. MS 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 14, 15, 16, between 17 and 18, 18, 19, 22, 23, 25, 31, 36, 38, 39, 40, 49, 57, Fol. 158. Two are published in Fischer III, 291: no 14 and the one between 17 and 18, "O Gott mein Herr, wie wunderbahr" and "Christe, Gottes einger Sohn du bist," both of which are also in Poem, p. 299 and p. 282.

² Joh. Tauler and Meister Eckhart.

³ An order established first in Italy in the thirteenth century. In 1348 there was a great flagellant movement in Germany, until the church was obliged to put a stop to the public scourging. Their hymns are chiefly of Italian origin.

⁴ Compare the hymns of Luther, Hans Sachs, Lazarus Spengler.

But after the anxiety and oppression of the first decades of the Reformation were over, the eager enthusiasm for the evangelical faith began to grow faint. Discords began within the church,⁵ and the power and fervor of the church hymn necessarily suffered under such conditions. The language was no longer so terse and pithy as at first. The tone often became dogmatic, pedantic and lifeless. To be sure, the form gained much through the efforts of Opitz and his school. The verses were smoother and more regular, the expressions not so downright; but to most of the poets the primitive power was lost.⁶

The third period was that of real subjective feeling. Paul Fleming, Paul Gerhardt, Simon Dach, Johann Rist and Martin Rinckart are worthy representatives of a time characterized by refinement of language and sincere piety of heart. Wackernagel has designated pertinently and briefly the difference between this period and the first. The hymns typical of the first period he calls "Bekenntnislieder," for they sing of the new faith; those of the third, "Erbauungslieder," for they are written for the edification of the saints.

Anna Owens cannot be classified as belonging to any one of these periods. In many of her hymns of praise she belongs to the sixteenth century, among the courageous and joyous singers of the Reformation. Her strong didactic tendency brings her into connection with the writers of the second period. The many reminiscences of the sectaries in her poems show the influence of the Schwenckfelders and the Anabaptists. Of the

⁵ Compare the strife between Melanchthon, Flacius and Wiegand concerning the union of the Lutheran with the Catholic Church; the strife concerning Osiander's teaching of Justification; concerning the Adiaphorites, who wished to adopt the forms of the Catholic Church since *form* was a matter of indifference; concerning the necessity of good works, and the part which the individual had to play in his own conversion; concerning the real presence of Christ in the elements of the Lord's Supper; etc.

⁶ This period lasted from about 1550 until almost 1625. It had some poets, of course, who expressed real feeling in their verses (Barth. Ringwaldt, Nik. Selnecker, Martin Moller, Christoph Knoll), but they were exceptions.

striving after variety and correctness of form, so important among her contemporaries, she knew nothing. In fact, she is not at all a product of her time, and is quite untouched by the soft, smooth, often affected style of her fellow poets.

The didactic note in her hymns is most apparent in the warnings which she gives to all sinful and indifferent hearts. The time of grace is short, the Last Judgment is at hand, and they must turn at once from their sins if they would obtain mercy. This thought she repeats again and again in her attempts "die sündler auffzuwecken":

Bekhret euch uon Eur bosheit,
o ihr vorstockte Hertzen,
Und last euch euwer sund seyn leit,
hab drüber rew und schmertzen.

—St. MS 19—1.

Her subjective hymns, on the other hand, show two distinct tendencies: one, the ardor and devotion of sincere gratitude to the Almighty for His manifold mercies; the other, profound despondency and despair over her own sins and those of the people round about her:

Auff, Auff lobt Gott mit singen,
Wasz lebt und odem hatt,
Die Seiten lasset Klingen,
Rühmet Gotts wunderthat,
Harffen in süßen thon,
Zythrн, lauten und geygen,
Wasz stimb hat sol nicht schweigen,
Lob Gott in Höhsten tronn.

—St. MS 4—1.

Zu wem soll ich nun fliehen hin
Weil ich so hertzlich traurig bin?

—St. MS 7—1.

O Herr bekehr, Regir und Lehr,
 All die noch sein in Sünden,
 Verleih dein Licht, Lasz zum gesicht,
 Nun kommen Alle blinden.

—St. MS 57—1.

The two elements of joyful hope and anxious sorrow are as apparent here as in any of the hymns of the immediate Reformation period.⁷

Then there is a group of seven hymns celebrating the second coming of Christ and the establishment of His kingdom upon the earth. The figure of the Bridegroom Who comes to claim His bride seems to be a favorite one with her:

Singet mit süsszem thon,
 Der schönen Braut Zion
 Zu ehrn, ein new Gesang,
 Last hörn der Harffen klang ;
 Der Breutigamb kömpt,
 Der Breutigamb kömpt ;
 Sein Nahm gebenedeyt,
 Sey weit und breit,
 Gelobt in Zeit und Ewigkeit.⁸

—St. MS 36—16.

She dwells also with special pleasure upon the great marriage festival with which Christ will celebrate His union with the church.

This theme has been used by other hymn-writers with whom we know she was well acquainted. Cunrad Hoier,⁹ Daniel Sudermann¹⁰ and B. Ringwaldt¹¹ all sing of the coming of the Bridegroom. One point of difference between them and Anna Owens is, however, very obvious. In none of her verses is there anything of the amorous tone which occurs occasionally

⁷ Wack. III, 2 and 5.

⁸ Compare Phil. Nicolai, "Wachet auff, ruft uns die stimme" (Wack. V, 259).

⁹ St. MS 56; Wack. V, 121, 127.

¹⁰ St. MS 63; Wack. V, 949, 950, 960, 961, 983.

¹¹ St. MS 54; Wack. IV, 1455, 1456.

in Hoier's, Ringwaldt's and Sudermann's songs. Entirely foreign to her were such verses as:

Jesu, du edler Breutgam werd,
mein höchste zier auff dieser Erd,
an dir allein ich mich ergetz.

—Wack. V, 121.

O Christe, vnser Breutigam,
du aller beste Bule.

—Wack. IV, 1456.

She did not use the symbol of the spiritual union of Christ with the individual soul, but with the whole body of believers, with Zion, His church. She mentions repeatedly the marriage supper described in Matthew (xxv, 1-12), and uses the story of the five foolish virgins as a warning to the church to prepare itself for the coming of the Lord; but she avoids the erotic note entirely.

There are, however, several reminiscences of other hymn-writers whose songs are contained in the Stockholm manuscript. Compare the lines:

Wo soll ich fliehen hin,
weil ich beschweret bin.

—Joh. Heermann, St. MS 60—1.

Zu wem soll ich nun fliehen hin,
weil ich so hertzlich traurig bin?

—St. MS 7—1.

Or compare the lines:

Ach Herr wan wirtzs dasz ich vorgesz
meiner selbst, und von mir werde losz,
ich bitte dich wollest mich mir Nehmen,
und dir zu eigen gantz thun geben.

—Ellyger, St. MS 50—3.

Von mir selbst wer ich gern erlöst,
Der eigen Will thutt mir das böst.

—St. MS 23—2.

For the form of her hymns she is also dependent upon other authors, and usually gives with each one the melody for which she has written it. The discussion of form would naturally appear in a chapter devoted to metre; but because it is such a vital part of a song intended to be sung, it may be considered here. Sometimes she has written to the melody of a folk-song: "Warumb sollt ich nicht frolig sein," "Einsmahls da ich lust bekam," etc.—a practice which was very common among the hymn-writers of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, partly because in this way the secular texts which were displeasing to the clergy might be suppressed. The phraseology of the folk-song also had its influence upon the sacred hymns of the Lutheran Church.¹² Anna Owens has not borrowed much more than the melody, however. Only occasionally do we hear the artless language of the "Volkslied":

Die hohen Berg und tieffen Thal,
 Die Bäum und Kräuter allzumal,
 Als wenn sie stimmen hetten,
 Sollen fröhlich antworten all,
 Mit einem hellen wiederschall,
 Der Trommeln und Trompeten.
 Die Thierlein werden springen dan,
 Die Vögel haben freud daran,
 Ihr stimm mit lassen schallen.

—St. MS 25—11.

Sometimes she has chosen the form and melody of the hymns of other writers, using particularly those songs which appear in Lobwasser's hymnal: St. MS 3; Hertzlich thut mich verlangen (Lobwasser 503); St. MS 14, Wann mein stündlein vorhanden ist (Lobwasser 522); St. MS 15, Bewahr mich, Herr, thu mir zur rettung kommen (Lobwasser, Psalm XII), etc.

Although our author displays little originality in the form and subject-matter of her songs, she certainly found pleasure in diversity of expression. The twenty-six hymns show twenty-

¹² Compare F. A. Hünich, *Das Fortleben des älteren Volksliedes im Kirchenliede des 17. Jahrhunderts*, Leipzig, 1911.

two different strophes, ranging in length from four to twelve lines. The arrangement of rhyme is also varied. Sometimes all the lines of a strophe have the same rhyme (St. MS 9). Sometimes couplets rhyme together (St. MS 15). Sometimes a very complicated rhyme scheme occurs (St. MS 7—a a b c c b d d e f f e).

Of Opitzian metrical rules no knowledge is revealed. The syllables are simply counted, without too much regard for the natural accent of the word; but the rhythm of the music makes the metre more regular in the hymns than it is in her other poems.

The refrain is used but twice, each time with remarkably good effect:

Wollt ihr dem Zorn des Herren entrinnen
So folget nicht mehr ewern Sinnen.

—St. MS 18 (at the end of the stanza).

Der Breutigamb kômpt,
Der Breutigamb kômpt.

—St. MS 36 (in the middle of the stanza).

Nineteen of the hymns are acrostics: thirteen with the full name Anna Ovena Hoiiers,¹³ one with the name Ovena Hoiiers,¹⁴ four with Ovena¹⁵ and one with Anna.¹⁶ Here, too, she shows the influence of others. For instance, acrostic hymns may be found in large numbers among the writings of Sudermann.¹⁷

The entire lack of feeling for nature in her poems is not very striking when one compares her verses with those of many of her contemporaries. Spee¹⁸ (1591-1635) and Gerhardt (1607-1668) showed, to be sure, a fine feeling for the beauties of the natural world. But they were the first, and we need not be surprised that Anna Owens, with her want of all real poetic imagination, remained untouched by them.

¹³ St. MS 2, 3, 4, 6, 11, 15, 18, 31, 35, 36, 39, 40, 49.

¹⁴ St. MS 57.

¹⁵ St. MS 9, 10, 22, 23.

¹⁶ St. MS 16.

¹⁷ Wack. V, 794, 797, 803, 804, 806, 846, etc.

¹⁸ Philipp Witkop, *Die neuere deutsche Lyrik*, Bd. 1, Von Friedrich von Spee bis Hölderlin, Leipzig und Berlin, 1910.

V. PRAYERS.

In close connection with her hymns, and, like them, expressions of feeling with occasional didactic touches, are the prayers in verse. She has written eleven prayers in all, only one of which is in prose. The desires of her heart are few but fervent. She prays for her children, for those still living in sin, and for herself. She has also written one evening and two morning prayers, as well as a prayer of thanksgiving for God's mercies.

The only prayer written in stanza form is that devoted to her children, and it is numbered among the hymns of the Stockholm manuscript as if it were intended to be sung. Her chief concern for her children is that they shall be genuine and devout Christians:

Mach ihre Hertzen New und rein,
Und wohn mit deinem Geist dar ein.

—St. MS 24—1.

Nim von ihnen all Eitelheit,
Mach sie zu deinem Dienst bereit.

—St. MS 24—2.

For herself she prays that she may have the necessary wisdom and grace to train them up in the “nurture and admonition, of the Lord.” A letter-cross at the end of the poem fills out the page:

G	Gib Gnade Meinen Kindern Mein
G	Getrewer Gott,
M	Das sie sich nicht verhindern lassen
G. G. M. K. M. G. G.	durch böse Rott.
M	Behüt fur schand und spott, hilff
G	halten dein gebott.
G	

Seven other prayers are quite as personal in tone. "Ach Herr Zeugh mich, so folge ich" petitions strength for entire self-effacement and complete obedience to the divine will:

Zeig mir dein Werck, gib dz ich merck,
 Den Willen dein, und mich allein,
 Dar nach stets richt, mich auch verpflicht,
 Dzu dinen dir, Herr nimb mich mir,
 Mein g'müth regier, und mich Nach deinen
 Willen führ. Amen.

—St. MS II, Fol. 19.

"O Gott du Meines lebens Erhalter" was written in an hour of despondency, when the burden of the years weighed heavily upon her and her Heavenly Father seemed to have forgotten her:

O Gott du Meines lebens Erhalter,
 Verlasse Mich Nicht in Meinem Alter,
 Gedenck Nicht Mehr Meiner Jugend Sunden,
 Gnad bitt ich Herr, lasz Mich gnade finden.

—St. MS II, Fol. 20.

"Wer steht, der seh dasz er Nicht Fall" requests strength to be ever on her guard against the cunning snares of the Evil One, and prays for complete renunciation of self:

Herr Nimb mich Mir, und gib mich dir
 in allen dingen mich regier,
 dein gnad von mir Nicht wende.

—St. MS II, Fol. 23.

"O du Ewige Krafft stercke mich"¹ begs for strength, the guidance of eternal truth, the teaching of eternal wisdom, the illumination of the eternal light, the embrace of eternal love, and union with God Himself. "O Wesen dasz all' ding

¹ St. MS II, Fol. 29.

beweg't" is full of interjections and has a certain poetic fire which is lacking in the other prayers:

O Wesen dasz all' ding beweg't,
 In dem sich alles wesen regt,
 O Inner Kern, O Morgen stern,
 O Glantz der Herlicheit des Herren,
 O sprechendes Wort, Gottes Sohn.

.

—St. MS II, Fol. 27.

Send down from Thy throne Thy divine wisdom to teach me and let Thy light break in upon my soul. Open wide the door of my heart and enter in. Drive the money-changers out and those that sell doves, and take complete possession of me. Make Thy presence manifest, and overrule all things to the glory of Thy Holy Name. "O liebe Gedult wie guth bistu"² is an earnest supplication for the patience which brings peace and tranquillity and consolation in sorrow. When all friends depart and leave me in distress, when the whole world rages against me and the devils hate me, I will not despair, but will have an heroic courage in all misfortune. "Dem Lieben Gott sey lob und danck"³ expresses the heartiest gratitude for the gifts of the Almighty, for food and drink, for shelter, clothing and shoes, for health and peace. Our author then requests that these mercies shall be continued to her, that she may be protected from her enemies, and may walk in the way of the Lord.

The morning and evening prayers (a form which so many hymn-writers have used)⁴ are for the most part very conventional in thought and language. Of the two morning prayers, one is in prose:

Morgen Segen A: O: H: Fecit.

Ich stehe auff durch die gnade Gottes, vnter dem schutz des aller höghten, und der liebe H. Engelen, mit allen ausserwelten

² St. MS II, Fol. 36.

³ St. MS II, Fol. 22.

⁴ Selnecker, Lobwasser, Ringwaldt, Petrus Herbert, Martin Behm, etc.

Kindern Gottes, in rechtem glauben, vestem vortrawen, Zu der Barmhertzikeit Gottes in bestendigger Hoffnung, Christlichem Vorsatz, und gutem Willen, Gottselig zu wandeln, Auffrichtig zu handelen, Gott zu loben, zu lieben und zu Ehren, und zu folgen willig und gern, Jhesu Christo meinem Herren, Im Nahmen Gottes des Vatters, Sohns, und h: Geistes. Amen.

—St. MS II, Fol. 20.

It reminds one strongly of Luther's "Morgensegen" in the Shorter Catechism, except that Luther prays for protection from the "böser Feind." This prayer is the only bit of prose which we have from Anna Owens' pen, and even here rhymes appear: wandeln—handeln; Ehren—gern—Herren.

The other morning prayer, "Gelobet sey Gott in Ewigkeit,"⁵ begins with thanksgiving for protection during the night and for the mercy of God in allowing us to see the light of another day. The petitions are for protection during the day which has just begun, and for the instruction of the Holy Spirit, that we may give unto the Lord the glory due unto His name.

The evening prayer⁶ has the same conventional tone: Glory be unto God that He has let us live through the day; may He protect us also through the night, that we may enjoy a sound, wholesome and refreshing sleep, without pain or the disturbance of an uneasy conscience, and may awaken with joy and gladness in the morning.

⁵ St. MS II, Fol. 17.

⁶ St. MS II, Fol. 18.

VI. DIDACTIC AND SATIRICAL POETRY.

Anna Owens' hymns and prayers are an expression of lyrical feeling, but even in them the instructive note is often heard. It is most natural for her to treat every subject from the didactic standpoint. In her satires there is also a strong didactic element, so that it seems better to discuss her satirical and didactic poems together.

In these she is very little affected by her contemporaries. The didactic and satirical poems of her time attack not so much the depravities of the church, and of the inner religious and moral life, as the absurdities of society, the susceptibility to foreign influence in dress and speech, and the political conditions of the period. There was much, both in the life and in the literature of the seventeenth century, to provoke scorn and derision; and the mockery came no longer in the form of the harmless fable or the good-humored jest.¹ The poets were especially vulnerable, partly because of the unwholesome sensuousness, partly because of the unnatural stiffness and bombast of their verses.² The world as it was, was much too ordinary and prosaic for them. Everything was made to move on stilts. The earth, the heavens, and all the gods were often forcibly produced as witnesses of the most indifferent occurrences. The verse-makers also loved to move in an idyllic world filled with beautiful shepherdesses and adoring shepherds. The preëminence of Italian literature in Germany was especially marked in the first half of the seventeenth century, and the poetry showed Italian influence in both form and subject-matter.³

¹ Der deutsche Michel (Anon.); Rist, *Die edle deutsche Hauptsprache*; Moscherosch, *À la mode Kehrausz*; Gryphius, *Horribilicribifax*; Lauremberg, *Scherzgedichte*; Rachel, *Deutsche satirische Gedichte*, and numerous others.

² Freiherr von Canitz, *Satire von der Poesie*, herausgegeben von J. U. König, Leipzig, 1727, p. 93.

³ M. v. Waldburg, *Die deutsche Renaissancelyrik*.

Scholars were as bad as poets in their pompous pedantry;⁴ and the people were worse than either, for they were weak and characterless, entirely ruined by their servile aping of other nations, and richly deserving of the slavery in which they lived.⁵

It was the time of the zealous literary societies, and of the great Thirty Years' War; but Anna Owens knew nothing of the one, and mentions only incidentally the distressing conditions resulting from the other.⁶ She was also entirely untouched by the Italian influences of the period. She remains, in fact, quite within her womanly sphere, concerning herself with the church which was open to her, but (with the apparent exception of the poem directed against the English rebels, in 1649) uninterested in political or literary questions. Only when the world about her came into an ethical conflict with her own, did she satirize it.

That she was independent of any literary models in her didactic and satirical poems, we can affirm with more assurance when we consider the poems in which she did follow in the footsteps of others.⁷ Where she was not entirely uninfluenced by others in her work, she followed her teachers very exactly. But here, in her robust and vigorous style, her blunt and uncouth expressions, she belongs still to the sixteenth century, as an associate of Brant, Murner and Fischart. Nor does she avoid the personal invective, as did the other satirists of her day. Rachel defines the satire as “ein solch Werk, welches allerhand übliche und im Schwange gehende Laster, iedoch ohne Verletzung eines Menschen Ehren, guten Namen und Leumut, durchziehet und mit lachendem Munde die dürre Wahrheit saget,”⁸ but Anna Owens always had definite persons

⁴ Joh. Balth. Schuppius, *Schriften, Lustiger und anmuhtiger Discurs von der eingebildeten Academischen Hoheit und Reputation eines unvorsichtigen Studentens*, 1660, p. 979.

⁵ Moscherosch, *Wunderbare Gesichte*.

⁶ St. MS 18, 31; Poem. p. 235.

⁷ “Das Buch Ruth,” Poem. p. 77; “Bedencken von Schwenckfelds Buch vom Wort Gottes,” Poem. p. 157.

⁸ Satire VIII, ll. 481 ff.

in mind, and she did not hesitate to name them. She looked upon the conditions round about her, conditions with which she herself was intimately connected, and wrote out of the abundance of her heart.

Her satires were directed, with one exception,² against the clergy, and here invective, ridicule, and direct moral teaching go hand in hand. The six poems against the orthodox ministers criticize every phase of their life and activity. In connection with these satires it is interesting to note that almost a century before the "Dörp-Pape," in 1539, there had appeared in Cologne, from the hand of a Catholic poet "Daniel von Soest, 'Ein gemeine bicht oder bekennung der predicanen to Soest,'" in which the sins of the ministers were also sharply censured. It is very doubtful, however, whether our author knew anything of this satire.

The faults so glaring in the professional life of the pastors of her day receive perhaps the most attention at her hand. Their sermons are lifeless, either superficial catalogues of Old and New Testament historical events or ostentatious displays of classical erudition. They have no understanding of heavenly things,³ nor are they concerned with the piety of their parishioners.⁴ They preach for money alone, which they obtain by fair means or foul. They have enormous power over the superstitious people and stop at nothing in their efforts to maintain their position. They absolutely forbid all independent thought,⁵ that no one may presume to investigate divine truths for himself or discover how faulty is his teacher's instruction in the way of life. He who persists in his attempt to find a living faith is persecuted with a most unchristian intolerance as a heretic and enthusiast, for the priests cannot bear even an implied criticism of their own methods.⁶

Their social sins are as great as their professional ones. They have a kind of aristocracy of their own, winning favor

² Poem. p. 263.

³ Poem. pp. 46, 68.

⁴ Poem. p. 64.

⁵ Poem. p. 68.

⁶ Poem. p. 70.

with the nobility by their learning, and tyrannizing over the peasants. They must have the most prominent place in every company, and the choicest morsel at every feast.¹⁴ They must always be treated with the respect due them as God's ambassadors, although their private life is far from justifying this claim. They simulate great piety, but misuse the power of their position ; and the people become so terrified at the threat of the ban that they are ready to agree, even if the priest says black is white.¹⁵

In private life they are the greatest of sinners, quick to stir up strife, proud of their learning, intolerant of contradiction, hypocritical. Their own actions give the lie to their teachings ; for they live luxuriously and lazily, are rich, sleek, and well-fed,¹⁶ and have no mercy upon the poor.¹⁷ Their most serious concern in life is how their power may remain untouched, and how they may eat, drink and sleep well.

Those who are more energetic do not by any means devote their energies to the fulfilling of the duties of their position. On the contrary, they have political interests. They are the ones who have caused the war which has wrought so much devastation.¹⁸ They have so much influence with the ruling princes that they cannot be withheld, and their voice is always for strife. These messengers of peace no longer have the cross upon their coat of arms, but a helmet :

In Husum habe ich gesehn,
Pfaffen Waffen im Fenster stehn,
Und auff ihren Schild einen Helm,
Seht, ist der Teuffel nicht ein Schelm?

.
Mich dunckt die sachen stehn sehr schlecht,
Wann ein Geistlicher führt Kriegszeichen.

—Poem. p. 238.

¹⁴ Poem. p. 45.

¹⁵ Poem. p. 52.

¹⁶ Poem. p. 46.

¹⁷ Poem. p. 174.

¹⁸ Poem. p. 235.

Even when a ruler would rather maintain peace and exercise justice and mercy, he cannot, because of his superstitious fear of the spiritual power of these would-be teachers of the gospel of Jesus Christ.¹⁹

In none of Anna Owens' other writings does one find such a wealth of choice epithets as in these poems directed against the clergy—Herrn Titultrager, Warheitsverjager, Fromheit-plager, Herrn von Hohen-Schulen, die Schriftklugen, Welt-gelerten, Seelenwürger, Finsterfischer, blinde Leiter, Mietlinge, der Schlangen Art, des Satans Vorreiter, die Cantzel-Herrn, die Pfaffen-teufel, Babelsbulen, Wolcken ohne Wasser, die Letterweisen, die klugen Letterknecht, faule Bäuche, leere Schleuche, die Herrn Gottes affen, fleischliche Pfaffen, geiszige blutsaugende Igel, etc. Her use of epithet is really one of her strongest points.

These "clerical" verses, if one may call them such, are grouped about two events, each of which caused a sensation in Eiderstedt and Husum. The first, which called forth "Schreiben an die Herrn Titultrager," "Einfältige Warheit," and "De Dörp-Pape," was the banishment of Nicolaus Teting at the instigation of the priests, and the subsequent attempt to banish Anna Owens herself. The second took place after she had gone to Sweden, but it produced two very biting satires: "An die Gemein im Land Holstein" and "Deutsche Warheit." It was the great Anabaptist lawsuit in Tönning. No wonder that the instincts of loyalty to her friend, of self-protection, and of justice to those unfairly attacked, aroused this resolute woman to an astonishingly fearless and ruthless criticism of the all-powerful clergy. That they did not remain entirely indifferent to her disapproval can easily be seen from the accounts they give of her.

"Das Schreiben an die Herrn Titultrager von Hohen Schulen," written in 1625, was intended as a refutation of Friedrich

¹⁹ Poem. pp. 234, 235.

Dame's "Abgetrungene Relation des Colloquii mit denen von Flensburg entwichenen Enthusiasten. Rostock 1625." It contains much personal invective against Habacuc Meyer (Tetting's confessor) and his colleague Friedrich Johannes, as well as against Dame himself:

O Ihr verkehrte Pfaffenknecht,
 Fritz Hannsen und Fritz Dame,
 O Schlangen art, Ottern geschlecht,
 Ja Satans eigner same.

—Poem. p. 67.

[Die Warheit wird] euch zu schanden machen gar,
 Mit eurem Kuckuck Meyer,
 Sein Kram hat auch kein gute wahr,
 Nur faul und Stinckend Eyer:

Mit dem Kuckuck er fliegen kam.
 Liesz sich in Tönning nieder,
 Auch mit dem Kuckuck abscheidt nam,²⁰
 Floh hinweg mit ihm wieder.

—Poem. p. 70.

It ends with the advice to the priests:

Lernet weiszheit studiren,
 Und gebt euch unter Gottes gewalt

Sonst wird sich ewer ansehn bald
 Verlieren bey den Leuten.

—Poem. p. 71.

This is the beginning of her open arraignment of the clergy, the first step along the way which in five short years led to the "Dörp-Pape." She began by losing all respect for their

²⁰ Habacuc Meyer had just entered upon his duties as pastor in Tönning when he suddenly and secretly left his church in order to accept an appointment to St. Mary's, in Flensburg. (Schütze⁽²⁾, p. 542.)

learning and authority and by setting up her own teachers as models for them:

Heran ihr Pfaffen all heran
Lasst euch zur Schulen fuhren
Von Herrn Tetinge und Lohmann.

—Poem. p. 71.

She ended by bringing a serious indictment against their moral character.

“Einfältige Wahrheit,” a product of the year 1630, contains the finest satire on the sermons of the orthodox minister. Beginning with the creation of the world, he relates all the events of the Old Testament, and then speaks of the New, that he may fill out the time. He emphasizes the mercy of Christ, justification through faith, and the uselessness of any further effort on the part of the Christian beyond church attendance and the partaking of the Sacrament. He has nothing to say of the new birth or of a striving toward perfection in this life. Indeed, he omits everything which would necessitate a change in his own manner of living or which is difficult of explanation. If any of the nobility are in his audience, he glorifies the life of the warrior and with skilful flattery wins the favor of his hearers. The poem closes with the earnest admonition to seek truth and wisdom and enlightenment at the hand of the Almighty Himself.

The climax of Anna Owens’ satire, “De Dôrp-Pape,” appeared in the same year, 1630, and is by far the best poem that she ever wrote. Paul Schütze has considered it important enough to merit separate discussion in an article entitled “Anna Ovens Hoyers und ihre niederdeutsche Satire ‘De Denische Dôrp-Pape.’”²¹ He connects it with the five Low-German peasant-comedies which Jellinghaus has edited in “Bibliothek des litterarischen Vereins in Stuttgart,” Vol. 147; for these comedies have similar drinking scenes, although in them the pastors do not carouse with the peasants.

²¹ Schütze (1).

The "Dörp-Pape" is a dramatic dialogue, and, in the clear-sighted penetration of character and the swift delineation of real, living persons, is unsurpassed by any of the contemporary dramatic attempts. It is not surprising that Anna Owens wrote this peasant scene in Low German, which was spoken in Eiderstedt, especially since the comic scenes even of High-German dramas were often written in dialect, and Low German was *the language of satire*.²²

The action takes place in a tavern on a Saturday evening. The priest Herr Hanns is amusing himself with his peasants and is dancing with the maid, when his colleague, Herr Hack, from the village near by, comes to visit him. Both sit down among the peasants, and a regular drinking bout begins. One of the peasants finally becomes so angry over the superior, patronizing air of Herr Hack that they almost come to blows, but his companion pacifies him and they both leave. The priests remain, expressing great contempt for the ignorance and stupidity of the peasants and rejoicing over their own easy life. They do not need to take thought for the church service of the morrow, for they can easily read an extract or two from their collection of sermons. They congratulate themselves upon their comfortable existence and the facility with which they can fill their purses. The dialogue is followed by a short but deeply serious moral teaching in strophe form:²³

O latht juw lehren,
 Gott recht tho ehren,
 Mit Word und Wercken;
 Hört Gottes baden,
 In tadt der Gnaden,
 Syt nicht alsz de Fercken.

—Poem. p. 262—13.

²² I have refrained from a discussion of the language of the "Dörp-Pape" and of its historical position in Low-German literature, since an adequate treatment of the problems involved would extend unduly the limits of this dissertation. Paul Schütze's article in the "Zeitschrift der Gesellschaft für Schleswig-Holstein-Lauenburgische Geschichte," Bd. XV, might be used as a basis for future investigation.

²³ Also in St. MS Fol. 153.

The uncouth realism of the poem, as well as the scene itself, reminds one of the pictures of Breughel, Brouwer or Teniers, and as a revenge for the banishment of Teting it was also effective.

It aroused such bitterness among the clergy that they redoubled their efforts to get rid of this woman who so zealously played the part of conscience-awakener. That they made her life almost unendurable is certain, and that she defiantly endured all the annoyances which they knew so well how to inflict, and remained in Husum four years after the publication of the "Dôrp-Pape," is but another proof of her high spirit and dauntless courage.

Then there was a silence of twelve years, so far as the clergy was concerned, until the great Tönning lawsuit called forth two other poems. The first, "An die Gemein im Land Holstein," written in 1642, is rather a plea addressed to the ruling princes than any attempt at consolation for her friends who were involved in Moldenit's bigoted persecution. The rulers are appointed by God to protect their peaceful subjects, but their power extends only to the regulation of externals. God reserves for himself the judgment of the inner man, and princes as well as priests should beware of intruding upon his jurisdiction. From a purely utilitarian point of view she urges the protection of loyal and obedient subjects against the fanatical opposition of the clergy, for with their industry and commercial ability they increase the prosperity of the country and do all they can to maintain peace:

Ihr Fürsten liebt Gerechtigkeit,
Schaffet ab allen zanck und streit,
Im urtheil'n unparteylich seyt,
In gnaden neigt die ohren beid,
Mit fleisz auffmerckend, ohn verstören,
Des gegenheils wort auch zuhören,
Ob es wol hat der Pfaff nicht gern.

—Poem. p. 236.

The poem contains also a bitter censure of the clergy themselves:

Aber ach dasz die Fürsten wüsten,
Wie weinig Apostolsche Christen,
Oder rechte Evangelisten,
Man unterm Pfaffen-volcke findt.

—Poem. p. 237.

The Eiderstedt flood in 1634 came as a warning, and carried off many of the "Cantzel-Herrn"; may they accept this second warning and rebuke, and amend their ways.

In 1644 appeared "Deutsche Warheit," a dialogue between the personified Veritas and the devout heart. It reminds one of the old English morality plays, and of Rist's "Das Friede jauchzende Deutschland," although the latter was not written until 1653. The devout heart laments over the absence of Truth and decides that the "Pfaffenvolck" are responsible for her non-appearance, for they persecute her and drive her away wherever they find her. She answers his complaint with the comforting assurance that she is not far off and will soon appear. God gladly bestows good gifts upon His children, she says, but your sins are great, for you tolerate and obey spiritual leaders who know nothing of me. Repent, for the time is coming when Babylon will fall and "the place thereof shall know it no more." The power of the prelates and "Domherrn" will be broken, their ban useless, their palaces the dwelling-place of owls, ravens, and wild beasts.

The only other poem devoted manifestly and avowedly to the shortcomings of the ministry is the "Trew-Warnungs Liedlein an die Saduceer und Epicureer."²⁴ Here the author speaks again of the coming of the Lord and of the eternal punishment which shall be the lot of those who do not believe in Him.

²⁴ St. MS Fol. 140.

Next to the priests she is most severe against rebellious subjects, as may be seen in "Schreiben an die Gemein in Engellandt," written in 1649. It is perhaps surprising that she should thus suddenly attempt to interfere in English affairs; but it was not the political situation which interested her, nor even the religious questions which were being agitated, but the ethical question of loyalty to those in authority. This feeling of reverence for established institutions we have already noted in discussing her standpoint with regard to the church as an institution, apart from its ministry. This is also contrary to the ideas of many of the mystics, for whom worldly authority did not exist. The magistrates are divinely appointed, she says, and Christians will gladly obey them, even eccentric magistrates and those who may have acted contrary to their oath. For the English nation which has beheaded its monarch, she cannot find words harsh enough. Charles I is to her the innocent martyr, the patient sufferer, the tragic hero. This tone of horrified indignation against the English subjects is also heard in Andreas Gryphius' "Karolus Stuardus oder ermordete Majestät" 1649 and in Philipp von Zesen's "Verschmähten doch wieder erhöheten majestät, das ist: Karls des zweiten, königs von Engelland u. s. w. wundergeschichte," 1661. Anna Owens accuses them of treachery, treason, tyranny, and calls them Eydbrecher, Ehrvergessene Meyn-Eydge Gotts-Ordnung-Schänder, Wetterhanen, tolle Thoren, Parlamentische Aufrührer, Rebellen, Teuffels-Rådleinführer, menschliche Teuffel, teufellsche Menschen. Then she proceeds to personal invective: she compares General Alexander Leslie with Judas Iscariot, who betrayed his Lord; Fairfax is "du gottloser Mann . . . Schelm tituliert dich jedermann"; Cromwell is "des Fairfax Spieszgesell"; and Hammond deserves Haman's gallows as his reward. She accuses them of wishing to make England a republic as Holland is. But they shall not succeed; God will rebuke and punish them according to their deserts.

The personal tone of these verses called forth a reprimand (from the English government apparently) which Anna Owens answered with the lines beginning

Seht doch, da kommt ein Adeler
Ausz dem Krug-hausz geflogen her,
Zu einer alten Frawen.

—Poem. p. 272.

She does not retract one word of what she has written, but maintains that it was only the truth and that she is entirely unconcerned with the hostility which it may cause. She also gives warning that it will be of no use to argue with her :

Wer sich an alten Kesseln reibt,
Gern streitt mit alten Frawen,
Derselb nicht unbesudelt bleibt,
Das sag ich euch in trawen.

—Poem. p. 274.

Such proud independence of spirit only increased her growing unpopularity.

But Anna Owens' earliest polemics were not directed against public evils, although we have discussed these first as being the most important. Her early attempts were indeed of quite a different character, and more exclusively didactic in tone. The first, "Süssbittre Freude," written in 1617, belongs really to the chapter devoted to her attempts at versifying the works of other authors; but because the fragment which we have is so intensely didactic, it may stand here as well. It consists simply of moral reflections concerning the folly and unhappiness connected with the passion of love. The other, "Kumpt her zu schawen unser Jungfrawen," of the year 1624, is a sarcastic description of the fashionable and frivolous maiden with her golden chains, her broad collar, her mincing gait and coy glances. A serious exhortation to old and young is added: Let them have nothing to do with these "Eulen, gar schon gesieret." We may compare in this connection Thomas Murner's "Die Gäuchmatt," especially the seventh chapter, "Dem

gouchlocken"; the eighth, "Den gouch fohen"; and the nineteenth, "Wenus lere vnd ermanung zü allem wypplichē geschlecht."

Anna Owens concerns herself also with her own household. Five poems are devoted to the instruction of her children: "Gespräch eines Kindes mit seiner Mutter von dem Wege zur wahren Gottseligkeit," "Christi Gülden Cron," "Posaunenschall," "Kurz Bedenken an der Alten Weiber Heyrath," "O Ihr Kinder ist es recht ewer Mutter zu betrüben?"

The first of these, written in 1628, is the least vigorous, least interesting of them all. In strong contrast to the vivid and natural characterization of the peasants and priests in the "Dörp-Pape," the child in this dialogue is the most wooden, most unfeeling, most unnatural puppet one could well imagine. This is, however, typical of the time and can hardly be used as a very serious criticism against Anna Owens herself. One sees not only in literature, but in art as well, that the world had not yet come to realize the peculiar problems and possibilities of the child. If Van Dyck could paint only stiff little figures with old, unchildlike faces, and the Italians could represent the Christ child without any expression in its face, we need not wonder that Anna Owens, in spite of her keen observation of human nature, was unable to depict a child which would appeal to us.

In "Das Gespräch" the child is instructed by the mother concerning the search for real holiness, which is not to be found in the churches or among the sectaries, but only in Christ. The child laments his wasted opportunities and his inability to do the good which he desires to do, but the mother comforts him with the thought that Christ's sufficiency will supply his need. She warns him that the priests are responsible for the lack of real piety in the churches and for the persecution which is the portion of the Lord's "chosen ones." The tone of criticism against the clergy is not yet so bitter as in the "Dörp-Pape," but a strong feeling of dissatisfaction is apparent.

Here, too, there are many mystical allusions. Thou shalt renounce the world and thine own will. Then will Christ come and dwell in thy heart, if thou art empty of self and entirely resigned to Him.²⁵ Thou shalt be anointed with the oil of gladness and His spirit shall enlighten thine eyes. Those learned only in worldly wisdom will never experience the "new birth" or be able to hear the "inner word." But thou, if thou art "still" and waitest before the Lord with faith, shalt receive His supreme gifts and come to understand His Holy Writ.

The three poems written in 1643—"Christi Gülden Cron," "Posaunenschall," "Kurz Bedencken an der Alten Weiber Heyrath"—show a grave anxiety for the welfare of her family. Her youngest child, Friedrich Hermann (born in 1621), was now a grown man, and the responsibility of getting her children settled in positions suitable for them was weighing heavily upon her.

"Christi Gülden Cron" is dedicated to all five, Christian, Caspar, Friedrich Hermann, Maria and Christina. She urges them to live as Christians should, to watch and pray, to take up their cross and follow Christ, to read the Holy Scriptures much and thoughtfully, to learn to know their own hearts, to be courageous soldiers of the Lord and merciful to those in distress, to live in peace and harmony with all mankind. The poem is full of letter-crosses, and is rather a collection of short moral poems than one long one.

"Posaunenschall" is a glorification of the marriage of Christ with the Church and a jubilant account of the wonderful festivities attending His advent. He will usher in the era of peace. All weapons will be laid aside. The pope, cardinals, abbots, bishops, "Münchesche dreckpatzen," and nuns must yield before the coming of the Lord. The evils which they have inflicted upon others will now descend upon their own heads.

Then she turns to her own children, and we gain a very good idea of the family life on the little estate in Sittwick, with

²⁵ Poem. p. 11.

its family concerts and its sternly exercised discipline. Motherly affection does not blind Anna Owens to her children's shortcomings. Caspar she warns against women and wine; Christian against indolence; Friedrich Hermann, the favorite son,²⁶ against anger and intoxication. Not neglecting the rather obvious opportunity for a pun upon her darling's name,²⁷ she urges him to be strong and courageous, chaste, zealous in good works, generous to the poor. Maria she praises for her maid-
enly purity and vigorous mind, but rebukes her hot temper. Christina's besetting sin is avarice; but if she will read the Scriptures and earnestly pray for help, she shall be freed from all sin.

Then follows an exhortation to filial dutifulness, in which the children have evidently been lacking:

Zu g'horchen mir
 Seyd schuldig ihr,
 Die Schrifft hats euch gebotten,
 Nach der euch richtt,
 Der Herr will nicht
 Dasz ihr sollt meiner spotten,
 Mit euch meyn ich
 Es Mütterlich
 Wolt dasz ihrs möchtest wissen;
 Dann würdet ihr
 Ohn zweiffel mir
 Zufolgen seyn geflossen,
 Und nicht hinfort
 Stoltz bitter wort
 Mehr wieder mich auszgiessen.

—Poem. p. 207.

At the end is added a song of rejoicing over the coming of the Bridegroom. It is in strophe form, with the refrain "Hanns Owens Tochter Anna."

²⁶ Poem. p. 200.

²⁷ Poem. p. 202.

In the same year, 1643, her motherly heart seems to have been very anxious about her three marriageable sons, lest they should choose unsuitable help-meets. In "Kurz Bedenken an der alten Weiber Heyrath," she warns them seriously, almost vehemently, against marrying older women, as if the danger were alarmingly imminent. It is quite right and proper to honor and help old women, especially if they are widows; but to marry them is nothing but legalized prostitution. The clergy ought never to allow such a disgraceful state of affairs; for if a woman is not able to give birth to children, then they lie when they say, "Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth":

Ein solch Heyrath gehôret
Zum grewel der Verwüstung mit,
Der Geist des Lebens wird verschüt
Viel guts dadurch zerstöret,
Des Herren grimm und straff erweckt,
Und das Gewissen sehr befleckt,
Disz wollet wol bedencken.

—Poem. p. 155.

Once more in 1650²⁸ she rebukes them for disobedience and undutiful resentment against her control (the *youngest* son was then 29 years old), and threatens them with the dire punishment which God visits upon those opposing lawful authority. It was quite natural that this strong-willed, energetic personality should seek to command and superintend those intrusted to her care, even after they had outgrown the necessity for her guidance; but it was also quite as natural that her sons and daughters, who had probably inherited some of their mother's independence, should chafe against the restraint.

Other people besides those in her own home attracted her didactic interest. We have already spoken of the poem in which she warns her sons against marriage with older women (1643). In 1645 she addressed another directly to the old

²⁸ "O Ihr Kinder ist es recht, ewer Mutter zu betrüben?"

women themselves, specifically widows—"Annae Ovenae Hoijers Rath an alle Alte Witwen."²⁹ You should not marry again, she says to them, for the men cannot really love you and they only desire your money. It is your fault if they break their marriage vows, for you no longer have charm enough to hold them. Your activities must lie outside the field of matrimony, which belongs only to young women and for which you are no longer suitable. You can help care for your grandchildren, spin and sew, teach the young women to keep house and to honor their husbands. If you are rich, fill your time with works of charity, with reading, prayer, singing and writing. Go often to church and meditate upon what is told you there.

Disz ist der rechten Wittwen arth,
 Gott wird ihr wolfart bawen,
 Sie werden ihn anschawen,
 Auf einer grünen Awen
 Selig sind solche Frawen.

—Poem. p. 152.

Then, as Anna Owens approached the last years of her long life, she wrote in a somewhat bitter mood about the duties of friend to friend. In the "Liedlein von den Gelt-liebenden Welt-Freunden,"³⁰ we see that she had had most unpleasant experiences with fair-weather friends. As wife of the influential Staller, she was courted, flattered and entertained. People were proud to be associated with her and promised unchangeable loyalty to her and her children. But only in adversity do we learn what true friendship is, just as we can see the stars

²⁹ G. Weigelt (Die nordfriesischen Inseln, p. 222) tells us, as a proof of the sacredness of the marriage vows among the Frisians, that they were especially unwilling to countenance marriage with a widow. For a long period of time such a thing was of rare occurrence among them. Compare the folk-song "'s ist nichts mit den alten Weibern" (G. W. Fink, Musikalischer Hausschatz der Deutschen, Leipz., 1843, no. 93); and Fischart, Das Philosophisch Ehzuchtbuchlin.

³⁰ Poem. p. 294.

only in the dark. Fair-weather friends stay by us as long as we have a well-set table and a well-filled purse; but when misfortune comes, they no longer recognize us when they meet us on the street. Again, in the "Liedlein von den Vndanckbaren gesten,"³¹ she laments that those very people whom she has entertained most hospitably are now her enemies and increase her sorrows and burdens. She forgives them freely and admonishes them to amend their ways; but if they do not, the wrath of the Lord shall descend upon them. Then, in a little five-line stanza almost at the end of the Stockholm manuscript, she comments upon the rarity of really loyal friends:

Ein getreuer freundt, ders hertzlich meint,
Ist in der Welt, mit gudt noch Gelt,
Zu bezahlen nicht, wie Sirach³² spricht,
Wirt dem gegeben, zu trost im Leben,
Der Gott recht förcht, Sein Wort gehorcht.

A: O: H: Fecit.

—St. MS II, Fol. 31.

The loss of her money and friends, and her consequent dependence upon the favor of patrons, were almost intolerable to this high-spirited woman. In 1655 she wrote with keen sarcasm against the undeserved superiority which wealth bestows upon its possessors.³³ Even those who are poor in virtue are considered rich if they have property and money, and the foolish are considered wise. Money has so much power that it can make the ugly beautiful and the peasant a nobleman. Even if it is obtained by deceit and cunning, that makes no difference in the respect which it commands. Few desire to be virtuous or God-fearing, and yet virtue alone brings nobility, beauty, riches, and all that is good in life.

There are also three undated poems of a more general didactic nature. The forty-second poem of the Stockholm

³¹ St. MS 43.

³² Sirach VI, 14-17.

³³ St. MS II, Fols. 36, 37.

manuscript is directed to "alle Stands Personen in der Welt," calling their attention to the evil conditions of the time, to the worldly ambitions of the multitude, and to the intolerance with which genuine piety is treated. Those in authority are exhorted to administer justice in the fear of the Lord, and to protect the stranger within their gates, the widows, the orphans and the poor. Subjects must honor and obey their rulers. Husbands should love their wives and with them help to build up Christ's kingdom in peace. Wives should submit themselves to their husbands, for the husband is lord of his household. The child should love his father and avoid doing anything to grieve his mother, for she brought him into the world with much pain. The wealthy should be humble, gracious and generous, and all classes of society should be zealous in good works.²⁴

The "Regulae Vitae"²⁵ recommend piety and moderation in all things. Live in peace with all mankind. Be joyous when it is time to jest and serious when the occasion requires. Be tolerant of your equals, respectful to your superiors and considerate of your inferiors.²⁶ Cultivate the society of good people and avoid those who are not of the same opinion as yourself. Speak little but observe much, and among thousands trust but one.²⁷

²⁴ This poem reminds us very strongly of part of Luther's "Haustafel" in the "Enchiridion, Der Kleine Katechismus D. Martini Lutheri." Strophes 5-7 are devoted to the "Herren von Gott ordenieret," corresponding to Luther's "Den Bischöfen, Pfarrherren und Predigern." Strophes 8-11 treat of the duties of loyal subjects, as does Luther's "Von weltlicher Oberkeit." The twelfth strophe, concerning husbands, may be compared with the paragraph "Den Ehemännern"; the thirteenth, wives, with "Den Eheweibern"; the fourteenth, children, with "Den Kindern." To the paragraphs "Den Eltern," "Den Knechten," "Den Hausherren," "Der gemeinen Jugend," "Den Wittwen," "Der Gemeine," there is nothing here to correspond. Compare also Caspar Löner's two hymns, "Ain gaistlich Gesang von allen Stenden" and "Hausztaffel, Von allen heiligen Orden vnd Ständen ampt in dieser Welt." (Wack. III, 726, 727.)

²⁵ St. MS II, Fol. 30. Compare also B. Ringwald's hymn "Merck auff du frommer Jungling zart." (St. MS 54.)

²⁶ Compare Ecclesiasticus iv, 7, 8.

²⁷ Ecclesiasticus vi, 6.

The poem “O Menschenkindt du Wasseblasz” is concerned with the emptiness of all worldly pleasures:

O Menschenkindt du Wasseblasz
Schnell flüchtig blat, zerbrechlich Glasz,
Vergänglich felt blum, hör doch wasz
Ich dir hir sag, und mercke das:
Heut, Heut bey Zeit die Welt verlasz,
Sie ligt im argen, lebt in Hasz.

—St. MS II, Fol. 20.

Here may also be mentioned the epilogue of “Das Buch Ruth,” which explains at length the lessons which the story of Ruth is supposed to teach:

Zwo Haubtlehren insonderheit
Sollen wir hie wol mercken.

—Poem. p. 105.

The first is that an all-controlling and loving Providence rules over our lives; the second, that every Christian should show the same kindly and generous spirit toward those in need that Boaz showed toward Ruth. The tone is as didactic as in any of the poems discussed above.

VII. TRANSCRIPTIONS.

As translator Anna Owens has attempted nothing, although she understood Latin and although most of the writers of the period were interested in the study of foreign authors. It was the time when in Italy Ariosto and Tasso, in Spain Cervantes and Calderon, were establishing a literary standard which it was destined should never again be attained. England had just produced in Shakespeare her greatest dramatist. In France the satirist Rabelais and the lyric poet Ronsard were giving promise of an active literary development there. Germany eagerly drank in the beauties which other peoples had to offer and waited for the day when she too might worship at the shrine of a national genius.

Anna Owens' attempts at introducing other authors to the German public in more popular form were very modest indeed and consisted simply in versifying works already in German: Niclas Wyle's translation of Aeneas Sylvius' story of Euryolus and Lucretia, of which we have only the opening verses; the Book of Ruth; and a "Judicium über Caspar Schwenckfeld's Buch vom Wort Gottes." All three might also be classed as didactic poems, for the instructive tone is heard throughout.

The story of the beautiful Lucretia was especially beloved, and had already been made use of by Hans Sachs. It is the history of a noble Italian lady, wife of the wealthy Menelaus of Siena, who falls in love with the Emperor Sigismund's chancellor Caspar and who dies of grief when his duty to the Emperor calls him away from her. Euryolus, however, does not take the matter quite so tragically, and is soon consoled by "eine hubsche Jungfrau aus herzoglichem Blut geboren," whom the Emperor bestows upon him.

Wyle's translation begins with the same moralizing tone as Anna Owens' rendering:¹ " Item in der ersten translatze dises büches von Euriolo vnd lucrecia wirt funden ain grosser fremder handel ainer bülsschafft vnd darjnne alle aigenschaft der liebe vnd was die gebürt, besunder daz darInne allwegen entlich mer bitterkait dann süsse vnd mer laides dann fröiden funden werd vnd darumb die syg zefliechen vnd zemyden." Anna Owens has made use of almost identically the same words:

Wie wunderbar die liebe Sey
 Ist klar hirinn zufinden,
 Was freud und Süsigkeit dabey,
 thut disz büchlein verkünden,
 Imglichen auch die bitterkeit
 Viel trauren, Sorg und schmertzen
 So wohnet bey zu iederzeit
 Allen verliebten Hertzen.

—Breitenburg MS 1.

Only a short fragment of thirty-six lines is left of this poem, but the probability is that it was written from the didactic point of view and that the story was used as a warning example.

Her versification of the Book of Ruth shows just as little independent thought; but that is in this case a virtue rather than a fault, for she has not attempted "eine ausführliche, paraphrastische Behandlung,"² which would have spoiled entirely the laconic beauty of the tale. Her reasons for choosing the Book of Ruth rather than any other Biblical story are evident. She saw without doubt an analogy between herself and Naomi. Both were widows, both knew the hardships attendant upon a sojourn in a strange country, both had had grave

¹ Translationen von Niclas von Wyle herausgegeben durch Adelbert von Keller, Stuttgart, 1861.

² West-Östlicher Divan, Leipzig, 1912, p. 135: "Ebenso hat das Buch Ruth seinen unbezwinglichen Reiz über manchen wackern Mann schon ausgeübt, dasz er dem Wahn sich hingab, das in seinem Lakonismus unschätzbar dargestellte Ereignis könne durch eine ausführliche, paraphrastische Behandlung noch einigermassen gewinnen."

misfortunes, both were dependent upon the favor of rich and powerful patrons. Another reason was that here was an excellent opportunity to make a suggestion for her own welfare. Boaz, who cared for these homeless and desolate women and was blessed of the Lord in doing it, furnished a good example which every Christian should follow:

Der sich des Nechsten noth annimmt,
Und helfet gern den Armen,
Segen vom Herrn wid'rumb bekombt,
Gott will sich des erbarmen,
Erretten ihn zur bösen zeit,
Beym leben ihn bewahren,
Dasz ihm in nöthen und kranckheit,
Kein leid soll widerfahren.

—Poem. p. 115.

The third reason, which she gives herself, was to comfort Queen Eleonora in her sorrow and bereavement with a story which illustrates the kindly overruling of a divine Providence (Gustavus Adolphus died in 1632, and this poem was written in 1634).

The poem begins with a long dedication to “Der Durchleuchtigsten, Grosmächtigsten Fürstinnen und Frawen, Frawen Mariae Eleonorae, Der Schweden, Gothen und Wenden Königin, etc.” May God grant you a long life, protect you from all sorrow, and comfort you in your present bereavement. I have transcribed this Book of Ruth that your Majesty may see how an all-wise Providence watches over the fate of each individual creature. Such a faith makes me forget my troubles and my poverty, for God is the protector and the husband of the widow, the father of the fatherless.

Then comes the story of Ruth itself in four chapters, just as in the Bible. In fact, the author has followed the order of the Bible story exactly, except that in Chapter II part of verse 18 is put before verse 15.³ She has used the exact words of the

³ Poem. p. 95.

text, too, as far as that was possible, with one exception. Chapter II, 21, reads, "He said unto me also, Thou shalt keep fast by my young men, until they have ended all my harvest," whereas Anna Owens has written:

Der Mann sagt mir imgleichen,
Ich solt sein'n Dirnen folgen nach,
Und nicht von ihnen weichen,
Bisz alles Korn zu hausz gebracht.

—Poem. p. 96.

The "maidens" she has evidently taken from the twenty-third verse: "It is good, my daughter, that thou go out with his maidens."

The additions which she has made are very brief. Some consist in moral reflections inserted in the course of the story:

Hie haben ein Exempel wir,
Gar schön, dassz gleicher massen
Einem ehrlichen Weib gebühr,
Ihrn Mann nicht zu verlassen.

—Poem. p. 87.

Some of her observations throw added light upon the psychology of the characters:

Wie sie nun meynten in der Ruh,
Ihr Nahrung zu erwerben,
Da sandte Gott unglück herzu.

—Poem. p. 87.

Er [Boaz] ist meins Manns Verwanter
Und Erb, ein solcher frommer Mann,
Der nicht hat unterlassen
Sein Güttigkeit zu zeigen an
Thut unser sich anmassen.

—Poem. p. 96.

Some further details of the story are also added: the account of Naomi's and Ruth's extreme poverty,⁴ of Ruth's zealous

⁴ Poem. p. 92.

energy in the field,⁵ of Boaz waking her in the morning,⁶ of Obed as Naomi's servant who should serve her in her old age.⁷

There are unfortunately some repetitions and unnecessary amplifications, but they are comparatively few. Instead of the simple words "I went out full, and the Lord hath brought me home again empty," Naomi tells all her troubles to the people of Bethlehem:

Leer hat er mich zu hausz gebracht,
Und den Mann den ich liebet,
Hat er von mir genommen hinn,
Beider Sôhn mich beraubet;
Von hertzen ich drum trawrig bin,
Ja mehr denn man mir glaubet.

—Poem. p. 91.

In Ruth's conversation with Boaz the rhetorical question is added:

Was solt ich doch begehren mehr
Denn ewer Gunst alleine?

—Poem. p. 94.

There is also an addition in Boaz' conversation with his servants,⁸ in Ruth's report of the day's happenings to Naomi,⁹ and in Naomi's advice concerning the winning of Boaz' favor.¹⁰

When Ruth's simple tale is finished, a long moral is affixed, that there may be no mistake about the lessons which the poem is intended to teach. The first is, that God guides all events in accordance with His eternal purposes. Ruth was a heathen maiden; but He decided that she should become a Christian, in order to show us (who were also originally heathen peoples) that we, too, should in due time be called "into the grace of Christ." He brought it about that she should become Boaz'

⁵ Poem. p. 92.

⁶ Poem. p. 99.

⁷ Poem. p. 104.

⁸ Poem. p. 95.

⁹ Poem. p. 96.

¹⁰ Poem. p. 97.

wife and, through her son Obed, the progenitor of Jesus. First He drove Boaz' relative Elimelech, with his family, out of Israel by means of a famine, and led them into Moab, to the very place where Ruth was dwelling. Then, because the father would never have permitted his sons to marry heathen women, God let Elimelech die, whereupon Mahlon married Ruth, making her a relative of Boaz. This justified Boaz later in taking her to wife, since the law of the land was, "If a man die having no children, his brother shall marry his wife, and raise up seed unto his brother."¹¹ Then the brothers were allowed to die, that their wives might be free to marry again and that Naomi, bereft of her entire family, might long for her own people and country. He also sent a time of plenty to the land of Israel, which was a further inducement to Naomi to return. Boaz would eventually have married Ruth anyway, since he was her nearest of kin; but in order to hasten the fulfilment of His plan, the Lord sent her to glean in Boaz' fields and filled the heart of the head-servant with pity for her. He also sent Boaz into the field just at the right moment, that he might see Ruth and question his servant about her.

The second important teaching is that concerning the outward conduct of the Christian. He should be reverent, devout, honorable, chaste in word and deed, and as kind as Boaz was. His works of charity must also be done in love:

So disz ausz liebe nicht geschicht,
Nutzen dir nicht die gaben.

—Poem. p. 119.

The poem closes with a "Vale Mammon," a series of letter-crosses, a joyous avowal of supreme confidence in God, an explanation and proof of the existence of a divine Providence, and an expression of gratitude for the immeasurable mercy of God.

The other transcription, "Das Judicium über Caspar Schwenckfeld's Buch vom Wort Gottes," was written in the

¹¹ Matt. xxii, 24.

year 1642 and has as a background the aforementioned Töning lawsuit against the Anabaptists. Anna Owens felt that the whole process concerned itself only with superficialities, and thought it time to call attention to the "inner word":

Man schreyt und schreibt, man singt und saget,
 Ist alles umbsonst und verloren,
 Verstockt und verstopfft sind die ohren,
 Das mach't der böse will allein,
 Keiner begehrt recht weisz zu seyn;
 Jedermann meynet er sey klug,
 Der Buchstab geb' ihm liechts genug.

—Poem. p. 165.

Schwenckfeld's book (published about 1555) bears on the title page the following inscription: "Vom worte Gottes Das khein ander wort Gottes sei / aigentlich zureden / denn der Sün Gottes Jesus Christus / Bewerung Durch Caspar Schwenckfeld von Ossing." But Anna Owens must introduce her subject with ten letter-crosses and her author with a brief description of his character and sufferings:

Caspar Schwenckfeldius
 Est Sanktus Christianus.
 Caspar Schwenckfeld Ein Seeliger Christ
 Und Zeug der reinen Warheit ist,
 Sein gedecktnüssz bleibt jederfrist,
 Wird nicht gedempfft durch Satans list.

—Poem. p. 162.

He tried to spread abroad the knowledge of the Most High and had on that account much to endure. Satan fought mightily against him; but the Lord was his refuge, and in spite of opposition his writings became known throughout the country.

She apparently had the idea of taking up his book chapter by chapter; but his dogmatic discussions, as well as his invective against his chief opponent, Flacius Illyricus, were too much for her. The argumentative part she therefore omitted entirely, and the rest she abbreviated to suit herself. Chapter II,

“Vom Worte Gottes, von seiner Natur, art vnd aigenschafft,” is disposed of in four lines:

Des waren Wortes Eigenschafft,
Sein lebendige wîrcklich krafft,
Sein wesen her von Ewigkeit,
Wird uns hirin klar angedeut.

—Poem. p. 163.

Chapter III, “Vom vnderscheide des schriftlichen oder mundtlichen worts, vnnd des lebendigmachenden worts Gottes,” is combined with Chapter X, “Das Gottes wort nicht ein stîn noch mundtlich wort, Sonder ein innwendig geistlich wort sei, vnd durch das mundtliche wort alls durch sein zeichen werde eröffnet.” The living word of God is a spirit. It speaks inwardly to the heart, enlightens the understanding and purifies the thoughts and desires of man. The letter of the Scriptures, on the other hand, is only a symbol of the true word. Chapter IV, “Von Illyrici vnd der andern Irrthumb beim schriftlichen vnd mundtlichen worte,” is omitted. Chapter V, “Was das ampt der H. schrift vnnd ihr rechter brauch vnd miszbrauch sei,” is combined with Chapter XIII, “Vom ampte des eusserlichen worts der predigt,” and with Chapter XIV, “Von der heiligen geschrifft, das die h. schrift ein gewiss zeugknus sei.” The Holy Writ is not on any account to be neglected. It was given us as a witness of the inner word, as a teacher, as a comforter, but it can accomplish nothing more:

Der Geist ist Herr, der Buchstab knecht.
So ich des Worts krafft soll gniessen
Musz der Herr selbst mein hertz auffschliessen.

Umsonst ist was man hört und list,
So nicht das Wort inwendig ist.

—Poem. p. 164.

The inner word can effect its purposes without outer means, but the reverse is impossible.

Then follows a glorification of the true word:

Das Wort das uns die Schriftt erkert,
Die Salbung die uns alles lehrt,
Ist die warheit die niemand treugt,
Ein Mund ohn falscheit, der nicht leugt,
Der Schlüssel Davids der auffschleust,
Der Brunn darausz die Weiszheit fleust,
Ein Liecht so das hertz illustrirt:
Der Weg so uns zum Vater führt.

—Poem. p. 164.

Anna Owens disregards entirely the proofs which Caspar Schwenckfeld brings for his doctrine from the Church Fathers, as well as his explanation of various passages in the Bible which his opponents had used against him. His long discourse concerning Justification, in which he defines his position with regard to Osiander and Luther, does not interest her. She turns instead to the life about her. Who regards the true word in these days? The letter of the law is sufficient for most people; and if anyone speaks of the spirit, he is attacked as a heretic, imprisoned or banished. The doctrine of the inner word is too hard for the children of this world. The desire for favor and friendship prevents many from accepting it. The authority of the learned and the persecution accorded to heretics hinder others. They desire worldly honor and glory rather than the pure teaching of God's word. At the close of the poem, in an "oratio" which occurs also in St. MS Fol. 27, she prays for the gift of divine wisdom, for the indwelling of God in her heart, and for the enlightenment of the Holy Spirit.

VIII. OCCASIONAL VERSES.

The only other literary genre of which Anna Owens has made use is the “Gelegenheitsgedicht,” a form which is especially characteristic of the seventeenth century. Everywhere poets sought noble patronage and recognition, in spite of the apparently democratic element in the pastoral poetry of the day. No one of any importance belonging to a princely family could be born, marry, or die, or could celebrate a birthday or a wedding anniversary, without a flood of verses. Neither political nor social events could pass unnoticed. The poets even celebrated the beauties of each other’s work, that they might be furthered in their own literary aspirations, and the flattery was often fulsome to the point of nausea.¹ Scherer says, “diese niedrige Gelegenheitsdichtung suchte das Mäcenatenthum oder kollegialisches Danklob herauszzufordern; sie bettelte um Geld und Ruhm: die vornehmen Gelehrten waren darin nicht besser, als die verachteten Spielleute des Mittelalters.”²

Anna Owens has written only eleven poems which can be classed as occasional verses in the strict sense of the term. The poems directed against the clergy and against the English

¹ Compare Opitz (funeral, wedding, and adulatory—“Genung, o Held, genung! Du Zier und Trost der Zeit,” etc.—poems); Tscherning; Nüsler; Buchner (especially “An Herren Martinum Opitum”); Rist (numerous wedding verses and laments over Opitz and Niebauer, etc.); Simon Dach (funeral and wedding poems, a “Loblied” for Opitz, etc.). Goedeke says (III, p. 345): “Die Reihe der Hofpoeten würde, wenn man die Dichter des Jahrhunderts nach ihrer Thätigkeit in dieser Richtung ordnen wollte, fast so umfassend werden wie das Verzeichnis aller bisher genannten Namen, da seit Opitz kaum ein Dichter Verse schrieb, der nicht auch zum Hofpoeten geworden wäre. Die Kunst, den Dichtern sorglose Musse zu gestatten, um ihre Natur frei herauszubilden, ohne dass sie mit Lob vergelten müssen, war an den Höfen noch unbekannt.”

² Geschichte der deutschen Litteratur, 1885, p. 318.

people were also written for special occasions, but they had another aim in view than that of immortalizing a particular event. None of her verses are in praise of her competitors for the undying laurel wreath. It is possible that she knew very little of the prolific writers of her day, and probable that she did not approve of them, although she cites Opitz, Johann Rist, Paul Nagel and Daniel Sudermann. None of her poems celebrates a birth or a wedding or a death. Three commemorate her escape from grave physical danger. Seven are devoted to her various patrons, but with very little flattery, notwithstanding her entire dependence upon their favor.

The first one concerns the pestilence in Hamburg in 1628 and the shipwreck off Helsingör, which she experienced on her way from Hamburg to Denmark. She had her children with her and was in great anxiety concerning them as well as herself :

Ich schreite zu dir im gebeth,
Mein Hertz für ängsten bebt,
Herr wilst hier, bezahlen mir,
In deinem grim mich töten,
Soll ich nun Nicht mehr dancken dir,
Sprach ich in Meinen Nöthen.

—St. MS 21—6.

From the very house which Anna Owens was occupying, the sick and the dead were carried out, but she and her children were saved. "Not because of any virtue on my part," she says, "did He bring our ship finally to port when others were broken and hopelessly wrecked, but because of His fatherly love toward us."

In 1633 appeared "Peer / Nielsz sin Söhn tho Westerwyck," written in Low German. This poem is the main argument of those who declare that our author went to Sweden in 1632. It purports to be a letter from some one living in Blickhem to Peer Nielszon, Mayor of Vestervik, concerning a half pound of butter which the latter may have, if he will send back the

linen bag in which the butter had been sent the time before. The real purpose of the letter is to recall to Nielszon's mind the protection which he had promised to the person who had sent the butter:

De Wedwen, Weysen un Frembden dwingen,
 Ehnens affnehmen, nist wedder bringen,
 Isz sülckes der Westerwycker wise?
 Gy hebben den Breef mit underschreven
 Den my Hinrich Hanszen hefft gegeven,
 Van wegen des wolgebarnen Herren,
 Dat my nemand schall molesteren.

—Poem. p. 74.

In the next year (1634) occurred the great Nordstrand flood, and this fearful catastrophe made such a deep impression upon Anna Owens that she wrote two songs³ of praise which are outbursts of genuine gratitude for her deliverance. She considers the whole tragedy as a punishment sent by God for the sins of the people:

Alles das, den odem hatt empfangen,
 kom hieher und sehe wasz
 unser Gott hat angerichtet
 wie er Leuth und Vieh vernichtet,
 Weh und Ach, itz ist der grose tag,
 und die Zeit angegangen,
 Drin Er wird vben rach.

—St. MS 12—1.

Then from the period of her sojourn in Sweden we have several poems. One undated, except that it contains a New Year's wish, is a song full of thanksgiving, written apparently in response to Maria Eleonora's gift of Sittwick. The Lord hath cared for me in my poverty and widowhood and bestowed a house upon me "auff Ladgarts landt." Sweden is now my

³ St. MS 12 and 13.

home, and I desire to remain here under the protection of the Swedish crown:

Gott erhalt in Schweden fried, in Schweden mirs behagt,
 Ich bin nun des reisens Müd, Auch alt und wolbetagt,
 Im fried lob ich freuden voll, Sitz geren in Sittwick still,
 So lang bis ich weichen soll, dann weich ich wan Gott will.

—St. MS 48—4.

The poem closes with a supplication for protection for herself and her children, and the assurance that she, too, values truth and peace as the best treasures of any people. She does not forget Schleswig-Holstein, prays daily for her friends there, but prefers to remain in this land where she has freedom from her enemies.

In the poem "Zu Ehren der Schwedischen Cronen," written September 7, 1644, she celebrates the coronation of Christina, reigning sovereign in Sweden from 1644 to 1654:

Grosz-mächtigste Königin
 Fräwlein Hochgeboren
 Durchleuchtigste Grosz-Fürstin,
 Von Gott auszerkoren,
 Zu führen das Regiment
 Im Königreich Excellent.

—Poem. p. 276—1.

Her enthusiasm for Sweden reaches such a height that she can even say:

Kein Königreich ist dir gleich
 In dir ist gut wohnen.

—Poem. p. 276—2.

She prays for the blessings of heaven upon the imperial councillors, who advise her majesty so boldly and wisely, as well as upon the queen herself. Naturally we do not hear anything of the rather bizarre character of this "Sibyl of the North"—nothing of her liking for masculine sports and dress; nothing of her extravagance; nothing of the dissatisfaction aroused by her patronage of talent, irrespective of birth or rank, and by her

intimacy with Calvinists and Jesuits alike; nothing of her change of faith. The tone of reverent respect is kept throughout.

There is one other song of rejoicing dated August 29, 1648, which concerns the safe arrival of Christina and her widowed mother, Maria Eleonora, in Stockholm:

Wie lieblich ist anzuschauen,
Die Gestalt der schönsten Frawen,
Und das Königlich Fräulein
Das von Ihr Maystät geboren,
Und von Gott ist auszerkoren,
Zu regieren die Gemein.

—Poem. p. 279—4.

This is a day of joy and gladness, for we have two queens present with us at the same time:

Ja, Gott sey dafür gepreiset,
Er hat mir viel Gnad beweiset,
Mich als bey der Hand gefürt
Ausz Holstein hierher ohn schaden:
Ich bin von Ihr Fürstlich Gnaden
An Ihr Maystät commendirt.

—Poem. p. 280—7.

Although I have had years of poverty and loneliness in this strange land, yet the mercy of the Lord has watched over me and kept me even to this my sixty-fourth year. May His blessing rest upon the royal household.

Then, when Christina formally resigned all claim to the throne, and Karl Gustavus, Palsgrave of Zweibrücken, was declared her successor, Anna Owens commemorated this event, in 1654, with two poems, one dedicated to the new queen, Hedwig Eleonora, Duchess of Schleswig-Holstein, the other to Karl Gustavus himself. She is especially proud of the fact that the queen is a countrywoman of her own,⁴ and that she now has three royal friends, Maria Eleonora, Christina and Hedwig Eleonora. The hope is expressed that the new queen

⁴ St. MS 44—3.

will treat Maria Eleonora with filial consideration, as if she were her own mother.

In the poem dedicated to Karl Gustavus she avows great confidence that with him a time of prosperity will come to the realm. He will abolish all evil, punish the rebels, protect the devout, feed the poor, the widows and the orphans, for he loves truth and peace:

Er wirds unrecht legen Nieder,
das verfallne bawen wieder
billig preist Man diesen Herrn,
der Mit eignen augen schwet,
Und Nicht leichtlich andern trawet,
wer wolt ihm Nicht dienen gern.

—St. MS 65—9.

Here, too, she mentions her “dearest queen,” Maria Eleonora, and wishes her, as well as the ruling king and queen, long life and happiness. The royal councillors are not forgotten in her prayer that the glory of Sweden may be made known to all the potentates of the earth.

She has two other patrons aside from the royal family, Benjamin Magnus Croneburg and his wife Elizabeth. In their honor she wrote two acrostic hymns. In the first she praises the mercy of Jesus Christ, who saves us from the sins into which we have fallen, and comments upon the transitory pleasures of the world and the certainty of death:⁵

O Mensch betracht, disz Tag und Nacht,
Gedenck am Hinweg scheiden,
So lebestu in guter Ruh,
Kanst leight die Sunde meiden.
Wan du auffstehst, auch schlaffen gehst,
Und liegst in deinem Zimmer,
So sprich bey dir, der Todt steht hier,
Und wartet auff mich immer.

—St. MS 46—17.

⁵ Compare Balthasar Bidembach's hymn, “Der grimmig Todt mit seinem pfeil.” (St. MS 55.)

The hymn dedicated to Elizabeth Krusbiörn is a mournful lament over the sorrows and anxieties and weaknesses to which the flesh is heir, and an earnest supplication to Christ for His mercy and help:

Bin ich doch dein, du hast mich ja geschaffen,
Darumb wirstu auch zu hart nit straffen,
Das liebe Creutz wirt mir zu schwer nit werden,
Leidlich und zeitlich sind all' Ding auff Erden.

—St. MS 47—6.

IX. STYLE.

What impresses the reader at first sight as the most characteristic element of Anna Owens' style is not the superabundant use of Biblical quotation and allusion, which one finds as a matter of course in writings of a religious character, but the "volkstümliche" element, especially the repeated recurrence of the proverb, reminding one of the writings of Hans Sachs¹ or of Fischart. Sometimes proverbs and adages are introduced in the midst of the most serious religious discourse:

Darumb mein kindt sieh dich wol für
Das diese drey nicht schaden dir,
So du wirst diese übermannen
Jagst auch all andern leicht von dannen,
.
Dann wann die Obersten erschlagen,
Sind die Soldaten leicht zu jagen,
Darumb von aller Eitelheit
Wende dein augen ab bey zeit.

—Poem. p. 21.

Sometimes they interrupt the fervent feeling of a spiritual song:

Sein Wort hat er euch kundt gemacht,
worumb wolt ihr nicht hören.
Man schreibt euch, ja man Singt und sagt,
verstopfft sind euwer Ohren,
Darum weil ihr wolt hören Nicht,
So müst Ihr fühlen wie man spricht,
Und folgen euwern Thoren.

—St. MS 19—3.

¹ Compare Charles Hart Handschin, *Das Sprichwort bei Hans Sachs*, 1902.

The learned poetizers of the day did not countenance this phraseology, taken directly from the lips of the people. They considered it unrefined and vulgar; but the aristocratic mistress of Hoyersworth loved the piquancy of thought so often contained in the vigorous, pointed, even uncouth expressions which she learned from her beloved countrymen. Especially in the verses directed against the clergy, she used the proverbs with a bitter sarcasm which reveals intense feeling and earnestness:

Dann Predigt wieder Herr Johann,
 Da hat das Weib den rechten Mann.
 Der topff sein'n Deckel funden,
 Sein rechte Schäflein auch der hirt,
 Sehr liebe Gåst' sind, da der Wirt
 Mit ligt oben und unden.

So soll mann der Gemein, vorstehn,
 Lassen den Bock im garten gehn,
 Die Reben auffzubinden,
 Die Butter ist verwahret fein,
 Wenn die Katzen ihre hüter seyn.

—Poem. p. 64.

Although she makes more generous use of this form of seasoning in her "clerical verses," her other writings are not entirely free from it:

Traw wol und glaube leicht, die beid
 Machen auch oftmals hertzenleid.

—Poem. p. 267.

Wer sich an alten Kesseln reibt,
 Gern streitt mit alten Frawen,
 Derselb nicht unbesudelt bleibt,
 Das sag ich euch in trawen.

—Poem. p. 274.

But not only with homely adages did our author adorn her energetic, rather violent tirades against the evil-doer. She

showed in other ways that she was not averse to strong expressions and unaesthetic figures of speech:

Nichts so verdrieszlich und beschwerlich,
Als die schändtliche wollust ist,
Ich gleich sie dem Kuhkoth und mist,
Den Fladen die in Felde ligen.

—Poem. p. 24.

Münchesche dreckpatzen.

—Poem. p. 189.

Gabst stanck für danck, dasz dich Gott schänd!

• • • • •
Weh' dir und auch dem krummen
Cromwel, des Fairfax spiesz gesell!
Der Hencker zieh' euch ab das fell.

—Poem. p. 267.

These quotations are hardly what one would expect from a lady's pen, nor was this the fashionable tone of the day. On the contrary, Anna Owens' contemporaries must be aesthetic at any price, and bombastic oratory was preferred to vigorous strength; but she did not concern herself about such standards of taste. The social polish which had come with the foreign influences of the seventeenth century had not affected her. She remained a worthy associate of the satirists of the previous century.

She did not adorn her rhymes with many metaphors, similes, or decorative epithets. Her feeling for nature is almost entirely undeveloped. Her feeling for color and form, if she had any, is never expressed. The strict simplicity of her style has something almost childish about it. But there are two figures of speech which she used to excess—the exclamation and the rhetorical question. These, too, are the elements which one finds in the old-wives' tales and in the stories of the glee-men. A learned poetess is certainly not to be found in these verses,

although Anna Owens was neither uneducated nor inexperienced. Sometimes she answers her questions herself:

Meint ihr dasz das recht weiszheit sey,
Wann man viel sprachen lernet frey,
Griechsch und Latein kan schwatzten?
Nein lieben leut, das fehlet weit.

—Poem. p. 51.

Sometimes they contain the keenest sarcasm:

Hat auch des nachts wol bey der leucht
Nicht geschont seiner augen,
Man sichts sie sind ihm itzt noch feucht,
Solt Er dennoch nicht taugen?
Ohn zweiffel ja, wer sagt das nicht?

—Poem. p. 69.

Sometimes she heaps them up in her wrath and indignation until they fairly tumble over each other:

Wie oft bist wol zur Kirchen gangen?
Sag was hastu für nutz empfangen?
Welcher Pfaff sagt vom innern wort?
Hast von der Salbung auch gehort?
Von der Tauff mit dem Geist und fewr?
Wie ist doch diese Lehr so theur?

—Poem. p. 34.

These groups of rhetorical questions, as well as single ones, occur repeatedly and are a favorite method of expressing any strong emotion which quickens the tempo of the lines.

The exclamations are almost as frequent, at times expressing awe and adoration,² or fervent longing;³ at times, anger,⁴ or sorrow.⁵ Sometimes they express a desire for the reformation of those about her,⁶ or admonition and warning.⁷

However, Anna Owens did not conceal her learning entirely. She made frequent use of foreign words and occasionally of

² Poem. p. 13.

³ Poem. p. 22.

⁴ Poem. pp. 148, 269.

⁵ Poem. p. 235.

⁶ Poem. pp. 64, 120.

⁷ Poem. p. 182.

Latin phrases. The phrases occur principally in the poems against the clergy, and in the verses dedicated to her five children:

Sprechen, er habs vollendet:
 In dem wort, Consummatum est.
 —Poem. p. 58.

In summa seyt erbawlich allen.
 —Poem. p. 138.

Cavete vobis, spricht der Herr.
 —Poem. p. 170.

Dominus sustentavit me
 Der Herr hat mich erhalten.
 —Poem. p. 144.

They occur also frequently in letter-crosses:

M	
M	
D	Miserere Mei Domine
M M D F D M M	Fili Dei Miserere Mei.
D	—St. MS Fol. 26.
M	
M	

Foreign words⁸ appear in almost all her poems, although they are of course not so numerous in the hymns as in the other verses:

Geistlich Gespräch: exempl, Prophet, Apostel, pur, vocation, Phantast, Enthusiast, Evangelist, etc.

Posaunenschall: Praesenten, Regiment, Tyranny, Scepter, Trompetten, Muszquetten, Cardinal, N. B. (nota bene), Pax, Charitas, Excellent, Concordia, Justitia, Pietas, Scientz, Fides, Spes, Veritas, Prophet, Creatur, pur, propheceyt, Luna, Scorpion, Ira, solarisch, Solis, Humilitas, Mars, Affekten, reverentz, Salvator, Glori, gebenedeyt, etc.

⁸ Compare Klara Hechtenberg Collitz, *Fremdwörterbuch des siebzehnten Jahrhunderts*, Berlin, 1904.

She even displays her erudition by making occasional reference to the old mythology, very occasional to be sure, but that she mentions this world of classical learning in such religious poems at all is worthy of notice:

Deucalion und Pirra beid
Haben viel Steinen Hertzen
Gelassen nach zu dieser zeit.

—Poem. p. 121.

Der Dreyköppige Hund der Hellen,
Kans lassen nicht, muss sie anbellen.

—Poem. p. 166.

Of the influence which her mystical teachers had upon her style we have already spoken in the chapter devoted to her religious point of view. The phraseology of the mystics is everywhere apparent, not only in the hymns but in her other writings as well: the anointing,⁹ the key of David,¹⁰ the new birth,¹¹ the inner word,¹² the effacement of self.¹³ All these expressions occur repeatedly in the writings of Schwenckfeld, Joris, Weigel and Teting.

The part which Luther's translation of the Bible plays in her poems is also very conspicuous. She seems to have known the Scriptures as thoroughly as any theologian, and to have been so imbued with their language that at times she adopted their phraseology unconsciously:

lasz fahren die fleischliche lüst
fleuch die Wercke der finsternüsz,
Der tag gar Nah verhanden ist,
Darin man rechnung geben musz
Von Worten und von Wercken,
Disz woll ein Jeder Mercken.

—Breitenburg MS Fol. 2.

⁹ Poem. p. 28.

¹⁰ Poem. p. 28.

¹¹ Poem. p. 33.

¹² Poem. p. 34.

¹³ Poem. p. 82.

At other times she herself acknowledges the source of her quotation and occasionally even gives the chapter and verse.

Ein guter Baum bringt gute Frucht,
Ein fauler arge, Christus spricht.

—Poem. p. 32.

Wol dem der mit dem Job einstimbt,
Spricht in gedult: Gott gibt, Gott nimbt.

—Poem. p. 82.

Disz sagt die Schrifft die noch mussz werden erfüllet.
Jerem. 5. vers. 25. cap. 6. vers. 7 &c. &c.

—Poem. p. 175.

She knew the Old Testament as well as the New, but there are some passages which appealed especially to her. The parable of the ten virgins, five of whom were wise and five foolish,¹⁴ occurs most frequently.¹⁵ The marriage supper of the Lamb, as told in Revelation xix, 7-9,¹⁶ and the parable of the great supper¹⁷ are also favorite themes.¹⁸ The advent of Christ, His revenge upon His enemies, the binding of the dragon, and the establishment of an era of peace upon the earth are frequently dwelt upon.¹⁹ The figure of the straight and narrow way which leadeth unto life, and the broad way which leadeth to destruction;²⁰ of the good tree which bringeth forth good fruit, and the corrupt tree which bringeth forth evil fruit;²¹ of spiritual blindness, and of the blind leaders of the blind;²² of the Christian's armor;²³ of the Word which was in the beginning,²⁴ she uses again and again. She refers also with special pleasure

¹⁴ Matt. xxv, 1-13.

¹⁵ Poem. p. 205; St. MS 1-5, 6; 6-3; 7-5; 12-12; 15-7; 39-2.

¹⁶ Poem. pp. 181, 182, 187, 194, 211, 216, 220, 223, 224, 225.

¹⁷ Luke xiv, 15-24.

¹⁸ Poem. pp. 28, 194; St. MS 1-4, 6-6, 14-9.

¹⁹ Poem. pp. 60, 65, 72, 175, 176, 177, 193, 194, 195, 196, 211, 221, 222, 226, 229, 241, 271; St. MS 12-5, 7; 13-5; 15-6, 14; 31-8, 15; 40-5; 46-21.

²⁰ Matt. vii, 13-14; Poem. pp. 16, 38, 165, 166, 199; St. MS 7-2, 3; 16-6; 18-5; 42-2; 45-8, 14; 46-6.

²¹ Matt. vii, 16-20; Poem. pp. 31, 32, 46, 173.

²² Matt. xv, 14; Poem. pp. 44, 68; St. MS 1-1; 19-4, 8; 57-1.

²³ Eph. vi, 13-17; Poem. pp. 19, 134; St. MS Fol. 45-13.

²⁴ Joh. 1, 1; Poem. pp. 13, 157, 161, 164.

to the story of Christ's driving the money-changers out of the temple,²⁵ and to his direction to Simon Peter, "Feed my sheep."²⁶ She had her favorite texts, too: "But the very hairs of your head are all numbered";²⁷ "Ask and it shall be given you; seek and ye shall find; knock, and it shall be opened unto you";²⁸ "Thou shalt dash them in pieces as a potter's vessel";²⁹ etc. From these references we can see that she had studied the Holy Writ "from her youth up."

When one comes, however, to consider Anna Owens' use of figurative language, which by her contemporaries was carried to such excess, the poverty of her imagination is at once apparent. The similes are the most numerous; but they, too, are often taken from the Scriptures:

Das zeitlich hie
Fleucht hin wie staub,
Felt ab wie Laub.

—Poem. p. 123

Geldt und Welt-Freund vertrawen,
Ist wie auff sandich grund,
Ein hohes Schlosz zu bawen.

—Poem. p. 294.

Here, too, she inclines to the vigorous at the expense of the aesthetic:

Ich gleich sie [wollust] dem Kuhkoth und mist
Den Fladen die im Felde ligen,
Bey Sommers zeit, darin die Fligen
Heuffig herumb spatziren gehn.

Eben also sind die dreck Gecken,
Die sich mit dollust koth beflecken.

—Poem. p. 24.

²⁵ Mark xi, 15-17; Poem. p. 167; St. MS 13—3, 15—13.

²⁶ Joh. xxi, 15-17; Poem. pp. 53, 64, 65, 67, 266.

²⁷ Matt. x, 30; Poem. pp. 83, 112, 127.

²⁸ Matt. vii, 7; Poem. p. 38; St. MS 7—2, 19—9, 31—7.

²⁹ Psalm 2, 9; Poem. pp. 158, 214; St. MS 13—4, 15—3.

Ubel wirds euch bekommen,
Ja eben wie dem Hund das grasz.

—Poem. p. 270.

The metaphors also are very often Biblical. Nevertheless, one finds here and there a figure carried out at some length and with a certain degree of originality. In the poem “Kumpt her zu schawen” (St. MS 41), the frivolous maidens are the owls adorned with fine feathers, the snares which capture the cuckoos, the traps which Satan sets to catch the finches. In “Geistlich Gespräch” (Poem. p. 24), the same idea with slight variations is used again:

Was ist wollust, die viel verblendt?
Ein dollust man sie billig nennt,
Ein überzukert tödtlich speise
Damit Satan fangt seine meuse,
Das allerhöchste gifft der Welt,
Ein Netz das er sein'n Vögeln stellt,
Ein garn und strick das er fürhangt,
Darin leichtfertig hertzen fangt.

One finds only occasional examples of personification:

.... wann *Hans Mors* anklopffet,
Von Hoff und Hausz, Treibt er sie ausz.
—St. MS 46—15.

Her style is, on the whole, very direct and terse; but there are some repetitions, especially in “Geistlich Gespräch”:

Im hertzen dasz noch krencket mich
Was ist es doch das dich thut krencken?
Disz ist es das mich krenckt so sehr.
—Poem. p. 6.

Wie nimpt der Vatr ihn an so gern

 Sieh wie freundlich Er ihn annimpt

 Ist bereit wann wir noch sind weit,
 Uns anzunehmn

—Poem. p. 12.

She is also sometimes at loss to fill out the lines, and resorts to phrases such as: das ist gewisz; wie ihr wisst; Ihr werdets sehen. Or she is guilty of tautology: die toten leichen;³⁰ in reiner Keuschheit.³¹ There is even one example of circumlocution:

Genug vorrath zu zehren hat,
 Vier tag' nach übermorgen.

—Poem. p. 64.

Our author is also sometimes tempted to display her wit in puns:

Wie schwer es sey dasz Reiche Leut,
 Ins Reich der Himmel gehen.

—Poem. p. 121.

Or she makes use of an ingenious repetition of words:

Recht Richtet unser Held.

—Poem. p. 227.

O ihr Menschliche Teuffel!
 Teuffelsche Menschen.

—Poem. p. 226.

She is also fond of stringing series of nouns or verbs together, not disposed in order of climax and yet giving a certain impression of gradation:

Brütet aus zorn, miszgunst, rachgir,
 Streit, neid und laster mehr ohn zahl.

—Poem. p. 20.

³⁰ St. MS 21—5.

³¹ St. MS Fol. 45—6.

Der Herr wird seyn dein liecht und Heil,
 Deins lebens krafft, dein gutes theil,
 Dein schilt, dein schutz, fried, freud, und ruh.

—Poem. p. 23.

Sometimes she arranges her words antithetically:

Süsز oder saur, grosz oder klein.

—Poem. p. 54.

Denn reichthumb, armut, glück und fall,
 Der Todt und auch das leben,
 Kompt uns von Gott her alzumal.

—Poem. p. 113.

It is remarkable how little sense of color she has. Although she contemplates with much affection the splendor of the great feasts of the New Testament and refers again and again to the Bridegroom and His Bride, the descriptions are very meagre:

Macht euch bereit,
 Man wird sie heut,
 Ihrem Breut'gamb zufuhren;
 Sie ist geschmückt
 Ihr kleid gestickt,
 Mit Gold und reiner Seiden.

—Poem. p. 187.

Her feeling for nature is also undeveloped. Indeed, she does not mention the world about her at all, except where she summons the winds and the clouds, the sea, the mountains, the trees, the birds, beasts and fishes to help her in praising the Lord. The phraseology reminds us at once of the 148th Psalm.

Her style is vigorous, direct, forceful, but lacks all graceful turns of expression as well as all poetic imagination. Her verses reveal an eminently didactic mind and, as she herself says, her sole purpose was to teach and to preach.

When one comes to consider the individual words, one finds here, too, some characteristic features.

Her use of compounds is on the whole not particularly original, but there are some combinations worthy of notice: Zornfeur, Freudenwein, Teuffels-Radlein-führer, Letterknecht, Titultrager, Frommenplager, Warheitverklager, Lediggånger, Schalcksnarren, Dreckpatzen, Truncken-trincken, Creutz-dor-nen, Pfaffen-teuffel, Trånen-brot, End-ursache, Dreck gecken, Dollust-koth, Schrift-verkehrer, Pfaffenschalck, Seelen-würger, Finsterfischer, Schulfuchserey, Sünden-mist, etc.

In her use of diminutives she is, as one might expect, very sparing. The sweetly emotional "Jesulein" tone, which is so audible in many of the writings of the sectaries, is entirely unknown to her. On the contrary, the diminutives in her verses are often very sarcastic:

Kompt her zu schawen, unser Jungfrauen,

Und Tochterlein

Seht doch, wie lieblich

Seindt diese Thierlein an zu sehnn.

—St. MS 41—1.

Ihr Euglein funcklen, lieblich in Dunkeln.

—St. MS 41—7.

Das Keützen ist schon abgericht

Zu fangen diesen Armen Wicht.

—St. MS 41—8.

Im langen Priesterlichen kleid,

Haben ein grosz ansehen:

Wann sie in ihrer Ehrbarkeit,

Da auff dem Höltzlein stehn.

—Poem. p. 69.

As we have already remarked, the descriptive epithets are usually scarce; but where they occur there is apparent a distinct inclination toward those formed with the suffixes -lich and -ig, as well as toward adverbs formed in the same way: leichtlich, künstlich, lieblich, manierlich, zierlich, jämmerlich, väterlich, männlich, trewlich, beständiglich, freventlich, priesterlich, unsterblich, hertzlich, sundlich, innerlich, tröstlich, etc.

The verbs formed with -iren are also used with particular pleasure, and show an innocent delight in the display of Latin learning: regiren, passiren, studiren, promoviren, vociren, vexiren, agiren, ordiniren, examiniren, illustriren, glossiren, allegiren, disputiren, arguiren, etc.

RÉSUMÉ.

Anna Owena Hoyers is essentially a didactic poet. In whatever literary form she strove to clothe her thought, the moral appeared as an unavoidable appendage. Even in the hymns and transcriptions, as well as in the directly didactic poems, her aim in writing was to instruct and correct. The satires also are fundamentally didactic, for they result from the fact that her teaching often failed to produce the desired effect, in which case she resorted to sarcasm and bitter denunciation, always adding the advice to the sinners whom she attacked to better their ways before it was too late.

Of real lyrical feeling she has given little sign except in the religious songs and in some of the occasional verses. There are no love lyrics at all among her poems. To be sure, the real German lyric had not yet been born. Spee and Fleming were the first of the lyric poets who were destined to be the precursors of Günther, Haller and Hagedorn. The lyric feeling of the time was embodied in the church-hymn and the folksong; but Anna Owens has nothing new to tell us in the one literary genre, and, although knowing and loving the other, she remained uninfluenced by it.

Neither was she in the least affected by the literary movements of the time. The literary societies, the Italian influence, the court atmosphere did not touch her. Although a contemporary of Opitz, she still belonged, in the form, style and subject-matter of her poems, to the robust and masculine sixteenth century. There she would not have been an unusual figure, with her vigorous, uncouth expressions and straightforward manner of expressing herself; but among the smooth,

skilful, adulatory verse-makers of her day she seems distinctly out of place.

She made use of but two sources for her work. The Bible, as we have seen, had the most pronounced influence upon her language and style. Every line of her writings is colored by its phraseology, and almost the only poetical figures which she uses are taken from its pages. On the other hand, conditions around her furnished her with material for her verses. The close connection between her own personal experience and her literary efforts accounts very easily for the characteristically emphatic and impressive tone of the latter. The thoughts which she has presented are real and vital, and the half-archaic garb in which they come to us does not detract from their power.

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
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
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
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